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ABSTRACT 
THE ROLE OF PRE-1945 NATIONAL AND CATHOLIC MYTHS IN 
TRANSFORMING AN ILLIBERAL POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE 
INTO A LIBERAL POLITICAL CULTURE OF OPPOSITION UNDER 
COMMUNISM 
The thesis, in exploring how and why illiberal pre-1945 Polish nationalism and 
political Catholicism were synthesised into a post-1945 liberal political culture of 
opposition under communism, argues that this process was much aided by 
universal myths. The thesis shows how these myths enable political culture to be 
transmitted over time and to be adapted to take on different values and yet retain 
legitimacy. In so doing, the research may contribute insights into how the political 
cultures of other Central East European countries were similarly transformed. 
Chapter 1 argues that the social anthropological literature on myths provides a 
theoretical framework to better understand the nature of political culture, its 
dynamics and its relationship with the process of democratisation. Chapter 2 maps 
the pre-1945 territory of nationalist and political Catholic illiberal and liberal 
discourse as reflected in the genesis and meanings of key myths. Chapter 3, in 
exploring how pre-1945 myths were deployed in 1945-1989 Poland, illuminates 
the relationship of myths with the dynamics of political culture and 
democratisation. Chapter 4 explores the 1970-1976 process of dialogue between 
liberal-leaning dissident Catholic and secular left Polish intelligentsia. The chapter 
sheds light upon the emergence of a liberal political culture of opposition and 
argues that the dialogue went beyond expediency. Chapter 5, in demonstrating 
how and why John Paul II deployed pre-1945 myths, argues that the Pope's 
preachings found practical expression in the formation of Solidarity. Chapter 6 in 
exploring the role of pre-1945 myths in influencing Solidarity, argues that these 
myths acted as vehicles for the union's liberal political culture. Finally Chapter 7 
draws together the conclusions of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF MYTHS OF 
NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL CATHOLICISM IN 
TRANSFORMING POLITICAL CULTURE 
1.1 The Liberalisation Of Polish Nationalism And Political 
Catholicism 
The main aim of the research is to seek a better understanding of a 
political paradox concerning Poland that until 1989 had experienced 
less than eight years of democratic rule. 1 The paradox relates to how 
and why Polish nationalism and political Catholicism, despite their 
illiberal pasts, were synthesised into a post-1945 liberal political 
culture of opposition supportive of democratisation. This post-1945 
political culture of opposition, the research argues, found eventual 
expression in a liberal Solidarity that was much shaped by pre-1945 
myths and their accompanying symbols and rituals as deployed by an 
increasingly liberal nationalism and liberal political Catholicism. 2 
Part 1 of the thesis argues that during the first half of the 20th century 
Polish political culture was much influenced by an illiberal Polish 
nationalism and political Catholicism. The main source of illiberalism 
within Polish nationalism was the social Darwinism of Roman 
Dmowski (1864-1939). The resulting illiberal nationalism was in tune 
with other European illiberal nationalisms of the time and expressed 
itself partly in terms of a conspiratorial enemy mythology, deployed 
1 From 1918-1926. 
2 These terms will be defined later in this chapter. 
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mainly against Jews and communists. 3 The Polish Church hierarchy 
adopted the same mythology, in tune with both the prevailing illiberal 
Polish nationalism and illiberal papal political Catholicism. 
However, Part 1 argues, there were also liberal strands of pre-1945 
Polish nationalism. Liberal nationalism came to the fore during 
Poland's brief Enlightenment (c. 1770-1790s), during her romantic 
period (c. 1820-1860s), her positivist period (c. 1865-1890s), and 
during her neo-romantic period (c. 1890-1918), when it competed 
with the aforementioned illiberal nationalism. Part 1 contends that the 
Enlightenment and positivist periods shaped a realistic nationalism, 
while the romantic and neo-romantic periods shaped an idealistic 
nationalism, and that both realistic and idealistic nationalisms had 
liberal and illiberal aspects. The romantic poetry of the lay political 
Catholic intelligentsia furthered the cause of liberal idealistic 
nationalism by propagating myths that served as vehicles for liberal 
values. These myths redefined the pre-1780s myths of state- and 
nation-building that had portrayed political Catholicism primarily as 
defender of the state. The romantic myths now portrayed political 
Catholicism as defender of the liberal nation and of liberal values. The 
neo-romantic revival ensured that the romantic myths were not 
forgotten. The romantic and neo-romantic myths appropriated liberal 
contributions of the Enlightenment and positivist periods respectively. 
3 The cause of liberal nationalism was not helped by the expansionist aspects of 
Pilsudski's nationalism, by Pilsudski's 1926 coup d 'etas, or by many of the 
Pilsudski camp increasingly adopting, after his death in 1935, the prevailing 
conspiratorial enemy mythology. 
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Part 2 argues that the post-1945 nationalism of opposition, shaped in 
large part by an increasingly liberal political Catholicism, gradually 
became more liberal. It did so by discarding its German and Jewish 
enemy myths and significantly altering the meanings attached to its 
communist and Russian/Soviet enemy myths, to make clear that it was 
opposing political systems rather than engendering a hatred of groups 
of people. Part 2 also contends that although the nationalism of 
opposition retained its myths of military valour, their purpose now 
was no longer to mobilise for a violent insurrection. Rather, they were 
retained to remind those in power that if Poland were reoccupied by 
the Soviets, the opposition would reluctantly revert to the physical 
force tradition of idealistic nationalism. Part 2 further argues that the 
main Polish propagators of the liberal papal political Catholicism that 
emerged in the 1960s were members of the lay Catholic intelligentsia 
movement Znak and Pope John Paul II (1978 - ). The 1970s' coming 
together of the Znak and democratic secular left intelligentsia and their 
subsequent advisory role within Solidarity did much to embed a 
liberal political culture of opposition. However, there was another 
`embedding factor', equally important. That factor was the 
increasingly liberal values fostered by the pre-1945 myths, symbols 
and rituals of nationalism and political Catholicism deployed by 
ostentatious political Catholicism 4 and in particular by John Paul II. 
John Paul II, in preaching a liberal political culture, was able, via his 
4 Ostentatious political Catholicism to some degree distinguished Catholicism 
from Protestantism by giving prominence to the veneration of various cults, saints 
and the Virgin Mary and to participation in such rituals as theatrical pilgrimages, 
Marian processions and mass rallies. The papal beatification and canonisation 
processes were particularly suited to creating and fostering myths, symbols and 
rituals. 
10 
deployment of myths, symbols and rituals, to synthesise liberal 
features of idealistic and realistic nationalism. 
The thesis may contribute important insights into how the 
nationalisms and religions of other Central East European (CEE) 
countries, 5 despite also having illiberal pasts, were synthesised into 
post-1945 liberal political cultures of opposition supportive of 
democratisation. Until 1989, the other CEE countries also had 
experienced little liberal democratic rule and their religions were also 
predominantly directed from Rome. 6 The myths of Polish 
nationalism and Catholicism are in essence universal ones, but strike a 
particular resonance within the CEE region and within CEE post-1945 
oppositions deprived of alternative vehicles for expressing their 
political culture. The region's nationalisms and religions also in part 
shaped the pre-1945 political cultures of these other CEE countries 
and their pre-1945 legacies also had to adapt to new post-1945 
communist political cultures directed from Moscow. 
In exploring its main aim, other secondary research implications 
became apparent that relate to Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism. The research reveals how and why an overt and 
5 The CEE countries are taken to be Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany, that is to say countries that were part of the 1945-1989 East European 
communist bloc. 
6 Roman Catholicism was and remains the major religion of the CEE region. 
Estimates of the percentage of the population that were Roman Catholic at about 
the time of the demise of communism are: Poland 95%; Hungary 54%; 
Czechoslovakia 65%; and East Germany 6%. (Sword 1990: 110,92,54, & 72). 
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enduring 1945-1989 illiberal national non-communism, 7 rooted in 
aspects of pre-1945 illiberal political culture and its associated enemy 
mythology, was propagated by influential factions of the Party-State. 
1.2 Nationalism And Political Catholicism: Illiberal Or Liberal 
Political Forces? 
Given the research concerns with illiberal and liberal nationalism and 
political Catholicism, the nationalism and political Catholicism 
literatures were explored with a view to better understanding the 
liberal and illiberal facets of their CEE manifestations and to construct 
a typology relevant to the concerns of the research. 
1.2.1 The Nature of CEE Nationalism 
The nationalism literature exploration revealed consideration of two 
related issues that pertain, directly and indirectly, to the concerns of 
the research. These issues may be summarised by the following two 
questions. Is CEE nationalism an inherently illiberal force? Are the 
roots of nationalism more related to culture/ethnicity/language or to 
7 National non-communism is so termed because of its disavowal of communism 
in two key ways. One way was to downplay its ties with communism and the 
Soviet Union. The other way was to deploy the pre-1945 illiberal nationalism of 
Dmowski. As Chapter 3 will show national non-communism was increasingly 
deployed in the Party-State's war of political legitimacy with the opposition as 
other forms of legitimation proved ineffective. Accordingly, the research 
necessitates a reinterpretation of Polish regime nationalism, and possibly of other 
CEE regime nationalisms, as depicted solely by national communism. The `Party' 
is used here and elsewhere as shorthand for the ruling communist party, which 
from 1948 was the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). (The Polish 
abbreviations will be given after the names of Polish bodies/organisations). The 
two key bodies of the Party leadership that effectively ruled Poland were the 
Politburo and the Secretariat. 
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the role of the state and the concept of citizenship? This second 
question relates to the first insofar as some of the writers - [for 
example Plamenatz (1973/1976) 8 and Sugar (1995a)] who compare 
Western with Eastern nationalism - imply, or directly argue, that 
Eastern nationalism is rooted more in culture/ethnicity/language. 
These roots, they contend, tend to make Eastern nationalism illiberal. 9 
The observation of Anderson (1983/1991: 141), writing of the 20th 
century, has much relevance, as other chapters will argue, to aspects 
of 19th and 20th liberal strands of Polish idealistic nationalism. 
"In an age when it is so common for progressive, cosmopolitan 
intellectuals 
... to insist on the near-pathological character of 
nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its 
affinities with racism, it is useful to remind ourselves that nations 
inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love. The 
cultural products of nationalism - poetry, prose fiction, music, 
plastic arts - show this love very clearly. " 
In 1907, the German historian Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954) 
characterised two types of nation, the Staatnation and Kulturnation. 10 
Most who subsequently compared Western nations/nationalism with 
8 The first date of publication together with the date, if different, of the actual 
publication consulted , 
is given in this chapter. Subsequent chapters give only the 
date of the publication consulted. First dates of publication are also given in the 
Bibliography. 
9 It will be seen later in this chapter that the definition of liberal nationalism 
adopted encompasses many of the features of Western nationalism, and that the 
definition of illiberal nationalism adopted encompasses some of the features of 
Eastern nationalism, as they are depicted here. 
10 In Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat. Studien zur Genesis des deutschen 
Nationalstaats. An English version was published as Cosmopolitanism and the 
National State. Princeton University: Princeton, New Jersey. 1970. 
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Eastern nations/nationalism, for example, Kohn (1944/1967), Sugar 
(1967/1971b), Plamenatz (1973/1976), Rady (1993), Shelton (1995), 
Smith (1995/1996a), and Vincent (1997), portray a somewhat over- 
simplified bi-polar model. Different aspects were emphasised by 
different writers in their bi-polar models. Kohn (1944/1967), 
Plamenatz (1973/1976) and Vincent (1997: 277-278) identify Western 
and Eastern nationalisms, although Hans Kohn (1891-1971) also 
depicts a CEE nationalism within his Eastern nationalism category. 
Sugar (1967/1971b), Rady (1993), and Smith (1995/1996a) 
differentiated between a Western nationalism and an Eastern 
European nationalism. Holy (1996: 49) juxtaposes a French political 
model of the nation with that of a linguistic and cultural one, based on 
the ideas of the French political thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712- 
1778) and the German philosopher Johann Herder (1744-1803). 
Kohn (1944/1967: 329) asserts that the emerging CEE nationalism 
first found expression in the cultural field. Rady (1993) and Smith 
(1995/1996a: 362-363) see the roots of Eastern European nationalism 
as based on ethnicity and language. Kohn (1944/1967: 330) and Sugar 
(1967/1971b: 10) contrast the genesis of Western nationalism based 
on an effort to build a nation in the political reality and struggles of 
the present with an Eastern European nationalism tied to the past. For 
Kohn (1944/1967: 329-331), because of the `backward state' of 
political and social development, early CEE nationalism was 
"the dream and hope of scholars and poets. ... Each new 
nationalism ... extolled the primitive and ancient 
depth and 
peculiarities of its traditions in contrast to Western rationalism 
and to universal standards. ... This new nationalism, not rooted 
in a political and social reality, lacked self-assurance; its 
inferiority complex was often compensated by overemphasis and 
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overconfidence. ... 
The quest for the meaning of ... 
nationalism, the musing about the `soul' or the `mission' of the 
nation ... all that became a characteristic of this new 
form of 
nationalism. " 
For Sugar (1967/1971b: 11) Eastern European nationalism 
"did not tend towards `a consummation in a democratic world 
society', but was `tending towards exclusiveness, ' seeking to find 
a justification, a specific mission for a given group ... When such 
a group ... was willing to include all members of their nationality in their nationalism, eastern European nationalism became 
messianic. Messianism cannot be egalitarian; it claims rights for 
a chosen people, the Volk, not for the individual or the citizen. 
This Volk concept is practically totalitarian. " 
For Sugar (1995a: 417), during the 19th century Eastern European 
nationalism begins to take on aggressive and chauvinistic features, and 
"by the beginning of the twentieth century, the nationalism of all 
nations of Eastern Europe was `integral'. " Apart from this `integral' 
feature, Sugar (1995a: 418-419) asserts that a number of additional 
common features distinguished 20th century East European nationalist 
attributes from those of West Europe. These included: a pessimism 
shaped by a fear that the nation could disappear suddenly and where 
historical benchmarks were tied to military or political defeats; a 
search for self-identification; a search among the peasantry for the 
specific features of their nations; and the lack of coinciding ethnic, 
ethno-nationalistic, linguistic, and political borders. As the Second 
Word War (WWII) approached, East European `super-nationalists' 
everywhere, asserted Sugar (1995a: 422) 
"needed a moral code to buttress their arguments and turned to 
religious bigotry, which had the added usefulness of excluding 
Jews from their nations..... A good Pole had to be a Catholic... . 
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This supposedly religious morality also justified the hostility 
towards atheistic Marxism-communism. " 
For Plamenatz (1973/1976: 33-35) Eastern nationalism was one 
"of peoples recently drawn into civilisation hitherto alien to 
them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success 
and excellence ... This is the nationalism ... of peoples who 
come to be called `backward'. ... This `eastern' nationalism (is) 
... 
both imitative and hostile to the models it imitates, and is apt 
to be illiberal. ... Eastern nationalism is disturbed and 
ambivalent. " 
For Rady (1993) the construction of East European national identities 
were `narrow in their definition' and `incapable of accommodation'. 
For Shelton (1995: 263), East European nationalism was combatively 
chauvinistic, furtively or openly xenophobic and possessing feelings 
of insecurity. For Vincent (1997: 277), "it is Eastern nationalism 
which has given nationalism a bad press in the twentieth century. " 11 
The First World War (WWI) defeat of the Axis powers and the 
Bolshevik 1917 Revolution heralded the collapse of the Austro- 
Hungarian, German and Russian multi-national empires and resulted, 
in part thanks to President Wilson's belief in nation-states and national 
11 Reinforcing the illiberal image of East European nationalism is the image 
presented of Herder. Herder, often described as the `father of cultural 
nationalism', who influenced Polish romantic idealist nationalism, has, as Daniel 
Chirot points out, been unfairly portrayed as an ultra-nationalist, hostile to 
Learning and Reason. Herder, claims Chirot (1996: 6), was also demonised for 
anti-Semitism and as responsible for a kind of nationalistic particularlism that has 
led to bitter national conflicts, not least those of the 20th century. Chirot gives as 
an example, Paul Rose's German Question/Jewish Question: Revolutionary Anti- 
Semitism from Kant to Wagner. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1990,97- 
109. The philosopher and historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) argued that 
Herder and cultural nationalism had been misunderstood in the 19th century in the 
West. (See Vico and Herder: Two Studies In the History of Ideas. Hogarth Press: 
London, 1976). 
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self-determination, in a totally transformed post-WWI East European 
map and with the creation of new nation-states. However, Wilson's 
liberal intentions of a new post-WWI world order based on peace and 
justice 12 did not result in liberal nationalisms prevailing within the 
region. Rather it helped fuel new illiberal agendas for East European 
nationalisms. In large part as a result of the Treaties of the 1919-1920 
Paris Peace Conference, Poland regained her independence, Hungary 
lost about two-thirds of her lands and population (Laszlo 1987: 133) 
and Slovakia, which for the last millennium had been under the rule of 
the Hungarian monarchy (Hoensch 1987: 158), became part of a 
newly created independent Czechoslovakia. 
Burgess (1998 Chapter 8) contends that because some forms of 
European nationalism gave rise to the atrocities of WWI and WWII, 
this shaped some Western negative perceptions of nationalism, 
particularly in its CEE forms. Vincent (1997: 277-278) argues that 
fascism shaped the historical context for the distinctions between 
12 In January 1918, Wilson presented his vision in a Fourteen Points address to the 
US Congress with points X and XIII directly relating to Central East Europe. 
"X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we 
wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest 
opportunity to autonomous development.... 
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include 
the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations ... and whose 
political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be 
guaranteed by international covenant. " 
(Source: http: //www. yale. edu/1awweb/avalon/wilsonl4. htm). 
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Eastern and Western nationalism drawn by Kohn and John Plamenatz 
(1912-1975) and others. 13 
Whether Burgess and Vincent's assertions are valid or not, what does 
appear to be clear is that several of those that compare Eastern and 
Western nationalism adopt a simplified bi-polar model. This model 
tends to portray the roots of Eastern nationalism as related more to 
culture/ethnicity/language and Eastern nationalism as tending to be 
illiberal. In contrast the roots of Western nationalism are portrayed to 
be related to the state and concepts of citizenship and Western 
nationalism is seen as tending to be liberal. 
The thesis argues that Polish nationalism does not reflect this over- 
simplified picture. The mismatch arises insofar as Polish nationalism 
also has liberal strands that are underestimated. These liberal strands 
owe their roots in part to Western liberal influences upon the Polish 
Enlightenment and upon Polish positivism, to liberal aspects of 19th 
century Western and Polish romanticism (c. 1820-1860s) and to late 
20th century papal political Catholicism. 
13 Vincent argues that Kohn and Plamenatz had direct or indirect experience of 
the rise of national socialism in Germany and were deeply sensitive to the dangers 
of nationalism. Kohn was born in Prague. A WWI prisoner of war, he was exiled 
to Siberia until 1920. An active Zionist as a student, in the mid-1920s Kohn lived 
in Palestine, but left for the US, where he started teaching in the early 1930s. 
Plamenatz was born in Montenegro and came to England in 1919. It should be 
noted that Kohn locates German nationalism within Eastern European 
nationalism, while Plamenatz locates it within Western nationalism. 
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1.2.2 The Nature of CEE Political Catholicism 
During the 19th century, papal Catholicism was the principal shaper 
of political Catholicism, with national hierarchies throughout the 
Catholic world tending to accept the views emanating from Rome. 
From the end of the 19th century, lay Catholicism made its own 
distinctive contributions to political Catholicism. 14 During the second 
half of the 20th century, some national hierarchies preached a different 
political Catholicism than that emanating from the Vatican. 
In the late 18th and the 19th century, there is little doubt that papal 
political Catholicism was illiberal. It sided with non-democratic 
absolutist governments and, as the evidence of its own promulgation 
clearly shows, was intolerant to other religious, moral and political 
opinions. Papal promulgation revealed anti-Semitism (Benedict XIV 
1751: paras. 2-3) and a condemnation of freedom of conscience 
(Gregory XVI 1832b: para. 15) & (Pius IX 1864: Errors 15,77 & 79). 
It banished to its Index important works expressing the new 
enlightened ideas of such political thinkers as Voltaire (1694-1778), 
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and John Stuart Mill (1806- 
1873). 15 It condemned the emerging late 18th and 19th century liberal 
nationalisms that sought popular sovereignty and/or national self- 
14 Chapter 2 will contend that in the Polish case, via its romantic poets, the 
contribution of lay Catholics to political Catholicism was even earlier. 
15 For example, Voltaire's Lettres philosophiques (1734), Rousseau's Social 
Contract (1762), Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and Mill's Principles of 
Political Economy (1848) were all banned. (Source: http: //www. fordham. edu/ 
halsall /mod/indexlibrorum. html). It should be noted that Rousseau is also seen by 
many as an influence upon romanticism, which is often portrayed as an antidote to 
the Enlightenment. 
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determination, including French, Italian and Polish manifestations. 16 
It also condemned the emerging liberalism and its ideals. (Gregory 
XVI 1832b: paras 14-15) & (Leo XIII 1888: paras. 15 & 34). Its anti- 
communist credentials were long-standing and numerous. (Pius IX 
1846: para. 16), (Pius IX 1849: paras. 18,25 & 32), (Pius IX 1864: 
Part IV) and (Leo XIII 1878: paras. 2& 10). Papal promulgation 
condemned others for their dogmatic certainty yet still believed that 
Roman Catholicism alone possessed the Absolute Truth and, that its 
pope, on occasion, was infallible. (Vatican I 1870: Chapter 4). 
Towards the end of the 19th century, papal political Catholicism was 
less inclined to merely condemn the new liberal impulses. Instead 
papal encyclicals began at least to address some of the liberal issues 
that had dominated the century and to put forward their own 
alternatives. Leo XIII (1891), for example, sought alternative 
solutions to social problems including the poor conditions of the 
working classes. Still wary of the emerging liberal democracy 
however, Leo XIII (1891: paras. 6,31 & 32) sought a third way 
16 For example, the 1789 French Revolution, in part a product of the emerging 
liberal nationalism that sought to establish the Enlightenment ideals of popular 
sovereignty and subordinate the Catholic Church to the state, was denounced by 
Pius VI (1775-1799) in 1791, as unholy. Pius VI also rejected the Revolution's 
1790 Constitution civile du clerge that demanded an oath of fidelity to the state 
from the clergy. In 1848, Pius IX was forced to flee Rome when the Italian 
nationalist Mazzini established a short-lived Roman Republic. Polish nationalism 
was condemned in (Gregory XVI 1832a: para. 1) & (Leo XIII 1894: paras. 4& 
10-12). Following the first attempted Russian Revolution of 1905, Pius X (1903- 
1914) recommended to the Polish Catholics in the Russian Empire in his 
Encyclical Letter Poloniae Populorum that they should `stand on the side of 
order', should not join the Socialist `pernicious sect' and should have no contact 
whatsoever with `parties of crazy people. ' (Stehle 1981: 13). 
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between what he saw as the excesses of liberal democracy and 
communism. As European fascism rose in the 1920s-1930s, papal 
political Catholicism sought an accommodation with it, 17 in part 
attracted by fascism's vehement anti-communism, which it also still 
shared (Pius XI 193 7b). (Pius XI 1931) deals with the relation of civil 
society to the state and proposes (para 95) a fascist-influenced third 
way corporatist model. During WWII, Pius XII failed to denounce 
publicly the Nazi atrocities, not least the Holocaust. 18 
In the last decades of the 19th century, lay Catholics across Europe 
began to openly link their religious faith with a commitment to many 
of the political values of liberal democracy. By the early 20th century, 
therefore, with the role of lay Catholicism coming increasingly into 
play, political Catholicism featured both liberal and illiberal features. 
This duality is well encapsulated by the Irish Marxist leader of the 
1916 Easter Uprising, James Connolly (1868-1916), who in 1913 
wrote: 
"Catholicism which in most parts of Europe is synonymous with 
Toryism, lickspittle loyalty, servile worship of aristocracy and 
hatred of all that savours of genuine political independence on 
the part of the lower classes, in Ireland is almost synonymous 
with rebellious tendencies, zeal for democracy, and intense 
17 In 1929, Pius XI (1922-1939) signed a Lateran Pact with Benito Mussolini 
(1883-1945), in which the papacy recognised the state of Italy, with Rome as its 
capital, and Italy in return recognised papal sovereignty over the Vatican City. 
Until 1938, Pius XI maintained good relations with the Italian Fascist dictator. In 
1933, Pius XI publicly praised Hitler for his stand against communism (Cook 
1987/1998: 328) and the Vatican negotiated a Concordat with Adolf Hitler's Nazi 
Germany. Pius XI also supported the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco (1892- 
1975) during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). 
18 See, for example, Hochhuth (1963/1964) and Falconi (1965/1970). 
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feelings of solidarity with all strivings upward of those who 
toll. "19 
WWI accelerated the development of lay Catholic political action and 
the immediate post-war years witnessed a rapid upsurge in Catholic 
political movements, including the 1919 formation of the Italian 
Partito Popolare (PPI). Molony (1977: 12) describes the PPI as a 
centre party "that was neither sufficiently anti-fascist for the left nor 
pro-fascist for the right. " He claims that the Italian fascist state and the 
Vatican worked hand in hand to help destroy it. 
The aforementioned upsurge owed much to a new mood of confidence 
among the Catholic laity, resulting in a flourishing of a Catholic 
component to civil society in the form of not only Catholic political 
parties and Catholic associations, but also via Catholic Action and an 
ostentatious Catholicism 20 that, as future chapters will show, could 
with its close association with myths, symbols and rituals, be deployed 
to propagate and adapt political cultures. 
Lay political Catholicism was greatly fuelled by the inter-war personal 
Thomism of lay Catholic French intellectuals, such as Emmanuel 
19 `Catholicism, Protestantism and Politics. ' Forward, 3 May, 1913. (Source: 
http: //www. marxists. org/archive/connolly/ 1913 /05 /c athprot. htm). 
20 Catholic Action was a key expression of Pius XI's belief, as promulgated in his 
1922 encyclical Ubi Arcano Dei that Catholicism must assert its ascendancy over 
the values and structures of state and society. Catholic Action movements of the 
Catholic laity, acting under the leadership of the clergy, spread rapidly to 
countries of Europe during the 1920s to bring about a re-Catholicisation of 
modern life. (Buchanan 1996: 21-22). The ostentatious political Catholicism 
sought to challenge publicly the secular character of modern life by propagating a 
distinctively Roman form of religious piety. 
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Mounier, Jacques Maritain, and Etienne Gilson. Their personal 
Thomism advocated an active political role for Catholics and sought 
the liberation of the individual from the twin perils of the totalitarian 
state and the anomie of liberal society. Unlike papal political 
Catholicism's third way, personal Thomism's third way strove neither 
to be associated with the fascist right nor the communist left 
(Buchanan 1996: Chapter 1). 
Of the newly independent post-WWI countries in the CEE region, 
Catholicism was the majority religion in Poland (Davies 1981b: 404), 
in Hungary (Laszlo 1987: 133), and in Czechoslovakia, especially 
Slovakia (Hoensch 1987: 158). The Catholic Churches in these three 
countries, in tune with the illiberal Vatican, were all illiberal. What 
distinguished them was only the extent of their illiberality, with 
Poland the least, and Slovakia the most extreme. 
During the inter-war period the rhetoric of many within the Polish 
Episcopate, led by Primate August Mond (1881-1948), was similar to 
that of Dmowski's National Democrats, deploying enemy mythology 
in the form of blaming foreigners, Jews, Masons and the communists 
for worsening economic conditions. 21 In evoking such mythology, the 
enemies would often be merged together to give hybrid dual-enemy 
myths. Mond evoked both the Jewish enemy and hybrid Jewish- 
Communist enemy myths. In keeping with popular perceptions, it is 
also clear that the Primate saw Jews as being different in terms of 
nationality also. There were not Jewish Poles but only Jews and Poles. 
In a 1936 Pastoral letter Mond wrote: 
21 Osa (1995: 201). 
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"`There will be the Jewish problem as long as the Jews remain ... It is a fact that the Jews are fighting against the Catholic Church, 
persisting in free thinking, and are the vanguard of godlessness, 
Bolshevism and subversion.... It is a fact that the Jews deceive, 
levy interest, and are pimps. It is a fact that the religious and 
ethical influence of the Jewish young people on Polish people is 
a negative one. "' 
22 
Despite the Church holding many similar views to Dmowski, the 
Polish bishops mostly declined to publicly support the Dmowski 
nationalists. This was because they did not wish to harm their 
relationship with the regime of Jözef Pilsudski (1867-1935) and the 
post-Pilsudski regime; a relationship that strengthened as the regime 
became more illiberal with Pilsudski's death. Despite the fact that 
some three million Polish Catholics also experienced the same war- 
time fate as the Jews, anti-Semitism within the Polish Church 
persisted in post-war Poland now under communist rule. Following 
the August 1945 Krakow and the July 1946 Kielce pogroms, 23 Hlond 
showed that the Jewish enemy and Jewish-Communist enemy myths 
were still alive when he publicly declared: 
"`The fact that conditions for Polish-Jewish coexistence are 
worsening is to a great extent due to Jews ... trying to 
impose a 
system of government that a majority of society does not 
want. "'24 
22 As cited by Szulc (1995: 41). 
23 See Chapter 3. 
24 As cited by Kwitny (1998: 94). 
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In Hungary, where some two-thirds of the population was Catholic 
(Laszlo 1987: 133), the Church supported the Old Right authoritarian 
regime that came to power in 1919 and represented the interests of the 
landed nobility. Most of the Church clergy participated in the anti- 
Semitic hysteria fuelled by the communist = Jew myth that followed 
the brief 1919 soviet republic. Leading Churchmen advocated 
restrictive measures against the Hungarian Jews (Laszlo 1987: 119). 
The Church also showed their sympathy for Mussolini and the fascism 
of the New Right that had prevailed in Italy in 1922.25 Many 
Hungarian Catholics also considered fascism as a more effective 
antidote to communism than the traditional parliamentary system. 
Many showed sympathy not only for the fascist dictatorship in Italy, 
but also for those in Spain, Portugal and Austria, where all four fascist 
regimes established occupational corporations in keeping with Pius 
XI's thinking. 26 (Laszlo 1987: 121-122). The Hungarian Church's 
reaction to the rise of Hitler and Nazism was more critical, particularly 
when the Reich took schools and other Catholic institutions away 
25 Mussolini was among the first to take up the Hungarian nationalist cause of 
regaining lands lost as a result of the Paris Conference's 1920 Trianon Treaty and 
the Italian dictator gained much credit amongst Catholics for recognising the 
sovereignty of the Vatican in the 1929 Lateran Pact. 
26 Pius XI (1931: paras. 93-95) envisaged his occupational corporations thus: 
"The ... corporations, are composed of 
delegates from the two syndicates 
(that is, of workers and employers) respectively of the same industry or 
profession and, as true and proper organs and institutions of the State, they 
direct the syndicates and co-ordinate their activities in matters of common 
interest toward one and the same end ... Strikes and 
lock-outs are forbidden; 
if the parties cannot settle their dispute, public authority intervenes ... The 
various classes work together peacefully, socialist organizations and their 
activities are repressed, and a special magistracy exercises a governing 
authority. " 
25 
from the German Catholic Church. The Hungarian Church and the 
Hungarian Catholic Action press widely propagated Pius XI's 
encyclical (1937a) that condemned the German Reich's persecution of 
the German Church and the Nazi teachings as contrary to natural law 
and Christian teaching. The Hungarian Primate protested strongly at 
the government's 1941 decision to enter WWII on the side of 
Germany. (Laszlo 1987: 122-123). The Church, however, persisted in 
its anti-Semitism and helped enact 1938 anti-Semitic legislation 
(Laszlo 1987: 127). 27 In March 1944 Germany occupied Hungary and 
a German puppet-government was established within which from 
October 1944 to April 1945 the Hungarian fascist Arrow Cross 
grouping prevailed. When the government started to round-up 
Hungarian Jews for deportation as part of The Final Solution, the 
Papal Nuncio in Budapest immediately protested. 28 The Hungarian 
Church, preferring to negotiate with the government, was more tardy 
in issuing a Pastoral Letter of public protest, by which time about half 
a million Hungarian Jews had been deported to their death (Laszlo 
1987: 129). 
The picture of political Catholicism in Slovakia was even more starkly 
illiberal than in Hungary and more closely linked with extreme 
illiberal nationalism in the form of clerical fascism. In 1919, the 
Slovak People's Party (HSL) under the leadership of the Catholic 
27 The bishops were ex-officio members of the Upper House of the Hungarian 
Parliament. 
28 The Nuncio, Monsignor Angelo Rotta, mounted an international rescue effort 
and intervened daily on behalf of the persecuted. Pius XI sent a personal letter to 
the Hungarian Regent Horthy (March 1920-October 1944) to persuade him to halt 
the deportations. (Laszlo 1987: 129-130). 
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priest Father Andrej Hlinka (1864-1938) unsuccessfully demanded of 
the Czechoslovakian Republic government recognition of Slovak 
national identity, of cultural autonomy and of self-government within 
the Republic (Hoensch 1987: 158). The Catholic Church was directly 
involved in the governing of Slovakia with, in 1938, well over a 
quarter of the Slovak State Council seats occupied by priests (Hoensch 
1987: 161). At the end of 1938, Czechoslovakian left-wing parties and 
trade unions were banned and the remaining political organisations 
within Slovakia were merged in the single Slovak People's Party - 
Party of Slovak National Unity under the motto One God, One 
People, One Party! (Hoensch 1987: 174). It was not until spring 1939 
that the Slovaks gained national self-determination of a kind, when 
under pressure from Hitler, Slovakia declared its independence. 
Hlinka's successor and the new leader of Slovakia was another 
Catholic priest Monsignor 29 Jozef Tiso (1887-1947). The HSL was 
the only significant factor in the formation of 1939-1944 domestic 
policy within the `Protectorate of Slovakia', essentially a German 
puppet-state. The HSL newspaper propagated its combination of 
Catholicism and nationalism with its slogan For God and the Nation 
(Hoensch 1987: 165). Despite Tiso's denial that fascism and national 
socialism influenced his ideology, barely one third of the 
approximately 135,000 Slovak Jews survived the `special treatment' 
of the German and Slovak governments. After 1939, a number of laws 
and decrees steadily deprived the Jewish population of their 
constitutional rights. In 1940 the Slovak authorities without hesitation 
agreed to German demands for Jewish deportations to Poland and to 
29 The title Monsignor is reserved for Bishops and Church officials of special 
importance. 
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their deaths. A 1941 Jewish codex provided the legal basis for the 
dispossession, ostracism, internment and finally extermination in 1942 
of some 56,000 Slovakian Jews. Only after repeated Vatican protests 
did the Tiso regime order a stop to the deportation of the few 
remaining Jews (Hoensch 1987: 176). 
The picture of illiberalism emerging from the above explorations 
within CEE political Catholicism has to be qualified where CEE lay 
Catholicism is concerned. At the beginning of the 20th century the 
influence of West European neo-Thomism resulted in an intellectual 
renaissance amongst Polish lay Catholic intellectuals. The Polish 
Catholic intelligentsia, via journals such as the Jesuit Universal 
Review in Krakow, and via writers and theologians such as the neo- 
Thomist Jacek Woroniecki (1879-1949), dissociated themselves from 
clerical conservatism, godless socialism and illiberal nationalism. 
They took a neutral position in the debate between socialists and 
nationalists, between Pilsudski and Dmowski, between Left and Right. 
They were offended by the blasphemous messianic metaphors of some 
of the idealistic nationalists 30 and embarrassed by the xenophobic and 
frequently anti-Jewish utterances of some of the Dmowski-influenced 
nationalist chauvinists. Showing loyalty to Rome, they raised 
themselves above the petty concerns of national politics, and yet 
provided a distinct moral viewpoint on all the important issues. 31 In 
the last few years of WWII, there was an important exception to this 
illiberal picture of Hungarian political Catholicism. In 1943, lay 
30 See Chapter 2. 
31 Davies (1981b: 222). 
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Hungarian Catholic leaders of the Catholic mass movements 32 created 
a Catholic Social People's Movement that was based on the ideas of 
Maritain. The Movement was a forerunner of the 1944 Christian 
Democratic People's Party and the two organisations joined the 
democratic resistance forces that opposed the 1944-1945 German 
occupation of Hungary (Laszlo 1987: 128). 
The nature of political Catholicism post-1945 
The influence of the French personal Thomists amongst European 
Catholics and of the behind-the-fascist-scenes work of lay Italian 
Catholics who had been active in Catholic Action and the PPI 
(Molony 1977: 199) contributed greatly to the emergence of a 
predominantly Catholic Christian Democracy seeking a third way 
between liberalism and communism as a major political force in West 
Europe after WWII. Almond (1948a: 131-132) notes that by August 
1948, the Christian Democratic parties headed half of the key 
ministerial posts in five of the major West European countries. 33 
Almond was also mindful that many still considered Catholicism as 
identified with anti-democratic forces. In (Almond 1948b: 762), he 
describes the Christian Democratic (CD) parties as having "a left- 
oriented elite but a primarily traditional and conservative rank and 
file. " The realities of holding power at the time of the Cold War 
32 The two main organisations were the half-million strong Catholic Agrarian 
Youth League (KALOT) and the Association of Catholic Urban Workers 
(EMSZO). 
33 In Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, Christian Democrats 
headed nine of the nineteen key ministerial posts, taken to be those of the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Ministers of the Interior and of Defence. 
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within a US-led essentially Western liberal democratic world, meant 
that Christian Democracy's third way in practice meant siding with 
liberal democracy against the perceived threat of Soviet communism. 
Later, Hanley (1994: 3-8) writing of contemporary West European CD 
parties observes the difficulty of identifying their common elements 
given their wide range of political opinion and practice, but does 
identify some of their common features. 
"Christian Democrats remain conscious of their religious roots 
first and foremost; they are in politics to express a Christian 
vision of humankind and its destiny. " (Hanley 1994: 4). 
Paul Lucardie and Hans-Martien ten Napel in their chapter within 
(Hanley 1994) detected a drift among leading CD parties towards a 
neo-liberal orientation in policy and ideology. Commenting upon the 
fact that CD parties strive for a supra-national identity, Hanley 
acknowledges that their "tangible discomfort in the face of raw 
nationalism" is a feature they share with liberals. 
"Christian Democrats recognise than humankind fulfils itself in 
different communities, one of which may well be the nation ... . 
But equally they know the fine line that often separates genuine 
identification with one's nation from unwarrantable pride and 
chauvinism. " (Hanley 1994: 8). 
The personal Thomists' liberating influence was also to express itself 
in the 1960s upon papal political Catholicism as manifested by the 
more liberal thinking of John XXIII (1958-1963), of Vatican II (1962- 
1965) and of Paul VI (1963-1978), and later, of John Paul II. Some of 
the proto-liberal seeds of influence were planted just after WWII in 
30 
Rome. Between 1945-1948, Maritain was France's ambassador to the 
Holy See and was a close friend of the future Pope Paul VI, 
Archbishop Giovanni Montini. 34 Both Montini and another future 
pope (John Paul II) Karol Wojtyla, then studying in Rome, were 
known to be sympathetic to Maritain's third way thinking (Szulc 
1995: 145). The 1960s more liberal papal political Catholicism 
reflected a genuine concern for the herenow issues of human rights 
and social justice. It heralded a new spirit of dialogue to find solutions 
to world problems. This new spirit went beyond mere tolerance of 
belief systems such as Judaism and communism, hitherto considered 
anathema, and involved an open-minded dialogue with traditional 
`enemies', including the Jews and communists. 35 
One consequence of the new papal liberalisation was that some 
national hierarchies began in the 1960s-1970s to publicly voice 
political views independently of Rome. This autonomous stance 
expressed itself most vividly in Latin America. Here liberation 
theology reinvigorated not only the role played by lay Catholics and 
priests in politics, but saw several national hierarchies sever their 
traditional ties with the state, oppose their authoritarian regimes, and 
support the civil and human rights of the poor. However, these 
changes were not endorsed everywhere. Some Latin American 
national hierarchies still supported the military dictatorships (Gill 
1994: 403 & 423) and a papal political Catholicism that despite its 
34 Montini was then an influential Vatican Under-Secretary of State and was much 
concerned with building a powerful Italian Christian Democratic Party. 
35 See Chapter 4 for a brief exploration of the Christian-Marxist dialogue. 
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increasing political liberalisation disowned liberation theology as it 
feared communism more than military dictatorships. 
Few contemporary observers appreciated the major political 
implications that the 1960s' more liberal stance within papal political 
Catholicism was to have upon CEE politics. Huntington (1991/1993: 
78fn. ), for example, asserts that `with rare exceptions' social scientists 
ignored the significance of Vatican II changes. Pre-1989 recognition 
of the implications of Archbishop Wojtyla being an important 
participant to the Vatican II liberalisation process, 36 (Kwitny 1998: 
195,197, & 200), (Walsh 1994: 30) & (Szulc 1995: 233), was even 
harder to discern. 
1.2.3 Towards a Typology of Nationalism and Political 
Catholicism 
Towards A Definition of Liberal and Illiberal Nationalism 
Not all depictions of East European nationalism were illiberal. 
Christensen and Bollerup (Bollerup 1997: 280), argue that it can be `a 
positive force'. 
"The idea of a nation-group provided the alienated East 
Europeans with an identity and a source of self-esteem when the 
hollowness of the identity as citizens in a so-called socialist or 
communist society was revealed. ... Nationalism 
is an inherently 
legitimate ideology as it builds on the basic liberal assertion that 
people should govern themselves. " 
36 Wojtyla helped draft Vatican II documents on relations with non-Christian 
faiths (Vatican II 1965a) and on human dignity (Vatican 11 1965b). 
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As Storey (2001: 70) reminded, one can distinguish 
"between a nationalism which asserts cultural distinctiveness but 
which does not involve an assertion of national superiority and a 
nationalism which is chauvinistic ... (and) which asserts that one 
nationalism is superior to all others. ... Rather than 
being 
automatically associated with regression, nationalism might be 
linked to progressive democratization. " 
Given the variety of quite fundamentally differing nationalisms in 
terms of attitudes to liberal democracy (Hutchinson 1994: 3) and 
methods deployed, the thesis accepts Smith's contention (1996b: 386) 
"that the differences between nationalisms across periods and 
continents are too great to be embraced by a single Euclidean theory. " 
The thesis also accepts the arguments of Haymes (1997) that 
nationalism is a socially defined concept that varies according to 
situation and time, that its character is highly context-sensitive and 
that it is an evolutionary process. 
Although the thesis accepts the 19th century connection between the 
spread of representative democracy in Western Europe and the rise of 
nationalism, the thesis is not arguing that there is a necessary link 
between democratic and nationalist ideas. Rather it agrees with the 
position adopted by Anderson (2000: 95-96): 
"At a minimum democracy means self-rule and this is difficult to 
envisage without bounded communities for some purposes of 
government. How those boundaries should be drawn and what 
could hold people together within them in loyal support of 
democratic procedures in the absence of a national bond is not, 
at the moment, obvious. " 
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Wider domains of solidarity than the state as currently constituted may 
emerge that will provide the basis of sufficient loyalty and trust 
necessary for democracy but for the foreseeable future democracy is 
not ill served by liberal nationalism. 
Plamenatz (1973/1976: 27) sees "no logical repugnance between 
nationalism and liberalism. " Goodwin (1982/1997: 261) argues that 
"nationalism is best viewed as a myth, whose intrinsic 
vagueness makes it valuable to propagandists and opponents of 
the state; like a chameleon it changes to suit the context. 
Nationalism lacks the utopian element which inspires ideology. It 
can make no concrete proposals, other than the demand for the 
independence of the national unit, until it is united with a 
political ideology. ... Nationalism, then, 
does not necessarily 
culminate in liberalism and democratic beliefs, except in cases 
where the nationalist cause adopts one or both of these ideologies 
as part of its creed. " 
In a similar vein, Freeden (1998: 759) argues that 
"when nationalist ideas are found in host ideologies they reflect 
the features of the host. It is therefore more accurate to talk not of 
liberal nationalism but of the areas of nationalist discourse within 
liberal ideologies. ... 
(Nationality) cannot be removed from a 
constraining context of `equal justice', `equal consideration', 
`freedom' and `concord' that takes precedence over nationality. 
... 
Nationalist concepts within liberal ideologies also reflect the 
universalism of liberalism. For liberals, nationalism has always 
included the bestowing of an equal right to national expression 
on a wide range of nations. " 
Gamble (1981: 184-185) writes of the emergence in the late 18th 
century of a nationalism that was `a celebration of Liberty, Equality 
and Fraternity'. 
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"The ideal of the armed people in revolt against injustice and 
arbitrary power was the early liberal image of nationalism ... The idea developed that every nation had the right of self- 
determination. Such a doctrine pointed at the heart of the great 
absolutist empires. " 
During the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, liberal 
nationalism evolved to take on board the modem liberal concerns of 
multi-culturalism and multi-ethnicity, social justice for all with some 
degree of state intervention, and of checks upon the nation-state via 
supra-national organisations. 
In the light of the above considerations liberal nationalism, which in 
accepting Goodwin and Freeden's arguments is now viewed more as 
nationalist liberalism, is defined as areas of nationalist discourse 
prevalent within 20th century modern liberalism that incorporate 
certain of the key universal values, including those of the French 
Revolution. The areas of discourse relate to: 
" Liberty, taken to mean a belief in popular sovereignty and national 
self-determination, in the sense, respectively, of democratic rule by 
the will of the people and independence from foreign rule/coercion. 
Liberty also entails a belief in the freedom of all nations to seek 
self-determination and the need for international law, supervised 
by supranational bodies, as a counter-check upon any state abusing 
the liberty of individuals and nations. 
" Equality, taken to mean a belief in human justice and rights for all 
citizens of all nations. 
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" Fraternity, taken to mean a belief in the solidarity with fellow 
nationals and a belief in the solidarity of nations. 
Thus the view of modern liberalism as adopted by the thesis is a broad 
one that encompasses social democracy, in the more recent sense of 
the term. 37 
Towards a Definition Of Illiberal Nationalism 
Writing of why ethnicity is relevant to modern nationalism, 
Hobsbawm (1990/1994: 65 & 66) asserts 
"visible differences in physique are too obvious to be overlooked 
and have too often been used to mark or reinforce distinctions 
between `us' and `them', including national ones. ... `Visible' 
ethnicity tends to be negative, inasmuch as it is much more 
usually applied to define `the other' than one's own group. 
Hence the proverbial role of racial stereotypes. ... The ethnic- 
racial homogeneity of one's own `nationality' is taken for 
granted. " 
Hobsbawm (1990/1994: 107-108) writes that approximately in the 
second half of the 19th century ethnic nationalism received much 
theoretical support by "the transformation of that central concept of 
nineteenth-century social science, 'race'. " He argues there were two 
main factors at work. 
37 See (Goodwin 1997: 107). That is to say the thesis sees modern social 
democracy as practised by, for example the British Labour Party or the Polish 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), as attempting to give liberal democratic 
capitalism an acceptable human face by promoting a welfare state and a limited 
role for the state, including the regulation of the excesses and abuses of the 
market. 
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"On the one-hand the old-established division of mankind into a 
few `races' distinguished by skin colour was now elaborated into 
a set of `racial' distinctions separating peoples of approximately 
the same pale skin, such as `Aryans' and `Semites' .... 
On the 
other hand Darwinian evolutionism, supplemented later by what 
came to be known as genetics, provided racism with what looked 
like a powerful set of `scientific' reasons for keeping out or even, 
as it turned out, expelling and murdering strangers. " 38 
Greenfeld (1992/1995: 12) asserts "in ethnic nationalisms, 
`nationality' became a synonym of 'ethnicity'. " 
Sugar (1995a: 20) depicts integral nationalism 39 as rejecting 
friendship with other nations, promoting jingoism, militarism and 
imperialism, and opposing personal liberties if they interfere with the 
aims of the state. Loyalty to the state comes before all other loyalties, 
and even religious considerations are subordinated to the ends of 
integral nationalism. Integral nationalism typically asserts ethnic or 
racial superiority of a particular group. 
The definition of illiberal nationalism/nationalist illiberalism adopted 
here incorporates aspects of the particularistic values associated with 
ethnic nationalism and integral nationalism. Nationalist illiberalism is 
defined as areas of nationalist discourse prevalent within late 
19th/early 20th century illiberalism inspired by the perception that the 
nation is under threat, either from within or from without. Nationalist 
38 Hobsbawm (1990/1994: 107-108) adds that anti-Semitism did not acquire a 
racial as distinct from a religio-cultural character until about 1880. 
39 The doctrine of integral nationalism was first formulated at the close of the 19th 
century by Charles Maurras, the leader of the Action Francaise movement. 
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illiberalism discourse deploys enemy myths that engender hatred by 
stereotyping `Other' races or nations. Within nationalist illiberalism 
discourse there has to be an `Other' to hate in order for a sense of `us' 
to be created: some communities and nations have to be superior to 
others. Those in the `other' group act as scapegoats for all the 
difficulties suffered by those in the `us' group. The superiority 
complexes associated within nationalist illiberalism may lead to 
justifications for, and enactment of, imperial expansion. Within 
nationalist illiberalism the state has a predominant position, and 
language is sometimes "but an epiphenomenon, a reflection of race, 
the indisputable testimony of common descent. " (Greenfeld 
1992/1995: 369). 
Towards A Definition of Liberal and Illiberal Political 
Catholicism 
Buchanan (1996: 2) provides the thesis with a definition of political 
Catholicism as political movements that claim a significant, although 
not necessarily exclusively, Catholic inspiration for their actions. 
Although this conception of political movements does not seek to 
include all Catholics who engage in political actions, it does seek to 
encompass not only the papacy and the national hierarchies but also 
lay Catholics whose faith influences their political beliefs and 
actions. 40 Goodwin (1982/1997: 36) identifies the `hallmark' of the 
liberal as being "a concern with the limits of authority and opposition 
to state interference with individual activities. " Goodwin (1982/1997: 
40 Such lay Catholics are to be found principally amongst the intelligentsia and 
within political parties and a wide range of socio-economic organisations inspired 
by Catholicism. 
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36-46) outlines what she sees as the `ingredients of liberalism' and 
includes toleration, freedom, consent, constitutionalism, the 
importance of the individual and of social justice. For Goodwin 
(1982/1997: 44) the liberal concept of tolerance entails that "society 
should accept a variety of religious, moral and political opinions, and 
that human and civil rights belong to all by virtue of their humanity. " 
Under the freedom banner, she observes (1982/1997: 41) "a pluralistic 
democracy is 
... the political outcome of the 
liberal ideal of freedom. " 
She takes consent to convey "that government should be based on the 
consent of the people, which legitimizes it. " (Goodwin 1982/1997: 
39). For Goodwin (1982/1997: 40 & 37), constitutionalism entails 
"some form of constitution that limits the power of government", and 
the importance of the individual entails that: 
"the individual person is to be regarded as inviolable, and all 
human life as sacrosanct; violence is therefore prohibited except 
in a war to preserve liberal society itself. This individualism is 
based on a morality which commands equal respect for all 
persons as moral beings with equal sensitivity. " 
Finally, for Goodwin (1982/1997: 42) a liberal view of social justice is 
based upon a sense of deserving/meriting it. 
The thesis adopts Buchanan's definition of political Catholicism and 
uses it and many of Goodwin's perceptions of liberalism to define 
liberal political Catholicism as the political Catholicism that 
propagates the liberal values of toleration, of a pluralistic democracy 
exercising limitations upon interference from the state, of respect for 
the individual and of social justice. Following on from this definition, 
illiberal political Catholicism is defined as the political Catholicism 
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that propagates the illiberal values of intolerance, authoritarianism 
with few restrictions upon the state, disrespect for the individual, and 
that is indifferent to the cause of social justice. 
The definitions of liberal nationalism and liberal Catholicism adopted 
incorporate most of the key values that are part of a modem liberal 
democratic culture. However, individually these values are also to be 
found in other ideologies. Thus, for example, a belief in the value of 
social justice or in national solidarity is necessary but not sufficient to 
demonstrate that the belief is part of a modem liberal democratic 
political culture. For example, communists would also ascribe to 
social justice and fascists to national solidarity. However, if social 
justice and national solidarity are added to the other identified values 
within liberal nationalism and liberal political Catholicism as 
presented in this chapter - such as liberty, toleration, pluralistic 
democracy and respect for the individual - then a picture of a liberal 
democratic political culture emerges. 
Whether one agrees with the contention of the thesis that the Polish 
opposition under communism in the main supported a liberal political 
culture may be, in part, a question of definitions. For example, Szacki 
cites, and implicitly agrees with, Father Jan Piwowarczyk, who in an 
1985 Znak publication criticised the former Catholic MP and writer 
Stefan Kisielewski (referred to as Kisiel), a leading theoretician of the 
Znak movement. Piwowarczyk asserts: 41 
41 Kisielewski (1911-1991) was also a renowned writer and a Znak MP (1957- 
1965). 
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"`What Kisiel calls liberalism is not liberalism. One can call it 
the politics of emancipation, the postulate of human rights, free 
trade, the principle of private initiative, but this is still not 
liberalism. Liberalism is not only human rights, not only free 
trade and private initiative. It is something more and something 
different. "' 42 
The broad conception of liberal democracy as indicated in this chapter 
would concur with Kisielewski's view of liberalism. Agreement or 
disagreement with the contention may also be a question of 
differences in judgement as to where the prevailing balance lies 
between liberal and illiberal strands, undoubtedly both to be found 
within Poland's pre-1945 and post-1945 political cultures. Of course, 
it may also be partly due to differences of overall view. Szacki takes 
the view that 
"In their fight against communism, even people of traditionally 
anti-liberal structures (such as the Roman Catholic Church) 
manifested clearly liberal tendencies by sometimes defending 
principles which they would have rejected in other 
circumstances. " 43 
Szacki concurs with Ost's judgement of the pre-1989 Polish situation: 
"`the heart of the problem was state control ... the state's 
subsumption of society. When the enemy became the state, the 
opposition became liberal. "' 44 
42 Jan Piwowarczyk. Spor o liberalizm in his Wobec nowego czasu, Krakow, 
Znak, 1985, p. 270 as cited by Szacki (1995: 178-179). 
43 Szacki (1995: 73). 
44David Ost. `The Limits of Liberalism in Poland. ' Telos, 1991. No. 89, p. 91 as 
cited by Szacki (1995: 73). 
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It is accepted that some dissident Catholics within the Polish 
opposition might not have recognised and/or been prepared to 
concede that their principles were liberal-influenced. For it is 
acknowledged that post-1950s there were still vestiges of the 19th 
century heritage of liberalism as an anathema within political 
Catholicism and that there were still strong critiques of what was 
perceived as certain acts of excessive individualism within liberalism. 
If one discounts third way or other authoritarian solutions, then, in 
post-WWII Europe, the only serious contender to communism was 
liberal democracy. In opposing communism one was de facto 
supporting liberal democracy. 
Szacki casts doubts on the depth and sincerity of the coming together 
of the Polish Catholic Church and the secular left in the last years of 
communist-ruled Poland. 45 Szacki argues that their solidarity then 
was based on the expediency of fighting a common enemy. Szacki 
further contends that, after 1989, the dissident secular left/liberal ideal 
of an open pluralistic society based on the acceptance of different 
conceptions of truth was difficult to reconcile with the Catholic 
illiberal ideal of Absolute Truth. Szacki also argues (1995: 117) that 
the emergence of a proto-liberalism within the pre-1989 opposition 
fell short of a `mature liberalism' as 
"elements of liberal thinking were intermingled with elements of 
collective thinking, which finally gained the upper hand as the goal 
of independence became disseminated among the masses. " 
45 Szacki (1995: 190-194). 
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1.3 The Roles Of Nationalism, Political Religion And Political 
Culture Within The Democratisation Process 
Four domains of democratisation literature were explored to establish 
what emphases nationalism and `political religion' and their 
relationship to the transformation of political culture were given 
within the democratisation process. 46 The domains explored were the 
functioning democracy, revolution, East European Study and 
transition literature. 
1.3.1 The Contribution of The Functioning Democracy Literature 
During the 1950s-1960s, stimulated by a mid-1940s-early 1950s wave 
of countries seeking to democratise, 47 a number of studies that 
focused on functioning democracies attempted to identify 
prerequisites for democracy. The literature had several weaknesses. 
Some of the studies assumed that the functionalist factors identified as 
necessary for a functioning democracy were the same as the genetic 
factors required to achieve democracy. However, as Rustow 
(1969/1970: 346) points out 
46 The exploration focused mainly upon the initial stage of democratisation up to 
the point of collapse of the non-democratic regime, where democratisation is 
taken to be "the overall process of regime change from beginning to end, 
including both stages of what are generally called ... `transition' to a liberal democracy and its subsequent `consolidation'. " (Pridham 1994: 2). 
47 This wave is referred to by Huntington (1991/1993: 18) as the `second wave'. It 
includes Uruguay's return to democracy during WWII; the democratisation 
processes promoted within West Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan and Korea, as a 
result of Allied occupation in WWII; Argentina, Columbia, Peru and Venezuelan 
1945-1946 elections for popularly chosen governments; Brazil and Costa Rica's 
shift to democracy in the late 1940s; and Turkey and Greece's moves towards 
democracy in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
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"the (functionalist) factors that keep a democracy stable may not 
be the (genetic) ones that brought it into existence: explanations 
of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis. " 
The studies, and earlier ones such as (Weber 1904-5/1965) & 
(Tawney 1926/1933) that had explored the relationship between 
religion and the rise of capitalism, were mainly undertaken by 
American, British and German academics exploring Western 
democracies. Collectively, they tended to engender a positive bias 
towards Protestant values and/or Western circumstances. For Max 
Weber (1864-1920), Catholicism specifically did not lend itself to the 
rise of capitalism (Weber 1904/1965: 39-40). For Lipset (1959: 75) a 
certain level of modernisation 48 was a prerequisite for democracy. 
Although the role of nationalism was not highlighted, the functioning 
democracy literature did, however, highlight the role of certain 
religions - Christianity and Judaism (Griffith 1956: 103) & 
Protestantism (Lipset 1959: 92-93) - diversity and conflict 
(Dahrendorf 1957/1967: 314) and civic culture (Almond 1963/1966: 
493) as prerequisites for democracy. However, its principal message 
was that Protestantism = rise of capitalism = modernisation = certain 
civic cultures = democracy. 49 
48 As expressed by certain levels of wealth, urbanisation, industrialisation and 
education. 
49 Huntington (1991/1993: 75) acknowledges the impact of the Protestantism = 
democracy equation that emerged from the functioning democracy and earlier 
studies. He observed that 
"Historically, Protestantism and democracy were linked with each other.... 
Catholicism was associated with the absence of democracy or with limited 
or late democratic development. " 
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1.3.2 The Contribution of The Revolution Literature 
A second domain within the democratisation literature, the revolution 
literature, identified pre-conditions, often structural factors, necessary 
for revolutionary democratisation. The studies often associated 
democratisation with a political culture of opposition that was 
Marxist/left wing (Leiden 1968: 112), and that adhered to a physical 
force tradition (Calvert 1967: 1), (Huntington 1968/1996: 265), 
(Leiden 1968: 19 & 73), (Gurr 1970/1974), (Tilly 1975: 300), & 
(Goldstone 1987: 206). In addition some of the studies portrayed the 
political culture of opposition as driven by class conflict (Skocpol 
1979: 5) and shaped by middle class/intelligentsia leadership (Leiden 
1968: 95) & (Huntington 1968/1996: 300). The studies underestimate 
two major socio-political changes that occurred in the decades 
between the classical revolutions and subsequent revolutions that 
affected the nature of the political culture of opposition considerably. 
One change relates to the mismatch between theoretical Marxism and 
the practice of communism. The other change relates to the promotion 
of non-Marxist democratisation modes, a consequence, in part, of 
However, Huntington (1991/1993: 77-78) goes on to argue that although until the 
1960s this association between type of religion and democracy `seemed 
unchallengeable': 
"That is no longer the case. The third (democratisation) wave of the 1970s 
and 1980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave. ... Overall, roughly three- 
quarters of the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 
were Catholic countries. ... In the 1960s, the Church changed. ... These 
changes occurred at two levels. At the global level change was introduced 
by Pope John XXIII. ... Most 
important, however, the changes flowed from 
the Second Vatican Council, which he called. " 
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liberal nationalism and political Catholicism and in part of modem 
liberal state intervention mitigating the social injustices of laissez- 
faire capitalism. 
Although neither the role of nationalism nor religion is highlighted, 
the revolution studies did at least emphasise the role of the political 
culture of opposition upon the democratisation process. 50 
1.3.3 The Contribution of The East European Study Literature 
The East European study literature explored the factors leading to the 
collapse of communism within the region. 51 The literature 
predominantly employed a cross-country approach. 52 It usually 
stressed short to medium-term factors, although some 
actors/observers, for example Dahrendorf (1990: 15), John Paul II 
(Bernstein 1996: 482) and Rakowski (Kwitny 1997/1998: 592), 
mentioned communism's inherent weaknesses/flaws, although they 
usually failed to elaborate on what these were. Most of the 
explanations were conjunctural, stressing a mixture of structural and 
actor-orientated factors. The literature highlighted the relationship 
50 However, few of the characteristic features of the political culture of opposition 
identified within the revolution literature, particularly the role of class conflict and 
the use of physical force, had much resonance with the political culture of 
opposition within post-1945 Poland. 
51 A few other works, not strictly East European study literature, but nevertheless 
relating to democratisation of CEE countries, were also reviewed. 
52 It should be noted that publications attributed to editors that purported to be 
comparative typically comprised country-specific chapters, with the contributing 
authors working to a common agenda, and the editors in their chapters making the 
comparisons across-countries. 
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between economic difficulties and increasing 
dissatisfaction/decreasing regime legitimacy, for example Sword 
(1990: 30), Pravda (1992b: ix), Schöpflin (1993/1994: 226), Lewis 
(1994: 227), Verdery (1996: 36-37), White (1993b: 8), Crampton 
(1997: 410), and Batt (1993: 205-206). The main, ostensibly actor- 
orientated factors emphasised the role of political leaderships, but with 
differing emphasis upon ruling and opposition elite actors and upon 
the extent that these actors were shapers of their environments. Some 
explanations, for example in (Bunce 1985: 2& 46), (Kennedy 1988: 
513-514), (Garton Ash 1988), (Kux 1991: 3), (Rakowski 1991: 246- 
253), and (Koslowski 1994: 218 & 236), were from a decline-of- 
(Soviet) Empire perspective, and Dawisha (1988/1990: 198) wrote of 
Mikhail Gorbachev's desire to `de-Sovietise' Eastern Europe to 
facilitate `the Europeanisation of the Soviet Union'. 
Few East European studies highlighted the role of the political culture 
of opposition, not least its nationalist and politico-religious 
manifestations, within the democratisation process. As the historian 
Raymond Pearson (1995: 77) notes, some Western observers had 
persuasively argued that nationalism had been effectively contained 
by internationalist communism for forty years in East Europe. For 
example, both the historian Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner rule 
out a significant role for opposition nationalism in the democratisation 
process. 
"The changes in and after 1989 were ... essentially not due to 
national tensions, which remained under effective control even 
where they genuinely existed, as in Poland. " (Hobsbawm 
1990/1994: 167). 
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"This (East European communist) system had no very great 
difficulty in suppressing and containing nationalism ... 
it was not 
nationalism that brought it down. " (Gellner 1997/1998: 57). 
When the role of political Catholicism is mentioned beyond Poland, it 
is usually as an institutional rather than a political cultural force, for 
example Huntington (1984: 207-208)1,53 or the role of John Paul II as 
an elite actor is stressed. Lipset (1994), although now acknowledging 
the link between Catholicism and the 1970s-1980s democratisations, 
retains his modernisation stance by drawing attention to considerable 
post-WWII economic growth in many major Catholic countries. 
Schöpflin (1993/1994: 293) explicitly downplays the dissident role of 
both religion and nationalism within the political culture of 
opposition. "Neither religion nor nationalism was effective in 
mobilizing opposition to the existing regimes. " In contrast, Paul Lewis 
(1994: 263) describes the political culture of opposition that emerged 
in the 1980s as "often more a form of symbolic expression of national 
and religious sentiment (most notably in the archetypal emergence of 
Solidarity in 1980). " Many who stressed the role of the CEE political 
cultures of opposition were not, however, political scientists; for 
example, R. J. Crampton, Timothy Garton Ash, Peter Sugar, Raymond 
Pearson, Ladislav Holy, and George Weigel. The first four are all 
historians, Holy was a social anthropologist and Weigel is a Roman 
Catholic theologian. Crampton (1997: 414) argues that one factor 
"eating away at the vitals of the communist system was a desire for a 
fair and accurate interpretation of the national past. " Garton Ash 
(1990: 134 & 136) writes of the 1989 revolution being born as much 
53 It should be noted that subsequently Huntington (1991/1993) highlights other 
aspects of political Catholicism. 
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of hopes as of discontents and of its inner history being of "a set of 
ideas whose time had come, and a set of ideas whose time had gone. " 
Sugar (1995a: 429) asserts that "the ideology that made the defeat of 
communism possible ... was nationalism. " Pearson (1995: 69) writes 
of `the rising tide of nationalism' during the final years of CEE 
communism. Holy (1996: 48) contends that nationalism was "the basis 
for the opposition to communism which culminated in its overthrow. " 
Finally, Weigel (1992: 34) argues that: 
"The Revolution of 1989 was, at its heart, a triumphant revolution 
of the human spirit. ... The West has too often forgotten that 
politics is a function of culture, and that at the heart of culture is 
religion. " 
1.3.4 The Contribution of The Transition Literature 
A fourth domain within the democratisation literature, the transition 
literature, focused not upon structural factors but rather upon the 
processes leading to the 1970s-1980s transitions to democracy that 
occurred mainly in South America, Southern Europe and Central 
Eastern Europe. Some observers, for example Linz and Stepan (Linz 
1996: 42), linked regime type with differing transition and 
consolidation pathways. In the CEE regimes of the 1980s, Linz and 
Stepan (1996: 56) argue there was some space for democratic political 
cultures of opposition to develop and impinge upon the regimes. 
Reforma-pactada, ruptura pactada was possible between authoritarian 
regime moderates and democratic opposition moderates or between 
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mature post-totalitarian regime leaders and the leaders of the incipient 
or democratic opposition. 54 
1.3.5 Discussion: Similarities of East European and Transition 
Studies and The Overall Contribution of the 
Democratisation Literature 
There were some similarities between the East European and the 
transition studies, particularly where the latter related to Central 
Eastern Europe. The transition study literature also predominantly 
employed a comparative approach, but across regions rather than 
countries. The transition studies, although primarily not concerned 
with possible structural factors leading to democratisation, also tended 
to identify short to medium-term demise factors. In consequence of 
the cross-regional/cross-country emphases in the East European and 
transition studies, both domains of literature sometimes produced not 
too insightful `common denominator' general conclusions that 
neglected the differing country-specific impacts of present and past 
socio-economic, political and cultural factors. 55 Both domains 
54 Linz and Stepan (Linz 1996: 61) define reforma-pactada, ruptura pactada as 
the overall process that occurs when regime and opposition moderates make a 
pact to reform and eventually negotiations lead to an agreed rupture that allows 
for the dismantling of the non-democratic elements of the state. 
ss Some of the conclusions drawn by Pridham (1994: 7& 263) illustrate this 
danger: 
"There is no such phenomenon as a straightforward or easy transition to 
liberal democracy. " "External factors can hamper democratization ... or 
further democratization.. . Historical 
legacies and cultural factors may 
hamper or further democratization ... Several conjunctural 
factors may 
become crucial in the transition process. ... The success or 
failure of the 
transition to democracy seems to depend more on domestic conditions and 
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identified modernisation factors, for example Pye (1989/1990: 7) in 
the East European studies and Pridham (1994: 261) in the transition 
studies. JQ jh 49rnains stressed the significance of PDrbachev's role 
and/or his policies, for example, (Garton Ash 1990: 140), (Dahrendorf 
1990: 13), (Pravda 1992c: 31), (Swain 1993: 189), l hfte 1993b: 9) 
& (Crampton 1997: 414) in the East European stucjips ap4 (pm, worski 
1991/1992: 5) in the transition studies. 
In summary, although some of the works within some of the 
democratisation literature domains signalled the significance of the 
roles of nationalism, religion and political culture it the 
democratisation process, the literature did not provide a useful 
uncerstan4ing of the relationship of nationalism anc political religion 
to the mechanism of transformation of political culture. 
1.1 ToWpnds A Theoretical framework: The ContrýPptjon of the 
f gJpAjFal Culture Literature 
The East European study and transition literature in particular 
appeared to emphasise economic, political institutions and political 
actor factors largely denuded of a wider political cultural perspective. 
Consequently, the political cultural literature pertaining to Eastern 
Europe was next investigated. 
The US political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba were 
among the first to introduce the concept of political culture to political 
on leadership than on external pressure, except in the cases of complete or 
vital dependence on a foreign power. " 
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science in the mid-1950s. However, the application of political culture 
concepts to communist studies did not emerge until the late 1960s - 
early 1970s. 
Two main areas of academic vulnerability of the political culture 
school relate to methodological problems and explaining the causal 
process by which political change takes place. (Eatwell 1997: 3-4). 
Some of the methodological problems stem from the complex 
subjective nature of political culture, however defined, resulting in 
neither qualitative nor quantitative methods ever proving completely 
satisfactory. 
One of the main differences in the definitions of political culture 
emerging from the literature pertains to the inclusion of political 
actions as an inherent part of the definition. Almond defined political 
culture in terms of a `pattern of orientations' where "`every political 
system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political 
action. "' 56 Similarly, Verba in (Pye 1965/1967: 513) defined the 
political culture of a society as comprising 
"the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values 
which define the situation in which political action takes place. It 
provides the subjective orientation to politics. " 
Huntington (1975: 15) and Brown (1977/1979: 1) also excluded 
political behaviour/actions as an integral part of their political culture 
definitions. Others, for example White (1979: 1), widened the 
definition by incorporating overt political actions. The thesis, in 
56 G. Almond. `Comparing Political Systems. ' The Journal of Politics, 1956,18, 
p. 396 as cited by Eatwell (1997: 1). 
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keeping with its definition of culture presented later in this chapter 
adopts the former approach. The thesis also perceives "political 
culture ... as that part of culture ... which 
bears relevance to politics. " 
(Brown 1984: 155). In other words, political culture is viewed as 
embedded within the overall cultural system. Huntington also reflects 
this embedded perspective when he observes (1984: 207): 
"Political culture is, presumably, rooted in the broader culture of 
a society involving those beliefs and values, often religiously 
based, concerning the nature of humanity and society, the 
relations among human beings, and the relation of individuals to 
a transcendent being. " 
This observation helps explain why the role of political religion 
impinges upon political culture. Narrower perspectives of political 
culture not so embedded as Huntington's may explain why the role of 
religion has consistently been underplayed in American political 
science, as Eatwell (Eatwell 1997: 5) notes. 
Tucker reflects a wider embedded perspective when he writes (Tucker 
1987: 6) of the Communist party-state as a political cultural 
formation, and of "an orientation toward the study of political 
institutions, ideologies, practices, values, etc., as phenomena 
embedded in the larger cultures of particular societies. " Tucker's 
political cultural formation of institutions approach suggests it may 
well be useful to apply such a perspective when looking at some of the 
key Polish institutions responsible for the creation of Polish regime 
and opposition political culture. The thesis adopts this approach with 
regard to the Catholic Church, the Polish communist Party-State and 
Solidarity. 
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The definition of culture adopted is a broad one taken to be "the total 
way of life of a people, the social legacy the individual acquires from 
his group. ... Culture 
is a way of thinking, feeling, believing. It is the 
group's knowledge stored up ... 
for future use. " (Kluckhohn 1949: 17 
& 23). The thesis accepts Kluckhohn's (1949: 28) premise that "every 
culture embraces those aspects of the past which, usually in altered 
form and with altered meanings, live on in the present. " It also, in 
agreeing with Kluckhohn (1949: 38) that "knowledge of a culture 
makes it possible to predict a good many of the actions of any person 
who shares that culture, " maintains that an understanding of a political 
culture facilitates prediction of certain political actions of those that 
share that political culture. Thus the embedded political culture 
definition adopted is the legitimate concern not only of political 
science, but also of historical, anthropological and sociological 
disciplines. Both Brown (1984: 155) and Eatwell (1997: 8) lend 
57 support to the interdisciplinary approach. 
Given the research's key concern about the role of political culture in 
the democratisation process, the issues of how political cultures 
change and whether political culture can help explain the causal 
process by which democratisation takes place are critical ones. 
Huntington (1975: 18) argues that "political cultures rarely give way 
completely to the new, no matter how ruthless the impact of 
innovation. " Political culture, he asserts (1975: 32), "tends to resist 
change and, when it changes, it does so more slowly than ideologues 
57 A further justification of an interdisciplinary approach is the inherently complex 
nature of political Catholicism and of nations and nationalisms. As Hutchinson 
(1994: 3) points out "the study of nations and nationalism cannot be confined to a 
single disciplinary perspective. " 
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may desire. " Gray, citing Poland as an example, concludes (Gray 
1977/1979: 272) that in those countries that in the past had 
experienced "the fruitful play of competing ideas and competing 
interests", the communist experience 
"has not weakened but actually strengthened the conviction 
among the population that political freedom brings both justice 
and greater efficiency. " 
Writing later, Huntington sees an association between democratisation 
and cultural factors. Of the `factors or preconditions' that appear to be 
associated with democratisation, he says (1984: 198) that "to a large 
extent these factors can be grouped into four broad categories - 
economic, social, external and cultural. " Later on (1984: 207) 
Huntington contends: "significant differences in their receptivity to 
democracy appear to exist among societies with different cultural 
traditions. " McAuley notes (1984: 23) that if it is to be argued that 
past culture is a crucial factor in forming present culture, then, it is 
necessary to trace the process by which perceptions are transmitted 
over time. Part 1 of the thesis argues that pre-1945 Poland can hardly 
be characterised as experiencing "the fruitful play of competing ideas 
and competing interests" and yet agrees with Gray's above-mentioned 
observation about the post-1945 strengthening of a liberal political 
culture. 
The thesis accepts Huntington's observation of the disinclination of 
political culture to easily change and yet argues that the prevailing 
pre-WWII illiberal political culture did, post-1945, as adopted by the 
opposition, liberalise. It therefore remains to find a conceptual tool 
that can explain how political culture, so often associated with 
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emphasising the continuity of power and traditions, can explain 
democratic change 
In summary, although the political culture literature provides useful 
definitions and convincingly makes the case for an embedded view of 
political culture within a broadly defined wider culture, it does not 
provide critical insights into the transforming dynamics of political 
culture that are necessary to investigate its liberalisation. 
1.5 The Theoretical Framework: Myths As A Key Tool 
1.5.1 The Contribution of the Nationalism Literature 
Some of the works within the nationalism literature - for example, 
(Barczewski 2000) 58 - argued the existence of a close relationship 
between myths and religious and national identity beliefs. It was 
therefore decided to explore the role of myths as depicted in the 
nationalism literature to see if myths might provide the sought-after 
theoretical framework for understanding how nationalism and political 
Catholicism contribute to the dynamics of political culture within the 
democratisation process. 
58 Barczewski (2000) identifies in the legends of King Arthur and Robin Hood 
two myths that played an important role in the 19th century construction of British 
national identity. 
56 
The Relationship Between Myths and the Nation, Nationalism and 
Religion 
For some that compared Western nation with the Eastern/East 
European nation, for example Sugar (1967/1971b: 10), the 
Eastern/Eastern European nation, in particular, was founded `out of 
myths of the past and the dreams of the future. ' Smith (1995/1996a: 
359) sees the nation as sharing common myths. Smith asserts (1996b: 
3 85-3 86) that there is `considerable evidence' that modern nations are 
in part created out of pre-existing origin myths, and that pre-modern 
ethnies bequeath to modern nations, a fund of myths. 59 Davies (1997: 
141) observes that some nations have more need of myths than do 
others and that defeated nations invent myths to explain their 
misfortune and to assist their survival. 60 
Schöpflin (2000: 80) defines a myth as a set of beliefs, usually put 
forth as a narrative, held by the community about itself. Myths are, he 
observes, about perceptions and not `historically validated truths'. 
Using Schöpflin's definition, a national myth is defined within the 
thesis as a myth where a significant proportion of the community, 
perceived as the nation, holds a set of beliefs and/or of emotions that 
relates to its national identity. Schöpflin (2000: 81) depicts the 
relationship between myths, rituals, and symbols thus: 
59 He made a similar argument in (Smith 1986/1995). 
60 Davies (1997: 141) suggests that Poles may fall into this latter category "as 
political adversity over many generations seems to have created the sort of 
imaginative climate in which myths can flourish. " 
57 
"Myth is the narrative, the set of ideas, whereas ritual is the 
acting out, the articulation of myth; symbols are the building 
blocks of myth and the acceptance or veneration of symbols is a 
significant aspect of ritual. " 
Rituals and symbols are therefore devices that can be used to 
propagate myths. The close relationship between myths and 
nationalism and religion is illustrated by Schöpflin (2000: 90-97), who 
describes a number of common myths that can be found all over the 
world, but `notable in Central and East Europe'. Amongst those 
Schöpflin depicts that have a particular resonance with the concerns of 
this thesis are those that may be loosely categorised as myths initially 
generated first by state- and then by nation-building contexts and 
another set that may be loosely categorised as myths initially 
generated by political Catholicism/Christianity. The themes of hopes 
to be fulfilled and evil enemies to be banished by saviours are to be 
found in several of these two sets of myths. The myths within the first 
set are: 
" Myths of military valour that reflect the special regard in which a 
collectivity holds itself because of its deeds of military valour and 
resistance. These myths are sometimes linked to the idea of 
insurrection or revolution. 
" Myths of foundation that highlight a particular moment that 
deserves special note in order to point to the future. They suggest 
that afterwards everything will be better and that the newly 
founded system has dispensed with whatever made the old 
reprehensible. 
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" Myths of territory that claim that there is a particular territory 
where the nation first discovered itself, assumed the form it aspired 
to, or expressed its finest self. 
" Myths of ethnogenesis that claim that because a particular ethnic 
group was there first, that group has a superior right to that 
territory over all others. 
" Myths of kinship that are linked to the organic nature of the ethnic 
group, to the concept of the nation as a family. 61 
The myths within the second set are : 
" Myths of rebirth and renewal that reflect the Christian idea that the 
present is tainted and must be cleansed and through that purgation 
a better world can be created. 
" Myths of redemption and suffering that claim that the nation is 
undergoing or has undergone a process of expiating its sins and 
will be redeemed or, may itself redeem others. 62 
61 One of the functions of these kinship myths is to impose a set of moral 
propositions on a group that is in the process of being welded into a nation. These 
myths work to exclude ethnic aliens and sometimes evolve into myths of racial 
superiority. 
62 The prevalence of these myths in Eastern Europe, Schöpflin (2000: 90-97) 
argues, can be explained by the legacy of Christianity in conjunction with a sense 
of geographical, political and cultural marginalisation. 
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" Antemurale christiantis myths that claim that the nation fought 
against paganism and other non-Christian `faiths' beyond the 
borders of Europe to save Europe and its Christian civilisation, and 
in doing so nearly bled to death. 
" Myths of election that are of Christian origin and claim that God or 
History has chosen a particular nation and entrusted it with a 
special mission because it is endowed with unique virtues. 
The thesis will show how these two sets of myths, which for 
shorthand purposes will be designated as national and Catholic myths 
respectively, were adapted and used to foster a liberal political culture 
of opposition via a synthesis of liberal nationalism and liberal political 
Catholicism within 1945-1989 Poland. 
In summary, the nationalism literature proved useful in helping to 
furnish definitions of liberal and illiberal nationalism and in 
highlighting the linkage between myths and the nation, nationalism 
and religion. Both the political Catholicism and nationalism literature 
highlighted a need to be aware of the evolutionary, contradictory and 
complex liberal and illiberal natures of both political Catholicism and 
nationalism, shaped by the specific wider social and cultural contexts 
within which they operated. Although a useful conceptual key for the 
research in myths was provided by the nationalism literature, an 
understanding of its mechanism in relation to the dynamics of the 
political culture and democratisation processes was still missing. 
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Therefore the social anthropological literature on myths was explored 
in the hope that it might provide the crucial insight. 
1.5.2 The Contribution of the Social Anthropological Literature 
A few works, some already mentioned, have explored aspects of the 
political role of myths and/or symbols within Polish 1945-1989 
politics. (Davies 2001b) 63 is a chapter on Polish national mythology 
that comprises various unconnected short accounts of pre-1945 myths, 
with a single post-1945 exception where Davies looks at the 
mythology surrounding the 1952 Polish Constitution. Apart from one 
instance, in looking at the pre-1945 myths Davies does not follow 
them through to any post-1945 manifestations. Mach (1985) in an 
article that looks at some Polish national symbols, traces their pre- 
1945 genesis and gives examples of their post-1945 usage. (Plewa 
1992) and (Kubik 1994) are the most extensive of these works 
focusing on Poland. Plewa (1992) adopts an interdisciplinary 
approach and focuses upon two myths deployed by the opposition 
during 1980-1983 and also provides some useful definitions of some 
of the functions of myths. 64 Kubik deploys an anthropological 
perspective and focuses on the role of symbols within the regime 
hegemonic and opposition counter-hegemonic discourse of the 1970s 
and within Solidarity. 
63 Davies (2001b) is a Polish version of the Davies (1997) chapter, which in turn 
was based on a 1996 Milewski Lecture given in New Britain, Connecticut. 
64 The miracle and insurrection myths and the functions of consolidating, 
integrating and mobilising. 
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From about the mid-1980s, a few works from the social 
anthropological literature, and in particular Kertzer (1988), 
significantly contributed towards understanding the mechanism of 
political cultural change. Before that mechanism is explored, the 
definitions of symbols and rituals provided by the literature and 
adopted in the thesis are presented. Symbols are defined as: 
"objects, acts, relationships or linguistic formations that stand 
ambiguously for a multiplicity of meanings, evoke emotions, and 
impel men to action. " (Cohen 1974: 23). 
Ritual is defined as symbolic behaviour that is socially standardised 
and repetitive (Kertzer 1988: 9). 
The Relationship Between Myths and the Nation, Nationalism and 
Religion 
The social anthropological literature, like the nationalism literature, 
also points to the close relationship between myths (together with their 
accompanying symbols and rituals) and nations, nationalism and 
religion. For Holy (1996: 3), myths, symbols and traditions make 
possible national identity. Kertzer (1988: 179) asserts that "without 
rites and symbols there are no nations. " He observes (1988: 178-179) 
that the struggle for national identity is waged in part through symbols 
and accompanying rituals. For example, the relationship between 
national identity and the symbolism as expressed by national flag, 
anthem and emblem and the accompanying rituals deploying these 
national symbols is very strong. 
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Doty (1986: 33-34) observes that myths very frequently feature the 
intervention of deities or forces from `another world' discontinuous 
with this one. Kertzer (1988: 86) points out the potent effects of 
combining ritual with sacred symbolism by citing Clifford Geertz: 
"`It is in some sort of ceremonial form ... that the models and 
motivations which sacred symbols induce in men and the general 
conceptions of the order of existence which they formulate for 
men meet and reinforce one another. "' 65 
Doty (1986: 33-34) asserts "myths typify qualities associated with 
highly marked experiences that indicate something transcending ... 
ordinary personhood ." 
The transcendental characteristic of myths reinforces their relationship 
with religion. This and other characteristics and functions are now 
explored. 
The characteristics and functions of myths, symbols and rituals 
Amongst the key, often shared, characteristics of myths, symbols and 
rituals are the following: universality, transcendentality, multivocality 
and the ability to adapt their multivocality by acquiring new 
meanings. 
65 C Geertz. `Religion as a Cultural System. ' (pp. 1-46) in Michael Banton (ed. ) 
Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. Tavistock: London, 1966, p. 
28. 
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As already noted within the nationalist literature, the basic form of 
myths and some symbols is fairly universal and can be found in all 
parts of the world. 66 
Myths are transcendental insofar as they answer to moral, spiritual, 
psychological, and/or emotional needs, and because they transcend 
human empirical experience, imparting a sense of destiny by giving 
meaning to the past, present and future. 
A consequence of multivocality is that the same myth/symbol is 
understood in different ways. In consequence people with different 
understandings can be united by identifying with the same 
myth/symbol. The multivocality of symbols can be adapted, for as 
Holy (1996: 131) points out, "symbols serve as vehicles for meaning 
through their linkage to other symbols" and thus "their meanings can 
be altered by explicitly linking them to different symbols. " Holy 
(1996: 131) argues that this adaptation facility means that oppositions, 
by altering meanings, can contest the authenticity of the myths of 
those in power. Kertzer (1996: 8) explores how political symbols are 
constructed and altered, and how people come to recognise certain 
symbols as legitimate and other as illegitimate. The exploration rests, 
on the assumption that "political perceptions... are symbolically 
constructed" and that "people are as driven by emotion as they are by 
any dispassionate calculation of personal interest. " 
66 Myth, asserts the German philosopher and educator Ernst Cassirer (1874- I945)ß 
"is a common element in human life that appears, in a similar shape, under tbh 
most various and divergent conditions. " (Cassirer 1945/1979: 244). Edelman 
writes of omnipotent hero-saviours and conspiratorial enemies as being the central 
archetypal myths. M. Edelman in Politics as Symbolic Action. Markham: Chicago, 
1971. 
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Amongst the key, often shared, functions of myths, symbols and 
rituals are their transmitting, condensation of meaning, morale- 
enhancing, solidarity creating, motivating, mobilising, legitimising 
and explaining functions. 
Their transmitting function is linked to the ability of myths and 
symbols to acquire new meanings, and means that myths and symbols 
from the past can and do re-emerge and carry new interpretations of 
contemporary events. 67 Mythical realities, Kubik (1994: 133) 
observed, also: 
"have ... a tendency to force themselves back into history and influence its course as powerful metaphors, endowing historical 
situations with meaning. " 
A consequence of the condensation of meaning function is that myths 
and symbols can embody and bring together diverse ideas. Often they 
condense meaning into simplistic profane and sacred divisions. 
Cassirer (1944/1979: 238) writes that a myth 
"conceives the world as a great drama - as a struggle between 
divine and demonic forces, between light and darkness, between 
good and evil. There is always a negative and positive pole in 
mythical thought and imagination. " 
67 For example, the regime banning of a symbolic emblem or hymn can give the 
symbol new meaning. 
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Myths, symbols and rituals enhance morale by giving confidence or 
hope, or by helping to overcome grief or adversity. Cassirer 
(1944/1979: 238) asserts that 
"one of the oldest and most widespread motifs in all the 
mythologies of the world is the idea of the `millennium' - of a 
period in which all hopes shall be fulfilled and all evils shall be 
removed. " 
Symbols and rituals, insofar as they become dominant, can give one 
confidence that one is seeing the world as it really is. 
"It is hard to argue with a flag ... ; hard to argue with a song ... ; 
and hard to argue with the view of the world embodied in the 
funeral rites of a popular leader. " (Kertzer 1988: 184). 
Their morale-enhancing function is linked to the function of myths, 
symbols, 68 and especially rituals that serves to create solidarity 
within a community. Kertzer (1988: 62) convincingly argues that "the 
rites of social communion not only express innate strivings for social 
solidarity, but also do much to build and renew them. " 69 Mass rituals, 
such as rallies, for example, 
"have powerful effects on the participants, increasing their 
identification with the group and reinforcing their opposition to 
the foes that are symbolically represented in the demonstration. " 
(Kertzer 1988: 119). 
68 For example, the wearing of the same symbolic badge may serve this purpose. 
69 In this he concurs with Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), who, in formulating his 
influential theory of social cohesion, emphasised the key role of ritual in 
producing and maintaining solidarity. 
66 
Because ritual is about common participation and emotional argument 
and not about the specific rationalisations by which one accounts for 
it, the ritual by transcending its ideological context can serve to 
produce bonds of solidarity without requiring uniformity of belief. 
(Kertzer 1988: 45 & 67). 
The principal role of myth, argues Cassirer (1944/1979: 237) "is to 
arouse emotions and to prompt man to certain actions. " The 
motivating and mobilising functions of myths can be engendered 
through the activation of collective memory. Martyrs, unknown 
soldiers, uprisings and wars are powerful symbols that, through their 
association with the symbolism of death and the ritual of annual 
commemoration, can constantly revive the collective ideals of the 
community. Thus myths and symbols call for a repetition of deeds 
(Plewa 1992: 16), often through ritual. 
Myths, symbols and rituals legitimise not only those in power, 70 but 
also those challenging/seeking power. Kertzer (1996) looks at how the 
Italian Communist Party (PC) used myths, symbols and rituals to 
legitimise itself and its ideology. 
Through ritual, nationalist, religious, and other `political' forces seek 
popular legitimacy by identifying with powerful symbols. Kertzer, 
(1988: 45) argues that as many of the most powerful symbols of 
legitimacy are of religious origin, it is unsurprising that 
70 Durkheim argued that rituals serve to re-enact central values and norms guiding 
society at large, and to legitimise political systems and political power holders. 
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"new political forces eagerly rummage through the pre-existing 
body of religious rituals and symbols to find those that will 
enrich their own ritual forms. " 
Kertzer adds that such legitimation is not limited to cases where the 
political and religious goals are identical. Ritual, Kertzer contends 
(1988: 42), is important to the forces of political change just because 
of its conservative properties. These forces can borrow legitimacy 
from the old by nurturing the old ritual forms, redirected to new 
purposcs. 
The explanatory function of myths and symbols contributes to the 
formation or re-enforcement of belief systems and actions. It does this 
by helping to deal with the chaos and complexity of human experience 
and put it into a coherent framework by creating a world where the 
causes are simple and the remedies are apparent. (Kertzer 1988: 8& 
84). Myth, asserts Cassirer (1945/1979: 249), "becomes an interpreter 
of rite: it enables man to understand what he does. " 
j(ertzer (19$8: 99) observes that rituals do not simply excite, týey also 
ir}struct with the pote ey of that instruction depending heavy on ý4e 
power of ritual to pjarP ýýe jpdividual in a receptive frame of npincj. 
Myths serve to explain, regardless of whether or not they are based on 
`historically validated truths'. Cassircr (1944/1974; 237) asserts that 
"to inquire into the `truth' p4 p9st-19th century political myths is 
meaningless, für they are weapons and weapons prove their truth by 
their efficiency. 
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The Political Potency of Myths, Symbols and Rituals 
The aforementioned characteristics and functions all contribute to 
myths, symbols and rituals being politically very potent. Part of the 
political struggle is a struggle over the dominant symbolic paradigm, 
the struggle for symbolic hegemony. 71 As Holy (1996: 33 & 43) 
argues, the political significance and potency of symbolic and 
ritualistic actions of opposition within East European communist- 
ruled countries, where the official political processes strove to prevent 
the open formulation of political alternatives, was much greater. 
Religious rituals, for example, could allow mobilisation where other 
forms of more explicit political protest were not allowed. 
Although the political potency of myths is relevant to the concerns of 
the thesis, the prime importance for the thesis of the social 
anthropological insights into myths (and their accompanying symbols 
and rituals) is that the literature provides explanations for their 
71 Cassirer (1944/1979: 236) writes forcefully of the political potency of the 
myth. Cassirer, ousted from his teaching post at Hamburg University in 1933 as 
Hitler came to power, argues "the invention and the skilful use ... of the technique 
of political myths - decided the victory of the Nationalist Socialist movement in 
Germany. " Writing of the Nazi's myth-making of the Jews as a maleficent and 
Satanic force, he argues (1944/1979: 238-239) that in such myth-making one is 
encountering something much worse than anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism has 
`existed at all time', 
"but it cannot account for the specific methods of the German anti-Jewish 
propaganda. What was proclaimed here was a mortal combat -a life-and- 
death struggle which could only end with the complete extermination of the 
Jews. " 
Kertzer (1996), gives examples of the PC's manipulation of symbols in ritual 
contexts, such as public commemorations and anniversaries, and the PC's use of 
military valour, hero and enemy myths and symbols in inventing history. 
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relationships with political culture and with the mechanism relating to 
the dynamics of political culture and democratisation. The literature 
explains how their characteristics and functions enable myths, 
symbols and rituals to serve as vehicles for nationalist and religious 
political beliefs, values, and emotions, and thereby for political culture 
and for the political actions it induces. The transmitting function and 
the adaptability of the multivocality characteristic of myths and 
symbols meant that the pre-1945 beliefs, values, and emotions could 
be transmitted and adapted to the post-1945 context. The extension of 
the multivocality and legitimising attributes of myths and symbols 
facilitates the adaptation of political culture. These attributes allow 
new liberal democratic meanings to myths and symbols and yet at the 
same time permit them to retain legitimacy associated with the 
continuation of past less liberal traditions. This partly explains why 
political culture, usually perceived as explaining aspects of continuity, 
can also explain aspects of `adapted continuity'. 
1.6 Locating The Polish Case 
In order to locate the Polish case within a wider context, a summary of 
recent Polish history and a brief assessment of how the 20th century 
Polish political scene compares with that of other CEE countries are 
presented. 
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1.6.1 Poland under Foreign Rule: The Late 18th Century to 1918 
Andrzej Walicki takes issue with some of the perceptions of East 
European nationalism and nation-building as they pertain to Poland, 
arguing that they are `simply wrong and misleading'. Thus, for 
example, Kohn's depiction of Eastern nationalism, asserts Walicki 
(1989: ix-x), 
"disregards the circumstances that the Poles ... were a `historical' nation -a nation whose national consciousness had 
reached quite an advanced stage of development under 
conditions of its own statehood. " 
Walicki (1989: 88) asserts: 
" modern Polish `nationalism' originated ... in the atmosphere of 
the universalist ideas of the Enlightenment, as an ideology not of 
the pre-political folk community, but of the nation-state, that is of 
apolitical community formed by a common political history. " 
During the 18th century, the independent status of the Polish-led 
Commonwealth (1569-1772) - comprising Poland, Lithuania and parts 
of the Ukraine - declined as Poland's neighbours increasingly 
dominated her affairs. The last monarch of Poland, King Stanislaw II 
(1764-1795), had been handpicked by Catherine II of Russia. Despite 
this, Stanislaw embarked upon a modernisation programme for 
Poland. 72 His efforts were constantly undermined by Poland's 
Prussian and Russian neighbours, with Russia encouraging non- 
72 This included the establishment in 1765 of the Knights' School, the first truly 
secular college that promoted civil virtues and religious toleration. 
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Catholic Poles and conservative elements within the Polish nobility to 
form confederations. In defiance of Russian pressure, 73 a group of 
Polish Catholic nobles, formed, in 1768, the Bar Confederacy and 
waged a war (1768-1772) of national self-determination against the 
Russians. The Confederacy's programme combined anti-royalist and 
anti-Russian sentiments with patriotic and conservative overtones in 
defence of Roman Catholicism. Their movement strengthened a 
nascent Polish national consciousness but resulted in 1772 in their 
defeat and the first partitioning of Poland by Prussia, Russia and 
Austria. Poland lost about one-third of its territory and population. In 
the following two decades, there occurred a remarkable Enlightenment 
period within the remaining Poland, with key reformers such as Hugo 
Kollataj (1750-1812) and Stanislaw Staszic (1755-1826) advocating 
such reforms as improving the status of Polish Jewry and of the still 
feudal peasantry. Such proto-liberal sentiments found expression in 
Poland's 1791 Constitution. The Constitution was unacceptable to 
both Russia and Prussia, fearful of a Polish revival, and in 1793 the 
two powers partitioned Poland further. The following year, 1794, 
witnessed the first of a series of ill-fated National Uprisings by Poles 
to regain national self-determination from the absolutist powers. The 
defeat of the 1794 Uprising led to the third 1795 partitioning of 
Poland by her three aforementioned neighbours. Poland now was 
effectively erased from the map of Europe until 1918. 
In the long absence of a Polish state, Polish culture, including its 
myths, was to play a significant role in maintaining Polish national 
73 Pressure that included the presence of Russian troops that terrorised the Polish 
parliament. 
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identity. Other Uprisings followed in 1830-1831,1846,1848,74 and 
1863-1864. These Uprisings were fuelled by an idealistic nationalism 
that in turn was nourished by Polish romanticism. Following the brutal 
repression of the 1863-1864 Uprising, a more realistic Polish 
nationalism prevailed. Such nationalism, fuelled by Poland's positivist 
period, disavowed the physical force tradition of idealistic nationalism 
and advocated instead that Poland needed, via organic work, to 
strengthen her society and economy by peaceful means as a 
prerequisite for regaining national self-determination. When this 
approach also seemed ineffective, idealistic nationalist sentiments 
revived, encouraged by a neo-romantic period. 
The defeat of the German and Austro-Hungarian Central Powers 
during VM, and the collapse of the Russian Empire with the 1917 
Bolshevik Revolution, made the Wilsonian vision of nation-states and 
national self-determination appear realisable. 
1.6.2 Independent Poland and WWII: 1918-1945 
1918-1939 Polish nationalism and political Catholicism, in eschewing 
domestic fascism, were not as illiberal as their Hungarian and Slovak 
counterparts. However, the overall picture of an illiberal East 
European nationalism and political Catholicism, particularly in the 
1918-1939 inter-war period described in this chapter, is broadly in 
keeping with the Polish situation as depicted in Chapter 2. Chapter 2's 
more detailed exploration of the Polish scene - particularly by 
74 In 1848, there were two Uprisings centred within Galicia and then Poznan. 
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revealing pre-1918 liberal strands of Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism, illustrates, however, the dangers of over-simplified 
generalisations. 
Poland regained her independence in 1918, led by Pilsudski who had 
been influenced by Poland's romantic and idealistic nationalist 
traditions. Pilsudski's nationalism competed with a now more strident 
realistic nationalism that was dominated by Dmowski and his 
illiberalism. The influence of the romantic and idealistic traditions 
upon Pilsudski manifested itself in a desire to restore the Polish 
Commonwealth, which in turn led to the Polish-Soviet War (1919- 
1920), as Pilsudski tried to reclaim lost Eastern lands. Although 
successful in the war, Poland was facing increasing socio-political and 
economic difficulties. In 1923, a frustrated Pilsudski resigned all state 
functions. The period of economic depression in the 1920s-1930s hit 
an already economically backward Poland particularly hard. This, 
combined with constant national/ethnic minority and border disputes 
and a prevailing illiberalism propagated by Dmowski and his 
followers and by most of the Polish Church hierarchy, led to 
instability and a drift to authoritarianism, as exemplified by 
Pilsudski's coup d 'etat in 1926. 
The partitioning of Poland by the Germans and Soviets at the outset of 
WWII and their subsequent war-time atrocities had a profound effect 
on Poles and their nationalism. The war re-fuelled the German and 
Russian/Soviet enemy myths and saw a divided Polish resistance. 
Some six million Poles were killed and much of Poland, including 
Gdansk and Warsaw, physically destroyed by the Germans. About 1.5 
million Poles were deported by the Soviets to the Soviet Union, where 
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many failed to survive for more than a few years. The main pro- 
Western resistance was the Home Army. Amongst the other resistance 
groupings was a small pro-communist force, which, thanks to Soviet 
support, provided some of the leadership for post-WWII Poland. 
1.6.3 Poland Under Communist Rule: 1945 to 1989 
Several East European and transition studies argued that compared 
with the other East European regimes Poland constituted a `special 
case'. For example, the Polish Stalinist period was not as rampant as 
that experienced by other countries within the Soviet orbit (Crampton, 
1997: 221). Some studies asserted that Poland's regime was less 
totalitarian (Markus 1982: 91) & (Linz 1996: 256) 75 and that her civil 
society was more autonomous compared with other CEE regimes. 
The autonomy was reflected by the role of the Church (White 1993a: 
36), of Solidarity (Garton Ash 1990: 134), and by the existence of a 
significant private agricultural sector (White 1993a: 36) (Linz 1996: 
257) and of a self-organised, ethical civil society (Linz 1996: 270- 
271). Some studies commented upon Poland's civil society's 
`nationalist antagonism against the Soviet hegemon' (Linz 1996: 259) 
and of Poland's `tradition of revolt' (White 1993a: 37). Within the 
political culture literature, Eatwell (1997: 5) asserts that religion and 
nationalism played a notable role in the mobilisation of dissent in 
communist Poland during the 1980s. 
7' Linz (1996: 254) contends that of the 27 post-communist European states, only 
Poland was authoritarian, while the other 26 were totalitarian during the period of 
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During the 1945-1989 period, Poland was effectively ruled by Polish 
communists within the framework of a coercive Soviet hegemony. 
The Polish communists removed, by civil war, imprisonment, 
intimidation, or by co-optation, any opposition force that threatened 
their monopoly of power. Their ascendancy to power was aided by 
coalition fronts, a rigged 1946 referendum and non-free and unfair 
1947 elections. The post-war Polish communist leadership could be 
loosely divided into `Muscovites' who showed their allegiance 
foremost to Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) and those that sought a nationalist road to socialism, the 
national communists. At first, led by Wladyslaw Gomulka (1905- 
1982), 76 the national communists prevailed, but in 1948 Gomulka fell 
victim to the Stalinist national deviation witch-hunt and was replaced 
by the Muscovite Boleslaw Bierut (1892-1956) as leader of the Party 
(1948-1956). 
There followed a period of Stalinism (c. 1948-1956) within Poland, 
where national communism within the leadership gave way to almost 
total subservience to the Soviet Union. Most Polish victims of 
Stalinism, which included not only national communists but also non- 
communist opposition figures, were imprisoned rather than executed. 
Such a figure was Stefan Wyszynski (1901-1981), the Primate of the 
Polish Catholic Church (1948-1981) who was interned from 1953- 
1956. Despite the attempts of the regime, the Catholic Church 
high Stalinism or before the Yugoslavian `heresy' and mostly evolved into post- 
totalitarian regimes. 
76 Gomulka had headed the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) from 1943. Shortly after 
Gomulka's downfall in 1948, the PPR was renamed the Polish United Workers' 
Party (PZPR) following a merger forced upon the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). 
76 
remained the only major institution within Poland that the Party-State 
was not able to remove or control. This circumstance, coupled with 
political Catholicism's long anti-communist tradition and 
Wyszynski's skilful deployment of myths that reinforced the Church's 
credentials as defender of the nation, meant that the Church, but for 
the short period of a legal Solidarity, " was the effective leader of the 
opposition. 
Stalin's death in 1953 and Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of him in 
1956 had a profound undermining effect upon the Stalinist leaderships 
with the satellite communist states, including Poland's. The mid- 
1950s de-Stalinisation period saw a revival of the national 
communists' fortunes but also, particularly following the Soviet 
intervention to crush the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, witnessed a 
number of the Polish secular left increasingly questioning whether 
communism was reformable. The return to power of Gomulka 78 and 
the release of Wyszynski during the Polish October of 1956 and the 
appearance of independent Catholic MPs, meant that for a short 
period, Polish (national) communism experienced a revival as it 
attempted once more to seek a Polish road to socialism. However 
Gomulka's popularity was soon dissipated as he increasingly took 
hard line ideological stances, as his reforms failed, and as he faced the 
inherent contradiction of dependency upon the Soviets while seeking 
greater national self-determination. The Catholic MPs were part of a 
Catholic intelligentsia movement called Znak and, as the only voice in 
77 Between November 1980 and December 1981, and from April 1989. 
78 For a brief period following Bierut's death in Moscow in March 1956, the Party 
was led by Edward Ochab. 
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Parliament prepared to question Party policy, constituted an important 
element of the opposition. The crushing of the student protests in 
March 1968 
, 
followed by the regime's repressive tactics, which 
included deploying the Jewish enemy myth and attacks upon the 
intelligentsia, and the Soviet-led intervention into Czechoslovakia in 
1968, had the effects of further disillusioning the now actively 
dissident secular left, and of increasing co-operation between them 
and members of Znak. Workers' protests in 1970 led to the ousting of 
Gomulka 79 and his replacement by Edward Gierek as First Secretary 
of the Party (1970-1980). 
The Gierek-led regime attempted to woo Poles with more consumer 
goods, but Gierek's attempts at economic legitimation failed and he 
increasingly resorted to national legitimation devices. Like his 
predecessor Gomulka, Gierek too was toppled by workers' protests 
with the emergence of Solidarity in the summer of 1980. Several of 
the key intelligentsia figures that played a significant part in the 
ground-work that led to formation of Solidarity and to the 1989 
Solidarity-led governing coalition were directly involved and affected 
by the `events' surrounding March 1968.80 The 1970s witnessed a 
79 The Party at times of extreme crisis was quite prepared to suddenly and 
dramatically scapegoat and/or sacrifice its leaders, as 1970,1980 and 1981 also 
show, in an attempt to preserve any political legitimacy it had. 
80 These included Jacek Kuron (1934- ) and Adam Michnik (1946- ) on the 
secular left, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki (1927-) and Wojtyla amongst the dissident 
Catholics. Wojtyla was a particularly pivotal opposition political player. As a 
former Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) lecturer with two doctorates and 
someone with close ties with the Krakow Znak intelligentsia, Cardinal Wojtyla 
(1967-) served as a bridge between the Znak movement and the Polish Church 
hierarchy, where he ranked only below Primate Wyszyrnski, the only other Polish 
cardinal at the time. See also Chapter 5. 
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dialogue and increasing co-operation between the dissident Catholic 
and secular left intelligentsia and the emergence of numerous 
independent opposition groups, of which the Workers' Defence 
Committee (KOR) was perhaps the most significant. Solidarity, led by 
Lech Walcsa, was formed following workers' protests in the summer 
of 1980. It owed its political strength in large part to the stubborn 
defiance of the workers who were increasingly frustrated by the 
regime's economic failures. It should be noted, however, that 
Solidarity also owed much of its legitimacy and ability to sustain its 
1982-1988 period of illegality, to the support of John Paul II and of 
the Catholic and secular left intelligentsia. 
Gierek was replaced for a short period by Stanislaw Kania (1980- 
1981) as First Secretary, but with the Soviets increasingly concerned 
about the strength of an autonomous Solidarity, Kania was replaced 
by Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland's Minister of Defence since 1968. In 
December 1981, Jaruzelski declared Martial Law and outlawed 
Solidarity. However, Jaruzelski did not attempt a full frontal attack on 
the Polish Church, much enhanced by the John Paul II papacy. Like 
Gierek, Jaruzelski, with an inability to achieve economic legitimation 
and ideological legitimation effectively bankrupt, also attempted 
nationalist legitimation. With the appointment of Gorbachev as 
General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985, Jaruzelski had the `green 
light' to try and seek an accommodation with the opposition. With the 
Church and Znak intellectuals playing a key behind-the-scenes role, 
especially during 1988, which also witnessed a resurgence of 
workers' protests, Solidarity and the regime reached a compromise 
during the Round Table Talks in the Spring of 1989. In the late 
summer of 1989, thanks in part to the defection of the hitherto non- 
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autonomous regime coalition partners to Solidarity's side, 
Mazowiecki became the first non-communist Prime Minister within 
the Soviet bloc. 
1.6.4 The Approach Adopted 
The thesis accepts the special-case arguments for post-1945 Poland 
being politically distinctive from other countries of the region, not 
least in its nationalism, political religion and political culture of 
opposition. The thesis also takes on board the arguments in some of 
the literatures for the desirability of an interdisciplinary approach. As 
the key research issue involves complex belief systems and complex 
processes over a long-time span, it was felt it would be more fruitful 
to adopt a single-country rather than a comparative approach in order 
to explore in depth rather than breadth. In the light of all these 
considerations, Poland was chosen for investigation, using insights 
into myths, rituals and symbols provided by nationalism and above all 
by the social anthropological literature, but also using political science 
concepts from other fields of literature. In the light of the complexity 
of the research issue and the inevitable subjectivity and ambiguity of 
the associated definitions adopted, the thesis would deploy a 
qualitative rather than quantitative approach. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PRE-1945 GENESIS OF POLISH 
NATIONAL AND CATHOLIC MYTHS 
2.1 Introduction: The Aims Of The Chapter 
A key aim of this chapter is to map the pre-1945 territory of the 
nationalist and political Catholic illiberal and liberal discourse, as 
reflected in the pre-1945 genesis and meanings of the myths and their 
associated symbols and rituals that helped shape the 1945-1989 Polish 
liberal political culture of opposition. Another key aim is to illuminate 
the role of myths of pre-1945 Polish (proto-) nationalism and political 
Catholicism in synthesising these two belief systems. 
This chapter argues that during the first half of the 20th century, Polish 
political culture was much influenced by an illiberal Polish 
nationalism and political Catholicism. The main source of Polish 
illiberalism was the social Darwinism of Dmowski, facilitated by 
illiberal strands of political Catholicism. The resulting illiberal 
political culture was in tune with other European illiberal nationalisms 
and the illiberal papal political Catholicism of the period, and 
expressed itself chiefly in terms of an external and internal enemy 
mythology deployed mainly against Russians/Soviets, Jews and 
communists. However, this chapter contends that there were also 
proto-liberal strands within pre-1945 Polish nationalism and Polish 
political Catholicism as expressed in certain myths and symbols that 
had evolved over centuries and that constituted the seeds of a post- 
1945 liberal political culture of opposition. 
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2.2 The Emergence Of Polish Nationalism 
Poland's inception as a state is usually linked to the beginning of the 
Piast dynasty, c. 960. The 960-1770s state-building and subsequent 
national consciousness-building period is significant for Polish 
modem nationalism in a variety of ways. The period provided the 
genesis of many of the myths to be deployed by modem Polish 
nationalism. Also Poland experienced similar state- and national 
consciousness-building influences as those exerted upon Western 
countries. For example, the sense of solidarity to a common monarch 
arising from the struggles against external threats and a sense of 
common identification arising from the ascendancy of the vernacular 
over Latin with the advent of print-capitalism. 81 
Flag, Anthem and Emblem: Symbols of Club Membership 
The appearance of a commonly recognisable emblem, flag and anthem 
greatly contributed to state-building and national consciousness- 
building. As Hobsbawm observed these three symbols are emotionally 
charged signs of club membership through which an independent 
81 Thus 16th century Poland saw the first printed book translated from the Latin 
into Polish - Raj Duszny (1513) by Biernat of Lublin - and the encouragement of 
Polish literature in the vernacular by Mikolaj Rej (1505-1569) and Jan 
Kochanowski (1530-1584). In 1661, the first newspaper in Polish appeared. By 
about the 1780s, Polish was the established language of educational instruction 
and of intellectual life. Anderson (1991: 46) notes that 
"the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of 
human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined 
community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modem 
nation. " 
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country proclaims its identity and sovereignty, and as such they 
command instantaneous respect and loyalty, and reflect the entire 
background, thought and culture of the nation. 82 The Polish 
state/national emblem to be, the eagle, appeared on Polish money as 
far back as the 12th century. Originally it appeared uncrowned, but 
with the subsequent coronations of kings of Poland, the eagle gained a 
crown and became the emblem of state. The eagle, together with the 
flag and anthem were to feature constantly and prominently in 
Poland's subsequent history: at first as symbols of the Polish state and 
later as symbols of the Polish nation and/or state. Although these 
politically powerful symbols changed little in outward appearance, 
significant differences in meanings attached to them did emerge, as 
this and future chapters will show. During its war of independence 
against Russian domination, the Bar Confederacy adopted as its 
emblem a white-and-red flag with a silhouette of the Virgin Mary. 83 
In 1831, during the National Uprising, the white and red colours were 
incorporated within the emblem in the form of a white eagle with a 
red background. During the Second Republic (1918-1939) the 
crowned eagle was reconfirmed as the official emblem of the Polish 
state. During WWII, the Home Army's emblem was a crowned eagle, 
while the pro-communist People's Army adopted an uncrowned eagle. 
The 1944 Lublin Manifesto announcing a new pro-communist 
authority for Poland was bedecked with the Polish white-and-red flag 
and the uncrowned eagle. Apparently, the pro-communists uncrowned 
82 Hobsbawm (1985: 11). Such observations were originally made in an Indian 
government brochure as mentioned by Firth (1973: 341). 
83 Mach (1985: 27). 
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the eagle in order to symbolise the liberation of the Polish people from 
class hierarchy and the relics of feudalism. 84 
Dqbrowski 's Mazurka the future national/state anthem was composed 
in Italy in 1797 by Jözef Wybicki (1747-1822) for General Jan 
Henryk Dabrowski (1755-1818) who helped to incorporate into 
Napoleon's army the thousands of Poles who had escaped Poland to 
join the Polish Legions. 85 Dqbrowski's Mazurka contained several of 
the usual features of national anthems that help create a highly 
emotionally charged atmosphere of national solidarity 86 and thereby 
help explain their political potency. The first verse of Dgbrowski 's 
Mazurka reads 
`Poland has not perished yet 
So long as we still live 
That which alien force has seized 
We at sword point shall retrieve. ' 
The second and third verses contain the lines: 
`we will be Poles, 
Bonaparte showed us 
how to win. ' 
84 Mach (1985: 30). 
85 The Poles hoped that Napoleon, in his opposition to the three partitioning 
powers of Poland, would deliver to them national self-determination. Some 
100,000 Poles joined Napoleon in his ill-fated attempt to conquer Russia. 
86 Kertzer (1988: 73) observes that from their late 18th century inception to their 
current global spread, the content and sentiments of national anthems are 
remarkably similar. Often calling for God's blessing, they effusively praise the 
nation, call for undying loyalty, and use martial music together with graphic 
symbolism to create a highly charged emotional atmosphere of national solidarity. 
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`we will come back across the sea 
to save our motherland. ' 87 
In addition, Dqbrowski 's Mazurka was even further emotionally and 
politically charged. Unlike most anthems that are written when a 
nation has a state, it was written shortly after the final partitioning of 
Poland. Thus it had the dimension of contemporary protest against an 
alien state. In 1815, following Napoleon's defeat, the Tsarist and 
Prussian authorities banned the anthem. Dqbrowski 's Mazurka was 
banned again in 1860. Yet it lived on in numerous variants, sung 
during the Uprisings and WWI and II, when the name Dqbrowski, 
who features in the refrain 
`March, march Dqbrowski, 
from Italy to Poland. 
Under your command 
we will reunite with the nation' 
was replaced by names of contemporary Polish military leaders, such 
as Pilsudski during WWI and Wladislaw Sikorski (1881-1943) during 
WWII. 88 Following Pilsudski's coup d'etat in 1926, Dqbrowski's 
Mazurka became Poland's official National Anthem. 
87 The fourth verse appeals to basic sentimentality: 
"Father, in tears, says to his Basia: 
`Just listen, 
It seems that our people 
are beating the drums. "' 
Source: http: //www. usc. eduJdept/polish_music/repertoi /dabrowski html 
88 Sikorski was, like Pilsudski, a symbol of idealistic nationalism. Before WWI, 
Sikorski established a secret Polish military organisation. During WWI Sikorski 
was a war commissioner in the Polish Legion that served with the Austrian Army 
fighting Russia. After WWI, Sikorski distinguished himself in the 1919-1920 
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The genesis of modern Polish nationalism 
The genesis of modern Polish nationalism was in large part a reaction 
to the annihilation of the Polish state with the successive partitioning 
of Poland in 1772,1793 and 1795 by the absolutist powers of Prussia, 
Russia and Austria. This reactive Polish nationalism was kept alive 
mainly by the Polish educated classes, chiefly the nobility, the clergy 
and the intelligentsia. During the course of the 19th century the 
Prussian and Russian imperial governments shifted from a policy of 
legitimacy based on loyalty to divinely sanctioned monarchs to one 
based on a secular ideology of state. In consequence, Polish 
nationalism also reacted to the increasing official state nationalisms of 
these partitioning powers, and to the resulting Germanisation and 
Russification that took place within their respective partitions. 89 
From 1918-1939, Poland regained independence and showed an 
active, expansionist nationalism in incorporating parts of the old 
Commonwealth back into Poland. In 1939, Poland's western and 
eastern neighbours again partitioned Poland and again the annihilation 
of the Polish state fuelled a Polish reactive nationalism. 
A key question for Polish nationalists was whether to seek national 
sovereignty via deployment of the physical force tradition or whether 
Polish-Soviet War. During WWII, from 1939-1943, Sikorski headed the Polish 
Government in (Western) Exile. 
89 Nationalism and Multi-national Empires (pp. 3-35). 1963 essay in (Seton- 
Watson 1964: 20-23). 
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to seek it via more gradual, non-violent means. During the partitions, 
the two different approaches expressed themselves in the form of 
Polish idealistic and realistic nationalism, with the latter strand opting 
for the peaceful strategy. 90 Idealistic nationalism was more influenced 
by political romanticism and neo-romanticism and the myths of 
political Catholicism, while realistic nationalism was more influenced 
by the Enlightenment, positivism and secularism and their associated 
myths. A key myth emerging from the Polish positivist period was the 
organic work myth that did much to influence subsequent Polish 
political culture. The realistic nationalist assessment that physical 
force would not gain Poland her independence following the defeat of 
the 1863-1864 Uprising, contributed to the formation of the myth of 
organic work or as Zamoyski puts it: "the nebulous dreams of the 
Romantics' New Jerusalem were superseded by 'scientific' visions of 
earthly paradise. " 91 The myth held that economic strength was a 
prerequisite for national independence. The Polish organic workers 
viewed the nation as an organism that they wished to strengthen in 
order for it to withstand the pressures of the occupying powers. In 
order for an organism to function, it was necessary, they believed, to 
take care that every element was properly functioning, as an 'illness' 
can affect the entirety. From this tenet came a concern for the poorer 
sections within society, and a belief in the equal rights for ethnic 
90 Bromke (1967: 2) wrote of Poles being divided into political idealists "who 
imagine the world to suit their policy, " and political realists "who arrange their 
policies to suit the realities of the world. " Laun (2000) identifies idealism and 
realism as the two dominating Polish nationalist ideologies. 
91 Zamoyski (1987: 316-317). 
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minorities. An evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach, 
organic work glorified the perseverance in collective, civilising, and 
constructive work. The organic workers valued the benefits of the 
experience of work in common, and of the need to respect all workers 
and all forms of work. This in turn helped further to lessen the rigid 
class/estate compartments separating the peasantry and other workers 
from the nobility/gentry and the emerging bourgeoisie. 92 The 
philosophical poet Cyprian Norwid (1821-1883) helped turn the belief 
in organic work into a myth of redemption/salvation. He perceived 
organic work not in a typical positivist way, but as a means of 
redemption. For Norwid, work 'whose end is Resurrection, ' 93 was the 
path to personal liberation and salvation. Norwid shared with 
communists the belief in the centrality of labour and its alienating 
dangers, and asserted that 'work cannot be treated as merchandise. ' 
However, whereas communists also emphasised the need for class- 
war to bring about liberation, Norwid, as did other organic workers, 
emphasised the common aspects of all who worked and the need to 
respect all workers and all fon-ns of work, thereby attenuating rather 
than exacerbating religious and class tensions. 94 
The leading realist and idealist nationalists of the early 20th century 
were Dmowski and Pilsudski, respectively. Dmowski simultaneously 
92 Halecki (1942: 204). 
93 From his Promethidon (1851). 
94 Norwid defined a nation as 'the internal union of inter-related races. ' Following 
a Polish anti-Russian demonstration in the 1860s, in which Jewish participants 
were singled out by the Czarist authorities for extra beatings. Norwid wrote a 
poem, Polish Jews. In it, he argued that Poland had the "priceless heritage' of two 
different, but great cultures - Polish and Jewish. 
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denounced policies of conciliation and of armed uprising. 95 In 
contrast, Pilsudski was convinced that armed struggle was the only 
effective way to achieve independence. Before the outbreak of WWI, 
Pilsudski organised Polish Legions as an underground army of about 
10,000 Poles to fight for Poland's independence. Idealistic nationalism 
tended to see fellow Western Christian nations as its natural allies and 
to perceive Russia/Soviet Union as its greatest threat to national 
sovereignty. 96 Realistic nationalism tended to see Germany as its 
greatest threat to national sovereignty and accordingly sought 
alliances of support from Russia/Soviet Union. The idealist nationalist 
orientations were expressed most vividly in the 1768-1772,1919-20, 
and WWII Home Army (AK) Western-supported resistance to 
Russian/Soviet hegemony. The realistic nationalist orientations were 
expressed in the anti-German, People's Army (AL) supported by the 
Soviet authorities. 
2.3 The Coming Together Of Polish Nationalism And Polish 
Political Catholicism: The Seeds Of A Post-1945 Synthesis 
The onset of the Polish state was closely related to the advent of 
Catholicism within Poland. In 966, the first Piast ruler of Poland, 
Mieszko I (c. 960-992), together with his court, were baptised into 
Christianity, to be followed shortly afterwards by mass conversion of 
95 Zamoyski (1987: 329) and Wandycz (1974: 291-293). 
96 The German-Russian/Soviet distinction is encapsulated by a saying attributed to 
Pitsudski's successor, Marshall ýmigly-Rydz (1886-1943) shortly before the 
outbreak of WWII: "'With the Germans we will lose our freedom, with the 
Russians we wi II lose our soul. "' As cited by Bromke (1967: 3 9). 
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his subjects. From its inception, the organisation of the Polish Catholic 
Church was common to the whole territory of Poland. Following the 
11th century east-west schism of the Christian Church, the Polish 
Church stayed loyal to Rome. 
The Genesis of the Madonna Myth 
The Madonna Myth was to prove one of most potent of the political 
myths deployed by the opposition in post-1945 Poland. In 1382, the 
Madonna was said to have manifested herself within a Church and a 
fortified Pauline Monastery founded in the same year at Jasna Gora in 
Czqstochowa, southern Poland. The Monastery is the site of the shrine 
of the Black Madonna, so called because the face of the Byzantine 
icon of the Virgin Mary has become blackened over the centuries. 97 
During the 15 th_ 18'h century, myths evoking the Black Madonna as 
Defender of the State did a lot to portray political Catholicism's close 
ties with the state. The Czqstochowa shrine became the focus of 
Catholic resistance to attacks upon its faith and upon Poland, be it 
from a 15th century precursor of Protestantism, Bohemian Hussitism, 
from 17 th century Swedish Protestantism, or from 18 th century Russian 
Orthodoxy. In a 1430 invasion, the Black Madonna's face was slashed 
by a sabre cut inflicted by a Hussite soldier, and ever since the Virgin 
Mary was referred to by the faithful as The Queen ofPoland. In 1655, 
the Swedish General Milller, despite several thousand soldiers pitted 
against a mere 150 Polish noblemen and sixty monks, was, after forty 
97 According to one legend, Saint Luke the Evangelist painted the icon on the 
wooden plank that was the Holy Family's table at Nazareth. 
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days of abortive attempts, forced to call off his siege of the Monastery. 
The defence of Jasna Gora inspired Poles to fight harder and marked a 
turning point in Polish efforts to free their country from the harsh rule 
of the Protestant Swedes. Many Catholic Poles believed that the 
successful defence of the Monastery against the Swedes was thanks to 
God and their Lady of Jasna G6ra. Their belief was perhaps fuelled 
by the following 1688 account, which, not untypically, links the 
Madonna myth to another sacred hero-saviour, God. 
"'Yet Jasna Gora was not saved by men. The holy place was 
preserved by God, and more by miracles than by the sword. ... MUller himself saw a Lady in a shining robe on the walls, 
priming the canon and tossing shells back in the direction from 
which they came ... Of course, no heretic will believe that canon- balls were repulsed from the walls of Jasna Gora by supernatural 
means ... But all that I have described is true. "' 
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The belief in the Madonna as defender of the faith and of Poland was 
to endure over the centuries, with kings, noblemen, burghers and 
peasants acknowledging the spiritual presence and control of the 
Black Madonna over their lives through acts of unconditional 
submission to her divine authority. 99 After his return to Poland in 
1656, the Polish King Jan Kazimierz vowed to entrust the country to 
the authority of Mary, officially proclaiming her, Queen of Poland. '00 
98 W. Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae Climacter Secundus. Krakow, 1688. 
Published in Polish translation as Lata Potopu 1655-7, L. Kukulski (ed. ) et al., 
Warsaw. 1966. As cited by Davies (1981 a: 452-453). 
99 Kubik (1994: 10). 
loo Szajkowski (1983: 4-5). 
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Davies (1997) argues that this was a key moment in the growth of the 
Pole = Catholic myth. He points out that, given that one third to one 
half of Poland's population then was not Roman Catholic, 101 the 
growing association of Polishness and Catholicity was to prove 
divisive. 
During the period of Commonwealth, the Catholic Primates of Poland 
served as interrex figures, acting Heads of State between the death of 
a king, who was often not Polish, and the election of his successor. 
The Polish Reformation saw many Polish nobles convert to 
Protestantism, but by the 17 th century and the Polish Counter- 
Reformation, the Protestant influence declined and Polish Catholicism 
strengthened. The century became the age of a triumphant 
Catholicism, which became increasingly more intolerant and severe 
toward dissenters. The Roman Catholic Church had never enjoyed a 
monopoly in the religious affairs of the multi-faith, multi-national 
Commonwealth. Yet Catholicism's influence gradually increased in 
response to the plundering by Swedish and Prussian Protestants, and 
Orthodox Russians. Polish Catholicism became more ostentatious, 
with religious ceremonies such as Holy Mass and pilgrimages to 
venerate holy figures becoming important and colourful social 
manifestations, complete with the ritual of hymn-singing and the 
symbolism of banners. These ostentatious features, not least the 
venerating traditions of cults, beatification and canonisation, 102 all 
101 Mainly Protestants, Orthodox Catholics, Uniates and Jews. 
"'2 The tradition of making certain of the venerated figures (usually ones beatified 
or canonised) patrons of a country, also facilitated the relationship between 
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lent themselves particularly well to the creation and deployment of 
national myths, symbols and rituals. 
From 1768-1772, as mentioned, a group of Polish nobles named the 
Bar Confederacy waged a war of independence against ever increasing 
Russian domination. The 1768 Bar Confederacy Manifesto expressed 
attachment to the Catholic Faith and especially to "'the Czqstochowa 
fortress, famed for its miracles"' and proclaimed its intention "'to save 
the homeland, faith and freedom, rights and liberties of the nation. ý iq 103 
The Manifesto also called for armed, bold and self-sacrificing action, 
conducted under the watchword Jesus-Mary and with Mary 
silhouetted against a white-and-red flag as their emblem. A Bar 
Confederacy poem declares: 
For Freedom. ) I'll die: My faith not deny. ... The Cross is my Shield, 
Salvation my Loot... 
When Poland's Fate 
Is to enter the Battle 
As Mary's Breastplate. 
She succours her Knight, 
And Thee, Sweet Fatherland. "' 104 
political Catholicism and the state, and later, the relationship between political 
Catholicism and the nation. 
103 As cited by Suchodolski (1986: 119). 
104Poezja barska ed. K. Kolbuszewski, Krakow, 1928 as cited by Davies (1981b: 
19). 
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Helping to fuel the Black Madonna myth, the last centre of the 
Confederacy's forlorn resistance against the Russians was at the Jasna 
Gora Monastery in August 1772. 
With the absence of a Polish state, during the course of the 
partitioning (1772-1918) and re-partitioning (1939-1945), Polish 
political Catholicism succeeded in strengthening its nation-building 
activities by becoming a defender of civil society and thereby the 
nation. This process was much aided by three factors. First, the 
Church's loss of powers and privileges, but not its annihilation, during 
partitioning and re-partitioning. Second, the reaction of political 
Catholicism to the pressures of the predominant non-Catholic 
religions/belief systems of the two major partitioning and re- 
partitioning powers, the Prussians/Germans and the Russians/Soviets. 
Finally, third, lay political Catholicism's creation of new political 
myths and symbols and its redefining of old ones. 
The romantic poetry of the lay political Catholic intelligentsia 
furthered the cause of liberal idealistic nationalism by propagating 
myths that served as vehicles for liberal values. The Romantic poets 
Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) and Juliusz Slowacki (1809-1849) 105 
were to have an immense influence on the mindset of generations of 
future Poles, and to become enduring symbols of idealist nationalism. 
The romantics created new myths evoking sacred Catholic omnipotent 
saviours such as God, Christ and the Black Madonna, and redefined 
the pre- I 780s myths that had portrayed political Catholicism primarily 
105 Together with Zygmunt Krasin'ski (1812-1859), they were known as the 
Romantic Bards. Later Norwid was to become known as the 'fourth Bard. '. 
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as defender of the state. The romantic myths now portrayed political 
Catholicism as defender of the proto-liberal nation and of proto-liberal 
values. The neo-romantic period ensured that the romantic myths 
were not forgotten. 1 06 The romantic and neo-romantic myths 
appropriated liberal contributions of the Enlightenment and positivist 
periods, respectively. 
During the course of the l9th-20th centuries, a symbiotic relationship 
developed between Polish nationalism and Polish political 
Catholicism. At times the cause of Polish nationalism was served by 
Polish political Catholicism, at other times the cause of Polish 
political Catholicism was served by Polish nationalism. In the end, 
both belief systems gained from the relationship; a relationship that 
was often aided by the deployment of myths and symbols that served 
both causes. Increasingly during the 19th century myths evoking the 
Black Madonna deployed the symbolism of state by portraying her as 
Queen, but also deployed the symbolism of the nation, by portraying 
her as Queen of the Poles and Defender of the Nation. Under 
106 The neo-romantic anti-positivist Young Poland literary movement centred 
around Krakow, situated within the relatively less repressive Austrian partition, 
led to the works of the Polish Bards becoming more widely known and the 
'discovery' of Norwid. In Krakow, Mickiewicz's Forefathers' Eve, KrasM'ski's 
Irydion and Un-Divine Comedy, and many of Slowacki's plays were staged for the 
first time. In fiction, one of the most prominent artists of the Young Poland period 
was Nobel Prize Laureate Wladyslaw Reymont (1867-1925), famous for the 
novels The Promised Land (1899) and The Peasants (1902-1909). Stefan 
Zeromski (1864-1925) produced stories and novels emphasising patriotism and 
social criticism, among them Ashes (1904), a historical novel of the Napoleonic 
Wars, and The Faithful River (1913). Stanislaw Wyspian'ski (1869-1907) was the 
most eminent dramatist of the Young Poland era. His dominant concern was 
Polish nationalism and individual freedom. Among his plays are Varsovienne 
(1898), Liberation (1903), November Night (1904), and The Wedding, first staged 
in 1901. 
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partitioning, the Black Madonna became the Main Revolutionary 
supporting the insurrectionists in their attempts to gain national self- 
determination, while exiled Poles called her the Patroness Qf the 
Exiles. 107 One such exile, Mickiewicz did much to keep the Madonna 
myth alive. Mickiewicz writes of Mary in his epic poem Pan Tadeusz 
(1834) thus: 
"'0 Holy Maid, who Czqstochowa's shrine 
Dost guard and on the Pointed Gateway shine 
As thou didst heal me by a miracle ... So by a miracle thou wilt bring us home! "' '08 
In 1854, Pius XI declared Virgin Mary's Immaculate Conception 
dogma, raising yet further the high veneration status that Mary 
enjoyed within the universal Catholic Church. Later, Henryk 
Sienkiewicz (1846-1916) '09 also evoked the Madonna myth. His The 
Deluge (1886) deals with the 1650s' Swedish assault on Poland and 
deploys the mythology of Madonna and God as sacred omnipotent 
saviours. Sienkiewicz recounts a speech by the Prior of the Jasna Gora 
Monastery during the 1655 defence against the Swedes: 
"'But no matter how low our nation has fallen, or how deeply 
steeped in sin it might be, there is a limit ... which none of our 
people would ever go beyond. They turned their backs on their 
King and the Commonwealth but they never ceased to honour 
and worship their Patroness and Mother who has always been the 
true Queen of Poland ... We've 
lost fall our former virtuesl but 
107 Kubik (1994: 109). 
108 As cited by Kwitny (1998: 20). 
109 In 1905, Sienkiewicz received the Nobel Prize in Literature for Qlio 1radis? 
(1896), in which the vista of the fall of empire (the Roman Empire) and of the 
triumph of religion (Christianity) is presented. 
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one, and that is our Faith and the honor we show to the Holy 
Mother, and that is the foundation on which we can reconstruct 
the rest. ... (Our enemies) understand what is at stake here ... they'd never dare strike at Jasna Gora. Because that day would 
be the beginning of the end of their supremacy and the beginning 
of our awakening. "' "o 
The hymn God Who Protects Poland, particularly in the light of the 
responses of the partitioning powers, also did a lot to bring political 
Catholicism and nationalism together. In 1816, the poet and priest 
Alojzy Felin'ski (1771-1820) composed the hymn that included the 
key verse: 
"0 God who through the ages 
Hast girded Poland with power and fame, 
Whose shield hath kept Her in Thy care 
From evils that would cause her harm. 
Before Thy altars, we bring our entreaty: 
Restore, 0 Lord, our free country. " 
God, the protector of Poland, was to give Poland back her sovereignty, 
and the hymn was to become part of the nationalist mythology 
repertoire. Like so many of the nationalist protest songs,, the context 
and accumulating symbolic baggage surrounding the hymn, explains 
much of its political Potency. The hymn was written to mark the 
anniversary of the creation of the Kingdom of Poland, a personal 
fiefdom of the Russian Czar, gained at the 1815 Congress of Vienna 
as a result of the defeat of Napoleon. Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism were to exploit the symbolic significance of the timing of 
110 As cited by Weigel (1992: vii). Shortly afterwards Reymont wrote Pilgrimage 
to the Mountain of Life (1894) an exploration of the mood of a group making a 
pilgrimage to Jasna Gora. 
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rituals, by invariably holding demonstrations/commemorations on the 
anniversary dates of significant nationalist/religious/political past 
events which were associated with their present cause. In this respect, 
rituals involving protest singing are, observes Kertzer (1988: 122) 
"important in attaching participants to a 
protest, lending the legitimacy obtained by 
movements to the newer movement. " 
longer tradition of 
the earlier protest 
Felin'ski's hymn became particularly popular and was sung at the end 
of the Holy Mass throughout the land. Considered the unofficial 
national anthem by many Poles, the last line of the key verse in 
particular stirred religious and nationalist hopes. In the years 
preceding the 1863-1864 Uprising, patriotic fervour was intense and 
God Who Protects Poland was openly sung in the streets. 111 In 18 72, 
Mieczyslaw Ledochowski (1822-1902), the Primate within the 
Prussian partition, succumbed to Kultfirkampf 112 pressure and agreed 
that Felin'ski's hymn would not be sung at Mass. 
With the regaining of independence in 1918, the hymn was again 
openly sung during the period of the Second Republic, but with one 
major symbolic difference. The key verse's last line Restore, 0 Lord, 
111 Davies (1981 b: 349). 
112 Literally translated as culture struggle, Kulffirkampf was a conflict between the 
Roman Catholic Church and the German Empire. In 1870, the First Vatican 
Council (Vatican 1) moved to strengthen the power of the Pope by promulgating 
the dogma of papal inffillibility. The German Chancellor, Bismarck, felt that the 
increasing subservience of German Catholics to Rome, combined with the 
political power of the Centre party (composed of Catholic groups) threatened the 
authority of the Empire. Accordingly, Bismarck initiated a series of laws aimed at 
reducing the powers of the Roman Catholic Church. 
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our firee country was changed to Bless, 0 Lord, our ftee country. 
However with the onset of WWII . the original 
line was once more 
deployed. A report on the Polish national situation in Soviet-occupied 
Poland observed that "today, they are singing God Who Protects 
Poland in the churches. " 113 
Nationa st sentiment manifested itself first within the lay Catholic 
intelligentsia and faithful, and amongst Catholic priests. Many 
Catholics lost their lives participating in the National Uprisings of 
17949 1830-18319 1846,1848 and 1863-1864. Within the Prussian 
partition, the 1870s' Kultfirkampf attacks on the Church resulted in 
the politicisation of priests on a mass basis. 114 At first, members of 
the Hierarchy were influenced by their loyalty to a papal Catholicism 
that opposed Polish nationalism. Like the papacy, the Hierarchy 
initially opposed physical force and any fundamental realignment of 
the alliance between the state and civil society, but gradually, and 
often reluctantly, it was drawn into the nationalist struggle. To a 
significant degree the Hierarchy's increasing involvement with Polish 
nationalism was a result of excessive attacks upon the Church by the 
Russians before, during and after the 1863-1864 National Uprising, 
and by the Germans following the Kultfirkampf. 
113 Raport gen. Michala Tokarzewskiego-Karaszewicza do. gen. Kazimierza 
Somkowskiego, o sytuacji na terenie okupacji radzieckiej, z 17 111 1940r. As 
reported by Sobafiska-Bondaruk (1998: 255). 
1 14 Leslie (1980: 30). 
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2.4 The Genesis Of The National myths Of 1900-1944 Illiberal 
Polish Political Culture 
In the last decades of the 19'h century and during the early decades of 
the 20th century, some European nationalisms, for example in France, 
developed strongly illiberal strands. These strands entailed more than 
just an intolerance of 'others' or a dislike of particular political 
systems. They entailed a strong loathing of particular groups of 
people. These illiberal components were boosted by pseudo-scientific 
theories of race and social Darwinism, and later fuelled by economic 
depression. At the end of the 19th century, integral nationalism 
appeared in France. With the 1917 Russian Revolution, a virulent anti- 
communist and anti-Soviet component was added to an already 
existing virulent anti-Semitic component. In Germany Blut und 
Boden 115 thinking was incorporated into Nationalist Socialist 
ideology. Poland was not immune from these illiberal influences, and 
the prevailing illiberal political culture during this period generally 
reflects the East European illiberal political culture as portrayed in 
Chapter 1. Subsequently, the atrocities inflicted upon Poles during 
WWII served to reinforce and justify many of the prevailing 
prejudices of Polish illiberal nationalism and political Catholicism. 
Thus during the 1900-1945 period, enemy mythology, whether 
internal and conspiratorial, or external, was deliberately exploited by 
Polish illiberal nationalists and illiberal political Catholics. 
115 The slogan came into political prominence in Germany in the early 1920s 
when it denoted an integral link between the tribe and the land, a link to be 
defended by blood if necessary. (Bramwell 1985: 55). 
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2.4.1 The Genesis of Internal Enemy Myths 
The aforementioned illiberal influences to a large extent explain the c. 
1900-1920s genesis within Poland of myths of territory, of 
ethnogenesis and of kinship, the related Pole = Catholic m th and the y 
Jewish and communist enemy myths. 
The Genesis of the Jewish Enemy Myth 
For the first six decades of the 19 th century, the Polonisation of Jewish 
culture and the assimilation of Jews into Polish society were 
advocated both by Jewish reformers and by Polish liberals alike. After 
the 1863-64 Uprising and aided and abetted by the partitioning 
powers' anti-Semitism, attitudes hardened in both Jewish and Catholic 
communities. The Austrian authorities treated the Jews as a social 
anomaly, but with more tolerance than the Prussian and Russian 
authorities. 116 Increasingly, young Jewish nationalists saw 
assimilation as a threat to their own national aspirations, 
117 
and 
condemned co-operation with Catholic Poles out of hand. 
116 Zamoyski (1987: 344-345). The greater repression within the Prussian and 
Russian Partitions resulted in the Jews congregating in the Austrian Partition. 
(Kwitny 1998: 34). Andrew (1990: 4-5) notes that by far the most persecuted 
group in the Russian Empire was the Jews. The assassination of Tsar Alexander 11 
in 1881, for example, unleashed a wave of anti-Semitism, resulting in pogroms. 
Here, state-sponsored anti-Semitism, which was particularly virulent at the turn of 
the 19 th /20th century, led to the exodus of several million Russian Jews and may 
well help to explain why communism spread more rapidly among the Jews than 
among any other ethnic group in the Russian Empire. 
117 During the 1890-1918 period, anti-Semitism became an explicit political and 
economic weapon that in turn encouraged Jewish nationalism. By the end of the 
19th century Zionism on the one hand and Jewish internationalist socialism on the 
other inhibited any assimilation tendencies that had survived. 
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At the beginning of the 20th century, industry and trade in Poland were 
predominantly in the hands of the German and Jewish ethnic 
minorities. At about this time, the concept of integral nationalism was 
first voiced in Poland "8 and the Piast myth, which may be seen as 
having some of its roots in the Sarmatian myth and as an example of a 
myth of ethnogenesis, came to the fore. "9 In the period when 
monarchs of Poland were elected (1573-1764) and often not Polish, it 
was customary for all the Polish candidates for the throne to be given 
'Piast' as a first name. 120 The early 20th Piast myth was propagated 
by the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) and by the National Democrats 
(ND) led by Dmowski. The Piast m th claimed that some thousand Y 
years before, the Polish nation had lived in its ancestral home-land in 
unity and harmony under the rule of the Piast kings. 121 Over the 
118 Walicki (1988: 23) describes Dmowski as the founder of modem, integral 
nationalism in Poland. 
119 In the I Ohcentury a French chronicler described the Poles as Sarmatians. The 
Sarmatians were originally of Iranian descent, and in the 6 th - 4th centuries B. C. 
settled in the Urals, and then in other parts of South European Russia and the east 
Balkans. The Sarmatian myth emerged in 16th and I 7th century Poland. The myth 
embraced a number of mainly illiberal concepts propagated by members of the 
Polish gentry. These included the beliefs that Poles were descended from the 
brave Sarmatians; that the Polish way of life should be defended against foreign 
influence; and that cultural and moral values should be strengthened. The myth 
also engendered an hostility to scientific and economic progress, and emphasised 
the greatness and the ancient history of the Polish people; and the necessity of 
limiting royal power, especially that of foreign kings. 
120 Later the Piast m th was appropriated by the romantic nationalists, Y for example 
Slowacki, who tried to change the myth of ethnogenesis into a paradise lost myth 
by portraying the Piast era as a distant pagan past, full of mysteriousness, 
simplicity and abundance. (Davies 2001b: 62). 
12 ' Following the first Piast dynasty (C. 960-1138), there was a brief second Piast 
dynasty between 1306 and 1370 ending with Kazimierz the Great, King of Poland 
(1333-1370). Kazimierz was remembered for his concern for the development of 
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following centuries, as the myth has it, the Poles lost their unity and 
lost control of their native land. Unlike during Piast times when 
Poland was ruled by Polish kings, during the Commonwealth period 
with its elective system, the majority of the kings of Poland were not 
Poles. All manner of aliens and intruders - Germans, Jews, Ukrainians 
and Russians - abused Poland's natural hospitality, foreign kings were 
seated on the Polish throne and Poles were robbed of their inheritance. 
The import of the myth was clear: 'Poland for the Poles. ' All patriotic 
Poles had a duty to unite and drive all foreigners from their native soil. 
The Second Republic, albeit less heterogeneous than the 
Commonwealth, still had sizeable ethnic minorities. The 1931 census 
revealed that 14% of the population were Ukrainian, 9% Jewish, 3% 
Belorussian, 2% German and 3% were from other ethnic minorities. 122 
Dmowski's social Darwinism fitted well with the Piast myth and its 
associated intolerance of ethnic minorities. Like the organic workers, 
Dmowski also perceived the nation as an organism, an integrated 
social whole. However the social Darwinism of Dmowski, a biology 
and zoology graduate, resulted in excluding rather than including 
minorities, which for him, whether based on caste, religion or ethnic 
differences, were alien bodies within the nation. He thought of nations 
as the natural product of ethnic differentiation, defining them in terms 
the Polish economy, for money reform and codifying the laws and for the defence 
of the country, and for establishing in 1364 the first university in Poland, at 
Krakow. He reunified the state, brought comparative peace to Poland, and more 
than doubled its size. 
122 The percentage of Poles was 69%. The census was based on linguistic criteria. 
The figures are as cited by Davies (1981 b: 404). 
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of language and ethnic origin. 1 23 For him the nation was a 
biologically distinct ethnic group fated to struggle against other 
national organisms to ensure its survival and development. 124 
Dmowski's thinking contributed greatly to the legitimisation of the 
Pole = Catholic myth, an archetypal myth of ethnogenesis and 
antiquity. In 1927, Dmowski wrote: 
"'A Polish state is a Catholic state ... It is Catholic because our 
state is a national state and our nation is a Catholic nation ... Catholicism is not a supplement to the Polish national character, 
but is inherent in its very essence. "' 125 
Dmowski rejected the old Polish Commonwealth tradition of defining 
the nation in multi-national terms irrespective of ethnicity. He 
advocated that former Commonwealth territory be incorporated into a 
unitary Polish State where Belorussians and Ukrainians would be 
expected to assimilate, and where it was believed Germans could not, 
and Jews should not, be assimilated. 126 
Dmowski also argued against religious toleration. Significant elements 
within Polish Catholic society, particularly those that supported the 
ever strident Dmowski-influenced illiberal nationalism of the 
National Democrats with their slogan Polandfor the Poles and their 
123 Gomulka (1990: 34). 
124 Gomulka (1990: 8). 
125 As cited by Ludwikowski (1991: 201-202). 
126 Brubaker (1997: 99-100). 
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journal Polakatolik, voiced their anti-Semitism even more explicitly. 
Dmowski regarded tolerance as a sign of national weakness that could 
lead only to national extinction. 127 Many now equated Polishness with 
being Catholic. Even less chauvinistic Poles believed that Catholicism 
exerted so great an influence on Polish culture that the culture as a 
whole could not be separated from Catholicism without the loss of its 
very identity. 
During the inter-war period, as explored in Chapter 1, the Polish 
Church in the main supported Dmowski's illiberalism, and evoked 
both external and internal conspiratorial enemy myths, particularly the 
Jewish and communist ones, to blame minorities for the deteriorating 
economic situation in Poland. 
The Genesis of the Communist Enemy Myth 
Such is the adaptability of myths that they often link-up with other 
myths. Such a linking-up occurred with the Jewish and communist 
enemy myths. The Jew = Communist myth that held that there was a 
word-wide Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy emerged following the 1917 
Russian Revolution. It was fuelled by the Polish-Soviet War and by 
Polish and Western politicians, including Winston Churchill. 128 
127 Shelton (1995: 267). 
128 During the attempted Polish advance into Soviet territory in the 1919-1920 
Polish-Soviet War. Jewish soldiers and officers of the Polish Army were not 
allowed to fight and were even put into detention camps. The Army and the 
Church openly professed an anti-Semitism that intensified during the war. (Mosse 
1985: 180). In early 1920. Churchill, who was closely involved in the Polish- 
Soviet War, wrote an article entitled Zionism versus Bolshevism: A Strugglefor 
the SoulQf the Jewish People. In it, Churchill depicts a Jewish conspiracy behind 
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During WWII, in the zones initially occupied by the Russians. Polish 
anti-Semitism persisted and the Jew = Communist myth was 
reinvented to become the Jew = Enemy of the Nation m- yth. The 
widely held stereotype now perceived Jews as first enthusiastically 
welcoming the Red An-ny and then collaborating with the Soviets in 
the local administration and the apparatus of coercion. As the Nazi's 
moved into the Soviet partition from June 1941, many hundreds of 
Polish Jews were allegedly killed by fellow Poles, who saw them as 
collaborators in the Stalin repression. "' 
During the 1900-1944 period, another internal enemy myth, the 
communist enemy myth, that as mentioned was linked-up to the Jewish 
enemy myth, emerged within Poland. Between c. 1880s-1930s Polish 
nationalism successfully competed with socialism, the other dominant 
political ideology within Poland, with many Polish socialists, as 
typified by Stanislaw Brzozowski and Pilsudski, moving from an 
international socialist stance to an increasingly pro-independent, 
national one. Throughout this period, Polish communism was a 
marginal political force, in large part because of its anti-nationalist 
the Russian Revolution. (London Sunday Illustrated Herald, 8 February, 1920, 
p. 5). Later, Nazi politicians were also to deploy the Jew = Communist myth. 
129 For example, an estimated 1,500 Jews were allegedly killed by fellow Poles in 
several villages in what is now North East Poland during the months of July and 
August 1941. (Word Zyd6w w Jedwabnem. ' Dziennik Baln, cki. I September, 
2000, p. 7). ('Dowody z MSW'. Gazeta Wyborcza. 7-8 April. 2001, p. 4) and 
('Wykonawcami byli Polacy'. Gazela Wyborcza, 21-22, April. 2001, p. 5). The 
Germans allegedly turried a blind eye or aided and abetted them. For sources that 
dispute the role of Poles in the killings see www-geocities-com/jedwabne 
/english/. 
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stance both during partitions 130 and during the 1918-1939 Second 
Republic years of Polish independence. Paradoxically, during 
partitions, Marx, Engels and Lenin all supported Polish nationalism. ' 31 
The subordination of the Polish Communist Party (KPP), established 
in December 1918, to Soviet foreign policy and to the Comintern led 
Polish communists to disavow Polish independence, and the Polish 
Army, and to side with the Red Army during the Polish-Soviet War. 132 
Polish communists were considered by many as traitors to the nation, 
which helps explain the genesis of the communist -z- Pole and the 
communist = enemy ofthe nation myths. 
130 The first Polish socialist group Proletariat, founded in 1882, was markedly 
anti-nationalist. The Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and 
Lithuania (SDKPiL) - formed by a 1900 merger of the main Polish Communist 
Party, The Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP) with The 
Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (SDL) - actively opposed the union of 
Polish lands. Its leaders, who included RNka Luxemburg and Feliks Dziertynski, 
devoted most of their energies to the German and Russian Revolutions. In 1921, 
Dzier2ynski conceded: ... our mistake was in repudiating Poland's independence 
for which Lenin always rebuked us. "' As cited by Dziewanowski's The 
Communist Policy of Poland (Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p. 103) as cited by 
Bromke (1967: 54). The Polish Socialist Party (PPS), founded in 1892, agonised 
over the priority between national and social justice. By the time Pilsudski 
emerged as its leader in 1918, he no longer regarded himself as a socialist, and 
adopted a strongly nationalist line. (Davies 1981b: 65) and (Jelen'ski 1982: 181). 
131 Their support was pragmatic in the sense that they saw Polish independence as 
a means of weakening the partitioning absolutist powers and thereby as a means 
of spreading revolution. 
132 In 1920, during the Red Army's advance on Warsaw, the Polish communists 
formed a revolutionary government in Bialystok and gave active support to the 
Red Army. (Coutouvidis 1986: 117). 
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2.4.2 The Genesis of External Enemy Myths 
The German and Russian/Soviet 1 33 enemy myths that evolved over 
the centuries of Polish conflict with her neighbours were much fuelled 
by repressive acts against Poles during partitioning and repartitioning. 
In August 1939, Poland's two key historic enemies signed the Soviet- 
German Non-Aggression Pact with its secret re-partitioning protocol 
whereby the Germans would take western Poland and the Soviet 
Union would take eastern Poland. 
The Genesis of the German Enemy Myth 
Given their belief in the physical force tradition, myths of military 
valour were normally associated with idealistic nationalism. However, 
it was realistic nationalists - such as Dmowski and Sienkiewicz, who 
was to aid Dmowski during VA", and the MMI communist 
partisans - who saw the Germans as a greater threat to Poland than the 
Soviets and who helped create the 1410 Battle of Grunwald myth and 
transform it into a German enemy myth. 
The 14 10 Battle of Grunwald represented a ma or Polish-Lithuanian- i 
Ruthenian ' 34 victory over the German Knights of the Teutonic Order 
133 Many Poles saw the Soviet regime as merely a continuation of the Czarist 
regime's coercive hegemony. 
134 The term Ruthenia was applied to the Ukraine in the Middle Ages, which was 
to become part of the Jagiellonian/Commonwealth territory. Later, in Austria- 
Hungary, the term Ruthenians was used to designate the Ukrainian population of 
West Ukraine and Carpathian Ukraine. In 1772, Ruthenia was divided between 
the partitioning powers, Austria and Russia. The Austrian portion, Galicia, was 
returned to Poland in 1918. After 1918, the term Ruthenia was applied only to the 
easternmost province of Czechoslovakia, which was also known as Carpathian 
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and was to give rise to a German enemy myth. The German defeat at 
Grunwald heralded two centuries of Polish growth. It also marked the 
end of the Order's expansion along the south-eastern coast of the 
Baltic Sea and the beginning of the gradual decline of the pre-eminent 
military power of the age. More than four and a half centuries after the 
Battle, the myth remained. A famous 1878 painting by Jan Matejko 
(1838-1893) of the 1410 Battle helped stir collective memories. Two 
decades later Sienkiewicz revisited the myth in his The Teutonic 
Knights (1900). 
Dmowski's social Darwinism also helped to engender external enemy 
mythology. Dmowski believed that international relations were 
subject to the severe Darwinian 'survival of the fittest' laws and that it 
was pointless to believe in the final victory of the 'right cause', since 
the fate of any cause depends first of all on material forces. In a social 
Darwinian manner he asserted: "'Struggle is the foundation of life. ... 
Nations morally degenerate and decay whenever they cease 
struggling. "' 135 Dmowski advocated the concept of national interest, 
emphasising that each nation had a natural right to 'healthy national 
egoism'. Dmowski's real-politik view meant that the primary duty of 
the nation was to pursue its own interests. The only principle of 
Ukraine. In 1945 Galicia was annexed to the USSR. There is no ethnic or 
linguistic distinction between Ukrainians and Ruthenians. Culturally, however. 
the Ruthenians were distinct from the Ukrainians. especially after 1596. W-hen the 
Orthodox Church of the Western Ukraine entered into union with the Roman 
Catholic Church, and after 1649, ý, vhen a similar union was effected in Hungary. 
When in 1945 all Ruthenians were united in Soviet Ukraine, government pressure 
resulted in the secession of the Ruthenian Uniate Church from Rome and its 
reunion with the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1989 the I Iniate Church broke with 
the Russian Orthodox Church and re-established its ties ývith Rome. 
135 Thoughts qfa Modern Pole (1903) as cited by Bromke (1967: 15). 
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international relations, he argued, was that of strength or weakness, 
never that of being morally right or wrong. ' 36 Dmowski accused his 
countrymen of clinging to the ideas of their romantic poets, that is, to 
the comforting but foolish illusion that all nations were brothers and 
that conflicts could be solved on the basis of an abstract 'justice'. 137 
The Rota, a song protesting the process of Germanisation within the 
German partition, had a refrain that asked for God's help. Rota was 
first performed on 15 July 19 10 at the Grunwald Memorial in Krakow, 
precisely a half millennium after the 1410 Battle of Grunwald. 138 The 
setting of the protest at the Grunwald Memorial had the characteristic 
features of conscious 20'h century political manipulation. Edelman 
(1964: 96) observes that political settings are contrived. "They are 
unabashedly built up to emphasize a departure from men's daily 
routine. " He notes (1964: 190) that 
"the settings of formal political acts help 'prove' the integrity and 
legitimacy of the acts they frame, creating a semblance of reality 
from which counter-evidence is excluded. Settings also help 
leaders find the roles and identifications that are significant to the 
followers. " 
As both Kertzer (1988: 120) and Holy (1996: 33) note, and as Part 2 
of the thesis will also show, opposition mass demonstrations usually 
136 Walicki (1982: 33 8). 
137 Walicki (1982: 3 50). 
138 Source: http: //www-personal. engin. umich. edu/-zbigniew/Hymny /HRot. html. 
The lyrics to Rota were written by Maria Konopnicka (1842-1910) 
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take place in locations of symbolic value to the demonstrators, rather 
than in the centres of the holders of political power. 
During the 1939-1945 re-partitioning, the Germans killed an estimated 
three million Catholic Poles and three million Jewish Poles. These 
atrocities fuelled the German enemy myth but did not abate the Jewish 
enemy myth. 
After WWII, the Polish communist regime, conveniently forgetting 
the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and the role of the much 
larger Home Army, were to make much of the communist partisans' 
anti-German WWII exploits. Two exceptions to the pre-1945 
communists = internationalists rule were Gomulka '39 and Mieczyslaw 
Moczar (1913-1986). With the outbreak of WWII, Gomulka was 
released from prison and went on to direct communist resistance to the 
Germans in Warsaw. 
In January 1942, at the initiative of the Stalin-controlled Comintern 
(1919-1943), the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) was formed. As its 
Party name suggested, Polish communism was learning from its past 
mistakes of disavowing Polish nationalism and of highlighting its 
ideology. Shortly afterwards, the PPR established the People's Guard 
(GL) 140 that constituted the main force entering the People's Army 
139 Paradoxically Gomulka's Polish imprisonment (1936-1939) by the post- 
Pilsudski regime probably saved him from summary execution. In 1938, Stalin 
abruptly dissolved the Polish Communist Party (KPP). All ranking Polish 
communists not then in Polish prisons headed to the So,,,, Iet 
Union and to their 
death at Stalin's behest. 
140 The GL numbered about 11,000 of which about 1400 were partisan units. 
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(AL), established in January 1944 by the PPR, headed by Gomulka 
from 1943. Moczar was a district commander in the (GL) and then the 
AL. The anti-German GL and AL took their directives from Moscow. 
The Genesis of the Soviet Enemy Myth 
The original antemurale myths within Poland were probably fuelled 
by Tartar and Turkish threats to Poland, and in particular by the Polish 
King Sobieski's victory over the Islam Turks in 1683. In the 20th 
century, the antemurale myth had to adapt to new circumstances. The 
Polish mission now was to save Christian Europe from a new faith, in 
the form of Soviet communism. There were two key 'opportunities' to 
fulfil this mission and in doing so fuel the Soviet enemy myth. The 
first opportunity was during the Polish-Soviet War and the second was 
at the end of WWII when the Home Army tried, by attempting to 
liberate Poland first, to prevent a Soviet 'take-over' of Poland. 
After WWI, Marshall Pilsudski was to become the chief overseer of 
Poland's brief 1918-1939 taste of national sovereignty after nearly one 
and a half centuries of foreign rule. The cavalrymen in his Polish 
Army, resplendently attired in their four-cornered caps, were a source 
of great national pride. The Polish Army was also Pilsudski's means 
of enacting the Commonwealth myth. The myth that subsequently 
evolved around the 1920 Battle of Warsaw conveniently forgets that 
the Polish Army 'invaded' neighbouring Lithuania and the Ukraine in 
an attempt to reconstitute the former Commonwealth. The 1920 Battle 
of Warsaw was the turning point in the Polish-Soviet War. When the 
Red Army attacked Warsaw in August 1920, most of the diplomatic 
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corps had already retreated to Poman'. Achilli Ratti - the future Pius 
XI - remained, for he thought it his duty to brave the hordes of the 
Antichrist in person. 14 1 The Soviet commander of the Western front 
wrote that, had they not lost, the war might have been the link by 
which the 1917 October Revolution would have united with the West 
European revolution. 142 The 15 August, a decisive turning point in the 
Battle, was, coincidentally, also the date of The Feast of the 
Assumption of the Virgin Mary, and as Assumption Day, the 15 
August was a national holiday 143 of the Second Republic. Following 
the 1920 Battle of Warsaw,, Dmowski's National Democrats, 
preferring that God rather than Pilsudski gained the credit, described 
Poland's victory over the Soviets as the Miracle of the Vistula. The 
Battle of Warsaw/1%4iracle of the Vistula had all the ingredients for a 
good antemurale myth in that it combined the sacred symbolism of 
Christ, God and Mary with Pilsudski and the Polish Army as hero- 
saviours, and communism and the Soviets as enemies. 
The Soviet Union's WWII re-partitioning and subsequent atrocities 
against the Poles further deepened Polish anti-communist and anti- 
Soviet antipathy. During 1939-1941, the Soviets deported an 
estimated 1.5 million Poles to Siberia and Kazakhstan for slave labour 
and massacred some 22,000 Polish Officers and reservists in the 
14 1 Davies (1972: 18). 
142 Pochod za Wislq. VIII Rewolucja z zewnqtrz. Lod2; 1989 as presented in 
(Soban'ska-Bondaruk 1998: 142). 
143 It was also a holy day of obligation for Catholics. 
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Katyn', Kharkov and Miednoje areas. 144 In 1944, in terms of numeric 
strength the AK was by far the largest Polish WWII resistance 
grouping. 145 The AK-led Warsaw Uprising, which post- 1945 evolved 
into a myth of military valour, commenced in August 1944 and 
resulted in some 250,000 Polish deaths and in the complete 
destruction of the capital by the Germans. 146 However, the Uprising 
was not only to fuel the German enemy myth, but also the Soviet 
enemy myth, for the Soviet Red Army was on the opposite banks of 
the River Vistula and failed to intervene. The Soviets even refused to 
allow Allied planes to land on Soviet-controlled airfields after 
dropping supplies to the Poles. The ties between the AK and 
Catholicism were close. Every AK member had to swear a solemn 
religious oath on the Holy Cross (the Christ-invoking symbol of 
martyrdom and salvation), before God the Almighty, and before the 
Virgin Mary, Queen of the Crown of Poland. 147 Following in the 
tradition of the national uprising insurrectionists, the AK had army 
144 The reservists killed were not career soldiers but from the professions and 
represented Poland's intellectual elite. 
145 The AK numbered some 300,000; the National Armed Forces (NSZ) some 
65,000; and the AL, 50,000. In addition, the other major resistance grouping, the 
Peasant Battalions, numbered some 160,000. (Mizerski 1996: 59). The right-wing 
NSZ WWII resistance group that included National Democratic supporters 
stressed the Germany - USSR two-enemy concept. 
146 The Uprising saw heroic street fighting. The capital's sewers were used as 
lines of communication and escape. The people of Warsaw were under heavy 
bombardment for 63 days. After surrendering, many civilians and soldiers were 
executed or exterminated in concentration camps. Kasprzyk (1997). 
147 Bruce (1974: 3 2). 
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chaplains. 148 With the post- 1945 communist regime's attempts to 
4conveniently forget' the role of the Home Army, the AK evolved into 
a myth as defender of the nation against communist and Soviet 
hegemony. 
2.5 The Genesis Of The Myths Supportive Of A Proto-Liberal 
Polish Political Culture 
Although the illiberal political culture expressed by the national myths 
depicted above was the prevailing culture of pre-1945 Poland, it 
should not be forgotten that there were proto-liberal nationalist strands 
within Polish political culture. The influences of the West European 
Enlightenment and positivist movement had a liberalising influence 
upon strands within Polish nationalism. Strands of liberal nationalism 
came to the fore during Poland's brief Enlightenment (c. 1770-1790s), 
during her romantic period (c. 1820-1860s), her positivist period, and 
during her neo-romantic period, when it competed with the 
aforementioned illiberal nationalism. Around the 1760s-1770s 
prominent West European enlightened writers, including the English 
philosopher John Locke (1632-1704), Voltaire and Rousseau, were 
translated en masse within Poland, 149 resulting in the first signs of a 
proto-liberal realistic nationalism that briefly manifested itself during 
the short-lived Polish Enlightenment. As Walicki (1989: 88) notes, the 
key representatives of the Polish Enlightenment, Kollqtaj and Staszic, 
148 Post- 1945, one such AK chaplain, Stefan Wyszyn'ski, was to become Polish 
Primate; two others were to become members of the Workers' Defence 
Committee (KOR). 
149 Suchodolski (1986: 140-14 1). 
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both Catholic priests who became deists, represented a nationalism 
"that was par excellence 'Western'q making conscious reference to the 
French model. " Polish positivism built upon aspects of West European 
positivism that believed that liberal democracy was the proper basis 
for a nation and saw the state as an organism founded on the co- 
operation between all its inhabitants. 150 
Part 2 will show how the opposition increasingly advocated popular 
democratic sovereignty, respect for other nations, civil rights for all 
citizens, toleration of ethnic minorities, and social justice for all 
citizens. These liberal values were reflected in the myths and symbols 
associated with the proto-liberal strands within Polish nationalism and 
political Catholicism. 
It is difficult to discern when a sufficiency of cognate symbols evolves 
into a myth, or when the numbers believing in myths relating to 
national identity constitute to a 'significant proportion' and thereby 
allow one to designate it a national myth. It is also difficult to 
categorise myths, given their multivocal, adaptable qnd ambiguous 
meanings. Some only achieved 'myth status' post-1945, and the 
values associated with them also were often reinforced, extended 
and/or significantly changed by post- 1945 circumstances. 
Notwithstanding these important caveats, the myths and symbols that 
reflect the above-mentioned liberal values are presented sequentially 
below. 
150 Kietlin'ska (1998: 279-280). 
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2.5.1 The Genesis of 3 May Myth and of a Belief in Popular 
Sovereignty 
Values contained within both early idealistic and realist Polish 
nationalism contributed towards the concept of Polish national 
sovereignty taking on the modem French Revolutionary aspect of 
encompassing the will of the entire nation rather than just that of the 
first and second estates of the Church and nobility. The Bar 
Confederates were conservative, in the sense that they wanted to 
defend the political privileges of the nobility/gentry and appealed to 
the 'wisdom of their ancestors'. However, at the same time, their 
criticism of absolutism gave the Confederates a proto-liberal edge, and 
they included within their concept of the 'good citizen', one who was 
prepared to protest and resist and willing to lay down his life in 
resistance to the established order. The loss of privileges and power of 
the large Polish nobility/gentry and clergy following partitioning 
helped radicalise them and also to reduce class/estate tensions. 
The May 3 Myth 
The 1791 May 3 Constitution was the first liberal written constitution 
in Europe. "' The Constitution furthered the universal ideals of the 
American (1775-1783) and French (1789) Revolutions. The 
Constitution strengthened and liberalised the govenunent, in that, 
15 1 The May 3 Constitution was only second to the American Constitution of 
1789. The American Constitution was drafted in 1787, but became effective in 
1789. The first draft of the written French Constitution was approved in July 
1790, but the final draft was not completed until Autumn 1791. The oral French 
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man was attached in written form to the 
Constitution. 
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following the American model, it established three independent 
branches of government: the executive, the legislative and the 
judiciary. 152 Karl Marx would praise the Constitution as the only 
work of freedom that Central Europe had produced of its own 
accord. 153 Engels went even further: 
"'The constitution of 179 1, embodying the rights of man, became 
the banner of the revolution on the banks of the Vistula and made 
Poland the vanguard of revolutionary France. " 154 
Written just before the second partitioning and adopted in the face of 
violent opposition from a section of the Polish nobility/gentry, the 
Constitution saw the nation in the modem terms of the entire nation 
rather than privileged sections of it. Most importantly, it referred not 
only to the 'will of the people'. but also to 'all citizens'. and 'national 
sovereignty'. The Constitution characterised with the prefix 'national' 
such concepts as 'religion'. 'army9, 'government' 'constitution". 
'laws9, 'integrity'. 'needs', 'authority' and 'liberty'. At the same time, 
the Constitution moved from an elective to hereditary system for 
choosing its monarch. The Constitution, however, curtailed the 
executive power of the King and the Royal Council which was 
answerable directly to the Parliament via Custodians of the National 
Laws which included the Primate of Poland. 155 
152 Zamoyski (1987: 248). The Constitution also abolished the infamous liberum 
veto whereby a single vote in Parliament could prevent legislation. 
153 Davies (198 1 a: 53 5). 
154 Engels, Der Volksstaat, 24 March, 1875 as cited by Marx (1992: 389). 
155 Zarnoyski (1987: 248). 
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The short-lived 3 May 1791 Constitution, like so many other facets of 
Polish nationalism, would remain an example of the reconciliation of 
contradictions. Although it was essentially a product of the realistic 
nationalism of the Polish Enlightenment, idealistic nationalists had 
contributed to its making 156 and it was later appropriated and 
mythologised by the Romantic idealistic nationalists, who saw the 
Constitution as an act of spiritual liberation of the nation and as a 
model of mild revolution. For the romantics, the 3 Ma myth signified Y 
that the Polish nation by its own means would have been capable, but 
for the 1793 partitioning, of reforming the political system of the 
Commonwealth and restoring Poland's independence and grandeur. 157 
2.5.2 Solidarity of Nations and the Genesis of the Christ of 
Nations' Myth 
Despite the fact that Poland is surrounded by Slav nations to its south 
and east, pan-Slavism, although a presence in the I 9th century, never 
developed strong roots within Poland. 158 However, Polish idealistic 
156 Julian Niemcewicz (1757-1841), a poet and an adjutant of Tadeusz 
Kogciuszko (1746-1817), and Bishop Adwn Krasin'ski (1714-1800), one of the 
leaders of the Bar Confederacy, joined with Kothitaj, and others, in its 
preparation. 
157 Plewa (1992: 130). 
158 This was in large part because the only independent Slav state of the time, 
Russia, used the pan-Slavic movement to cover her expansionist designs. As 
Poland figured within these designs, Polish nationalists accordingly regarded the 
movement's veiled Russophilism with grave suspicion (Clark 1969: 338). Pan- 
Slavism in the years before World War I came to mean the liberation of non- 
Russian Slavs from their Ottoman, German, and Austro-Hungarian rulers. 
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nationalists expressed their solidarity/fraternity with other (Christian) 
nations to the West by not only fighting in the American Revolution, 
but also in Napoleon's (Polish) Legions; in France, Italy, Germany, 
Austria and Hungary in 1848; in the Paris Commune of 1871, and 
with the British during WWII. 159 
The most famous of the Bar Confederacy's commanders, Kazimierz 
Pulaski (1746-1779), went on to fight for the American Revolution as 
had KoS'ciuszko, the leader of the first Polish National Uprising in 
1794. Kos"ciuszko found 'national egoism' intolerable and believed in 
the international brotherhood of peoples. 160 
The Polish Romantics shared several of Herder's convictions. 
161 Their 
belief in a nation's specificity did not mean a dismissal of other 
nations' specificity; on the contrary,, it meant an appreciation and 
solidarity with other specificities, for they believed all cultures were 
valid. They were not illiberal nationalists. They believed in a 
brotherhood of nations and perceived a nation, as Herder did, as 'a 
wild garden full of bad plants and good. ' They were strictly anti- 
imperialist, and their opposition to the Enlightenment was not because 
they were hostile to learning and reason, but rather because they 
disagreed with the Enlightenment's tendency to reduce human 
IS9 Towards the end of WWII there were almost 230,000 Poles under British 
command in Western Europe. 
160 Walicki (1989: 126). 
161 See Chirot (1996). 
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behaviour and the entire natural universe to a set of rational laws 
devoid of passion and spontaneity. 
Polish idealistic nationalist sentiments of solidarity of nations were to 
be found within the 1830-1831 Uprising and within the Christ of 
Nations' myth. During a January 1831 Warsaw demonstration 
commemorating the 1825 Decembrist Uprising, 162 and just weeks 
after the commencement of the 1830-1831 National Uprising, the 
Polish leftist patriot Adam Gurowski (1805-1866) declared: 
"'Freedom not to one country or one people, but to all on earth, 
all humanity is one. Whoever wants his country to throw off the 
yoke will respect foreign freedom, too. Self-seeking interested 
parties divide and sow discord between one people and 
another. "' 163 
During this demonstration, the slogan For Your Freedom and Ours! 
first appeared on Polish banners. The exiled Mickiewicz was to write 
with appreciation that they were Polish banners, and that the word 
Your was put before Ours - in defiance of all previous diplomatic and 
realistically pragmatic logic. Later, Mickiewicz succeeded in forming 
a Polish Legion which fought for Italian nationalism under the slogan: 
Wherever there is evil, there is our homeland! 164 Elsewhere, the 
162 The Decembrists, mainly Russian army officers, were influenced by French 
liberal ideas and tried to prevent the accession of Tsar Nicholas I after the death of 
his eldest brother Tsar Alexander 1. 
163 As cited by Suchodolski (1986: 192). 
164Davies (1981b: 342). The Legion fought in August 1848 against the Austrians 
in Lombardy, in April 1849 in Genoa against the Royalists, and in June 1849 in 
the vain defence of the Roman Republic. 
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Polish idealist concept of brotherhood of nations was also put into 
practice. In Italy, Polish generals helped various armed forces fighting 
for Italian nationalism and one Polish general, JOzef Bem, a hero of 
the 1830-1831 National Uprising, took part in 1848 Revolutions in 
Austria and Hungary. 
The Christ of Nations' Myth of Election 
The Christ of Nations myth held that because Christ died for the sins 
of others, Poland, 'the Christ of nations', through fighting for 
freedom. ) would redeem not only herself, but, by her suffering, other 
Christian nations also. Poland's sacred mission was to break the 
chains of absolutism and thereby bring universal freedom. 
In numerous articles published during the 1830-31 National Uprising, 
the poet and literary critic Kazimierz Brodzin'ski (1791-1835) 
developed ideas typical of myths of election, particularly in About the 
Nationality of the Poles (183 1). Brodzin'ski felt the Polish nation 
mission was: 
"'to grow the tree of freedom and brotherhood under the sun of 
religion' and overcoming the natural egoism of the nation, to 
teach other nationalities that none of them should be an object in 
itself, but all should concentrate like planets around the unique 
sun, meaning '-the co-operation of all mankind. ' By this token 
the Polish nation 4appeared like the Copernicus of the moral 
world. "' 165 
165 As cited by Suchodolski (1986: 168). 
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Polish I 9th century Messianism, stripped of its extravagant mysticism, 
may be summed up in two ideas, that of sacrifice in the Christian 
sense and that of the solidarity of nations. 166 Disinterested sacrifice to 
achieve independence for one's own and for other Christian nations 
transformed Polish Messianism from the religious to the political, and 
the romantic poets were able to elevate sacrifice to sublime heights. 
The Christ of Nations myth bordered on the blasphemous. Traditional 
Catholics found it difficult to accept that the political fate of a people 
may be compared, even metaphorically, to the crucifixion of Christ. 
Although officially disapproved of by the Catholic Church, political 
Messianism did not lack sympathisers within the clergy, and it 
contributed greatly to a revival and renewal of Catholicism amongst 
the ordinary faithful in Poland. 
167 
Mickiewicz contributed a great deal to the creation of the Christ of 
Nations myth. Mickiewicz's Forefathers'Eve (1823 and 1832) gives 
expression to the bitterness of a defeated nation, but also a sense of 
hope as a result of Poland's sufferings. One of its characters, Father 
Piotr, in an emotional passage regarded as a defining influence on the 
Polish literary tradition of Messianism, equates the martyrdom of 
Poland with the martyrdom of Christ and urges a moral revival. In 
Tomes of the Polish Nation and the Polish Pilgrimage (1832), 
Mickiewicz argued that Poland had sacrificed herself for others: 
"'Christian Poland became a natural defense of Western civilization, 
166 Halecki (1942: 195). 
167 Pomian-Srzednicki (1982: 39) and Davies (198 1 b: 216). 
123 
which originated from Christianity. "' 
168 He also prophesised that 
"'the Nation shall arise, and free all the peoples of Europe fTom 
slavery. "' 
169 
2.5.3 Civil Rights for All and the Genesis of the Commonwealth 
Myth 
The Jagiellonian/Commonwealth myth has its genesis with Jadwiga 
(c. 1374-1399), the daughter of King Ludwik of Hungary and Poland, 
who was born in Hungary about 1374. From 1384-1386 she was, apart 
from the Madonna, the one and only Queen of Poland. In 1386, she 
married the Grand Duke Jagieflo of Lithuania, who thereby became 
King Wladyslaw 11 of Poland. The following year, 1387, Jagiello 
returned to Lithuania and put in motion the conversion of his people to 
Christianity by receiving mass baptism. Jadwiga was revered for being 
devoutly religious, for extending the eastern territory of Poland and 
for devoting her personal wealth to the development of the Krakow 
Academy/University. Shortly after her death, she became a cult figure 
and in 1419 a list of the miracles that were said to have occurred by 
her grave was drawn up. Legend had it that Jadwiga asked her 
husband to build a church for the Virgin Mary. 170 
Poland and Lithuania were from 1386 united via the Jagiellonian 
dynastic union and, in 1569, Poland and Lithuania were formally 
168 As cited by Suchodolski (1986: 19 1). 
169 As cited by Davies (198 1 b: 8-9). 
170 Backmann (1999: 58 -5 9). 
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merged into a 'Commonwealth of Two Peoples'. 171 The 
Commonwealth was then the largest state in Europe. 
Jews originally moved eastward into Poland from about the end of 
13 th century, fleeing persecution and banishment from Western 
European countries. 172 The Commonwealth 'sheltered' some four- 
fifths of the world's Jews. They fitted fairly comfortably into its 
political, economic and cultural framework, and there was no serious 
Jewish 'problem', rather a Polish-Jewish symbiosis, with Jews granted 
more autonomy, rights and privileges than elsewhere in Europe. 173 
Following the 1772 partitioning and the dismemberment of the multi- 
national, multi-ethnic Commonwealth, a Commonwealth paradise 
lost myth evolved. The myth tended to be propagated by idealistic 
nationalists, including Lithuanians who had assimilated Polish culture, 
who sought to restore a modem version of the Commonwealth, which 
they saw as an ideal. With the onset of partitioning, the idealistic 
nationalists, mainly Polish and Lithuanian nobility/gentry, the latter 
having adopted Polish ways, looked to the 
JagiellonianICommonwealth myth for sustenance. Although looking 
to the past, the myth sustained proto-liberal concepts. Davies, writing 
of the Commonwealth nobility noted: 
171 One of the Polish words for Commonwealth is Rzeczpospolita, (RP) which 
comes from the Latin res publica and signifies the sovereignty of the nation in 
relation to the state. The inter-war designation of Poland was RPII, a designation 
that was not changed to the Polish People's Republic (PRL) until 1952. The first 
RP relates to the 1569-1772 Commonwealth and RPIII to the post-PRL republic. 
172 For example, Jews were banished from England in 1290, France in 1306 and 
1394, Spain in 14922 and Portugal between 1496-1497. Rohozinska (2000: 2). 
173 Rohozinska (2000: 2). 
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"In an age when most Europeans were lauding the benefits of 
Monarchism, Absolutism, or of state power, the noble citizens of 
Poland-Lithuania were praising their 'Golden Freedom', the right 
of resistance, the social contract, the liberty of the individual, the 
principle of government by consent, the value of self reliance. 
These concepts feature widely in the ideologies of modem, 
liberal democracies. " 174 
Later, the myth was revitalised by the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and 
Pilsudski's Independence Movement. Pilsudski envisaged a nationally 
tolerant society and was a believer in the Jagiellonian/Commonwealth 
myth. Pilsudski was committed both to the democratic traditions of 
Res Publica and the multinational tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. 175 Accordingly, Pilsudski and his followers revived 
the Jagiellonian/Commonwealth myth as propagated by early 
idealistic nationalism following partitioning. In power, Pilsudski 
sought to establish a Federation of States covering pre- 1772 
Commonwealth territory (which included parts then lying mainly in 
Lithuania and partly in the Ukraine) and sent forces eastwards to 
achieve this aim, which in turn triggered the 1919-1920 Polish- Soviet 
War. His aim was to grant a wide autonomy to the different 
nationalities and encourage them to develop their national 
individuality. 176 
174 Davies (1981a: 371). 
175 Shelton (1995: 268). 
176 Brubaker (1997: 99). 
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In its m141ji-faith aild multi-ethic values, the Jagiellonian 
Xommonwealtb myth embraced a concept of civil rights irrespective 
of religious qr qhpic criteria. Such thinking was apparent in both 
realistic and idealistic nationalism in the decades that followed the 
Commonwealth's demise. 
The 3 May 1791 Constjýation begins with thQ words. 'In the name of 
God, One in the Holy Trinity' and its first Artiple declares that: 
"The dominant national religion is and shall be the sacred Roman 
Catholic faith with all its laws. Passage from the dominant 
religion to any other confession is forbidden under penalties of 
apostasy. " 
However, the first Articlý-, continues in a more tolerant and liberal 
tone, in guarantgeing the right to worship for other non-Catholic 
k 
faiths: 
"Inasmuch as the same holy faith bids us love our neighbors, we 
owe to all persons, of whatever persuasion, peace in their faith 
and the protection of the goverrunent, and therefore we guarantee 
freedom to all rites and religions in the Polish lands, in 
accordance with the laws of the land. " 177 
j and Staszic's Enlighterument-influenced realistic nationalism Koll4ta 
assumed that all inhabitants of the country ought to become conscious 
of being Poles, irrespective of their ethnic origins or religion. Staszic 
tried to convince the nobility/gentry that they were not 'the whole 
nation, ' but only one of its estates. Staszic saw Polish society as an 
177 Constitution. 1791: Article 1. The Dominant Religion. 
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inclusive 'moral entity'. This entity, he argued, comprised all, whether 
they were nobility/gentry or peasants, townspeople or Jews. 178 
KoS'ciuszko, the leader of the 1794 National Uprising, was a polonised 
Belorussian who saw Lithuania as part of his native land. During the 
Uprising, an Act of Insurrection of the Lithuanian Nation was signed 
and for a few months the two parts of the Commonwealth were 
reunited. Kos"ciuszko and the 1794 National Uprising he led 
proclaimed the universal ideals of both the American and French 
Revolutions. The Uprising's Manifesto of Polaniec promised a 
reduction of the burden of feudal labour. KoS'ciuszko sought freedom 
for all classes and all religions in Poland. He sought the co-operation 
of Greek Orthodoxy and equipped a Jewish Legion as part of the 
Polish Army. 179 
Although regarded as the supreme representative of Polishness, 
Mickiewicz was born in Lithuania within an impoverished noble 
family. He began Pan Tadeusz with the invocation: '0 Lithuania, my 
Fatherland! You are like health to me. ' and the 1846 National 
Uprising Manifesto To The Polish Nation appealed to "'Our brothers 
... fighting with the enemy 
in Lithuania and in Ruthenia. "' 180 
178 Staszic opposed separate Jewish aspirations and in 1816 wrote the pamphlet 
Concerning the reasons. for the Obnoxiousness of the Jews. 
179 Kohn (1967: 526). 
180 As cited by Davies (1981b: 337). 
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2.5.4 Toleration and the Genesis of the Old Testament Myth 
A more tolerant attitude to Jews leading to an acceptance of Jews as 
Polish citizens by Polish Catholics may well owe it roots to the Old 
Testament myth of election. 
O'Brian links the genesis of the very first nationalism to the Jewish 
religion of the Old Testament and argues that for a period Judaism and 
nationalism became indistinguishable. "God chose a particular people 
and promised them a particular land. " 181 In the 16 th and 17th century, 
O'Brian contends, the Old Testament was read again in the sense of 
its apparent, literal meanings, including its nationalist meaning. 1 82 
The famous sermons that the Polish Jesuit priest and counter- 
reformationist Piotr Skarga (1536-1612) delivered before the Polish 
parliament in 1597 support O'Brian's contention. Skarga's eight 
sen-nons appealed to the patriotism of Poles and were written after 
Parliament's failure to address the Turkish threat. In one sermon, 
Skarga dealt with the subject of patriotism, which he defined as the 
love of one's country. Contrary to the later Polish concept of 
Fatherland, Skarga talked mainly in biblical and metaphorical terms of 
181 O'Brian (1988: 3). According to the Old Testament, Moses was commanded 
by God to deliver his people out of Egypt and slavery. Historians date the 
commencement of a movement out of Egypt to c. 13 th century B. C. Some three 
centuries later, in c. 10th century B. C., according to the Old Testament, King 
David, eventually delivered his fellow Israelites to the 'Promised Land' 
(Israel /Palestine). David made Jerusalem his capital and the 'Holy City of the 
Jews'. 
182 O'Brian (1988: 7). 
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'Our own Jerusalem. ' and ... 'our sweet Mother'. 
183 Shortly 
afterwards, in 1618, a translation into the vernacular of the poem 
Jerusalem Liberated (1581) inspired attempts at epics on proto- 
national themes. 
The Messiah in both Judaism and Christianity is the saviour or 
deliverer. King David is described in both Old and New Testaments as 
the Son of the Messiah, and the New Testament describes Christ as 
the Messiah. The post-Romantic development of political Messianism 
was based, for the most part, upon the work of the Polish philosopher, 
Andrze . Towian" ski (1799-1878), who drew parallels between the fate 
of Old Testament Israel and partitioned Poland. Towian'ski appeared 
in Paris in 1841, in the guise of a mystic-prophet foreseeing a new era 
of Christendom in which politics - thanks to the Polish, French and 
Jewish chosen nations - could become truly Christian. He attracted a 
considerable following among Polish emigres, including Mickiewicz 
and Slowacki. Mickiewicz established with Towian'ski a group that 
believed that Poland was 'the Messiah of nations' and that its 
suffering was to bring the world liberation from the evils of thraldom 
as well as universal freedom. Poland was called upon to relive in 
modem times the acts and fate of ancient Israel. 
184 In his Manifesto 
for a Future Slav State Constitution (1848), Mickiewicz declared that 
183 Davies (1981a: 358). 
184 Suchodolski (1986: 168) and Wandycz (1974: 181). After two years, 
Mickiewicz parted company with Towiafiski. Backmann (1999: 111). 
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6all citizens are equal - Israelites, too', 
185 and just before his death, 
Mickiewicz attempted to fon-n Jewish Legions to fight the Russians. ' 86 
In 1886, Sienkiewicz wrote The Deluge. One meaning of the Polish 
word for deluge is the Old Testament Flood in which Noah, chosen 
and protected by God, heroically survives. Almost six decades later, in 
Nazi-occupied Krakow, Wojtyla, future Pope, wrote three plays, 
David, Job, and Jeremiah. 
187 In his three plays: 
"There are constant references ... to the situation of Poland. The 
mystique of sacrifice and the recognition of the moral decadence 
of Israel/Poland are underscored ... with soliloquies on the value 
of suffering and the longing for a new national liberation. 
Israel/Poland in its time of trouble, Wojtyla warned, had to be 
defended not only with the sword but above all through spiritual 
renewal. " 188 
2.5.5 Social Justice and the Genesis of the Stanislaw and Albert 
Myths 
The Genesis of the Stanislaw Myth 
In 1079, Stanislaw Szczepanowski (c. 1030/5-1079), the Bishop of 
Krakow (1072-1079), was murdered by, or on the orders of, the Polish 
King, Boleslaw 11 (1058-1079). The event resulted in a papal interdict 
185 As cited by Szulc (1995: 68-69). 
186 Grudzifiska-Gross (1995: 296). 
187 Job and Jeremiah were published in Poland, shortly after Wojtyla's election as 
Pope. The manuscript for David did not survive. 
188 Bemstein (1996: 53). 
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upon Poland and engendered different political and mythical 
interpretations as shown by the Polish historians and chroniclers 
Gallus Anonymous (c. turn of 11th/12th century) and Wincenty 
Kadlubek (c. 1150-1223). In 1088 Stanislaw's body was buried in 
Wawel Cathedral, 189 but in c. 1112 Gallus depicted Stanislaw as a 
traitor who was justly killed by the king. From c. 1150 the cult of 
Stanislaw as a holy martyr began. 190 In c. 1190, Kadlubek, later 
Bishop of Krakow (1208-1218), depicted Stanislaw as a martyr who 
died fighting for justice, and emphasised the right of subjects to 
remove a 'tyrant. " '9' In 1253,192 Stanislaw was canonised by Pope 
Innocent IV (1243-1254). Stanislaw became a co-patron saint of 
Poland and his canonisation led to the writing of several stories about 
his life. Subsequently prophecies were heard that the Nation would 
soon be united, thanks to the intercession of the Saint whose body had 
miraculously reassembled after dismemben-nent. 193 Stanislaw now 
became a popular symbol of justified resistance against the excesses 
189 Wawel Cathedral in Krakow was to become the burial place of several future 
national heroes and kings of Poland. 
190 Backmann (1999: 164-165). 
191 In doing so, Kadlubek pre-dated Locke, who in his Two Treatises of 
Government (1690) attacked the theory of divine right of kings and the nature of 
the state as conceived by the English philosopher and political theorist Thomas 
Hobbes. Locke argued that sovereignty did not reside in the state but with the 
people, and that the state is supreme, but only if it is bound by civil and what he 
called 'natural' law. In England, the myth of Stanislaw has its counterpart in what 
might be termed the myth of Thomas Becket. 
192 Some sources give the date as 1254. 
193 Suchodolski (1986: 14). 
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of royal/secular power. 194 His cult played a big role in unifying the 
Polish state during the second half of the 13 th century and the 
beginning of the 14 Ih century. The myth of Stanislaw as omnipotent- 
saviour was being formed. Several centuries later, during partitioning, 
Slowacki's King-Spirit (1847) kept the Stanislaw myth alive by using 
the symbolism of an agonised Stanislaw in the context of the 
contemporary struggle for independence to inspire future 
generations. 
195 
Aided by the impact of neo-romanticism at the turn of the I 9th /201h 
century, when numerous Stanislaw bibliographies appeared, the 
Stanislaw myth lived on. Pilsudski was known to greatly admire 
Slowacki. At the reburial of Slowacki at Wawel Cathedral in June 
1927, Pilsudski ended his funeral oration with the words: "He is going 
forward as King-Spirit. " Pilsudski then turned towards the officers 
carrying the coffin and said: "In the name of the government of the 
Republic, I command you to take the coffin to the king's crypt, so that 
he be the equal of kings. " 196 In 1928, King-Spirit was published in 
full, having only been published partially in 1847. Wojtyla, greatly 
influenced by romanticism, took part 
performances of King-Spirit. 
194 Kubik (1994: 130). 
in W'Wll underground 
195 Slowacki's King-Spirit expressed the genesic idea that the material world is an 
expression of the ever-improving spirit capable of progression into ever-new 
forms. 
196 Pilsudski (1927). 
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The Genesis of the Albert Myth 
The painter and fiiar, Brother Albert, whose real name was Adam 
Chmielowski (1845-1916), took part in the 1863-1864 National 
Uprising against the Russians, where he was wounded and lost a leg. 
In 1884, ordered by the Czarist authorities to leave the Russian 
partition, he went to Krakow, where, gripped by a sense of national 
service, he devoted his life to the most deprived. Even during his 
lifetime, he knew fame as a saintly person. Shortly before his death, 
the neo-romantic writer Stefan Zeromski depicted him in his novel 
The Conversion of Judas (1916) as someone searching for the means 
to fight Satan. All sections of Krakow society - nobility, academics, 
artists, office-workers, tradesmen and the homeless - took part in 
Albert's funeral procession. In the early 1930s, moves were begun to 
beatify Brother Albert and on II November 1938, the Polish President 
decorated him posthumously for his services to the country and 
society. 197 
2.6 Conclusions: The Seeds Are Sown 
The chapter has explored the pre- 1945 genesis of myths of Polish 
nationalism and Polish political Catholicism and suggested that the 
myths identified were to play a significant role in shaping post-1945 
Polish political culture. The chapter also explored the gradual 
synthesis of Polish nationalism and Polish political Catholicism and 
argued that this process of synthesis was aided by the sharing of 
197 Gach (1997: 229 & 23 1). 
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common myths. These common myths, and in particular the Madonna 
myth, served both the aims of nationalism and of Catholicism and in 
doing so brought the two 'belief systems' closer together. 
The chapter argued that pre-1945 Polish nationalism manifested itself 
in two differing strands: an idealistic and realistic strand. The chapter 
contended that the Enlightenment and positivist periods shaped the 
realistic strand, while the romantic and neo-romantic periods shaped 
the idealistic strand, and that both realistic and idealistic strands had 
liberal and illiberal aspects. 
The chapter argued that the prevailing political culture of the Polish 
Second Republic was increasingly illiberal and that this culture was 
greatly influenced by an illiberal Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism. The chapter contended that the main source of 
illiberalism within Polish nationalism was the social Darwinism of 
Dmowski. The resulting illiberal nationalism was in tune with other 
European illiberal nationalisms of the time and expressed itself partly 
in terms of a conspiratorial enemy mythology, deployed mainly 
against Jews and communists. The chapter also argued that the Polish 
Church hierarchy adopted the same mythology during the 1918-1939 
period, in tune with both the prevailing illiberal Polish nationalism 
and illiberal papal political Catholicism. However, the chapter also 
indicated that there were liberal aspects of Polish political 
Catholicism. 
Finally, the chapter identified certain pre-1945 myths associated with 
the proto-liberal strands within Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism. Part 2 of the thesis will show how and why these pre- 
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1945 myths associated with proto-liberalism and their accompanying 
symbols and rituals served as vehicles for the post-1945 liberal 
political culture of opposition. In doing so, Part 2 will show how and 
why, thanks to the characteristics and functions of myths and symbols, 
associated pre-1945 political values were reinforced, extended and/or 
significantly changed. It will also show how and why the opposition, 
although retaining many of the sentiments of idealistic nationalism, 
adopted the realistic nationalist organic work strategy of evolutionary 
peaceful means. It will demonstrate how and why the opposition 
discarded the illiberal features of Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism, including German and Jewish enemy myths and how it 
transformed the communist and Soviet enemy myths into myths 
indicating an opposition to a political system rather than a hatred of 
others. Part 2 will show how and why the process of synthesising of 
Polish nationalism and political Catholicism that commenced in the 
19th century reached a high-point with the political preaching of John 
Paul 11, in large part due to his deployment of myths that served both 
the aims of liberal nationalism and liberal political Catholicism. In 
addition, Part 2 will also show how and why this synthesis found 
practical expression within Solidarity. 
The next chapter not only looks at the above processes as they 
occurred within the opposition's political culture, but also explores 
how the official and non-official regime nationalisms deployed and 
adapted myths and symbols of the pre- 1945 era. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF PRE-1945 MYTHS IN THE 
1945-1989 WAR OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
3.1 Introduction: The War Of Political Legitimacy 
The 1945-1989 war of political legitimacy was a struggle between the 
political cultures of the opposition and the Party-State for political 
hegemony over the Poles. The war included a struggle for national 
identity waged in large part through the deployment of pre-1945 
nationalist and religious myths and their associated symbols and 
rituals. Over the 1945-1989 Period the intensity and nature of the 
struggle was in part shaped by the changing regime positions 
regarding Polish nationalism and Catholicism and by the changing 
opposition positions regarding the degree to which liberalism shaped 
their nationalism and political Catholicism. Broadly speaking, the 
regime in its national communism propagated a Polish 'national road 
to socialism' during the periods where Gomulka led the Party,, that is 
to say 1943-1948 and 1956-1970, and during these two periods the 
regime tolerated the existence of the Polish Church. In the interim 
1948-1956 period, the regime, under the shadow of Stalinism, 
propagated internationalism and disavowed national communism and 
took a much tougher anti-Church stance. With ideological legitimacy 
becoming a spent force, 198 Gomulka's national communist formula 
the Polish socialist state = the nation evolved during the 1970s and 
1980s into Gierek's and Jaruzelski's national non-communist formula, 
198 It was particularly weakened as a result of the August 1968 Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which the Polish-Army participated, and as a 
consequence of the December 1970 massacre of unarmed striking Polish shipyard 
workers by regime forces. 
137 
the Polish state -= the nation. 199 Broadly speaking, the opposition 
during the 1945-1989 period, gradually freed itself of the pre-war 
shadow of illiberal nationalism and political Catholicism and 
increasingly adopted more liberal stances. Key events that shaped this 
liberalisation process were the period of de-Stalinisation following 
Stalin's death in 1953 and Khrushchev's 'secret' speech in 1956, the 
invasion of Hungary in 1956, the events in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, the renaissance of civil society during the 
1976-1979 period, the changes in papal Catholicism from the 1960s 
and the election of John Paul 11 as Pope in 1978. 
Before specific manifestations of this struggle are examined, some 
assertions of the nature of the political cultures of each side are stated. 
Justification of these assertions will rest upon the empirical evidence 
presented. 
3.1.1 The Political Culture of Opposition 
In the context of a Poland under a communist rule that sought an 
ideological monopoly and where the Church was at best tolerated, but 
never fully approved, by the regime, and where the Church at best 
tolerated communism but never fully approved it, the Polish Church 
was, almost inevitably, part of the opposition. To a significant extent 
nationalism and political Catholicism shaped the post-1945 political 
culture of opposition. Although initially this political culture featured 
both liberal and illiberal facets, it gradually became more liberal, in 
199 The concepts of legitimacy and national non-conununism are explored later in 
this chapter. 
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large part because its nationalism and political Catholicism became 
more liberal. As national non-communism deployed the pre-1945 
illiberal enemy myths, so the opposition gradually discarded them, as 
its political culture became more liberal. From about the mid-1960s, 
the opposition began to distance itself from the German and Jewish 
enemy myths, in part due to the influence of Vatican 11 upon political 
Catholicism. In a September 1972 Pastoral Letter, marking the 200'h 
anniversary of the first partition of Poland, the Polish bishops defined 
Christian patriotism thus: 
"'True love for one's country entails profound respect for the 
values of other nations. ... It eschews 
hatred, for hatred is a 
destructive force that leads to a diseased and degenerated version 
of patriotism. ýqq 200 
By the late 1980s, thanks partly to the impact of Gorbachev, the 
opposition had, to a significant extent, redefined its Russian/Soviet 
enemy myth. The opposition was now not in the business of evoking 
hatred, but of putting its liberal beliefs, via Solidarity, into practice. 
This liberalisation process was facilitated by three factors. One was 
that the opposition deployed certain of the myths associated with the 
proto-liberalism that constituted part of the pre-1945 political culture 
discourse. A second was that the attributes of myths facilitated a 
legitimate, politically potent and adaptable political culture. The third 
was that the opposition discarded or re-interpreted the enemy myths 
associated with 1900-1944 illiberalism. 
200 As cited by Kubik (1994: 124). 
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By 1945, communists controlled the new Polish regime. They owed 
their power to the Soviet Union and the war-end dispositions of its 
Red Army. Most Poles perceived communism as a non-democratic 
4alien import' and Poland as being part of a coercive Soviet 
hegemony. In consequence the regime was deemed not to have 
political legitimacy in the sense of not commanding the respect of the 
majority of Poles, of not being "a political order marked by respect 
for authority and law. " 201 This essentially liberal democratic 
interpretation of legitimacy did not materialise suddenly after WWII. 
It slowly evolved over the decades of communist rule. Two key 
factors in this process of evolution were the increasing disillusionment 
of the dissident left with 'practising communism', resulting in their 
abandoning communism for liberal democracy, and the increasing 
liberalisation of political Catholicism. The perception of a coercive 
hegemony reinforced the legacy of recent centuries of non-sovereignty 
due to Russian/Soviet partitioning and repartitioning and resulted in 
two key opposition aims, both construed in a liberal sense. One aim 
was to seek popular sovereignty and the other was to seek national 
self-deten-nination. Thus for the opposition, popular sovereignty was 
increasingly a belief that only rulers, freely and fairly elected by the 
nation, had the right to command obedience. Rulers, so chosen, would 
better serve the interests of civil society. 202 National self- 
determination increasingly meant that a Polish government so elected 
should be allowed to rule free of any coercive non-Polish influence. 
201 Held (1998: 3 34). 
202 Civil society is defined for the purposes of this thesis as the section of society 
'independent of the formal structures of power' and engaging in ýa sphere of 
action distinct from that of state forces. " White (1993a: 38 & 193). 
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The key constituents of the mainstream opposition were initially 
members/followers of the Polish Catholic Church and of the Catholic 
intelligentsia Znak movement, 203 and later, from 1976 and 1980 
respectively, also of the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) 204 and 
of the political-cum-trade union movement, Solidarity. For most of 
the 1945-1989 period, the Church led this mainstream opposition, and 
it should not be forgotten that Solidarity only enjoyed the freedom of 
action that legal status gave it for less than two years under communist 
rule . 
205 For most of the 1945-1989 period, the Church constituted the 
only organised opposition that was tolerated by the regime. 206 The 
mainstream opposition as defined did not, of course, have a uniformity 
of views. Some were atheists, some Catholics, but increasingly from 
the 1970s, three factors unified the opposition. One was having a 
common enemy in the communist state, the other was an increasing 
203 The Znak movement owed its origins to the Polish October of 19-56. It 
represented the backbone of the Catholic anti-regime intelligentsia. Amongst the 
more prominent Znak intellectuals were Jerzy Zawieyski, Stanislaw Stomma, 
Jerzy Turowicz, Jacek Woz'niakowski, Mazowiecki, Bohdan Cywin'ski, and 
Kisielewski. From 1957 to 1976, the Znak movement comprised a loose 
federation of five MPs; five Clubs of the Intelligentsia (KIKs); the editorial boards 
of three Catholic periodicals, Tygodnik Powszechny, Znak, and WiqZ'; and, 
between 1967-1976, the Centre for Documentation and Social Studies (ODiSS). 
After 1976, the independent Znak MPs were replaced, due to regime pressure, by 
a less critical group of neo-Znak MPs, but the importance of the independent Znak 
movement was undiminished. By the autumn of 1981, for example, the numbers 
of KIKs had grown ten fold, from the permitted five to a tolerated fifty. Gomulka 
(1990: 147). 
204 KOR, although influential, only existed from 1976-1981. Several of its 
members, however, were to play key roles during 1980-1989 within Solidarity. 
205 Between November 1980 and December 198 1. and from April 1989. Although 
Solidarity was still a political force when driven underground and illegal, it often 
fell to political Catholicism to represent its interests. Konieczny (1996) and 
Sobocifiski (1996). 
206 Wal (1998). 
141 
acceptance of the values of liberalism, which included attitudinal 
shifts relating to how the secular left viewed Catholics and vice versa, 
and the third was an acceptance of the authority of John Paul 11 as the 
spiritual leader of this opposition. 207 This mainstream opposition will 
be referred to in shorthand simply as the opposition, although it is 
recognised that there were other elements within civil society that 
opposed the regime. The latter were less-influential and included the 
following organisations established during the 1976-1982 period: the 
Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPOO), the 
Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), the Young Poland 
Movement, the Polish League for Independence (PPN), and Fighting 
Solidarity. 
The opposition's political culture was unofficial in the sense that it 
was not sanctioned by the Party-State and was advocated by groups 
that were deemed illegal or strongly disapproved of by the regime. 
This unofficial political culture was essentially a response to not 
accepting the 'present realities' of Soviet hegemony and of a Soviet- 
installed Polish communist regime. However, to the extent that the 
opposition increasingly appreciated that these realities could not be 
altered by the physical force tradition, it opted, in keeping with the 
pre-1945 organic work myth, for a more evolutionary and peaceful 
approach, that was less reckless than during the Uprisings . 
208 In so 
207 See Chapter 4. 
208 An example of the dying legacy of recklessness was a small student group 
called Ruch (The Movement), which was established in 1965. The arrest of its 
members for planning to set fire to the Lenin Museum in Poronin in 1970 led to 
Ruch's demise. Ruch opposed Russian domination and openly embraced Polish 
nationalism. Osa (2002: 19). Ruch was unusual insofar as it comprised some left- 
leaning members and Catholic youth, and because its goals and tactics were 
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doing, the opposition did not discard the possibility of the use of force 
in exceptional circumstances, 209 as reflected by its deployment of pre- 
1945 myths of military valour. Nor did it quite become cautious, 
reasonable and unheroic, as exemplified by Solidarity's very existence 
that defied the norms of realpolitik. 
3.1.2 The Political Culture of the Regime 
In the People's Republic of Poland (pRL), 
210 
the Party-State sought to 
control virtually all aspects of public life and thereby eliminate a 
subversive, namely to other-throw the state. Its methods included robberies to 
finance its operations and arson. Ruch's members included: co-founder Stefan 
Niesiolowski. ) later, a co-founder of L6d2 Catholic Club of the Intelligentsia (KIK) 
and a 1980 Solidarity member, Andrzej Czuma, later a co-founder of ROPOO 
and a Solidarity adviser, and Emil Morgiewicz, later a KOR member and arrested 
in August 1975 for trying to establish a Polish branch of Amnesty International. 
Although Ruch's conspiratorial mode of operation, influenced by the traditions of 
pre-1945 idealistic nationalism, was to be rejected by the mainstream opposition, 
its significance lies in the co-operation of left-leaning and Catholic young 
intellectuals, that was to find more effective expression in 1976 within KOR. 
209 For example, although falling short of advocating armed resistance, Primate 
Wyszyfiski, in a letter issued in January 1961, told his clergy to be prepared for 
any sacrifice in defence of the faith. Bromke (1967: 146) citing The New York 
Times, 4 March,, 1961. In a sermon, probably also in early 1961, Wyszyn'ski 
declared: 
"'Woe to those who seek to deprive others of freedom. ... In defense of 
his 
personality and human dignity, man will descend into the catacombs and 
will begin a life of conspiracy toward the outside world. "' Bromke (1967: 
146) citing Polish Affairs, April 1961. 
See also Chapter 5, for an example of the extent of resistance advocated by John 
Paul 11. 
210 Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (PRL) was the official name of the Polish State 
from 22 July 1952 until 29 December 1989. PRL, however, will be used as 
shorthand to depict the period from 1945-1989 when Poland was under 
communist rule. 
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genuinely autonomous civil society. Within this context, any activity 
not approved by the Party-State could be considered political, but, 
clearly, there was a wide spectrum of activity ranging from explicit, 
organised opposition to implicit opposition that simply ignored some 
of the dictates of the regime. To a significant extent national 
communism and what might be ten-ned 'national non-communism' 
shaped the regime's political culture. National communism sought a 
Polish road to communism. National non-communism sought merely 
to maintain power, and disavowed communism in two keys ways. One 
way was to downplay its ties with communism and the Soviet Union 
in order to mitigate the effects of the popular pre-1945 communism 
and Russian/Soviet enemy myths. The other way was to deploy the 
pre-1945 myths associated with the illiberal nationalism of Dmowski, 
namely the Pole = Catholic, the Piast, the Jewish enemy and the 
German enemy myths. In consequence, national non-communism 
tended to be pro-Catholic, anti-Semitic, and anti-Gen-nan. National 
communism differed insofar as it tended to be anti-Catholic, anti- 
Zionist, and was against West German imperialism. 
The regime's claim to political legitimacy rested on both a Marxist- 
influenced and a liberal-influenced view of legitimacy. The regime 
claimed it had the right to rule because it was 
"the repository of history, ... the most rational and efficient force in the state,, (and) that it represented the best and most 
progressive elements of the national tradition. " 211 
211 Sch6pflin (1994: 228) describing the basis of legitimacy of 'Soviet type 
systems'. 
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This claim justified the use of coercive power to repress opposition 
where necessary. As with more explicitly military regimes, the Polish 
Party-State, in deploying its Marxi st- influenced political legitimation 
was seeking to appropriate popular sovereignty by claiming to 
'embody the national interest' and to 'represent the people'. 212 The 
Party would represent the people/nation via the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. In time, indeed, the Party's First Secretary was to be 
described in the regime-controlled media as 'the leader of the Polish 
Nation. ' 213 However, Polish civil society was becoming less and less 
willing to accept such ideological national communist legitimacy, and 
the regime preferred not to use coercive means if possible. 
Accordingly, the regime began to increase its simultaneous 
deployment of two other forms of more liberal-influenced legitimacy; 
(liberal-influenced in the sense that the legitimation did not rely on 
coercion but rather on authority. ) 214 These forms were socio- 
economic 215 and national non-communist legitimacy. De-Stalinisation 
and the fact that by the end of the 1960s and 1970s, respectively, 
national communist and socio-economic legitimacy were transparently 
212 See Beetham (1991: 233) for the use of national legitimation by military 
regimes. 
213 This phrase began to be applied to Gierek from 1976. Glowin'ski (1993: 12). 
214 Goodwin (1997: 306) defines authority as attached to offices and requiring a 
subjectively deferential attitude on the part of citizens to be fully established. 
Goodwin points out that those in authority may also have recourse to other means 
to exercise power. Goodwin identifies five increasingly coercive archetypes 
ranging from the ability to influence, to rights of the office-holder, to coercive 
power, to force and finally, to violence. 
215 Socio-economic legitimacy was linked to the implicit social contract concept 
that rested on the premise that the legitimacy of communist rule resided in an 
implicit contract for civil society "to accept a limited range of political liberties in 
exchange for a modest but steadily improving standard of living. " White (1993b: 
8). 
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spent forces, meant that the Party-State, although not abandoning 
these approaches, increasingly resorted to national non-communist 
legitimacy. The regime's main motivation in simultaneously 
deploying a national non-communist strategy was to win the war of 
political legitimacy with the opposition. National non-communism, it 
was hoped, could more easily reap the political harvest to be gained 
by deploying pre- 1945 myths. 
The regime's national communism was partly a recognition of the pre- 
1939 political illegitimacy of its internationalism; partly a response to 
misgivings about the 'present realities' of Soviet hegemony, and 
partly a result of seeking legitimacy 216 with the nation. National 
communism varied considerably over the 1945-1989 years in terms of 
the degree of subservience to the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU). Polish Party leaders had always to walk a tightrope 
between the demands of Moscow and the aspirations of Poles for 
national self-determination. Apart from the Stalinist era (c. 1948- 
1956), there existed a national communism that was partly a reflection 
of political expediency and partly an expression of genuine nationalist 
sentiment. 
The Polish emigre and sociologist Maria Markus has defined the overt 
and covert process of legitimation used by East European communist 
regimes as involving: 
44a simultaneous reference by the officials of the regime 
themselves to two different and often contradictory principles in 
the same sphere, one of which is openly proclaimed on 'public' 
216 Legitimacy is used henceforth in the thesis, unless otherwise stated, in its 
liberal democratic sense. 
146 
occasions and the other in a more covert way in dealings with 
individuals and smaller groups. ... 
(The covert mode) role ... 
is 
not merely an auxiliary one, for it is believed to be more 
effective, appealing as it usually does to more popular, 
sometimes traditional, sometimes 'external', so-called 'petty 
bourgeois' values. " 217 
The overt and covert modes in the Polish context pertain to national 
communism and national non-communism, respectively. However, in 
Poland, the regime's deployment of national non-communism was not 
just in the piecemeal, private and covert way, but was also as a 
systematic, public, and overt political legitimation process. 
The regime's national communism was official in the sense that it was 
driven by communist ideology and was sanctioned by the Party-State 
apparatus. The regime's national non-communism was non-official in 
the sense that it was based on the nationalism of non-communist 
ideologies and was sanctioned usually only by some factions, albeit 
powerful ones, within the Party-State apparatus. 
Although using the rhetoric of autonomy and independence, in 
practice national communism accepted and required Soviet hegemony 
to maintain power. Perceived by its pre-1939 internationalist legacy 
and shaped by an ideological doctrine that had internationalism, 
friendship with the USSR, and the acceptance of the Soviet right to 
intervene as built-in components, national communism had little 
legitimacy, but hegemonic and ideological considerations meant that 
the regime was obliged to retain its national communism. The built-in 
217 Markus (1982: 88). 
147 
internationalist dimension of national communism was always going 
to undermine it. 
The war of political legitimacy may be seen as having two 
dimensions. The first dimension involved a war between the political 
culture of the opposition and political culture of the regime as shaped 
by its national communism. The second dimension involved a war 
between the political culture of the opposition and the political culture 
of the regime as shaped by its national non-communism. 
3.2 The War Of Political Legitimacy (1): 
The Opposition v. The Regime's National Communism 
In the war between the opposition and the regime's national 
communism, each side sought to define the symbolic paradigm. The 
opposition sought a paradigm that defined the true nation as liberated 
and the false state-nation removed; the Party-State sought a 
hegemonic paradigm that defined the state and the nation as one. 
The post- 1945 rejection of 'present realities' meant that the opposition 
tended to look to the past and the associated myths and symbols, for 
inspiration and as a vehicle to articulate an alternative legitimate 
order. Many within post-1945 civil society, for example, perceived 
the partitions (1772-1918) and repartitions (1939-1945) as periods of 
heroic struggle for national self-determination. Moreover, many 
within post-1945 civil society perceived the Second Republic period 
not in ten-ns of a failure of democracy, but as a period of freedom and 
independence, viewed with patriotic pride, with Pilsudski a national 
hero-saviour rather than an authoritarian leader. 
148 
The omnipotent hero-saviour myths and sacred symbols that the 
opposition often deployed in their war of legitimacy battles were kept 
to the fore of national consciousness by the use of rituals, in particular 
political pilgrimages, Holy Mass and annual commemorations. 
Pilgrimages within Poland had declined during the Stalinist era of 
218 harassment, but by the 1960s had recovered their pre-WWII vitality. 
Polish Primate Wyszyn'ski exploited the political dimension of 
pilgrimages during the 1960s and 1970s, and from 1978-1989, John 
Paul 11 was to exploit political pilgrimages, as Chapter 5 will show, 
even further. Holy Mass became more politically potent when, in the 
mid-1960s, following Vatican 11, the Polish vernacular was introduced 
into services, thereby contributing to a more personal reception of the 
messages of political Catholicism and undermining unreflective 
participation .2 
19 The annual commemorations observed by the 
opposition, whereby the dates of politically significant events were 
commemorated, constituted a useful device to maintain the potent 
force of history. In the context of Polish censorship and fears of 
repression, such commemorations allowed the political messages 
associated with the event to be implicitly expressed when explicit 
expression proved impossible. The ability of rituals to create solidarity 
was given significant confirmation, when, in the early 1980s, the 
Polish sociologist and priest Wladyslaw Piwowarski carried out some 
extensive studies into the participation by Poles in religious rituals. 
Piwowarski concluded that the religious rituals contributed less to the 
218 In the 1970s, an estimated annual average of 1.5 million visited the Marian 
shrine of Jasna Gora alone. Kubik (1994: 117). 
219 Kubik (1994: 116-117) makes this point too. 
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deepening of religious ties, but rather more to the deepening of social 
and national ties and to the identification with the Polish nation. 220 
Myths and symbols had proved a potent force in legitimising new 
European states in the 19'h and 2Wh centuries . 
22 ' However, national 
communism was largely based upon more recent traditions of 
communism and upon the discontinuation of older pre- 1945 traditions 
and their associated myths and symbols. 
A major problem for the new post-1945 Polish regime was that its 
ideological-bound national communism usually obliged it to 
attack/replace/ignore many of the pre-1945 traditions and their 
politically rich reservoir of myths and symbols. The Second Republic 
years, for example, were treated in official discourse in terms of their 
dialectical historical role in the evolution of socialism in Poland or 
were selectively ignored. 222 Thus, for example, the regime's 'official 
line' as expressed by the Party's daily newspaper Trybuna Ludu in the 
1960s followed the Soviets' official line, and viewed the decision to 
stage the 1944 Warsaw Uprising as one of the most tragic Polish 
4sins', resulting in 'futile sacrifice. ' 223 The regime thus had to invent 
220 Trzemiany globaInych postaw wobec religii' by W. Piwowarski in RefigýnoS'C' 
ludowa. Ciqglos'c' I zmiana. W. Piwowarski (ed. ). Wydawnictwa Wroclawskiej 
Ksiqgami Archidiecezjalnej: Wroclaw, 1983, p. 346 as cited by Kubik (1994: 
124). 
221 See Rigby (1982: 3). 
222 See Harper (1997). 
223 , SpOr o idealy wychowawcze socjalizmu'. Trybuna Ludu. 26 April. 1963 as 
cited by Bromke (1967: 197). 
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new legitimising traditions, and one way in which the regime sought 
to 'traditionalise new material' was via official, often mandatory, 
Party-State rituals of confirmation, such as May Day and 
Independence Day ceremonies that sought to reinforce the 
mythology/symbolism associated with the newer traditions of 
communism. 224 The regime decreed that streets, including private 
houses, had to be decorated with national flags for such rituals of 
confirmation. Further evidence of the regime's appreciation of the 
political potency of myths and their associated symbols and rituals is 
demonstrated by the regime's actions to attempt to monopolise the 
use of symbols and rituals and prevent the opposition availing itself of 
such political weapons. In 1955, for example, the regime decreed the 
unauthorised use of the national/state emblem and colours as illegal. 
In the early 1960s, the regime introduced a Parliamentary Bill which 
removed the Catholic festivities from the calendar of official state 
holidays. 225 In 1976, it banned the unauthorised use of the national 
flag and emblem and the singing of the National Anthem, and in the 
early 1980s, the regime decreed the use of all unregistered symbols, 
226 including those of Solidarity, as illegal . 
Three key battles in the first dimension of the war of legitimacy 
between the oPposition and the regime's national communism will be 
termed the Battle of the Second Millennium, the Battle of May Days, 
and the Battle of Foundation Days. The dynamics of the three battles 
224 Kubik (1994: 246). 
22S Brornke (1967: 230). 
226 Mach 0 985: 34). 
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were driven by the opposition's desire for popular sovereignty and 
national self-determination and by the regime's official position that 
Poland already enjoyed such status. Thus, in the Battle of the Second 
Millennium, the Church sought to link the nation to a millennium of 
Polish Catholicism where Madonna, an omnipotent hero-saviour, was 
there to save and protect the nation. The Party-State sought to link the 
nation to a millennium of the Polish state, where the Party was the 
omnipotent hero-saviour, there to save and protect the nation. In the 
Battle of May Days, the opposition sought to promote the values 
associated with the 3 May myth, while the Party-State sought to 
propagate the values associated with the I May. 227 Lastly, in the 
Battle of Foundation Days, the opposition sought to propagate the 
values linked to the II November 1918 Independence Day foundation 
myth, while the Party-State sought to propagate the values associated 
with its foundation myth, the 22 July 1944 Liberation Day. The focal 
point of each battle was usually a ritual commemoration of a 
particular event/myth by one of the warring sides. Such 
commemorations by the opposition were more than symbolic in the 
sense that they frequently led to brutal beatings and/or arrests by the 
state security forces. 
227 During 1982-1988, illegal Solidarity also attempted to mark its own I May 
commemorations. In so doing, Solidarity, by boycotting the official 
commemorations, was demonstrating that the fight for social justice could be 
undertaken outside of the 'legality' as defined by the Party-State. Without 
exception, Solidarity's attempts led to clashes with the state security police in 
each of the seven years. 1982-1988. See Kuron' (1996: 316,318 & 319), Helsinki 
Watch (I 986a) and Biernacki (2000: 76,94,110,120,135,144 & 157). 
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The regime's national communist ritual ceremonies associated with 
Second Millennium, May and Independence Day celebrations were 
meant, as Kubik (1994: 248-249) observes with regard to those during 
Gierek's era, to legitimise the Party-State in the official Marxist sense, 
for they were partly designed to engender socialist patriotism and to 
propagate sufficient Marxist-Leninist 'noise' to hinder self-reflection 
by society. The Second Millennium and May Day ceremonies also 
sought to portray the Polish People's Republic as a culmination of the 
victorious march of the forces of progress through history. 
3.2.1 The Battle of The Second Millennium 
Implicit in the Battle of Second Millennium was a conflict between a 
Church-led opposition and the Party-State as to who best represented 
the values of the nation. It was a conflict essentially between two 
myths: the Church = nation and the Party-State = nation. It was a 
battle between two different perspectives of Poland's second 
millennium. On the one side of the battle was a Church-led nine-year 
(mid-1957 to mid-1966) celebration of a millennium of Polish 
Christianity. 228 Known as the Great Novena, 229 the celebration 
stressed Poland's pre- 1945 heritage and in particular its close ties with 
Roman Catholicism. On the other side was a regime-led seven-year 
(1960 to 1966) celebration of a millennium of the Polish State. The 
regime-led celebration presented an evolution of statehood, with 
228 In 966, Poland officially became a Christian country. following the baptism of 
Mieszko 1, and his court. 
229 Novena normally refers to devotion consisting of special prayers or services on 
nine successive days. In the case of the Great Novena it was used to refer to nine 
successive vears. 
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Communist Poland representing the apogee. 230 1966, the final year of 
both celebrations, was the climax of the battle. 
Each year of the Novena 231 was devoted to one major theme relating 
to religious and/or national renewal. The more contentious themes 
were propagated between 1963-1966 and related to 'justice and social 
love'; 'the struggle against national vices and the acquisition of 
Christian virtues'; and 'the protection of the mother of God, Queen of 
Poland. , 232 The political impact of the Novena was greatly 
strengthened by the Church's deployment of the Madonna myth, 
assisted by its use of the rituals of pilgrimages, annual celebrations 
and Holy Mass and by its use of nationalist and religious symbols. 
Thus demands for religious freedom and the right of cultural 
expression were accompanied everywhere by the national emblem, the 
crowned rather than uncrowned eagle, 233 by the red and white 
national colours, by the yellow and white papal colours, and by the 
blue and white colours of Mary . 
234 
230 Wandycz (1992: 102 1). 
231 Conceived by Wyszyn'ski while still under detention, that is to say before his 
release in 1956. 
232 Kubik (1994: 111). 
233 According to Mach (1985: 30) the crowned eagle symbolised the period in 
Poland's past when the nation had attained full independence. 
234 Osa (2002: 12). 
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In 1966, the Czqstochowa Black Madonna icon 
235 
was sent on a 
pilgrimage to every one of Poland's eleven thousand parishes. The 
pilgrimage's purpose, the Episcopate explained later: 
"was to obtain the help of the Holy Mother in moral renewal of 
the Nation ... It was to 
be realized through the Jasna Gora Vows 
of the Nation and the Great Novena. " 236 
The regime attempted to stop the pilgrimage, by preventing the use of 
the icon. The Church responded by sending the icon's empty frame 
from parish to parish, where it was met with the same fervour the 
Black Madonna had received. 237 During 1966, Wyszynski also toured 
the entire country, province by province. Everywhere tens to hundreds 
of thousands of people greeted him. 
According to Osa (2002: 18), initially the dissident Catholic 
intelligentsia 238 criticised the Novena as too nationalistic, too 
traditional and not in tune with the liberal, ecumenical spirit of 
Vatican 11. Subsequently, as the regime-Church confrontation 
developed, the Catholic intelligentsia closed ranks, with Znak 
235 Some accounts talk of a duplicate icon being used. 
236 Episcopate Letter of 27-28, June 1980, quoted in Krzy2 Nowohucki, No. 2. 
1980 as cited by Kubik (1994: 110). 
237 Kubik (1994: 116) and Kurofi (1996: 302). 
238 Particularly those based around the Znak Warsaw publication Wiq.,: '. 
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publications producing a number of articles that explored Polish 
Marian traditions and their historic/national significance. 239 
The Party saw the Novena as: 
"aimed at the brutal exertion of pressure on non-believers, at the 
strengthening of the political position of the Church in social life 
and at encouraging the faithful to oppose the people's power. " 240 
The Party-State's response to the Novena was to refute the Church = 
nation myth and to propagate its own national communist counter- 
myth of the Party-State - nation. 
The scale and severity of the regime's response to the Novena shows 
how seriously the regime felt the Novena's political potency 
challenged its own political legitimacy. The regime proclaimed the 
1960-1966 period as a 'jubilee of Polish statehood and culture. ' 
Processions were staged to emphasise the patriotic and progressive 
traditions of the Polish people across the ages. Party-controlled youth 
organisations launched a huge effort to build 'a thousand schools for a 
thousand years. ' In February 1966, Interior Minister Moczar held a 
meeting at which plans to thwart the Church's 1966 millennium 
celebrations were discussed. The entire state-controlled mass media,, 
together with the entire Party apparatus were to be mobilised. Special 
operational, administrative and propaganda means to counteract the 
239 One such member of the Catholic intelligentsia, J6zefa Hennelowa, told this 
author how she realised that Wyszyfiski set out in 1956 quite consciously with his 
Great Novena to mobilise the Church. Hennelowa (1998). 
240 Dokument nr. 67 -a June 1970 analysis by the Party's Central Committee of 
its 1960s" religious policy. In (Aneks 1996: 317). 
156 
Church's celebrations and guidelines were set for other governmental 
departments to obstruct the rival celebrations . 
24 1 At a7 June 1966 
secret police meeting, the Deputy Interior Minister disclosed that the 
entire activity of his Ministry and of other Party-State bodies was 
concentrated on the Church millennium celebrations. He characterised 
the addresses of Wyszyn"ski and other Church leaders as 'hostile and 
trouble-making. ' Moczar stated that Wyszyfiski 'clearly was pushing 
for a showdown' and was particularly dangerous for the authorities. 242 
On 22 June 1966 the authorities ordered the Madonna icon back to 
Czýstochowa and informed the Church that the icon could not leave 
the monastery without its permission. In response there were anti- 
regime demonstrations in Gdansk, Krakow, Lublin, Opole and 
Warsaw. 243 Commenting on a 26 June Warsaw demonstration, 
Wyszyn" ski noted how a regime-organised crowd gathered outside the 
Curia, provocatively sang the 'Internationale 9 244 and shouted such 
241 These guidelines included: 
- broadcasting, at the time of the Church's millennium celebrations, popular radio 
and television programmes and extending them to the night hours 
- preventing foreign tourists from travelling to places where the Church 
millennium celebrations were taking place, 
- reducing the communications to places of pilgrimages, and 
- organising communications so as to get pilgrims away as quickly as possible. 
(Dominiczak 1997: 226-227). 
242 Dominiczak (1997: 230). 
243 Dominiczak (1997: 229). 
244 The Internationale (1888) was written to celebrate the 1871 Paris Commune, 
and later the Bolsheviks made it their Soviet national anthem. It remained so until 
1944, when Stalin, with his own brand of national non-communism, ) replaced 
it 
with the Hymn of the Soviet Union as WWII battlefield reports indicated soldiers 
were more willing to die for Mother Rlissia than for the 'international working 
class. 1) 
157 
slogans as 'Send Wyszyn'ski to Rome' and 'Traitor, traitor ... we do 
not forgive. ' 
245 
A Church-led opposition and the Party-State fought a conftontation of 
slogans with churches, state buildings and streets, the fighting ground 
for these competing nationalist symbols. Thus it was Poland's Sacred 
Millennium v. A Thousand Years of the Polish State; For God and 
Country v. Socialism and Fatherland; The Nation is with the Church 
v. The Party is with the Nation; Poland Alwa Faithful v. Socialism YS 
is the Guarantee ofPeace and Frontiers. 
246 
As both Weigel (1992) and Osa (1997) appreciated, the Novena was 
of ma or political importance. It provided 'a paradigm of i 
confrontation': 
247 
the united nation - with its long Church- 
safeguarded tradition of political myths, rituals and symbols, with 
Madonna to the fore - versus the secular state - with its more recent 
Party- safeguarded traditions of political myths, rituals and symbols. 
For Wyszyn'ski, according to Weigel: 
"the Great Novena would ... challenge the communist attempt to 
separate the Polish people from their past in order to subjugate 
them in the present. It would do so by giving back to the people 
... their historical memory. " 
248 
245 Wyszyfiski (1996: 130-13 1). 
246 Davies (198 1 a: 19-2 1). 
247 See Osa (1997: 352). 
248 Weigel (1992: 114). 
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The political significance of the Church deploying traditions and 
symbols of the past was immense, for, as Osa (1997: 365) recognised: 
"While the state reigned supreme in the official sphere of 
coercive political power, the Church dominated in the realm of 
national symbols and historic authority. Polish Catholicism 
managed to relocate its confrontation ... from the substantive 
ground of public policy to a higher plateau of symbolic politics, 
where the Church and society could win. " 
The Great Novena was a new Kultfirkampf- this time Polish political 
Catholicism was pitted against Polish communism, but now, a century 
later, the outcome was reversed, with political Catholicism now 
succeeding in undermining the authoritarian state's official 
nationalism. 
3.2.2 The Battle of May Days 
As Kubik (1994: 212) notes, under communist rule the I May was one 
of two major celebrations of the new social and political order, while 
3 May was for the regime taboo, an occasion to be erased from the 
collective memory. Attendance at I May celebrations was virtually 
compulsory until the end of the 1970s, with slogans to chant provided 
from above . 
249AII the Party-State organs participated in countrywide 
rallies, processions, marches and reviews to commemorate the 
249 The state authorities exerted much pressure on Poles to participate in I May 
celebrations. Maleszka (2000: 21). For example, attendance lists were made at 
schools and workplaces, and absentees from the celebration suffered 
consequences, including low marks for pupils, and lack of promotion for workers. 
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international day of labour. Fraternal communist parties offered their 
congratulations. 
For many, however, the state's I May symbolised not only a workers' 
celebration, but also in its internationalist and Soviet overtones, 
Poland's lack of national self-determination, 250 however many Polish 
flags were displayed. 
The 3 May celebrations symbolised for much of civil society a more 
liberal nation governed by popular sovereignty. The 3 May was also 
the Polish Church's Feast Dayfor Mary, Queen ofPoland. It was this 
opportune coincidence that enabled the Church to combine the 3 May 
myth with the Madonna myth. On 3 May 1966, for example, the 
culmination of the Novena celebrations and also the 31 Oth anniversary 
of King Kazimierz's 1656 dedication of Mary as Queen of Poland, the 
Church rededicated Mary to the Polish nation. To try and thwart the 
rededication, the regime specially switched the date of a football 
match between Hungary and Poland from 24 April to 3 May 1966 as a 
counter-attraction . 
25 ' Notwithstanding, about one million faithful 
made the pilgrimage to Jasna Gora. Wyszyn'ski had invited Pope Paul 
VI, but the authorities refused to give him a visa. The Polish Church 
retaliated by displaying the Pope's portrait on an empty chair, 
wreathed with roses in the national red and white colours. The Black 
250 1 May was the international day of labour as originally designated by the 
International Socialist Congress of 1889. It was thereby linked with the 
revolutionary internationalism of the precursor of the KPP, the SDKPiL. From I 
May 1890, Polish socialists in Warsaw and in Southern Polish towns, began to 
celebrate the day. Wandycz (1974: 296). 
251 
Dominiczak (1997: 227). 
160 
Madonna icon was removed from the chapel and paraded amongst the 
crowds before being placed above the empty chair, 252 bedecked with a 
papal crown as it had been in 1717 and 1910.253 In the closing 
sermon, Wyszyn" ski did not mince his words. 
"In the face of a totalitarian threat to the nation, due to the sheer 
force of Moscow, in the face of an atheistic program supported 
by the PZPR ... a great supernatural current is needed, so that the 
nation can consciously draw from the Church the divine strength 
that will fortify its religious and national life. Nowhere but in a 
Poland totally threatened does one feel such a close union as that 
between the Church and the Nation. Our 'temporal theology' 
demands that we give ourselves into the hands of the Holy 
Mother, so that we can fulfil our task. q-) 254 
A decade later, as was evident in 1977, political Catholicism had 
extended its liberal repertoire to include social justice backed by 
international law. On 3 May 1977, there was a ceremony in 
Czqstochowa to commemorate the renewal of the Jasna Gora vows of 
26 August 1956,255 when some one million people had sworn 
allegiance to Mary, Queen of Poland. Then, Wyszyn'ski was still in 
detention. Now in 1977 at the famous Marian shrine, he preached how 
in 1656 King Kazimierz stood up for the underprivileged and how 
Kazimierz's Vows 'declared the enfranchisement of the farming 
population. ' He also preached how in 1791, the 3 May Constitution 
ý14i was also to take up the cause of the underprivileged. "' The Primate 
252 Szajkowski (1983: 22). 
253 Kubik (1994: 109). 
254 Wyszyfiski (1996: 74-75). 
255 The date when the image of the Virgin Mary was said to have appeared at 
Jasna Gora is taken to be 26 August 1382. 
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added: "'today, we are ... supported 
in our Christian demands by such 
international documents as the 'Charter of Human and Civil 
mghts. 1 v)256 
It was a classic sermon using the Madonna and 3 May myths as 
vehicles for adapted political values and reinforced by the political 
power of the rituals of pilgrimage, Holy Mass, and annual 
commemoration to invent tradition. An invented tradition that aligned 
symbols of a feudal state (the king) with the emancipation of the 
peasantry and the cause of social justice. 
The political potency of the 3 May celebrations can be judged by the 
regime's reactions. In 1946 the 3 May celebrations were banned by 
the regime, but some took place anyway. The Krakow 3 May 
celebrations were explicitly anti-communist and led to physical 
257 
conflict between the state authorities and the participants. In 1950, 
the regime declared the I May a state holiday 
258 
and in 1951 they 
banned the 3 May as a national holiday. 259 3 May celebrations were 
now effectively deemed illegal and were now in direct conflict with I 
May manifestations. To thwart the opposition's celebrations, the state 
authorities always ensured that the national flags were removed before 
the 3 May. With Solidarity still legal and strong, the 3 May 1981 
256 As cited by Kubik (1994: 122). 
257 See (Kurofi 1996: 286) and (Habielski 1998: 144) for details of 3 May 1946 
conflicts. 
258 Habielski (1998: 161). 
259 Habielski (1998: 164). The national holiday ban also related to some other 
Church days of celebration. 
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witnessed the first ever 3 May celebrations under communist rule not 
disrupted by security forces . 
260 At times of great tension and in the 
absence of a legal Solidarity, the 3 May saw the return of conflict 
between the opposition and state security forces; for example, in 1982, 
261 1983,1984 and 1986 . 
3.2.3 The Battle of Foundation J)ays 
Post- 1945, the opposition and the regime were to create myths of 
foundation around two different dates, II November 1918 and 22 July 
1944 respectively. The different dates symbolised their different 
interpretations of what constituted national self-determination. The II 
November 1918 date was the Independence Day of the Second 
Republic and symbolised the end of foreign rule and new nationally 
self-determined beginnings. It became known as 'the miracle of II 
November'. 262 It was also the date when Pilsudski was appointed 
Chief of the Polish military and the German Governor abandoned 
Warsaw. 263 Thus, like all politically potent myths, the opposition's 
1918 foundation day myth combined a number of powerful inter- 
connecting, mutually reinforcing, symbols and myths. These centred 
upon national self-determination, the hero-saviour Pilsudski, and the 
defeat of the German and Russian/Soviet enemy. The II November 
foundation myth entailed the belief that Polish national self- 
260 Biemacki (2000: 44). 
261 Biemacki (2000: 76-77,94,110, & 135). 
262 Plewa (1992: 3 2). 
263 Wandycz (1974: 367). 
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determination was gained by Polish efforts, not least by those of 
Pilsudski and his Polish Legions/Polish Army before November 1918 
and again during the Polish-Soviet War, particularly during the War's 
turning point, the 1920 Battle of Warsaw. The foundation myth also 
encompassed the belief that Poland would have regained its 
independence after WWII but for the efforts of the Home Army being 
thwarted by the Red Army. The 22 July 1944 date was the day when 
the so-called Lublin/July Manifesto of the pro-communist Polish 
Committee of National Liberation (PK" was proclaimed. It 
symbolised the end of fascism, liberation and new pro-communist 
beginnings 264 for a new socialist Poland after recent centuries of 
servitude under capitalism and its offspring, fascism. The 22 July 
foundation myth entailed the national communist belief that Poland 
had gained national self-determination at the end of WWII thanks to 
the efforts of the Polish communist partisans, 265 aided by their Soviet 
allies, and that post-1945, Poland was a sovereign country. 
The Opposition's Deployment of the 11 November Foundation 
Myth 
During the Battle of Foundation Days, as the following 1978 example 
of the 60"' anniversary celebration illustrates, the opposition deployed 
both the rituals of Holy Mass and of annual commemoration. The 
example also shows how the beliefs and emotions surrounding the II 
264 Habielski (1998: 128). The PKWN had been established in Moscow the 
previous day as a 'provisional authority' for Poland. 
265 The WWII role of the Home Army was conveniently forgotten by national 
communism for most of the 1945-1989 period. 
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November myth were extended, by linking the myth to other 
politically potent pre-1945 myths and symbols of idealistic and proto- 
liberal nationalism. 
In October and early November 1978, opposition leaflets and posters 
depicting two Polish eagles, one - dated 1978 - chained, the other - 
dated 1918 - with the chains broken, were distributed throughout 
Warsaw. 266 The symbolism deploying the national emblem was self- 
explanatory. 
KOR, although critical of aspects of the Second Republic period, in a 
special declaration celebrating the 60th anniversary, acknowledged this 
period's successful realisation of the values of sovereignty, 
independence and pluralism. 
In November 1978, the Polish Church, energised by the recent papal 
election of John Paul 11, tried to make political capital of the 60th 
anniversary. Special 60th anniversary Holy Mass was celebrated in 
churches in many Polish towns, including Krakow, Warsaw, Gdansk, 
Lodz, Poznan, Szczecin, Wroclaw, Przemys'l and Lublin. The 
Episcopate ordered the singing of Felin'ski's 1816 hymn, God Who 
Protects Poland. In the event, many Churchgoers were to sing the 
4 subversive' version that included the original Restore, 0 Lord, our 
free country line as sung during the periods of Polish partitioning and 
repartitioning, rather than the Bless, 0 Lord, ourfree country line as 
sung during the Second Republic. 
266 
Kubik (1994: 170). 
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On 10 November 1978, a plaque commemorating Pilsudski was 
unveiled in a Warsaw church. On the II November, two further 
plaques honouring two Home Army leaders were unveiled in another 
Warsaw church. In the evening, some 20,000 within and overflowing 
crowds outside, celebrated a commemorative Holy Mass at Saint 
John's Cathedral, Warsaw. Amongst the participants were veterans of 
the Polish-Soviet War and members of the underground WWII Home 
Army. 267 Afterwards some 10,000 marched to the Tomb of the 
268 Unknown Soldier. Anderson showed his appreciation of the 
powerful nationalist and religious symbolism of the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier when he wrote: 
"No more arresting emblems of the modem culture of 
nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown 
Soldiers. ... Yet void as these tombs are of identifiable mortal 
remains or immortal souls, they are nonetheless saturated with 
ghostly national imaginings ... If the nationalist imagining is so 
concerned, this suggests a strong affinity with religious 
imaginings. " 269 
267 Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 9. Nos. 3 -4, Autumn 198 1, p. 175. 
268 In official ceremonies, the Party, in an example of symbolic co-optation. 
depicted the Warsaw Tomb of the Unknown Soldier solely as a symbol of Polish 
heroism against the Germans. Kubik (1994: 177). The regime's strategy of 
symbolic co-optation may be seen as falling between its national communism and 
its national non-communism, insofar as it retained the official national communist 
line, but also sought to co-opt an element of the opposition's political culture. The 
co-optation strategy entailed partially acknowledging pre-1945 tradition as 
national non-communism did, but celebrating it within a symbolic official 
framework that distorted or blurred the meaning of the event/myth. See Kubik 
(1994: 173). 
269 
Anderson (1991: 9-10). 
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The Polish opposition also appreciated such symbolism. Wreaths were 
laid at the Tomb, and religious hymns and patriotic songs, including 
the Polish National Anthem; God Who Protects Poland; and the 1831 
Warszawianka were sung. Slogans such as 'Freedom and 
Independence', 'There is no bread without freedom', 'Long live the 
Pope and the Primate' were chanted. 
270 In Gdansk, a solemn Holy 
Mass was celebrated in the Marian Basilica, followed by a march of 
about 1 1000 that headed for the Jan III Sobieski Monument. The 
monument evoked not only the antemurale christiantis bulwark of 
Christendom myth by stirring memories of Sobieski's 1683 victory 
against the Muslim Turks, but also evoked national self-determination 
emotions associated with Pilsudski and the 1919-1920 Polish Soviet 
War. 271 
In Krakow there was a Holy Mass at Wawel Cathedral in the morning 
of II November 1978 to the memory of 'the soul of ... Pilsudski. ' 
272 
In the evening, there was a Pontifical Mass in the Marian Church, 
during which Bishop Groblicki explicitly challenged the official 22 
July myth. "'No outsider gave us Poland. Poland came into being as 
the result of the nation's struggles - and prayers. 
-)ýý 273 After the Mass, 
270 Kubik (1994: 171-172). 
271 The monument had been brought to Gdafisk from Lw6w, the town that 
Pitsudski's Polish Army had defended during the 1919-1920 Polish-Soviet War. 
Lwow was lost to the Soviets at WWII end. 
272 Wawel Cathedral has become a nationalist shrine. The gothic Wawel 
Cathedral, situated within Wawel Castle, was built between 1320-1364. Saint 
Stanislaw and several Polish Kings and distinguished nationalist heroes are buried 
there, including Mickiewicz and Slowacki. 
273 As cited by Kubik (1994: 172). 
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some 400-500 marched to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. General 
Mieczyslaw Boruta-Spiechowicz (1894-1985), a co-founder of 
ROPOO, was the central figure at both the Mass and at the Tomb. 
Boruta-Spiechowicz had fought in Pilsudski's Legions, in the Polish 
Army (AP) during WWII, and in the Polish Army (WP) until 1946, 
when he was dismissed. He therefore combined the symbolism of 
Pilsudski and of the WP, together with the symbolism of opposing the 
communist regime. 
In a Pastoral Letter read on Sunday 12 November 1978 throughout the 
churches of the land, the Episcopate asserted that "'the anniversary 
after two centuries of foreign subjugation must not be omitted from 
our history. 151 274 Given that the first partitioning of Poland had 
occurred in the 1770s, the assertion implied that two centuries later, 
1970s' Poland was still subject to foreign subjugation. The Letter also 
referred to the 1795 partitioning of Poland, to the 3d May 1791 
Constitution, and to those Poles who had died in the Polish-Soviet 
War. Furthermore, the Episcopate declared: 
"the Poland Nation never gave up ... the right of every 
Nation to 
freedom, to self-determination within one's own borders. 
Testifying to this are both the Armed Uprisings and also the 
organic work movement. " 275 
This was an explicit example of an attempted synthesis of seeming 
contradictions by evoking myths of military valour and the physical 
274 As cited in Opinia, No. 10, October-November, 1978, p. 16 as reported in 
Religion in Communist Lands. Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1980, p. 176. 
275 Primate"s Secretariat (1988: 378). 
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force tradition of idealistic nationalism with that of the organic work 
myth of peaceful realistic nationalism. The bishops' Letter made clear 
where they felt responsibility for Poland's lack of full sovereignty lay: 
"'Responsibility for the freedom and the sovereignty of Poland, 
falls upon the men whose task it is to govern our country. It is 
necessary to create conditions of social life such that the nation 
can feel it is fully master in its own country. "" 276 
The Letter revealed the bishops' appreciation of the political 
significance of the ritual of annual commemoration in sustaining 
historical memory. 
"'It is therefore imperative to keep reminding ourselves of this 
date, so important for our Nation. ... The nation has the right to know the whole truth about its own history. 551 
277 
On II November 1978, several thousand participating in 'the 
Pilgrimage of Independence' arrived in Czqstochowa and Pilsudski's 
army insignia were deposited in the Jasna Gora, treasury. 278 Two 
idealistic myths - the II November and Madonna myths - had 
converged with the idealistic symbolism of Pilsudski, and the 
relationship between political Catholicism and nationalism was 
brought ever closer. 
276 As cited by OR, 30 November, 1978, p. 8. The abbreviation OR, used 
henceforth, is short for L'Osservatore Romano, the semi-official weekly Vatican 
newspaper. The English edition is cited throughout unless otherwise stated. 
277 Opinia, No. 16, October-November. 1978 as cited by Kubik (1994: 173). 
278 Opinia, No. 16, October-November. 1978 as mentioned by Kubik (1994: 173). 
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In November 1979, Independence Day celebrations were again 
conspicuous. In Warsaw, there was a Mass in Saint John's Cathedral, 
followed by a procession of some 2,000 to the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier. Here the crowd was reminded of the specific symbolism of 
the Warsaw Tomb, which was the 1925 grave of a Polish soldier who 
had fought at Lwow during the Polish-Soviet War. In Gdansk, after a 
celebratory Holy Mass in the Marian Basilica celebrated by around 
5,000 people, some 1,500 marched to the Jan III Sobieski monument. 
On 10 November 1980, the legality of Solidarity was reluctantly 
conceded by the regime. The next day, II November Independence 
Day celebrations took pace and were not disrupted by state security 
forces. 279 
The Party-State's Deployment of the 22 July Foundation Myth 
Under successive Party leaders, the regime invented new versions of 
the 22 July myth. This was done, as the following empirical evidence 
illustrates, by shifting the symbolism associated with the 22 July myth 
from liberation, to the creation of a People's Poland, to a millennium 
of Polish statehood, to Poland's independence, and finally to symbolic 
co-optation of the II November myth. 
For the first anniversary of national communism's foundation date in 
1945, the pro-communist ruling body, the Polish Committee of 
National Liberation, declared the 22 July a public holiday. 
279 
Biemacki (2000: 33). 
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Furthen-nore, on 22 July 1952, the communist regime proclaimed a 
new Polish Constitution for Poland. Poland was now officially a 
Peoples' Republic. Modelled on the 1936 Soviet Constitution, 280 the 
Constitution had all the hallmarks of Stalin and of the sovietisation 
and communisation of the country. 28 1 This provided ammunition for 
the opposition's association of the 22 July myth with a post- 1945 lack 
of national self-determination. 
In 1966, Gomulka specially chose the 22 July to commemorate the 
282 
millennium of Polish statehood . In 1977, Gierek, in a speech to 
Parliament, introduced yet another regime interpretation of the 22 July 
myth. Now it was to explicitly signif y independence, thereby directly 
283 
challenging the opposition's II November myth . 
Although the Gomufka regime had ignored the 5 Oth unofficial 
anniversary of independence in November 1968, the Gierek regime in 
1978, in the face of a much stronger opposition, felt it could not 
ignore the 60th anniversary. Instructions were issued to various Central 
280 Konopka (1999: 79) and Habielski (1998: 168). 
281 Stalin personally submitted several dozen drafting amendments. Konopka 
(1999: 79). The symbolism of the sovietisation and communisation of the country 
was conveyed by the change of the country's name from Republic of Poland to 
People's Republic of Poland, and the uncrowning of the national emblem, the 
eagle. The Constitution also confirmed the formal separation of the state and 
church, and the removal of the pre-WWII Senate and Presidency. The symbolism 
was further strengthened when on 22 July 1974, to celebrate the 30 th anniversary 
of new Poland's foundation., the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was awarded the 
Virfuti Militari, a Polish order usually awarded for exceptional bravery in the 
field. Basista (1999: 291). 
282 Later, the Jaruzelski regime was to choose the 22 July 1983 to lift Martial Law. 
283 Glowifiski (1993: 101). 
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Committee departments on how the official press should deal with the 
anniversary. The Party line was to deploy symbolic co-optation. It 
declared that Poland regained her independence in 1918 thanks to 
"'the unyielding patriotic attitude of our nation, its devoted 
struggle for its own state and national independence. ... 
(But), 
the final success in the long struggle for freedom was made 
possible due to the Great Socialist October Revolution ... We 
see ... that 
from the point of view of our sovereignty, continuity 
and safety of Poland, the historical breakthrough of 1944 was the 
most important event making possible the fulfilment of the task 
initiated sixty years ago. "' 284 
Thus, regime celebrations of the 60th 11 November anniversary 
culminated on 6 November 1978, the 61s' anniversary of the 1917 
Russian Revolution, 285 and the official press reported regime 60th II 
November anniversary celebrations alongside accounts of 61st 6 
November anniversary celebrations. 
286 
The Political Potency of the 11 November Foundation Myth 
Once more, regime responses are a good measure of the political 
potency of the political myths propagated by the opposition. 
Alongside its symbolic co-optation of the 1978 celebrations of the 60th 
anniversary of 1918 Independence, the regime tried to frustrate the 
294 Opinia, June 1978 as cited by Kubik (1994: 169). 
285 The 1917 October/Russian Revolution took place between 24-25 October 
according to the then prevailing Julian calendar, but between 6-7 November, 
according to the Gregorian calendar adopted by the Soviet Union in 1918. 
286 
Kubik (1994: 173-174). 
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opposition celebrations as the following empirical evidence illustrates. 
The police confiscated ROPOO's special declaration of the 
anniversary celebration. 287 Prior to the Gdansk celebrations, security 
forces detained people distributing leaflets about special 
commemorative Holy Mass services. Several houses were searched 
and a police trap in the flat of a KOR activist prevented a 'fairly large 
288 number' from participating in the main Gdan" sk Mass. Because of 
police harassment, only a few hundred of some 1,000 who started the 
march after the Mass reached their destination, the Jan III Sobieski 
monument. 
In November 1988, for the 70th anniversary, manifestations took place 
in nearly every Polish town, with the majority broken up by the 
police. 289 Some 15,000 attended the Warsaw manifestation. 290 
Paradoxically, the II November 1988 might easily have acquired 
further significance as a re-foundation myth: it was the date that had 
been oriainally scheduled to conclude the Round Table Talks between 
regime and mainstream opposition, specifically time-tabled so that the 
expected successful outcome could be celebrated on the 70th 
anniversary. 291 
287 Kubik (1994: 171). 
288 Lipski (1985: 278). 
289 
iemacki (2000: 163). 
290 Keesing, December, 1988, p. 36321. 
291 Kemp-Welch (2001: 18) citing Archivum Andrzeja Stelmachowskiego, 
Stelmachowski-Walqsa, I October 1988. 
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The Battle of Warsaw Myth and The Opposition's Belief in 
National Self-Determination 
The mythology of the 1920 Battle of Warsaw was a myth of military 
valour and also a component of the opposition's foundation myth and 
an indication of its belief in national self-determination. The Polish 
Church's post- 1945 deployment of the 1920 Battle of Warsaw myth 
and the regime's negative reactions illustrate the myth's politically 
charged nature. In its deployment, the Church exploited the myths of 
omnipotent hero-saviours (God and Mary), together with the Battle's 
pro-Catholic and national self-deten-nination symbolism. The Church 
was greatly helped by the fact that the Battle had been designated the 
Miracle of the Vistula and by the fact that a decisive turning point date 
in the battle, the 15 August, was also The Assumption Da of the Y 
Blessed Virgin Mary. The Church also exploited the political potency 
of the rituals of Holy Mass and of the annual commemoration, 
whereby focus was given to the 15 August. For much of post-WWII 
civil society, the 1920 Warsaw August battle also brought to mind the 
1944 one, the Warsaw Uprising, and its associated political 
symbolism of the Red Army's prevention of the Home Army 
liberating Poland. 292 
In 1970, an Episcopate Letter initiated by Primate Wyszyn" ski was 
drawn up. It was to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of Battle of 
292 Stalin had been involved personally in both events. He was a political 
commissar with Red Army forces attacking Warsaw in August 1920. In August 
1994 during the Uprising, as effective commander of Soviet Armed forces, he 
decided "that Soviet interests would be best served by doing nothing either 
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Warsaw/Miracle of the Vistula and was to be read out in all the 
churches throughout the land. A July 1970 Note from the Party's 
Central Committee to Gomulka 293 charged that the political aim of the 
Letter was to make evident the alleged mission of the Polish nation. 
The Central Committee Note quoted several fragments of the Letter to 
support its charge, emphasising one in particular that alluded to Soviet 
interference in Polish affairs. "'As Poles, "' the bishops proclaimed: 
446we are responsible for the nation and its perspectives because 
we are the hosts in our own fatherland. Nobody will dictate to us, 
how we are to rescue Poland and the nation, because this is our 
Polish, domestic affair. 9. )q 
294 
The Party's Note suggested that if negotiations with the Church to 
prevent the Letter being read out proved unsuccessful then the Letter 
and Wyszyn"ski should be attacked in the country's (regime- 
controlled) press. If, despite this, the Letter was read out, the Note 
proposed that a Church seminary should be closed down and that 
Wyszyn'ski and those bishops not accepting the ban should be 
temporarily prevented from travelling abroad. Gomulka accepted all 
the Note's proposals. In the event, the Episcopate Letter was 
withdrawn at the last moment as a result of pressure from the regime, 
which in turn, according to US journalist Jonathan Kwitny, was 
responding to Soviet demands for its revocation. 295 The Central 
through action by the Red Army ... or 
by aerial supply of the AK by Western air 
forces. " (Coutouvidis 1986: 101). 
293 The Note was from the Central Committee's Administrative Branch. 
Dokument nr. 68 in Aneks (1996: 334-337). 
294 
As cited by Aneks (1996: 335). 
29S Kwitny (1998: 229). 
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Committee's Note proposed celebrating the 22 July 1970, the 26 th 
anniversary of Poland's 'liberation', in such a way as to counteract 
the opposition's celebration of the 5 Oth anniversary of the Battle of 
Warsaw on the 15 August 1970. 
In February 1979, Politburo Member, soon to be First Secretary, 
Kania met with Bishop Bronislaw Dqbrowski, the Secretary General 
of the Polish Episcopate, to discuss the dates for John Paul 11's first 
pilgrimage to Poland. Kania told D, 4browski that the authorities were 
not prepared to accept a period around the 15 August 1979, the 5 91h 
Anniversary of the Battle of Warsaw. 296 
3.3 The War Of Political Legitimacy (2): 
The Opposition v. The Regime's National Non-Communism 
The second dimension of the war of political legitimacy, as 
mentioned, involved a war between the opposition and the regime's 
national non-communism. This dimension will now be explored from 
the regime's perspective which entailed two main strands: mitigating 
the effects of the Russian/Soviet and communist enemy myths and 
deploying the other myths associated with the Dmowski-influenced 
illiberal political culture of 1900-1944 Poland. 
296 Originally, the Pope had wanted to come in May 1979 to celebrate the 900'h 
anniversary of the death of Saint Stanislaw, but the authorities rejected this. Kania 
also ruled out the period around 17 September 1979, the fortieth anniversary of 
the Soviet invasion of Poland. (Raina 1995a: 349). 
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3.3.1 Mitigating the Effects of the Russian/Soviet and Communist 
Enemy Myths 
The post-WWII Polish communist regime was faced with a major 
dilemma. The Polish Party-State was now intrinsically dependent 
politically, economically and militarily upon the unpopular Soviet 
Union and yet to have a legitimate political culture, it felt it would 
need to downplay these links to mitigate the effects of the 
Russian/Soviet enemy myth. For the regime's national non- 
communism, the 'Russian/Soviet past' was an embarrassment to be 
suppressed, conveniently forgotten or invented. For example, before 
WWIL) Bolshevism and Bolshevik were words of offence in Poland. 
After the war, these words virtually disappeared ftom the regime's 
vocabulary. 
297 
For many Poles, particularly during the 1900s-1950s, the 
Russian/Soviet enemy myth was associated with an antipathy for the 
Russian/Soviet people rather than with an antipathy for the system of 
Russian absolutism and/or Soviet communism. The myth was 
popularly associated with Pilsudski, his 1920 defeat of the Soviet Red 
Army and with the sentiments encompassed in the 19th century's. 
idealistic nationalism linked to the National Uprisings, particularly the 
1830-1831 and 1863-1864 ones, that were initially against Russian 
rule. 
297 Glowifiski (1993: 13). 
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The regime's national non-communism tried to mitigate these anti- 
Russian/Soviet sentiments by seeming to stand up to the Soviet Union, 
and by seeming to be empathetic to the aspirations of the idealistic 
nationalist tradition, which included the symbolism of Pilsudski. 
In 1945 Gomulka sought to appropriate the pre-1945 insurrectionary 
myth of military valour. 
"'In the struggle against the German invader ... we reverted to the 
patriotic, insurrectionist tradition of the Polish people. ... Our 
partisan units followed the example of the best fighters for 
Freedom and Independence of the Polish nation. ... We 
have 
every right to regard ourselves as successors of the 
insurrectionist tradition. 5v) 298 
On coming back to power in 1956, Gomulka successfully negotiated 
the repatriation of Poles who remained in the USSR after )NT)NTII. 
299 In 
298 W walce o demokracjq ludowq. Vol. 11. W. Gomulka. Lod2,1947, p. 220 as 
cited by Bromke (1967: 59). A 1962 best-seller by a Colonel Zbigniew Zaluski 
attempted, according to Brom-ke (1967: 191 & 199), to provide a political 
ideology for the WWII national communist partisan group, by linking the 
romantic insurrection tradition of the Uprisings during Partitions with the 
insurrectionary of the Polish communists during WWII. The partisan Party-faction 
tended to be veterans of WWII communist underground resistance who 
subsequently occupied key posts in either the security apparatus or armed forces. 
They argued in both nationalist and communist terms and saw their war-time 
resistance as a deciding turning point in Poland's history. They tended to be 
strongly anti-intelligentsia, scornful of the latter's lack of ideological commitment 
and of their critical appraisal of Poland's history. Because of their background the 
partisans for years had been fairly close to Gomulka. Apart from General Moczar, 
Bromke (1967: 199) included in their numbers, General Franciszek Szlachcic 
(1920-1990) - like Moczar, a Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs - and General 
Jaruzelski, then Chief of Staff of the Polish Anny and a Deputy Minister of 
National Defence. 
299 Kurofi (1996: 94). Gomulka also took a stand against key CPSU ideological 
positions. For example, Gomulka granted the Polish Catholic Church some degree 
of autonomy. He released from 'monastery arrest' Wyszyn'ski, with whom he 
reached a short-lived accommodation. Gomulka also took a stand against forced 
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July 1966, in a special parliamentary session, Gomulka defined his 
Party's heritage in sweeping pre-1945 terms as: 
"'everything that was done in the past for Poland, for her 
development and for her benefit by other classes, estates and 
social strata - the monarchs and gentry, the town patricians and 
the clergy, men of science and culture ... we are the 
heirs of the 
whole rich and complex historical heritage of the nation. ýii 300 
An example of the regime's appropriation of the pre- 1945 idealistic 
tradition was the adoption of the Romantic bards, Mickiewicz and 
Slowacki. Between 1945-1975, for example, the regime published 
some 12.5 million copies of Mickiewicz's works 301 and there were 
also regime-approved stage and television versions of certain of his 
works. However, the regime's adoption backfired. In 1947, for 
302 example, the staging of Slowacki's Kordian was banned 9 as were, 
in 1948 and 1968, theatre premiers of Mickiewicz's Forefathers 'Eve. 
In 1978, Gierek attempted to sweeten nationalist tempers aroused by 
his failure in socio-economic legitimation by allowing the erection of 
a statue to Pilsudski. 
collectivisation by allowing Polish peasants to retain their privately owned small 
plots of land. In opposing these ideological positions, Gomulka was also seen as 
opposing the Soviets. It was not surprising therefore that, at least for a short while, 
Gomulka gained some degree of political legitimacy for himself and to a lesser 
extent for the system. Such national support that Gomulka had, soon dwindled, 
however, as he increasingly adopted a hard line, and as his economic reforms, and 
thereby his socio-economic legitimacy, proved ineffective. 
300 As cited by Kubik (1994: 114). 
301 Suchodolski (1986: 236). 
ý102 Tusiewicz (1993: 89). 
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The Jaruzelski-led regime issued postage stamps with the picture of a 
celebrated patriotic painting of 19'h century Polish partisans fighting 
the Russians. Soldiers now performed the changing of the guard at the 
capital's Tomb of the Unknown Soldier to a patriotic song of the 
1830-1831 National Uprising, and they were now dressed in hats that 
were copies of those worn by the pre-1939 Polish Army. The state 
radio started to broadcast marching songs of Pilsudski's Polish 
Legions. 303 However, for Jaruzelski, evoking the symbolism of 
Pilsudski was not just a matter of expedient national non-communism. 
Just as Stalin had, in his Great Russia nationalism, identified with its 
great dictators, military leaders and conquerors, 304 so Jaruzelski also 
personally identified with another great dictator, military leader, and 
conqueror: Pilsudski. 305 The Jaruzelski-led regime ventured into even 
more dangerous and taboo areas. Following a visit of Jaruzelski's to 
Gorbachev in April 1987, a Polish-Soviet Historical Commission was 
established. Amongst the 'blank spots' of history now to be 
investigated were the Polish-Soviet War and the 1940 Katyn' 
massacre. 306 Hitherto, the Soviets said the Germans had carried out 
the massacre, a line supported by the Polish regime. Katyn" had long 
fuelled the opposition's political culture as a symbol of Soviet crimes 
against Poland. Furthermore, the opposition took the regime's support 
303 Gamysz (1984: 53). 
304 
Rigby (1982: 58). 
305 
See Jaruzelski (1992: 147,188, & 375). 
306 Stalin's pre-WWII repression of the Polish Communist Party members was 
also to be examined by the commission. A TASS statement on 13 April 1990 
acknowledged Soviet responsibility for Katyfi and also for other mass WWII 
massacres of Poles. (Sienkiewicz 1997: 65) and (Gorbachev 1996: 481). 
180 
of the Soviet line as evidence of Poland's lack of national self- 
determination. Crosses in memory of the Katyh victims were 
surreptitiously placed at night in the Pow4zki military cemetery in 
Warsaw, only to be removed by irate authorities in the morning. 307 
Nevertheless, in October 1987, the main Party weekly, Polityka, 
, 308 raised the issue of Katyn and in March 1988, Dybuna Ludu 
published a letter by Polish intellectuals and political dissidents, 
including Walqsa, requesting Soviet intellectuals to 'speak out in 
public about the Katyn' murders'. 309 
In June 1988, the Polish regime accepted the removal of the Polish 
Army's oath of loyalty to the Soviet Red Army. Furthermore, in 
February 1989, the Polish parliament passed legislation to reinstate 
the II November as a public holiday. 310 
The regime's mitigating of the effects of Soviet enemy myth was 
largely unsuccessful, for much of civil society regarded the regime's 
downplaying of its ties with the Soviet Union as merely symbolic 
'winks' that constituted a form of 'double con'. The aim of this 
307 Central Europe Review, Vol. 3, No. 11,19 March, 2001. (Internet Journal. 
(http: //www. ce-review. org/). 
308 Trawo do w1asnej historii. ' Polityka, 3 October, 1987 as referred to in Mason 
(1988: 439). 
309 Trybuna Ludu, 12 March, 1988 as reported in Radio Free Europe RAD BR143. 
15 March, 1988. 
1 ý110 Biemacki (2000: 170). 
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'double con' was to deceive the population into thinking that their 
rulers were trying to deceive the Soviets. 
311 
Mitigating The Effects of The Communist Enemy Myth 
As mentioned, national non-communism sought to downplay its ties 
with communism in order to mitigate the effects of the pre-1945 
communism enemy myth. It did so by downplaying the communist 
nature of the state and by downplaying the Communist Party's leading 
role. 
As Glowin'ski observed, communist was a word not very often used in 
regime language. 312 The regime avoided the word and instead used 
words such as Polish. ) Poland, nation and national in order to gain 
nationalist legitimacy. The regime, for example, cloaked the various 
Party-State bodies in a garb of labels that emphasised Polishness and 
the nation and de-emphasised the institutions' inherent links with the 
communist party and state. After WWII, the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, 
Romanian (after 1965), Yugoslavian, and Soviet Parties all featured 
the word Communist in their official titles. 313 When the Comintern 
decided to reactivate the Polish communist party in 1942, it was called 
the Polish Workers Party (PPR). Despite the absence of the word 
Gamysz (1984: 5 8). 
312 Glowifiski (1993: 96). 
313 The Hungarian Party also used the word Communist in its title until 1948, but 
between 1948 and 1956, like its Polish counterpart, it was merely a Workers' 
party. From 1956, the Hungarian Party joined the East German Party in deploying 
the word Socialist. (Swain 1993: 12 1). 
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communist, the Soviet dependency legacy of the KPP weighed 
heavily on the PPR, particularly during WWII. In 1948, the PPR was 
renamed the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR). Yet paradoxically, 
the continued absence of the word communist and the continual 
presence of the word Polish within the official Party title were 
indicative of the post-WWII strength of the opposition's political 
culture and the weakness of the regime's national communism. 
The names adopted by the Polish regime for their communist- 
controlled front coalitions also tried to exploit popular nationalism by 
using words such as national and Polish to downplay communism and 
the omnipresent State. Its use of words such as national and Polish 
also served to hide the fact that these bodies constituted the first steps 
of Stalin's policy of the communist take-over of Poland. 314 
In October 1952, the Bierut-led regime set up the National Front 
(FN). It was the first of several post-1945 nationalist badged but 
communist-dominated ruling political coalitions. In November 1956, 
the FN was redesignated the National Front of Unity (FJN) and in 
May 1983, the Patriotic Movement for the Renewal of the Nation 
(PRON). In November 1981, the Party leadership considered setting 
up a Front of National Accord, but instead, with the Declaration of 
Martial Law in December 1981, Jaruzelski established the Military 
3 
_3 14 In 1943, Polish communists in the USSR established the Union of Polish 
Patriots (ZPP, 1943-1946). At the end of 1943, the PPR founded the All-country 
National Council (KRN). On 22 July 1944, the KPN formally established the 
Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKR17v) as a 'temporary authority' for 
Poland. The PKWN was to be the first of several communist-dominated ruling 
political coalitions. 
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Council for National Salvation (WRON), seemingly for the Polish 
Army to rule the country in lieu of the Party. 
Gierek and Jaruzelski, often remembered in the West for their 
respective use of socio-economic and coercive power legitimation, in 
emphasising the Polish state = the nation formula, furnish further 
empirical evidence of the regime's appropriation of non-communist 
characteristics. In December 1970, Gierek replaced Gomulka as First 
Secretary and addressed the nation. His speech aimed to appeal to 
Polish nationalism by deliberately mentioning all sections of the 
nation, including the intelligentsia, whom he had attacked so viciously 
in March 1968. Only fleetingly did he refer to socialism. He used 
phrases such as: 'the entire society'; 'put the fatherland in ... great 
danger'; 'wide consultation with the working class and the 
intelligentsia'; 'we turn to the workers, to the intelligentsia, to the 
scientists, to all sections of society'; 'the matters that we take up 
concern our entire nation - party and non-party, believers and non- 
believers'. and 'each citizen. ' 315 Gierek replaced the portrait of the 
Party leader that had hung obligatorily in every state office, with the 
pre-WWII national emblem, the Polish eagle, albeit uncrowned. He 
also decided to restore the Royal Castle in Warsaw, a potent pre- 1945 
national symbol, destroyed by the Germans during the 1944 Warsaw 
Uprising. 316 
3 15 Trybuna Ludu, 21 December. 1970 as cited by Tusiewicz (1993: 259). 
316 Sch6pflin (1994: 168) and Bromke (1972: 11). 
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The Jaruzelski-led regime issued postage stamps with the picture of 
the revered anti-communist emigre Polish writer and poet Czeslaw 
Milosz, who had been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literaýure in 198Q. 
Jaruzelski clearly appreciated the politic4l pptenpy'of natipn4l roytbs 
and symbols. "Mythology, " he wrote, " is an insepar4ble p4rt of 
social life. ... Probably Pilsudsýi said, t4at Poles 'do not tbi* with 
facts, but rather with symbols. 9-)ý 317 During the 19$2-1988 period there 
was a discernible tilt in J4ruzelski-led policies towards nqtjonal 
conciliation. The regime hoped to gain political le&imapy by 
emphasising pre-1945 still-popqlar state institutions and by creating 
new post-1981 state bodies. 318 These it portrayed as there'to defend 
the interests of the nation against the abuses of the communist system 
and as not inherently linked to communism and the Party. The pre- 
1945 institutions included the Parliament, the Presidency, aqd above 
all, the WP Polish Army. That thpir popularity remained was perhaps 
because their assoc4qiops ýyith communism were relatively brief and 
because týý legacy of their pre-1945 mythology and symbolism 
prevailo. Thus, for example, the Parliament and the Polish Appy had 
long pre-1945 traditions of serviqg t4o nqýjon. The Parliament had 
existed since the 15th century and the Army had existed in nascent 
317 Jaruzelski (1992: 426). 
318 In March 1982,, for example, a State Tribunal was set up to adjudicate upon the 
accountability of those, virtually all Commuaist Party members, occupying the 
highest state posts. In April 1985, a Constitutional Tribunal was established to 
decide whether new laws were in keeping with the Constitution. In December 
1986, a Consultative Council of the Chair of the Council of State was formed. In 
July 1987. a Civil Rights Ombudsman was appointed to guard the rights and 
freedoms of citizens. Similar constitutional moves were also afoot in Hungary, 
and a few years later within Vbe USSR, where Gorbachev also tried, in the late 
1980s, to distance new consoWtional state institutions from the Party. 
I / 
185 
form from the beginning of the I 9th century 3 '9 and was given official 
status with the gaining of independence in 1918. 
The Appropriation and Deployment of the Polish Army Myth 
On 21 July 1944 the communist-controlled All-Country National 
Council (KRN) appropriated the WP. It did so by merging the short- 
lived pro-communist Polish Army (Ap) 320 and the pro-communist 
People's An-ny (AL) 321 into the WP. The Polish Army myth had 
evolved mainly from the Army's pre-1945 actions, but partly also 
from its post-1945 actions and inactions in defending the nation's 
interests. 322 For many Poles, even details of military uniform evoked 
the one-time greatness of the Polish Army. The symbolism of the 
uniform was linked with heroism and national self-determination and 
its replacement by a foreign uniform was an omen of misfortune. 323 
The post-1945 WP was still revered for having saved Poland by 
defeating the Soviet Red Army during the 1920 Battle of Warsaw. 
319 Despite partitions, a 100,000 strength Polish Anny had participated on the side 
of Napoleon in the 1812-1814 French-Russian War. Mizerski (1996: 52). 
320 The AP was set up in the Soviet Union in March 1944. 
321 The AL was set up in January 1944. 
322 In 1956, the Army was believed to have supported the Party faction 
supporting Gomulka's reinstatement as leader of the Party against the wishes of 
the CPSU leadership. The Army had been widely rumoured to have secured the 
non-intervention of Soviet forces during the December 1970 workers' protests. It 
was believed by many that the Army, headed by Jaruzelski, refused to forcibly 
suppress the August 1980 Baltic workers' protests (that paved the way to the 
Gdansk Agreement that heralded Solidarity) and prevented Soviet intervention in 
1981. Sanford (1986: 97-98) concludes "the evidence is that the Polish Army 
ruled out the possibility of military repression of the Baltic seacoast workers' 
upsurge. " See also Avery (1988: 128-129). 
321 Mach (1985: 26-27). 
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Furthermore, the WP was seen as being more disciplined and less 
corrupt that the Party and, as it was a conscript an-ny, as being more 
representative of the nation. It even still had its own Catholic 
chaplains. 
Gomulka on his 1956 return to power succeeded in his demand that 
the Polish Defence Minister, Soviet Marshall Konstanty 
Rokossovsky, 324 together with 32 other high-ranking Soviet advisers 
be relieved of their Polish Army duties. Under Gomulka, the Polish 
Army underwent a process of re-Polonisation; the Polish uniform, 
flag, and insignia were all restored. 
325 
In his December 1981 Declaration broadcast to the nation, Jaruzelski 
characterised his imposition of Martial Law not as an attempt to 
restore communist rule but as a pre-emptive measure to avoid Soviet 
326 
military intervention. 
Jaruzelski made no mention of the Party 327 or of communism. 
Jaruzelski addressed the nation 'as a soldier' and not as First 
12 ' Rokossovsky had dual Polish and Soviet nationality. 
32' Fejto (1968: 32). 
326 It is still not clear whether the Soviets would have invaded Poland otherwise. 
The Soviet leadership certainly put heavy pressure on the Polish leadership to put 
'their house in order'. For example, Soviet Marshall, Viktor Kulikov, the Warsaw 
Pact Commander- 1 n-Chi ef, visited Poland some 22 times in 1981. Micgiel (1998: 
4). See also Jaruzelski (1992: 387 & 396) and Radio Free Europe RAD BR164.14 
April, 1987, pp. 1-2 for 1981 accounts by Jaruzelski and Colonel Ryszard 
Kuklin'ski. Kuklifiski was Head of the Strategic Defence Department of the 
General Staff of the Armed Forces from 1976 until November 1981. when he 
defected to the West. 
327 Sanford (1986: 118) also highlights this point. 
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Secretary: as a General and not a comrade. His efforts to achieve 
national understanding had been torpedoed by Solidarity. 328 The 
Declaration started with the opening bars of the National Anthem, and 
was littered with phrases with strong nationalist resonance such as: 
'the people'; 'the nation'; 'a national catastrophe'; 'in our country'; 'a 
crime towards the nation'; and 'the nation's instinct'. 329The message 
he wished to give was clear. The Polish Army, not the Communist 
Party, was saving the nation. Jaruzelski would impose military rather 
than communist rule. The military then exploited the positive 
symbolism of the Polish Army unifon-n. Polish Army officers took 
over the running of many civilian state enterprises, including the large 
state-owned factories and television announcers were conscripted and 
appeared in their army uniforms. 330 
3.3.2 Deploying the Myths Associated with 1900-1944 Illiberal 
Political Culture 
The Deployment of Piast Myth and the Pole = Catholic Myth 
The regime's national communism was anti-Catholic, but this was a 
major obstacle to gaining legitimacy in a country where over 90% of 
328 Sanford (1986: 118) also notes this. 
329 From Jaruzelski. - Prime Minister of Poland. Robert Maxwell (ed. ). Pergamon 
Press: Oxford, 1985, pp. 28-30 as cited by Stokes (1991a: 214-215). 
330 According to Mach (1985: 3 1) patrolling police were often dressed in army 
uniforms. Mach may possibly have confused the ordinary police with the 
paramilitary police that were also frequently deployed during Martial Law. 
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the population were Catholic . 
33 ' The regime's national non- 
communism in an effort to gain greater political legitimacy therefore 
set about appropriating a key ingredient of many Pole's national 
identity, namely their Catholicism. To help in this appropriation it 
deployed the Piast, Pole = Catholic, and the enemy myths associated 
with the Dmowski-influenced illiberal political culture of pre-WWII 
Poland. The consequences of this deployment were enormous and 
entailed the regime in a number of 'non-communist' actions including 
trying to create a state Catholicism, trying to appropriate Catholic rites 
of passage and Catholic symbols, trying to establish Catholic trade 
unions, the forced mass deportations of ethnic minorities, collusion 
with pogroms, and attacking the opposition as non-Polish enemies. 
Before WWII, over 30% of the population in Poland comprised ethnic 
minorities, mainly Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Belorussians, Russians, 
Germans and Jews. Some six decades later, the overall ethnic minority 
332 
percentage was an estimated 2% . There were three main reasons 
for this dramatic drop, of which the first two, WWII deaths, 
particularly of the Polish Jews, and MMI-end border changes, are the 
ones best known. A third significant cause was the deliberate policy, 
331 With the single exception of Italy, communist Poland was the most Catholic 
country in the world, with over 90% of the post-1950 population baptised as 
Catholics. The 'over 90%' figure should, however, be treated with some caution 
as percentages obviously fluctuated over the 1950-1989 period, and those 
describing themselves as Catholic or baptised as Catholic ranged from nominal 
Catholics to deeply devoted Catholics. GUS (1994: 65) gives a figure of 95.8% of 
the 1991 Polish population being Roman Catholics believers. A figure of 91% of 
the 1992 Polish population being baptised Roman Catholic can be deduced from 
GUS (1994: 44 & 61) data. Similar estimates of about 90% of the post-1950 
population being Catholic are given by Davies (1981b: 406) and Piwowarski 
(1976: 315-320). 
332 The figure is for 1999, as given by Nieuwsma (1999: 1). 
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with Stalin's backing, to enact the Piast myth by creating a Poland for 
'true Poles'. The regime set about this task during the 1945-1950 
period by ridding the country of its predominantly non-Roman 
Catholic ethnic minorities. These were forcefully deported, scattered, 
or simply went 'missing'. Poland was transformed from a pre-WWII 
multi-ethnic, multi-faith (chiefly Roman Catholic, Orthodox and 
Greek Catholic, Protestant and Jewish) country to a post-WWII almost 
mono-ethnicl mono-faith one. Nearly all the deported, scattered or 
4missing' minorities/faiths came from the three enemy myth groups, 
viz. the Soviets, the Germans and the Jews. Between 1946-1950, an 
estimated 3.4 million Soviets, Germans and Jews - some 14% of 
Poland's 1946 population - left or were forced to leave Poland. 
333 
333 Before WWII there were over 6 million Ukrainians and Belorussians living in 
Poland. Despite WWII deaths and the new post-WWII Poland shifting westward 
on the map of Europe, there were more than one half million Ukrainians, 
Belorussians, and Lithuanians living in the new Poland. Most of them were not to 
become Polish citizens. Instead, during the period 1945 to 1946, some half million 
left Poland for the USSR. Habielski (1998: 146). It is estimated that as at least 
120-150,000 Ukrainians were forced to leave Poland and in 1947 a further 80,000 
Ukrainians were scattered throughout Poland. (Nieuwsma 1999,2-3). A Ukrainian 
perspective, commemorating the 50th anniversary of Operation Vistula (see 
below), gives much higher estimates of the numbers involved: 
"'The forcible resettlement, involuntary deportation and massacre by the 
Polish government of more than 650,000 Ukrainians from their native 
ethnic territory took place in two phases: from 1944 to 1947 the Polish 
government deported 500,000 Ukrainians to the U. S. S. R. (many of whom 
were subsequently sent to labor camps in Siberia, imprisoned or killed); and 
throughout the spring, summer and fall of 1947 the Polish government 
conducted an operation of planned destruction code named Akcja Wisla 
(Operation Vistula) that forcibly resettled 150,000 ethnic Ukrainians, as 
well as those of mixed Polish-Ukrainian marriages, from their homes in 
eastern Poland to territories in northern and western Poland. " The Ukrainian 
Weekýi% December 28.1997, No. 52, Vol. LXV. (http: //www. ukrweekly. 
com/Archive/ 1997/5 29711. shtml). 
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After WWII, Gomulka exploited the illiberal sentiment associated 
with the Dmowski-influenced myths. As Secretary General of the 
Party and as Minister of the 'Recovered Territories' (1945-1948), he 
was well placed to do so. Maps were drawn up to show that Poland's 
frontiers under the Piast dynasty coincided almost exactly with the 
post-Yalta frontiers of the new Polish People's Republic. In the 
biggest population exchange in European history millions of 'non- 
Poles' were expelled from their homes and forcefully 'repatriated' to 
neighbouring countries. Conversely millions of Poles, whose homes 
were now in territory 'recovered' by the Soviet Union, were expelled 
to Poland. 334 
During the Stalinist era, the Party-State tried to appropriate Polish 
political Catholicism. It did so in three main ways. First it attempted 
not only to bring the Polish Church under its control, but also to invite 
pro-regime lay Catholic groups - of which Pax 
335 was the most 
prominent - to join its (nominally) ruling government coalition. 
Second, it took over Catholic charities and used them as cover for 
334 Davies (1997: 153). 
335 Pax numbered several former falangists within its leadership. It was the most 
important of several pro-regime lay Catholic groups that the Party encouraged and 
became part of the 'ruling' parliamentary coalition. Pax was granted considerable 
political and economic licence by the authorities. From 1945 to 1979 it was 
headed by the former falangist Boleslaw Piasecki. A recent publication by 
Professor Henryk Dominiczak, who gained access to Interior Ministry documents 
after the fall of Polish communism, confirms the mid-1950 allegations that 
Piasecki was also a secret police collaborator. Dominiczak (2000: 22). In October 
1953, ties were established between Pax and the 'patriotic priests' and 
subsequently the two merged under the leadership of Pax. Brornke (1967: 84). 
Piasecki's political programme was much shaped by the realistic nationalism of 
the Polish Count Alexsander Wielopolski (1803-1877), Governor (1861-1863) of 
the Czarist Kingdom of Poland. In the realm of practical politics, Pax accepted 
communism, while rejecting its materialist outlook. Bromke (1967: 22 1). 
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political activism. Third, it encouraged so-called 'patriotic priests' to 
act as Trojan horses within the Church. 336 
From the late 1950s, having failed in its crude attempts to establish a 
legitimate state Catholicism, the regime sought a different 
appropriation approach. The new approach was more subtle and 
included deploying Catholic rites of passage and Catholic symbols 
such as the family, 'true Catholicism, ' and (moral) renewal and 
salvation. As with other East European regimes, 337 the Polish regime 
recognised that the popularity of religious rites of passage, such as 
such as christenings, marriages, and funerals, constituted one of the 
major bonds between the people and the Church; a bond that 
constituted an obstacle to the regime's desire to monopolise loyalties. 
Accordingly the regime offered state alternatives, thinly disguised by 
a veneer of secularism. In the late 1960s, for example, the rite of 
name giving., the equivalent of christening was introduced, and by the 
early 1970s became more widespread. The law of People's Poland 
required all marriages to be regime-sanctioned, each accompanied by 
a civil ceremony with vows of conjugal fidelity, 338 and by the 1970s, 
there were several choices of regime-sanctioned funerals to die for. 339 
In February 1976, the Party adopted a resolution concerning 'the 
336 These priests had declared their first loyalty to the state rather than 
Catholicism. 
337 For example within the USSR, where despite considerable state resources, the 
alternative state rites of passage met with little success. Kertzer (1988: 115). 
338 In state weddings in the Soviet Union, traditional symbols were also carefully 
blended in with state symbols. Kertzer (1988: 116). 
339 Kubik (1994: 38-39). 
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necessity of increasing the significance of various events of family 
and private life. 5 340 During the 1970s, the word family was 
incorporated into official slogans such as Work and the Family, The 
Polish Family. The regime was applying the formula 'the good of the 
country' = 'a happy family' = 'the development of Poland'. 341 
Another approach of national non-communism involved the regime 
surreptitiously planting letters in Party newspapers. For example in 
1977 letters were planted in the Warsaw Party Committee's daily 
newspaper, Zycie Warszawy. The letters criticised the Hunger Strike 
in a Warsaw Church in support of the KOR dissidents imprisoned in 
May 1977. They were supposedly written by true Catholics in the 
name of 'millions offaithful Catholics sincerely devoted to God and 
the Fatherland. 9 342 Zycie Warszawy's 27 May 1977 editorial 
proclaimed of the hunger- strikers: "'half of them entered a Church 
certainly for the first time. "' 343 National non-communism was 
reviving the Pole - Catholic in th, a tactic reminiscent of the regime's Y 
non-official use of the true Poles phrase with its anti-Semitic 
connotations. Its use of God and the Fatherland was a part- 
appropriation of the Home Army's motto God, Honour, The 
Fatherland, which in turn was appropriated from the period of 
partitioning. The regime, or regime-sponsored bodies such as Pax, 
340 Kubik (1994: 38). The resolution was adopted at the Third Plenum of the 
Central Committee. 
341 Glowifiski (1993: 34-35). 
342 Glowin'ski (1993: 86). 
. 143 As cited by Green (1977: 4). 
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was not averse to deploying, for legitimising purposes, 
Catholic/Christian concepts such as (moral) renewal and salvation. In 
March 1958, Pax launched a nation-wide campaign in its major 
periodical Kierunki of 'moral renewal' aimed at coping with the 
ideological indifference undermining the 'social morality' and 
construction of socialism in Poland . 
344During the strikes leading to 
Solidarity in August 1980, in a speech at the Central Committee's 
Fourth Plenum, Gierek spoke of the need for moral renewal . 
34' The 
Jaruzelski-led regime renamed its nominal ruling socio-political 
coalition The Patriotic Movementfor the Renewal of the Nation, and, 
to run the country during Martial Law, which lasted from December 
1981-July 1983, Jaruzelski created the Military Councilfor National 
Salvation. 
In the 1980s, the regime, in what may be viewed as a sophisticated 
variant of symbolic co-optation, proposed that the mainstream 
opposition create its own more visibly Catholic socio-political 
organisations. In a secret meeting in early October 1984, Politburo and 
Secretariat Member Kazimierz Barcikowski Proposed to Walqsa that 
he form Christian Trade Unions in place of Solidarity. Walqsa rejected 
346 In the spring of 1988, f the proposal . ollowing strikes, the 
authorities floated the ideas of Catholic Workers' Associations, 
344 , Przeciw Indyferentyzmowi. ' Zygmunt Przetakiewicz. Kierunki. 23 March, 
1958. 
34S Glowifiski (1993: 165). That same day, Gierek implored Primate Wyszyfiski to 
ask the striking Baltic workers to call off their strikes. 
346 Kaczyn'ski (1996). Kaczyfiski was present with Walqsa at the October 1984 
meeting that took place at the Episcopate's premises in Warsaw. The proposal re- 
emerged in 1987. 
194 
Catholic Cabinet Ministers, a new group of independent Catholic 
MPs, and the creation of a Catholic Democratic Party. 347 
The Deployment of the Jewish Enemy Myth 
Before WWII there were over three million Polish Jews living in 
Poland. The Germans during the war killed most of them. After 
WWII, with some returning from USSR internment, there was only 
about 100,000. Despite the virtual post-WWII absence of Jews and 
despite the fact that some three million Polish Catholics also 
experienced the same war-time fate as the Jews, anti-Semitism 
persisted in post-war Poland. The Party-State's national non- 
communism decided to exploit that fact by reinventing the Jewish 
enemy myth. Following the August 1945 Krakow pogrom, and 
particularly after the July 1946 Kielce pogrom, carried out with the 
acquiescence of the local authorities, 348 the majority of the remaining 
Jews decided to emigrate . 
349Following the anti-Semitic actions of a 
Moczar-led Party faction in 1968, a further 13,000-20,000 
emigrated . 
350 Henceforth, there were only a few thousand practising 
347 Radio Free Europe Polish Situation ReportIll. 21 July, 1988 citing AFP, 23 
June, 1988, Financial Times, 25 May, 1988 and The Washington Post, 13 June, 
1988. 
348 Kuron' (1996: 286). During the 1946 Kielce pogrom, neither the military and 
secret police commanders, nor the local Party leaders did anything to stop the 
attack on the Jews that led to some forty being murdered. Szaynok (1998: 3). In 
1992, a new investigation reaffirmed that the local authorities had failed to 
undertake decisive steps to stop the pogrom. The Kielce pogrom was a turning 
point in the post-WWII history of Polish Jews. Between July and September 1946, 
over 60,000 Jews left Poland. Szaynok (1998: 7& 8). 
349 Habielski (1998: 146). 
350 The lower figure comes from D. Stola's Kampania antysojonistyczna w 
PoIsce 1967-1968. Instytut Studi6w Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk: 
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Jews and perhaps a similar number of non-believers 'of Jewish origin' 
remaining. 
351 
The regime's national non-communism first had to overcome the 
effects of the pre-1945 Jew = communist myth by breaking the 
popular association between Jews and communism. In a letter to 
Stalin in December 1948,352 Gomulka voiced his concern about the 
over-representation of Jewish comrades in the Party-State apparatus. 
This situation, he argued, created hostility among the working class, 
and the Party would suffer if it did not change its pro-Jewish CPSU- 
dictated cadre policy. Such a policy change was given the green light 
when CPSU-led anti-Semitic purges were launched and reached their 
height just before Stalin's death. 353 Paradoxically, Stalin's nationalist 
deviation witch-hunt merged into a campaign against 'cosmopolitans' 
that was mainly directed against Jews. Henceforth, communist regime 
attacks against cosmopolitanism and Zionism were coded attacks 
against Jews. Everyone was encouraged to expose 'Zionists', and the 
trials of East European national communist leaders constantly featured 
Warsaw, 2000. The higher figure comes from Radziwill (1994: 202-203). It has 
been estimated that two-thirds of the few remaining Polish Jews emigrated as a 
result of the 'administrative pogrom' following the March 1968 events. Osa 
(2002: 15) citing Z. Pelczynski's 'The Decline of Gomulka' in Leslie (1980: 
391). 
351 GUS (1994: 61). The indirectness of the phrase 'of Jewish origin', invariably 
used in Poland today, may be indicative of the extent of anti-Semitic baggage that 
still persists. 
352 The letter was found in both Polish and Russian archives and was published in 
'Ostatni sp6r Gomulki ze Stalinem. ' Andrzej Werblan (ed. ). DzIS', No. 6 (1993) as 
referred to in Gluchowski (2000: 16 &3 1). 
353 Seton-Watson (1964: 165). 
196 
accusations of Zionism. 
354 The Soviet Union now adopted a 
consistently anti-Jewish approach in cadre polices in Poland and 
elsewhere. 
355 Following Stalin's death in March 1953, Poland's 
Jewish communists, particularly those who served as investigative 
officers in the secret police, emerged as the major scapegoats for the 
Stalinist 'period of errors and distortions'. 356 However, as 
Gluchowski noted, it was not enough for Poland's communists to shift 
blame for Stalinism on Jews in the security apparatus. The Jew = 
Communist equation had to be rewritten and thereby the Jewish 
enemy myth reconstructed. The Jew = Stalinist = Zionist = 
357 358 Trotskyist = Enemy road had to be forged . 
During the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, 5-10 June 1967, key elements 
within the Catholic opposition sided with the Israelis, while national 
communism adopted an anti-Zionist position and national non- 
communism took an anti-Semitic stance. On 6 June 1967, Primate 
354 Hosking (1992: 258-259). 
355 Sch6pflin (1994: 118). This was a reversal of Stalin's wartime and immediate 
post-war nationalities and cadre policy with respect to Poland, which, in addition 
to favouring those who had taken Soviet citizenship and Soviet party membership, 
preferred 'comrades of Jewish origin' for many important posts. Gluchowski 
(2000: 1). This original policy led in Poland to a disproportionate number of Jews 
(compared with their proportion of the total population) in key posts within, for 
example, the Politburo, and the Public Security and Foreign Affair Ministries. See 
Gluchowski (2000: 8). 
356 Gluchowski (2000: 3). 
357 Trotsky was 'of Jewish origin. ' He was also head of the Red An-ny during the 
1919-1920 Polish-Soviet War. 
358 
Gluchowski (2000: 4). 
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Wyszyn" ski, during a Warsaw mass, appealed to his congregation to 
pray for the fighting Israelis. The Israeli nation, he added, in what 
might well be an indication of the Old Testament myth influence, had 
been condemned to death many times in the past despite the fact that it 
had the right to an independent existence. 359The deployment of the 
Jewish enemy myth by Gomulka in June 1967 360 and by Moczar in 
March 1968 in trying to forge the aforementioned road are fairly well 
known in the West. Less well known are three examples now 
presented of the myth's deployment by other elements within the 
regime to attack the opposition. The first example relates to the 1968 
role of Politburo Member Gierek in supporting Moczar in his attack 
on Jews and intellectuals. The second example relates to the 1976- 
1977 scapegoating of Jews for the 'excesses' of KOR. Finally, the 
third example relates to the autumn 1980-autumn 1981 anti-Semitism 
associated with Moczar 36 ' and his followers and its use against 
Solidarity. 
At a 14 March 1968 rally in Katowice, Silesia, Gierek declared: 
"'The dirty scum, who have flowed on the wave of the October 
events of eleven years ago, they have not been removed from the 
359 In addition, on 10 June 1967, a Znak MP spoke at a Parliamentary Foreign 
Affairs Committee meeting in favour of Israel and of a more flexible regime 
policy towards it. Rozenbaurn (1998: 3). 
360 In an infamous speech to the Sixth Trade Union Congress, Gomulka 
resurrected the Jew = Fifth Columnist = (Conspiratorial) Enemy myth. See 
Rozenbaum (1998). 
361 Dismissed from the Politburo and Secretariat in 1971. Moczar returned to the 
Politburo in December 1980. 
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current of our life. ... It's not 
difficult to guess who provided the 
organisation for the disturbances in Warsaw and the country. 
They are ... the successors of the old system, revisionists, Zionists, lackeys of imperialism. ... 
The Silesian water was not and never will be the grist to their 
mill. And if some of them still try and return to the current of our 
life adopted by the path of our nation, then the Silesian water will 
break their bones. gig 362 
"'The Zambrowski's. the Staszewski's. the Slonimski's and 
company, people like Kisielewski and Jasienica ... (constitute) irrefutably prove that they are serving foreign interests. 599 363 
The sub-text of Gierek's outburst was multi-layered. His declaration 
was an attempt to create mythical Jewish and intellectual enemy 
scapegoats for the wave of opposition sweeping the country triggered 
by the banning of a production of Mickiewicz's Forefather's Eve. By 
using such language as 'successors of the old system' and 'Zionists', 
and by juxtaposing the name of Zambrowski with Staszewski, 
Slonimski. 
) Kisielewski and Jasienica, Gierek was redefining the 
mythical equation to Jew = Stalinist = Zionist = Intellectual 
Enemy. 364 
362 Trybuna Ludu, 15 March, 1968 as cited by Tusiewicz (1993: 214). 
363 
As cited by Kuron' (1996: 3 03). 
364 Roman Zambrowski (1909-1977) had been the co-leader of the Pulawy Party 
faction of 1956 that had accused the Natolin Party faction of anti-Semitism and 
anti-intellectualism. (Kurofi 1996: 92). He was a leading Party member in the 
1940s to early 1960s. He was also a Jew, a close colleague of Gomulka before 
1948, and with fellow Jews Jakub Berman (1901-1984) and Hilary Minc (1905- 
1974), part of a ruling elite associated with the Stalinism of Bierut. Stefan 
Staszewski, a leading PPR communist, believed in a democratic Marxism unspoilt 
by the autocratic tradition of the Russians/Soviets such as Lenin and Stalin. 
(Kuron' 1996: 47). The trio Slonimski, Kisielewski and Jasienica were respected 
dissident intellectuals. In 1964, for example, all three had signed the Letter of 34, 
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The second example also illustrates the often used tactic of 
interconnecting enemy myths by incorporating different symbolic 
elements to adapt their meanings. It shows how the Party-State's 
national non-communism now deployed the mythical equation Jew = 
KOR member = non-Pole = German enemy. The purpose was, via a 
divides et impere strategy,, to discredit KOR which was increasingly 
proving an effective opposition to the regime. The example also 
shows how the Jew = Zionist = Enemy road was being reconstructed. 
The literature theorist Michal Glowin'ski and the historian Jan JOzef 
Lipski 365 both observed the ways that elements within the Gierek-led 
regime deployed the Jewish enemy myth in its 1976-1977 attacks upon 
KOR members and associates. Ursus and Radom workers 
366 
were 
now warned not to take money from the KOR Jews. Ludwik Dom, a 
the first collective protest against the regime's cultural policies. All three had 
attended the 29 February 1968 Extraordinary Meeting of the Warsaw Branch of 
the Union of Polish Writers (ZLP). The meeting had been called in connection 
with the banning of a production of Forefathers' Eve, and at the meeting the trio 
singled out by Gierek, had strongly criticised the regime's actions and cultural 
policy. Kisielewski had spoken of the 'dictatorship of the unenlightened'. 
(Kisielewski 1998: 8). A few days later, the 3 March 1968, marked the 
disappearance of Kisielewski's column in the Catholic Tygodnik Powszechny, a 
Znak weekly, but regime-censored. On the 11 March 1968, 'unknown 
perpetrators', which invariably meant secret police, beat up Kisielewski. 
(Kisielewski 1998: 8). Antoni Slonimski (1895-1976), ZLP President from 1956- 
1959, was best known for his lyrical reflections upon the tradition of Polish 
romanticism. Catholic, Pawel Jasienica (1909 1970) was a writer and historian, 
and fon-ner Home Army member. 
365 Lipski was also a KOR member. 
366 In June 1976 Ursus and Radom workers had gone on strike against government 
introduced price rises. As a result many were imprisoned and victimised and KOR 
was set up in defence of them and their families. There were a few smaller strikes 
elsewhere also. 
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Jewish KOR associate, suffered anti-Semitic verbal abuse while he 
was being beaten up in the Radom police headquarters. 'KOR IS 
JEWS' slogans, daubed in give-away green paint not available in 
normal shops, were, uncharacteristically, allowed to remain 
unremoved for long periods of time. 367 One way of alluding to KOR 
member Michnik being Jewish was for the regime to adopt the 
language of Dmowski's anti-Semitic National Democrats by using the 
style of speech adopted by pre-WWII uneducated Jews. 368 Between 
14-21 May 1977, Kuron", Michnik, Blumsztajn, Lipski and 
Macierewicz, along with six other KOR members and associates were 
arrested and imprisoned. The arrests were followed by a campaign of 
slander, often anti-Semitic, waged by the secret police and the Party 
press, of which Zycie Warszawy was the most virulent, but where 
others, including Trybuna Ludu, did not lag far behind. 369 In Lodz", a 
characteristic feature of the secret police's conversations with the 
parents of young, but legally liable KOR associates, was the use of 
Motif . 
370 anti-Semitic s On Easter Sunday, 1977, Zycie Warszawy 
carried a major article claiming Michnik and the former-communist 
Leszek Kolakowski (1927-) had made links on KOR's behalf with the 
West German neo-fascist newspaper Nazional Zeitung. 371 In another 
attack on Michnik on 30 May 1977, the 'Michnik = non-Pole' subtext 
was alluded to. "'Michnik is working not for Poland, but for 
367 Lipski (1985: 139). 
368 Glowin'ski (1993: 2 1). 
369 
Lipski (1985: 154). 
370 
Lipski (1985: 239). 
371 
MacDonald (1977: 3). 
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foreigners. For foreign people, foreign interests, foreign values. iiq 372 
On I June 1977, the Pax newspaper Slowo Powszechne reported that 
one of its MPs. Zenon Komender, had spoken in Parliament of 'anti- 
Polish and cosmopolitan centres' attempting to weaken 'the moral- 
political unity of all Poles. ' 373 A few days later, an article in the 
regime press questioned the integrity of the KOR supporters. "'Do 
these people have very great benefactors in the world, who look after 
them not just financially, but morally? "' 374 The subtext translated as 
immoral KOR member = Jew = non-Pole = Enemy. They have rich 
foreign benefactors. They are cosmopolitan, and thus certainly Jews. 
If Zionist was the key 1968 synonym for Jews, then in the late 1970s, 
in both regime-forged and Party propaganda, it was being joined by 
T rotskyiSt. 375 On the II June 1977, a Zycie Warszawy journalist in an 
interview for a Swedish newspaper 376 explained that the KOR 
ideology included Trotskyist and Zionist components. The Zionists, 
he said, had collaborated with Hitler and had made known their 
activities in 1968. KOR, the Party journalist informed his Swedish 
readership, had contacts with people who had emigrated from Poland 
out of hatred. 377 
372 Bogdan Maciejewski. 'Mqczennik'. Sztandar Aflody, 30 May, 1977 as cited by 
Glowifiski (1993: 66). 
373 Glowin'ski (1993: 76). 
374 Article by Tokarz Wojdyga, as cited by Glowifiski (1993: 92). 
37 -5 Lipski (1985: 139) talks of the Trotskyist synonym beginning even to replace 
the Zionist one. 
376 Bohdan Rolifiski's interview appeared in Svenska Dagbladet. 
377 Lipski (1985: 155). As part of a 1976-1977 campaign, the Polish authorities 
repeatedly turned back former Polish citizens, mainly Jews, that had emigrated to 
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From the autumn of 1980, the Jewish enemy myth was again deployed 
by members within the Party leadership. This time its target included 
not only KOR but also Solidarity members. The new mythical 
equation was Jew = Stalinist = KOR member = Solidarity member. 
The new purpose was to discredit Solidarity, which constituted a 
major challenge to the Party's monopoly of power. In a speech 
reported on 8 October 1980 in Trybuna Ludu, Politburo Member and 
Interior Minister Stanislaw Kowalczyk warned of 'cosmopolitans' and 
nationalists 'of every description' entering the authentic workers' 
movement. 378 The hard line/neo-partisan faction within the Party's 
leadership was much strengthened by the return of Stefan Olszowski 
in August 1980,379 by the appointment of Miroslaw Milewski, in lieu 
of Kowalczyk, as Interior Minister in October 1980, and by the return 
of Moczar to the Politburo in December 1980.380 Olszowski had 
Sweden during the 1968-1969 period, despite the fact that other former Polish 
citizens were usually admitted to Poland. Lipski (1985: 309). 
378 The 'of every description' phraseology was vintage March 1968 language as 
used by Gomulka. Walqsa protested and Kowalczyk was dismissed as Interior 
Minister. Glowin'ski (1993: 217). 
379 When Moczar had been dismissed from the Politburo and Secretariat in 1971 1, 
many of the national communist partisans transferred their support to a new hard 
line Party faction known as the neo-partisans, which included Olszowski, who had 
been dropped from the Secretariat in December 1971, but remained in the 
Politburo. Keesing: 1960-1994 CD. 
380 Olszowski was Foreign Minister from 1971 to 1976 and from 1982 to 1985; a 
Member of the Politburo from December 1970 to November 1985, a Member of 
the Secretariat from November 1968 to December 197 1. and from December 1976 
to 1982-, with a brief intermission from both the Politburo and Secretariat from 
February to August 1980. Milewski was Interior Minister from October 1980 to 
July 1981, and a member of the Politburo and Secretariat between July 1981 and 
May 1985. 
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381 
supervised the anti-Semitic press campaign in March 1968 . 
Milewski's patron was known to be Moczar, his boss at the Interior 
Ministry. 382 Moczar was also once more, from 1980 to 1983, head of 
the partisan Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, which 
had served as his 1964-1972 power base. In January 1981, Moczar 
was appointed a Deputy Chairman of the National Front of Unity, and 
Olszowski was appointed to its Presidium. 
In March 198 1. ) Party hard liners supported the establishment of the 
illiberal nationalist anti-Semitic Grunwald Patriotic Union, 
383 
whose 
purported aim was to prevent other national groups from dominating 
Polish life. 384 The Union called for demonstrations to support the 
victims of 'Zionist workers in the secret police' during the Stalinist 
era and to oppose the March 1968 anniversary commemoration at 
Warsaw University of those victimised by the regime. When the 
Solidarity press began to write about Polish national minorities, 
including the Jews, in a positive light, the Union responded with anti- 
Semitic slogans from the communist propaganda machine. 385 It also 
denounced the 'Jewish miasma' at the heart of KOR and Solidarity. 386 
381 Tusiewicz (1993: 209). 
382 Keesing: 1960-1994 CD. 
383 Krupa (1997: 150). The Union's use of the name Grunwald (after the 1410 
battle) was another example of the close association made between the Jewish 
and Gennan enemy myths. 
384 The Grunwald Patriotic Union conveniently forgot that post- 1950 Poland was 
one of the most ethnically homogeneous societies in Europe. 
385 Wrobel (1997: 566). 
386 
Kuron' (1996: 311-312). 
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In August 198 1, Politburo hard line member Albin Siwak said in a 
speech to the Central Committee's Second Plenum, using language 
evoking the Piast myth, that before WWII the 'fifth columnists' 
comprised foreign tribes - the Germans, the Jews, the Lithuanians and 
the Ukrainians. Now they constituted all those that criticised the Party, 
above all Solidarity supporters. The Party press had expressed similar 
statements, but Siwak's Plenum speech was the first time that such 
sentiments were expressed so crudely in such an important forum. 387 
By Autumn 198 1, Poland was in crisis with Solidarity and the Party in 
major conflict and the CPSU putting extreme pressure upon the 
Jaruzelski regime to quash the opposition movement. In November 
1981, speakers at a Warsaw meeting of the Grunwald Patriotic Union, 
quite possibly with Soviet encouragement, 388 denounced 'the 
treacherous activity of the Zionists who made a tragic contribution to 
the abuses of the 1950s' and claimed that Michnik's 'true name" was 
Szecter. 389 Also in November 1981, the National Renaissance of 
Poland, a body ideologically similar to the Grunwald Patriotic Union, 
387 Glowin'ski (1993: 311). 
388 Towards the end of 198 1, according to KGB defector Colonel Oleg 
Gordievsky, the Moscow Centre of the KGB was pointing to the prominent role of 
Jewish 'internationalists', such as former KOR members Kuron', Michnik and 
Mojzesz Finkelsztein, as evidence of a Zionist conspiracy. KOR had decided to 
disband in September 198 1, but Kuron' and Michnik were now key advisers to the 
Solidarity leadership. Several other East European countries, including the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia, took up the Zionist conspiracy theme in public. Ruane 
(1982: 134) and Andrew (1990: 484-485). 
389 
Ruane (1982: 134). 
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was formed with regime approval . 
390 Forged pamphlets, probably the 
work of the secret police, were distributed in Warsaw on II 
November 1981, the opposition's 'foundation day'. The pamphlets 
purported to be a patriotic opposition manifesto. The manifesto, 
complete with the crowned eagle, 
391 
was 'signed' by five known 
dissidents, including three who had been KOR members. The 
manifesto conveyed anti-Semitic undertones by writing of 'people of 
unknown origin', a known synonym for Jews. 392 National non- 
communism was becoming more devious, by attempting to portray the 
opposition rather than the regime as exploiters of the Jewish enemy 
myth. 
The Deployment of the German Enemy Myth 
Post- 1945, the German enemy myth was to be appropriated by the 
regime's national non-communism. Its anti-Germanism differed from 
the official regime anti-capitalist, anti-expansionist West-Germanism 
in several ways. It equated West Germans to all Germans, partly by 
omitting to explicitly exclude fraternal East Germans from its attacks. 
It portrayed Germans as not only the past enemy but also the present 
enemy still shaped by fascism. What is more, it depicted the 
Germans, together with Jews, as acting against the interests of the 
Polish nation. 
390 Mac (2000a: 23). The National Renaissance of Poland officially registered as a 
Party in 1992 (sic). 
391 According to Mach (1985: 31) in all opposition actions against communists, 
when the national emblem was deployed it always retained its crown. 
392 Glowifiski (1993: 339-340). 
206 
After WWII, partly as a result of Poland's borders moving westward, 
there were some three million Gen-nans living in Poland. 
393 
According to some estimates by 1950, in large part thanks to the 
enactment of the Piast myth, virtually all three million had been 
forcefully displaced from Poland 5 
394 
or had died in post-war labour 
camps, in forced labour, in transit to Germany, 
395 
or as victims of 
Polish security forces. 
396 
The Gomulka-led 1956-1970 regime tried to maintain the demonic 
view of the Germans, who, but for communist vigilance, would yet 
again attempt a Drang nach Osten. Shortly after his 1956 return to 
power, Gomulka, referring to the remilitarization of West Germany 
asserted that "German revisionism, " represented, "'as the gruesome 
historical experience indicates -a threat to Poland, to our borders, to 
393 According to the 1931 census, there were some 0.7 million Germans then 
living in Poland. Polish mythology conveniently forgets that during WWII in 
Poland, over three and a quarter million signed the Volklist as Germans. Some 0.8 
million signed in categories I and 11, and a further 2.5 million in categories III and 
IV. (Mac 2000b: 40). Of the three million Germans living in Poland after WWII at 
least two million had been resettled in the part of Poland incorporated in the 
German Reich in 1939. 
394 Szajkowski (1983: 21-22) gives a figure of some three million 'forced 
evictions' of Germans. Habielski (1998: 146) gives a figure of about 2.8 million 
Germans 'leaving' Poland during 1945-1950. Officially, the 'forced displacement' 
was as a result of a decision taken by the Allies. 
395 It has been estimated that about 400,000 Germans who found themselves in 
Polish and Soviet post-war territories died in such ways. (Bogusz 2000: 28). Most 
of the victims were children, the elderly, invalids and women. (Mac 2000b: 39). 
396 For example, Polish guards burnt alive some 48 people, the entire population 
of several villages of the Opole region, situated within the Western 'Recovered 
Territory'. (Mac 2000b: 39). 
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our security. qqý 
397 In November 1965, the Polish bishops, in defiance 
of the sentiments of the German enemy myth, sent a letter to the West 
German bishops in which they proposed mutual forgiveness for the 
wrongs each nation had inflicted on the other. 398 The Polish regime 
responded by launching a furious media campaign against the Polish 
bishops, depicting them as acting against the interests of the nation 
and even as traitors to the Polish raison dWat. 399 During the 1967 
anti-Zionist campaign following the Arab-Israeli War, when the 
official media linked West German with Israeli aggression, Polish 
Defence Minister, Marian Spychalski, attending a graduate ceremony 
at the General Staff Academy, spoke of 'Hitler's epigones from 
Bonn. ' 400 
As long as West Germany and other key Western powers failed to 
recognise Poland's post-WWII Western border, the Polish regime had 
a powerful political legitimacy card to play. This was a card that could 
also be used to justify its political realist stance that only the Soviet 
Union could guarantee its Western border. More difficult was the 
397 Prem0wienia, 1956-1957; W. Gomulka, Warsaw; p. 200 as cited by Bromke 
(1967: 110). 
398 The letter offered pardon for the atrocities inflicted by the Germans on Poles 
throughout Polish history, particularly during WWII. In addition the Polish 
Episcopate asked for forgiveness for the forced eviction of some three million 
Gen-nans from 'Recovered Territories' after WWII. (Szajkowski 1983: 21-22). 
399 Szajkowski (1983: 22). An example of this campaign was the article 'In Whose 
Name? % Zycie Warszawy, 10 December, 1965, p. 5. 
400 Rozenbaum. (1998: 8). Spychalski had been a Politburo Member from 1945 to 
1949, and from 1959 until 1970. Like Gomulka, he had been both a WWII 
communist resistance fighter against the Germans and also a casualty of Stalin's 
nationalist witch-hunt, when he was imprisoned from 1950-1956. 
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post-1970 deployment of this card, for in December 1970, Chancellor 
Willy Brandt recognised German-Polish frontiers and normalised 
relations between West Germany and Poland. Despite this, the 
regime's use of the German enemy myth persisted. In attacking KOR 
members, post-1970 national non-communism continued to combine 
the two enemy myths as expressed by anti-Semitism linked to anti- 
Germanism. In a diary entry for 29 January 1977, for example, 
Kisielewski wrote of a claim propagated within ruling circles that 
KOR was a German-Jewish plot. 401 On 25 May 1977, Secretariat and 
Politburo Member Kania, at a meeting with the Episcopate's Secretary 
General, rhetorically asked: 
"What kind of people are they? Amongst others: Kurofi. 
Michnik, Blumsztajn, Strassberger and the other Jews? They 
stand on the margins, but 'Free Europe' and the German mass 
media support them. v) 
402 
The anti- German plus anti- Semitic theme was pursued in two articles 
that appeared in the Party's Central Committee and Warsaw 
Committee newspapers on 31 May 1977.403 Michnik and Blumsztajn 
were now accused of being partners and allies of Hupka and Czaja, 
who previously had been portrayed as two Polish-hating German 
401 
Kisielewski (1998: 895). 
402 Raina (1995a: 308). From the autumn of 1976, Seweryn Blumsztajn was co- 
editor of the KOR periodical Biuletyn Informacyjny. He joined KOR as a Member 
in October 1977. Kuron' (1996: 192). Michnik, Blumsztajn and Kurofl had been 
arrested days before Kania's outburst. 
403 Trvbuna Ludu and, ývcie Warszawy. (Glowifiski 1993: 70). 
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revanchists, 
404 
and secret police forged pamphlets, on give-away 
quality paper, informed one that Hupka and Czaja had generously 
rewarded the KOR saboteurs. 
405 
On the 29 August 1980, the day the Silesian miners joined the striking 
Baltic workers, the Gen-nan enemy myth was resurrected during the 
main national TV news and in an article in Zycie Warszawy. The 
article contrasted KOR members with true Poles, suggested Kuron, and 
Michnik were acting against the 'most important of our national 
affairs' and accused Michnik of wanting to sell out Poland to the 
Germans. 406 The true Pole concept had also been exploited by the 
regime in the post-March 1968 period. The implication was clear: the 
Jews and KOR members were not true Poles. 407 
3.4 Conclusion: The Liberalising Of The Political Culture Of 
Opposition 
This chapter's use of empirical evidence to explore how pre- 1945 
myths were deployed in post- 1945 Poland has illuminated the 
relationship of myths with the dynamics of political culture and 
democratisation. It has shown how myths can further the synthesis of 
nationalism and religion. It has shown how political culture can be 
404 Hupka and Czaja had been expelled after WWII from 'Recovered Territories' 
and went on to lead the (West German) Union of Expelled Germans. 
405 Lipski (1985: 137). 
406 Zycie Warsanty. (Glowihski 1993: 171-172). 
407 Glowin'ski (1993: 337). 
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transmitted over time and how political culture can be adapted to take 
on different values and yet retain the legitimacy of past tradition. 
The changing political culture of the opposition and the regime during 
the post-1945 period has been reflected in their different uses of pre- 
1945 myths. Both opposition and regime exploited the attributes of 
myths that engender political legitimacy and political potency and 
allow myths to extend and/or change their meanings. However, the 
opposition increasingly deployed the pre-1945 myths as vehicles of 
liberalism, while the regime used them as vehicles of illiberalism. 
In the Battle of the Second Millennium. ) the Church's Novena, much 
aided by the Madonna myth, revived the protest repertoire and 
pastoral mobilisation 408 that had its genesis under the state 
authoritarianism of the partitioning powers. The Madonna myth again 
furthered the synthesising process between political Catholicism and 
nationalism. As chapters 5 and 6 will show, the Novena acted as a 
bridge between the pre-1945 deployment of religious myths and their 
associated symbols and rituals for nationalist purposes and their 
subsequent post-1978 deployment by John Paul 11 and Solidarity to 
further the liberal political culture of opposition. 
During the mid- I 960s- I 970s period, as exemplified within the Battle 
of May Days, political Catholicism, by extending the multivocality of 
408 Pastoral mobilisation entails programmes designed to strengthen the bonds 
between Church and society by involving believers in intensive religious activities 
and in mass rituals that carry forward the Catholic social agenda into the public 
domain. Pastoral mobilisation differs from other organised collective action 
including political mobilisation, in that although it carries strong political 
implications, it lacks explicit political goals. See Osa (1997: 3 54). 
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the 3 May myth, became more liberal. It began to link its deployment 
of the 3 May myth not only with popular sovereignty, but also with 
national self-determination and social justice, including human and 
civil rights to be safeguarded by international law and supranational 
bodies. In large part this liberalising influence was a result of post- 
Vatican 11 thinking and the meeting of minds between the dissident 
Catholic intelligentsia and the secular left, a process explored in 
Chapter 4. 
In the Battle of Foundation Days, the Church adapted the original 
Russian/Soviet enemy connotations of the Battle of Warsaw myth. 
The myth now served as a vehicle to criticise an imperial system that 
prevented national self-determination rather than a vehicle to engender 
hatred of others. 
The deployment of myths evoking sacred symbolism by the Church- 
led opposition continued the 19th century synthesising process 
between political Catholicism and nationalism. However, there was 
now a significant development. The Church hierarchy was now 
playing a leading role in preaching an increasingly liberal political 
culture. 
Changing attitudes to the Soviets, Germans and the Jews, as reflected 
by the ways in which the three associated enemy myths were adapted, 
shaped much of the development of 1945-1989 Polish nationalism and 
significantly impacted upon the course and outcome of the war of 
political legitimacy. As the opposition discarded or significantly 
changed the meaning of these myths, so the regime maintained the 
illiberal values associated with them. The result was that the political 
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culture of opposition became more liberal, while that of the regime 
became more illiberal. 
The simultaneous deployment by the Polish regime of two 
contradictory nationalisms - communist and non-communist - served 
to undermine them both. The attempts by the regime's national non- 
communism to mitigate the effects of the Russian/Soviet and 
Communist enemy myths opened a Pandora's box which, when filled 
with the blank spots of history, served only to expose the regime's 
double standards and increase its political illegitimacy. The chapter, in 
identifying a distinct non-communism strand of nationalism deployed 
systematically by the regime, necessitates a reinterpretation of Polish 
regime nationalism as depicted solely by national communism. 
The war of political legitimacy was increasingly fought according to 
the agenda of the opposition. For the regime, in deploying socio- 
economic and nationalist legitimacy, even if for illiberal purposes, 
was forced to adopt the definition of political legitimacy that 
incorporates a regime commanding respect from the majority, a liberal 
definition that, as Held (1998: 334) notes, "suggests the necessity of 
pursuing the model of democratic autonomy, " rather than a Marxist 
definition that deployed national communist ideological legitimacy 
and could justify coercive power legitimation. The opposition's 
agenda, as subsequent chapters will show, was increasingly becoming 
a liberal democratic one. 
The extent of the multivocality and adaptability of myths was perhaps 
best illustrated by the regime's non-communism. In evoking such 
mythology, the enemies were merged together to give hybrid dual- 
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enemy myths that ran the illiberal gamut of the Jewish enemy myth 
from the Jew-communist, to the Jew-Zionist, to the Jew-Stalinist, to 
the Jew-intellectual, to the Jew-non Pole, to the Jew-Gennan, Jew- 
KnD OR member, and finally to the Jew-Solidarity member. Chapter 5 
will illustrate these multivocal and adaptable attributes equally at 
work for the opposition's liberalism by showing how John Paul 11 
continued the opposition's liberalising process by extending yet 
further the meanings attached to the pre-1945 myths. Chapter 5 will 
also show how John Paul 11, much aided by these myths, continued the 
synthesising process between political Catholicism and nationalism. 
Chapter 6 will show the influence of a more liberal political 
Catholicism and nationalism upon Solidarity. 
During the 1976-1979 period, political Catholicism, as fuelled by the 
Polish Church, Znak and a John Paul 11-led more politically liberal 
post-Vatican 11 papacy, decided to align itself with KOR rather than 
ROPCiOIKPN, the other major civil rights grouping. In so doing, 
political Catholicism was now co-operating in practice with the 
liberal-leaning dissident leftist secularism rather than with the more 
right-wing, Dmowski-influenced, illiberalism advocated by 
ROPCiOIKPN. This decision may well have had a profound impact on 
the course of the 1980s and the decade's liberal democratic outcome. 
The background to the decision of political Catholicism to align itself 
with KOR is now explored in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4: A MEETING OF MINDS - THE 1970-1976 
PROCESS OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN DISSIDENT 
CATHOLIC AND SECULAR LEFT INTELLIGENTSIA 
4: 1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to examine the 1970-1976 process of 
dialogue that led to a meeting of minds between liberal-leaning 
dissident Catholic 409 and secular left intelligentsia. The political 
significance of this dialogue lies in the subsequent 1976-1979 
practical co-operation that in turn contributed to the fostering of a 
liberal political culture of 1980-1989 opposition. The 1976-1979 co- 
operative political activities have been covered by several works. For 
example, Sch6Pflin (1979) and Raina (1981) give good general 
coverage of this period and of the emergence of opposition groups, but 
there is no systematic examination of the 1970-1976 process of 
dialogue, nor any detailed exploration as to why the predominant pre- 
Solidarity opposition was a liberal-leaning one in Poland, rather than a 
more conservative national Catholic or populist one. The formative 
1970s period was, unsurprisingly, to have a bearing upon the nature of 
the 1980s' opposition. Within Poland, unlike in Hungary where the 
1980s' opposition was divided between national populist and liberal- 
leaning wings (Sword 1990: 102-103), the 1980s' Polish opposition 
was essentially united around a liberal-leaning Solidarity supported by 
a liberal-leaning political Catholicism. 
409 The dissident Catholic intelligentsia came mainly from the ranks of Znak. 
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Some of the participants in the 1970-1976 dialogue, particularly but 
not exclusively from the ranks of the secular left, had previously been 
attracted by the theory of communism. However, the practice of 
Polish and of international communism confirmed existing doubts, 
stirred by the crushing of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution by the 
Soviets, as to whether communism was reformable. In particular the 
Polish regime's anti-Semitism and anti-intelligentsia onslaughts in the 
spring of 1968 and, to a lesser extent, the crushing of the 
Czechoslovakian Revolution in the summer of 1968 by Warsaw Pact 
troops, including Polish ones, had a profound effect on many of the 
dialogue participants. In coming to the conclusion that communism 
was not refort-nable, they moved towards accepting liberal democracy 
as the only viable alternative political system. 
Before exploring the 1970-1976 process of dialogue, the chapter will 
briefly outline some 1976-1979 examples of the co-operation between 
dissident Catholic and secular left intelligentsia that followed this 
dialogue. In addition, the issue as to why during this 1976-1979 period 
the Polish Church hierarchy decided to show a preference for 
supporting the Committee for the Defence of Workers (KOR), rather 
than the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights 
(ROPCiO)1 the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), will 
be examined. This preference for supporting KOR rather than 
ROPCiOIKPN, the other main civil rights grouping of the time, it will 
be argued, was an important factor in enabling the liberalisation 
process of the political culture of the opposition. 
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4.2 Some Practical Outcomes Of Dialogue: Examples Of 
Co-Operation During 1976-1979 
Although it is difficult to prove a causal link, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the 1970-1976 meeting of minds' process contributed to 
four significant 1976-1979 interrelated developments involving 
practical co-operation between dissident Catholic and secular left 
intelligentsia. In turn these developments must be seen also within the 
context of the re-emergence of a more self-assured, more openly 
dissident, civil society. From 1976, numerous dissident groups, 
including those of lay political Catholicism, mushroomed in Poland. 
Underground newsletters, petitions and periodicals outside the state 
censorship system began to appear. It was estimated that before 1980, 
one out of every four Poles had read an underground publication and 
200,000 read such bibula regularly. 4 10 A May 1978 Central 
Committee pamphlet cited nineteen illegal journals with a total single 
print run of 20,000 copies. By the time Solidarity appeared on the 
scene in the summer of 1980, it was estimated that there were some 
fifty underground publications . 
41 ' Four underground Catholic 
publications appeared regularly: Zgrzyt (Discord), Krzy± Nowohucki 
(The Cross of Nowa Huta), WspOlny Dom (Common Home), and 
Spotkania (Encounters), which appeared twelve times between 1977- 
1981. Spotkania was published in Lublin the home of the Catholic 
410 See Bernhard (1991: 319). Bibula, which literally means blotting paper. was 
the Polish equivalent of the Russian samizdat underground publication. 
411 Of these, amongst the most influential publications were KOR's Robotnik (The 
Worker), Biuletyn I?? formacyjny (Information Bulletin) and Glos (The Voice), 
ROP00's Opinia (Opinion) and Spotkania (Encounters). Robotnik had the 
largest circulation, at about 10.000 copies monthly. (Vale 1981: 225). 
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University of Lublin (KUL) with which Spotkania had links, and was 
edited and written by young academic chaplains, Catholic students 
and Catholic intellectuals. Spotkania stressed "the necessity to extend 
the Catholic faith to social principles, and to fight against the 
deliberate process of social disintegration. " 412 
The 1976-1979 examples of practical co-operation between dissident 
Catholic and secular left intelligentsia outlined below had the explicit 
or implicit support of the Polish Church hierarchy and in particular of 
Primate Wyszynski and, until his departure to Rome as Pope in 
October 1978, of Cardinal Wojtyla. The four aforementioned 
outcomes of dialogue developments, although highly politically 
significant, are not the main concern of this chapter and others have 
written about aspects of them. Accordingly, the developments are now 
only briefly outlined. The first development pertains to the 1976 co- 
operation 413 between dissident Catholic and secular left intelligentsia 
as expressed in their opposition to the regime's attempts to amend the 
Polish Constitution. 414 The second development relates to the co- 
operation between dissident Catholic and secular left dissidents as 
expressed by membership of the Committee for the Defence of 
Workers (KOR) established in 1976 and by support for KOR activities. 
412 Szajkowski (1983: 56). One issue of Spotkania appeared during Martial Law. 
Its chief editor, Janusz Krupski, was arrested after ten months in hiding. 
(Szajkowski 1983: 85). 
13 The co-operation actually commenced in December 1975. 
414 For further details see Raina (1978: 212-213) and Blazynski (1979: 25 1 ). 
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The third development relates to the co-operation between dissident 
Catholic and secular left intelligentsia as demonstrated by the 
activities of the Flying University, 415 resurrected in 1977. Finally, the 
fourth development pertains to the 1978-1979 establishment of links 
between the dissident Catholic and secular left intelligentsia (often 
realised through KOR and the Flying University) and the embryonic 
workers' groupings, precursor to the Solidarity movement that 
emerged in 1980. 
4.3 The Polish Church's Preference For Supporting KOR 
The issue as to why the Polish Church hierarchy showed a preference 
for supporting KOR rather than ROPCiOIKPN is now explored. As 
mentioned, the two key civil rights groupings of the 1976-1979 period 
of opposition in Poland were KOR and ROPCiOIKPN. KOR was 
established in 1976 to support Ursus and Radom factory workers and 
their families following regime repression related to the price rise 
protests. ROPOO, the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil 
Rights, was formed in 1977, and in 1979, a group of ROPOO activists 
established the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN). 
415 The origins of the original late-19th century Flying University that inspired 
this late-20th century reincarnation are explored later in this chapter. 
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The Nature of ROPCiOIKPN 
Initially, ROPOO was regarded by many as more influential than 
KOR. KOR was the more liberal of the two and ROPCiOIKPN was the 
more socially conservative and outspokenly nationalist. According to 
Lipski there was no anti-Semitism within KOR, but, although anti- 
Semitism was not the prevailing sentiment, there was some anti- 
Semitism within ROpCjO. 416 
The circumstances of the announcement of the formation of the KPN 
were full of nationalist symbolic and ritual overtones, evoking the 
German enemy myth. The announcement was made on I September 
1979 to those gathered at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw 
to commemorate the 40'h anniversary of the Gennan invasion of 
Poland. KPN was aligned to a traditional political Catholicism that 
bordered on a belief in the Catholic = Pole myth associated with the 
period of Dmowski-influenced illiberalism. In KPN's Declaration of 
Principle one read: 
"Polish national consciousness has been moulded by an over 
1000 years long process ... a process accompanied 
by the 
presence of the Catholic Church. " "The irremovable values 
inherent in the Polish national consciousness (include) ... 
attachment to the world of values formed by Catholicism and to 
the principles of Christian ethics. " 417 
Moreover, in contrast to the more guarded nationalism of KOR, KPN 
was stridently explicit in its criticism of the Soviet Union, a criticism 
416 Lipski (198: 12 1). 
417 The Declaration qf Principle of the Confederation as in Raina (1981: 414). 
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more likely to evoke the Soviet enemy myth rather than opposition to 
the Soviet political system. 
418 
The Nature of KOR 
The influence of political Catholicism and nationalism within KOR 
was greater than is generally perceived, not least by Western 
observers. These observers tend to portray KOR either in unspecific 
general ten-ns as an intelligentsia-led organisation, for example, 
(Lewis 1994: 184), or specifically as a secular left-led organisation, 
for example (Crampton 1997: 3 64) and (Davies 198 1 b: 63 0). A closer 
look at KOR reveals a more complex picture. 
Crucially, the Polish Church hierarchy and prominent dissident liberal 
Catholic intellectuals showed a preference for co-operating, 
supporting and/or working within KOR rather than ROPCiOIKPN. 
This preference, which increased the political legitimacy of KOR, was 
to play a significant part in the genesis and character of Solidarity. It 
was from the ranks of KOR and its supporters that several of the key 
intelligentsia that gave direction and advice to the 1978-1979 nascent, 
and the 1980-1989 actual, trade union cum political Solidarity 
movement, came. Direction and advice from KOR intelligentsia such 
418 Thus in KPAIs Declaration of Principles one finds phrases such as: the 
"infamous Yalta Agreement"; "Soviet domination over Poland"; with the Polish 
Communist Party governing Poland "in a totalitarian way ... a modem form of 
institutionalized Russian rule over Poland"; "the Polish nation bent in the yoke of 
slavery for so long, is awakening"; "the historical national community which 
contains all the past, present and future Polish generations. " The Declaration of 
Principle qf the Confederation as in Raina (1981: 412-414). 
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as Kuron' and Michnik, and from Catholic intellectual supporters of 
KOR such as Mazowiecki, contributed to a 1980s' Solidarity 
movement that preached and practised a more inclusive liberal 
political culture. The question remains as to why key exponents of 
political Catholicism opted for KOR. Three inter-related factors help 
explain the choice. Firstly, the liberal nature of KOR was more in tune 
with the increasing liberal political Catholicism emerging as a result 
of 1960s' changes within papal political Catholicism than with the 
more illiberal nature of ROPCiOIKPN. Secondly, the influence of 
political Catholicism and nationalism within KOR was greater than 
often perceived. Thirdly, the 1970-1976 process of dialogue 
contributed to a readiness for co-operation between liberal-leaning 
dissident Catholic and secular left intelligentsia, a co-operation 
reflected in KOR's membership. 
Primate Wyszyn'ski and Cardinal Wojtyla, in their support for KOR, as 
the following empirical evidence will illustrate, were also supporting 
modem liberal values of human rights, social justice and popular 
sovereignty and national self-determination. 
After the regime repression following the June 1976 workers' protests 
over price rises, the Episcopate officially declared its full support for 
KOR. As the Bishops assembled for the November 1976 Episcopate 
Conference, KOR's co-founder, Antoni Macierewicz, met with 
Cardinal Wojtyla, and although there was no substantive discussion, 
Macierewicz clearly felt Wojtyla was encouraging KOR's work and 
would help as he much as he could. At the November 1976 Episcopate 
Conference, with Cardinal Wojtyla in the lead, the Bishops demanded 
an amnesty for the arrested workers who had protested the summer 
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price rises, and warned the regime that an 'embittered people' would 
not be productive. 419 On Sunday 28 November 1976, all church 
collections were dedicated to helping the arrested or sacked workers 
and their families, with the donations being handed over to KOR. 
On 7 May 1977, a Krakow University student and an active supporter 
of KOR, Stanislaw Pyjas, was murdered, most probably by the secret 
police. Over five hundred attended a Requiem Mass for Pyjas in Lodz'. 
Memorial Masses were also held in Lublin, Poman'. and Wroclaw, 
where both the Cathedral and the square in front were filled with 
mourners. In Warsaw, crowds overflowed Saint Anne's Church to 
attend another Requiem Mass at which Primate Wyszyn" ski spoke. The 
Primate said that when people demanded 
"'their rights in a drastic and impatient way, ' this was because 
they felt 'the loop tightening around their necks'. How could 'a 
nation, a state exist without manT ... How could 
it 'live when 
basic human rights are not being observed? ... It would then not be a nation ... and with soulless 
beings neither the nation nor the 
state would be able to fulfil their tasks. q-)q 420 
Wojtyla also protested the murder of Pyjas . 
42 1 Following a massive 
funeral march on 15 May 1977 for Pyjas in Krakow, 422 Wojtyla spoke 
out against the regime at the memorial service. He said that the 
419 Kwitny (1998: 271). 
420 As cited by Raina (1978: 276). 
421 Pyjas, like Wojtyla, ) was a philology student 
from Krak6w University. 
422 During the commemoration some 5,000 students announced the formation of 
the Student's Solidarity Committee in place of the regime-sponsored Socialist 
Union of Polish Students. 
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student Pyjas was a victim of hatred towards the student democracy 
movement. 
423 Wojtyla condemned all regimes that would commit 
such acts for political reasons. 
424 
For his 9 June 1977 Corpus Christi Sennon, Wojtyla placed, as usual, 
a biblical quotation across the main outdoor altar. It read "'Your 
efforts will not be in vain' KOR 1. -)-3 
425 In so doing, Wojtyla was 
showing his support for KOR. 
426 In the sermon, Wojtyla made an 
indirect mention to the May murder of Pyjas. He attacked the press for 
its one-sidedness and for not seeing that young people longed for 
social justice and respect for human and national rights. 
"When human rights are not respected people rebel. This is not 
surprising. People have their dignity ... One cannot solve human 
problems by relying on police methods and imprisonment ... To dominate is not in the essence of rule. To rule is to protect 
human, civil and even national and religious rights. " 427 
Unsurprisingly, the regime was concemed about the Church's support 
for KOR. At a September 1977 Interior Ministry meeting, for 
example, a number of the Church Episcopate, including Cardinal 
423 Kwitny (1998: 273). 
424 Szajkowski (1983: 49). 
425 As cited by Kwitny (1998: 276). 
426 Apart from being the initials of the Workers' Defence Committee, KOR was 
the abbreviation for the Polish spelling of the New Testament book of 
Corinthians, from which the quote came. 
427 As quoted from Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1980, p. 
84 citing Opinia, Issue 3. June 1977. 
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Wojtyla, Bishop Tokarczuk, and several priests, were attacked for 
their contacts with 'anti-socialist groups, ' and in particular with 
KOR. 428 
The titles of KOR's two main publications reflect its nationalist and 
political Catholic influences. Robotnik was named after a turn of the 
19th/20th century underground publication edited by the future 
nationalist leader Pilsudski. KOR's Biuletyn Informacyjny was named 
after the main pro-Catholic and nationalist Home Army weekly of the 
same name. Although one of KOR's two co-founders, Kuron', and 
other members already-known-in-the-West such as Jan JOzef Lipski, 
Edward Lipinski, and Michnik 429 were of the secular left, 430 there 
was also a considerable Catholic presence within KOR's small 
membership. 431 Indeed, KOR members included a broad spectrum of 
nationalists. ) those of the secular left and 
liberal-leaning Catholics. 432 
According to Lipski "in KOR there was no division between believers 
and non-believers. " 433 KOR as an organisation participated in the 
most important of the Church's religious-patriotic ceremonies, which 
428 Dominiczak (1997: 309). Tokarczuk was a member of the Episcopate's Main 
Council (1967-1993). 
429 Michnik was not a KOR founder member, but became a member shortly after 
KOR's inception and his return from France. 
430 Raina (1978: 254). 
431 As a matter of deliberate policy KOR always had a small membership. of at 
most about three dozen. The Founding Members numbered just fourteen. In 
addition to its core membership, KOR had several thousand active supporters 
known as 'associates. ' (Lipski 1985: 52-59 & 175). 
432 Osa (2002: 27-28). 
433 Lipski (1985: 392). 
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as the secular leftist Lipski conceded, 'played a positive role. ' 434 The 
other co-founder of KOR was the historian and Catholic nationalist, 
Antoni Macierewicz. Other Catholic members of KOR were Father 
Jan ZieJa and JOzef Rybicki who had been an officer in the Home 
Army. In 1968, Rybicki spoke out against the regime sanctioned anti- 
Semitism and he co-operated with the Episcopal Commission in 
fighting alcoholism. Other Catholics who subsequently became KOR 
members included: the well-known actress Halina Miko1aJska; the 
poet and writer Anna Kowalska, who left the pro-regime Catholic 
organisation Pax in March 1968; Stefan Kaczorowski, a former 
secretary-general of the Christian Democratic Party; 435 and Father 
Zbigniew Kaminski who, like Father Zieja, had been a chaplain in the 
Home Army. Lipski was to write that these Catholic members joined 
KOR "for purely ethical reasons" and that their Catholicism "was seen 
among other things as a moral imperative to combat evil in public 
life. 9436 
In September 1977, the Madonna myth was enlisted to KOR's cause. 
There was a pilgrimage to the shrine of the Black Madonna at Jasna 
Gora by KOR supporters and workers from the Ursus and Radom 
factories who had been involved in the 1976 price protests to mark the 
437 
-f first anniversary of the founding of KOR In April 1978, sixty ive 
434 Lipski (1985: 278). 
435 Kaczorowski was also a founding member of ROPOO. He left KOR in 
September 1977. 
436 
Lipski (1982: 75). 
4-17 Opinia, No. 6, October 1977. As reported in Religion in Communist Lands. 
Vol. 8, No. 1. Spring 1980. pp. 85-86. 
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KOR supporters sent a letter to Parliament demanding an end to all 
438 
restrictions imposed on the Church . 
The relationship between KOR and the Znak movement was close. In 
early 1977, for example, the Head of the Office for Religious Affairs, 
Kazimierz K4, kol, started court proceedings to seize the Znak 
publications on the grounds that they were supporting KOR. Indeed 
KOR leaders were both close friends and political allies of the editors 
of Znak publications . 
439 At the end of May 1977, for example, a 
protest fast took place in Saint Martin's Church, Warsaw. The fast 
was in support of five workers imprisoned for up to ten years for 
taking part in the June 1976 food price demonstrations, and in support 
of the release of nine KOR members and supporters arrested in the 
previous two weeks. Bogdan Cywin'ski 440 was one of the hunger 
strikers within the church, and, outside the church, Mazowiecki 441 
acted as the strikers' spokesperson. 442 Wo tyla had given both j 
438 Opinia, No. 13, May 1978. As reported in Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 
8. No. I Spring 1980, p. 87. 
439 Kwitny (1998: 27 1). 
440 Cywifiski was a KIK activist and Chief Editor of Znak (1973 -1977). Cywin' ski 
was also a friend of Cardinal Wojtyla. 
441 A Pax member until 1956, Mazowiecki was a K[K activist, Chief Editor of 
WiqZ' from 1958 to 1981, and a Znak Member of Parliament from 1961 to 1971. 
From 1953 to 1955, he had been the Chief Editor of the pro-regime Pax weekly 
IJ'TK. 
442 Among the ten hunger strikers there was also a Catholic priest; Henryk Wujec; 
and Michnik's father. Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 5 No. 4, Winter 1977 
and Szajkowski (1983: 49). The Rector of Saint Martin's. Father Bronislaw 
Dembowski gave moral support. Wujec, a physics graduate, was a KOR member 
from 1977. In 198 1, Wujec was to become a member of the Presidium of the 
Warsaw Region of Solidaraj% According to Kwitny, Father Dembowski was 'one 
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Cywin'ski and Mazowiecki his moral support prior to their 
participation. 
443 
KOR was not an explicitly nationalist movement, but, implicitly, one 
of its aims was Poland's popular sovereignty and national self- 
determination. As mentioned, KOR's co-founder Macierewicz was a 
Catholic nationalist. Several of KOR's members had risked their lives 
for the struggle to regain national self-determination during WWII as 
members of the nationalist, anti-communist and pro-Catholic Home 
Army. KOR members Lipski, Zieja, Kaminski, Rybicki and 
Kaczorowski also had taken part in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising led by 
the Home Army. Immediately after the war, Rybicki became a member 
of the anti-communist Freedom and Independence (WiN) underground 
organisation. 
4.4 The 1970-1976 Process Of Dialogue 
The exploration of the 1970-1976 process of dialogue examines four 
of the key factors contributing to the case for dialogue made by the 
dissident Catholic and secular left intelligentsia. One factor relates to 
lessons learnt from the end of 19th century/early 20th century period 
of Polish partitions. A second factor relates to the contribution of 
personal Thomism espoused by certain French Catholic thinkers from 
around the 1920s-1930s. A third factor relates to the 1960s' changes 
of John Paul 11's favourite priests'. Dembowski, despite secret police pressure 
took no preventative action when the May 1977 protest fast took place in his 
church. (Kwitny 1998: 275). Dembowski had close ties with the Warsaw 
Catholic Club of the Intelligentsia. 
44-1 Kwitny (1998: 273-274). 
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in the socio-political thinking of Roman Catholics as influenced by 
John XXIII, Vatican 11, and Paul VI. Lastly, the fourth factor relates to 
the ideas of new evolutionism as expressed by Michnik and other 
dissident intellectuals in the mid- I 970s. 
4.4.1 The Genesis and Nature of the Dialogue 
The 1970-1976 theoretical case made by dissident, mainly liberal- 
leaning, Catholic and secular left intelligentsia for dialogue and 
greater solidarity was well encapsulated in six publications. The first 
three publications to appear were books written by Catholics: 
Crossroads and Values (1970) by Tadeusz Mazowiecki; 444 At the 
Polish Intersection (1972) by Janusz Zablocki ; 445 and Genealo ies of 9 
Cywi, Ski. 
446 
the Unconquered (1972) by n The other three publications 
were written by two secular leftists in 1976, when Michnik wrote an 
essay New Evolutionism 447 and the book The Church - The Left- 
Dialogue, (Michnik 1977), 448 and Kolakowski penned an article 
444 Rozdroza i wartosci. Biblioteka wiezi: Warsaw: 1970. 
445 Na polskim skrzyzowaniu drog. Wydawnictwo ODiSS, Warsaw: 1972. A 
former Pax member, Zablocki was a Znak and neo-Znak Member of Parliament 
from 1965 to 1976 and 1976 to 1985, respectively. He was a co-founder in 1957 
of the Znak publication WiqZ'. In 1967, Zablocki established the Centre for 
Documentation and Social Studies (OASS). 
446 Cywin'ski (1972). 
447 Michnik (1976). Michnik (1946-), a dissenting Marxist historian, was 
dismissed from his post at Warsaw University in March 1968. He was imprisoned 
a number of times for his opposition to the regime. He became a member of KOR 
and was involved in the Flying University. 
448 Written in 1976, it was first published in Paris in 1977. 
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entitled Stanislaw Brzozowski: Marxism as Historical Subjectivism. 
449 
Judging by subsequent references to these publications, in terms of 
impact upon the process of dialogue, Cywin"ski's book, (Cywin"ski 
1972) was the most influential, 450 followed by Michnik's response to 
it, (Michnik 1977). Personal Thomism and Michnik's essay, (Michnik 
1976) had an important influence upon the opposition tactics and upon 
the political behaviour of Catholic and secular left intelligentsia, and 
thereby upon their subsequent practical manifestations of solidarity. 
Unsurprisingly, events and debates of the past influenced the six 
publications. Lessons were extracted from the mistakes and successes 
of the final decades of Polish partitioning; from the impact of personal 
Thomism, first developed around the 1920s-1930s in West Europe; 
and from the aftermath of the fundamental 1960s' changes in the 
Roman Catholic Church, particularly as expressed by John XXIII, 
Vatican 11, and Paul V1. 
Lessons to be learnt from partitioning were first emphasised by 
Cywin'ski and then taken up by Michnik and Kolakowski. They 
subsequently gave rise to greater C athol ic- secular left co-operation in 
practice than under partitioning. In Genealogies of the Unconquered, 
Cywin'ski, noted that the spread of positivism and radicalism in 
partitioned Poland during the latter half of the 19th century was 
responsible for the siphoning off of many of the more able minds from 
449 Kolakowski (1976). The article in Survey was a 'reprint' from the then as yet 
not published Main Currents of Marxism, Volume IL A former Marxist, 
Kolakowski, a Philosophy Professor. was dismissed from his post at Warsaw 
University, following the student protests in 1968. 
450 See, for example, Kurofi (1996: 164). 
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the Polish Catholic Church, resulting in its intellectual 
impoverishment. Cywin'ski linked the stand taken by the Catholic 
intelligentsia against the partitioning powers with the Polish 'events' 
of 1968. One person from the past that Cywin'ski praised as a role 
model for the current political situation was the unorthodox Marxist- 
tumed-Modernist Catholic, 451 Stanislaw Brzozowski (1878-1911). 
There were striking parallels between Brzozowski's past and the 
present situation. As with many secular left dissidents in 1968, the 
student Brzozowski was expelled from Warsaw University in 1897 for 
helping to organise a patriotic demonstration. Like many dissident 
intelligentsia in the late 1970s, Brzozowski was arrested in 1898 for 
Flying University activities. The original incarnation of the Flying 
UniversitylSociety of Scientific Courses (TKN) owes its origins to the 
war waged upon Polish culture by the official nationalisms of 
Germany and Russia during the latter half of partitioning. The 
repression of Polish culture helped in the realisation, amongst 
Catholics and non-Catholics and amongst both idealistic and realistic 
nationalists, that all Poles concerned with the fight for national self- 
determination had a common interest in protecting Polish culture. 
Idealistic nationalism focused upon the culture of the past, and 
realistic nationalism upon the culture of the present. Yet for both 
nationalisms, the relationship between culture, national identity, and 
the struggle for national self-determination was so intrinsically linked 
that it was deemed necessary, despite the grave risks, to maintain 
Polish culture, illegally, underground. The creation of the first Flying 
451 Modernism within Roman Catholicism tended to deny the objective value of 
traditional beliefs and to regard some dogmas of the Church as symbolic rather 
than literally true. 
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UniversitylTKN in the late I gth /early 20"" century and their 
reincarnation in the late 20th century symbolised this realisation. As 
the Tsarist authority russified education within their Partition, 
underground classes began to be held for the teaching of Polish 
language, history and religious instruction. During 1882-83, Polish 
left-wing radicals, as part of their resistance to the Russian imposition 
of political and ideological restrictions on education, decided that they 
should establish academic societies to encourage students to preserve 
their Polish identity and enrich their knowledge through self- 
education. They initiated uncensored education courses, especially in 
social, political, and economic sciences, that were secretly conducted 
by well-known radical professors in private homes. A generation of 
Poles was introduced to aspects of Polish culture banned from their 
schools and colleges. In time, four separate faculties were established 
and diplomas were issued to graduates 
452 in what became known as 
the Flying University, or from 1905/1906, the Society of Scientific 
Courses (TKN), which functioned until 1918. 
Kolakowski, (1976: 247) praised Brzozowski in almost hyperbolical 
terms: 
"'The intellectual history of twentieth-century Poland cannot be 
understood without reference to the bizarre and disparate effects 
of his writings and personality. "' 
452 One such graduate was the Warsaw-born Maria Sklodowska (1867-1911). In 
189 1, Sklodowska went to Paris and as Maria Sklodowska-Curie achieved 
international fame as the first female and two-time Nobel Laureate in Physics 
(1903) and Chemistry (1911). 
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Michnik, like Cywin'ski, felt linked to the tradition of the unconquered 
intelligentsia of the final period of partitioning, which he affinned 
included 'the tradition of Brzozowski. ' 
Brzozowski constituted an ideal symbol of solidarity between 
nationalism and political Catholicism; between proto-liberal political 
Catholicism and proto-liberal secularism; between political realism 
and idealism; between questioning left-leaning former Marxist 
intellectuals and dissident workers. The potential for Brzozowski to 
serve as such a symbol of solidarity is apparent from observations of 
both Cywin" ski and Kolakowski pertaining to Brzozowski's influence. 
Thinking of people such as Brzozowski, Cywin'ski observed that: 
"'Although the secularist circles of the radical intelligentsia were 
separated from the Church by a wide rift of mutual antipathy and 
distrust; the differences were, nevertheless, not 
insurmountable. 9. ). ) 453 
while Kolakowski commented: 
"The ambiguity and variability of Brzozowski's influence 
extended beyond the grave. Young people of the Left were 
brought up on his novels and other writings ... yet 
before and 
during the second world war he was successfully claimed as a 
prophet of the radical nationalist camp. " 454 
453 Cywin'ski (1972: 420), as cited by Pomian-Srzednicki (1982: 170). 
454 Kolakowski (1976: 247). 
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According to Kolakowski, Brzozowski "saw in Catholicism an 
important and fruitful source of cultural values" 455 and "the leitmotiv 
of Brzozowski's thought was the desire to safeguard the absolute 
value of humanity and endow it with absolute meaning. 11 456 
Brzozowski's socio-political values which stressed nationalism, the 
importance of cultural values emanating from Catholicism, and the 
centrality of labour and human dignity, have clear parallels with those 
of John Paul 11's. 457 
4.4.2 The Impact of Personal Thomism 
Although there was a renaissance of Thomism within papal 
Catholicism in the 1870s, 
458 it was not until the 1920s and 1930s that 
a less theological more political personal Thomism emerged. The 
latter was as a result of the thinking of lay Catholic philosophers such 
f 
as the French trio Emmanuel Mounier 9 Etienne Gilson and Jacques 
Maritain. The French trio's personal Thomism facilitated an active 
political role for Catholics, and gave them a philosophical weapon in 
455 Kolakowski (1976: 253). 
456 Kolakowski (1976: 265). 
457 As a first year undergraduate Polish philology student in 1938-1939, Wojtyla 
is known to have chosen as one of his options 'Novels, Memoirs, and Letters of 
Stanislaw Brzozowski. Szulc (1995: 88). 
458 In 1879. Leo XIII, although still insisting that Catholicism alone offered a 
solution to the problems of the modem world, recommended in his encyclical 
Aeterni Patris that Thomism be made the basis of instruction in all Roman 
Catholic schools. In so doing, Leo XIII helped establish neo-Thomism as the basis 
of theological orthodoxy for the modem papacy. In 1950, for example, Pius XII, 
in his encyclical Humani Generis, (Pius XII 1950) reaffin-ned Thomism as the 
surest guide to Roman Catholic doctrine. 
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their fight against liberal egoistic individualism. According to Hanley, 
personalism saw 
44society as composed not of individuals (as in the liberal 
paradigm), but persons. The person is an outgoing, 
fundamentally sociable being, whose destiny is realised not in 
competition (again as with liberalism) but more through insertion 
into different types of community, be it neighbourhood, church, 
family or nation. This type of thought is instinctively solidaristic 
(SiCy-) 459 
Personal Thomism held that active involvement in the community was 
part of the religious process. Active involvement in the community 
provided an opportunity to pursue 'la lumiere de la raison'. One's task 
was not to passively endure the travails of earthly life, but to treat the 
life on earth (the Herenow) rather than just the afterlife (Hereafter) as 
a source of enrichment that offered numerous possibilities for spiritual 
development. 460 
Before WWII, personal Thomism influenced the development of a re- 
invigorated Christian Democracy in Western Europe. Personal 
Thomism also influenced the thinking of Polish Catholic intelligentsia 
in pre-WWII independent Poland. Before WWII, strong ties were 
established between liberal-leaning Catholic Polish intelligentsia and 
Maritain who won a considerable number of Polish readers and a 
following of close friends. 461 
459 Hanley (1994: 4). 
460 
Hughes (1995: 165). 
461 Suchodolski (1986: 205). 
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In 1937, Jerzy Turowicz 462 met Mounier and other leading 
personalists. Mounier's Personalist Manifesto was translated into 
Polish during WWII and later, thanks to Turowicz, many of Mounier's 
other works were also published in Poland. In May 1946, Mounier 
gave a talk at Krakow University and his Polish experience led 
Mounier to reflect upon Poland as uniquely suited for a synthesis of 
Catholicism and socialism. 
463 
After WNYII, the calls of the personalists for the liberation of the 
individual from the twin perils of the totalitarian state 4nd of the 
anomie of liberal society were to influence the self-evidently 
successful development of Christian Democracy within Western 
Europe, including French, Italian, Belgium and Spanish 
manifestations. 
During the 1930s-1950s, personal Thomism also inquenced the 
thinking of two future popes, Paul VI and John Paul 11. Before WWII, 
the future Paul VL who from 1933 as Giovanni Montini worked 
within the Vatican Secretariat of State, had been greatly influenced by 
Maritain's ideas. Just before WWII, Maritain had written Humanisme 
Integral that called for a greater humanism within Catholicism and 
during WWII Maritain produced Christianisme et Democratie. 
462 Turowicz (1912-1999) was an editor of the influential dissident Catholic 
intelligentsia weekly Tygodnik Powszechny from mid- 1945 and its Chief Editor in 
1951-1953 and in 1956-1999. From 1960, Turowicz was also the President of the 
Znak Publishing House. Turowicz was a close personal friend of Wojtyla/John 
Paul 11. 
463 Walsh (1994: 20). 
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Maritain's New Christendom that proclaimed a third way between 
Western liberalism and Soviet communism attracted many amongst 
the Catholic intelligentsia who were uncomfortable with fascism as 
the third option. Maritain believed the individual should serve the 
community and the common good, which in turn served the person. 
Maritain believed that the good of the human being is realisable only 
through the community since man is a social being, and by virtue of 
his rationality, a political being. Maritain believed that man had a 
sacred and inviolable right to freedom of conscience. He believed that 
to exist is to act. He believed that people holding different beliefs 
should co-operate within 'salutary' political institutions, maintaining 
that co-operation was always possible when humanity pursued a 
common good. In post-WWII Rome, where Wojtyla was studying, a 
battle developed within Roman Catholicism between a conservative 
theological Thomism and a more liberal-leaning political Thomism. 
By now Montini was a very influential Vatican Under-Secretary of 
State (1944-1952), and Maritain was the French Ambassador to the 
Vatican (1945-1948). In the end, the liberal-leaning Thomism 
triumphed at Vatican Council 11, where Paul VI presided over much of 
Council's work and in his remaining years embarked upon the 
implementation of the new Vatican 11 thinking. 
A large part of Mazowiecki's Crossroads and Values and Zablocki's 
At the Polish Intersection focus on the philosophic and social thinking 
of Maritain and Mounier. Mounier's distinction between spiritual 
order Oe christianisme) and temporal order (la chretientý) helped 
liberal-leaning Catholics to separate two spheres of activities: the 
religious and the secular. From Mounier's personalism, asserts 
Bromke, these Polish Catholic intellectuals developed a coherent 
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program of their own. 464 In practice, Personal Thomism, as was the 
case with Christian Democracy, proved to be closer to the values of 
modem liberal democracy than its theory professed. 
4.4.3 The Impact of 1960s' Changes in Vatican Socio-political 
Thinking 
As mentioned, the aften-nath of the fundamental 1960s' changes in the 
Roman Catholic Church, as expressed by John XXIII, Vatican 11, and 
Paul VI, had an important influence upon the process of dialogue and 
upon the ensuing greater solidarity. The 1960s' changes within papal 
political Catholicism reflected a new 'spirit of dialogue' to find 
solutions to world problems, a spirit that extended to dialogue with 
Jews and with secular left non-believers. The changes reflected 
attitudinal shifts that went beyond mere tolerance of non-Catholic 
belief systems such as Judaism and communism that were hitherto 
considered anathema. Moreover, the changes reflected a genuine 
concern not only for the Hereafter but also for the Herenow: a concern 
that expressed itself in political Catholicism increasingly championing 
the modem liberal values of human rights and of socio-economic 
justice. In Poland, the dissident liberal-leaning Catholic intelligentsia 
and some within the Polish Catholic Church hierarchy welcomed the 
new policy, hoping it might contribute to the improvement of relations 
between the Church and the Polish communist regime. 465 One such 
464 Bromke (1975: 69). 
465 Bromke (1975: 70). 
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member of the Church hierarchy was Wojtyla, a protege of Paul VI 
and an active contributor to the Vatican 11 liberalisation process. 
John XXIII's 1963 Pacem in Terris (On Establishing Universal Peace 
In Truth, Justice, Charity And Liberty) allowed the ideological 
stalemate between Christianity and Marxism to be broken. It did so by 
making: 
64a clear distinction between false philosophical teachings 
regarding the nature, origin, and destiny of the universe and of 
man, and movements which have a direct bearing either on 
economic and social questions, or cultural matters or on the 
organization of the state, even if these movements owe their 
origin and inspiration to these false tenets. " 466 
Pacem in Terris (John XXIII 1963) affirmed the inviolability of 
human rights and advocated world peace based on mutual trust. 
According to Kwitny, John XXIII sent CPSU General Secretary 
Nikita Khrushchev an advance copy of the encyclical, 467 which was 
4very positively received' by the regimes of the Soviet bloc, 468 with 
the Soviets even lifting a ban on papal publications to encourage 
distribution of the 'Peace Encyclical. 9 
469 
466 John XXIII (1963: para. 159). 
467 Kwitny (1998: 183). In March 1963, a month before the encyclical's 
publication, John XXIII received Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexis Adzhubei. The 
meeting was the first public contact between a pope and a senior Soviet official. 
Szulc (1995: 229). 
468 Szajkowski (1983: 23). 
469 Kwitny (1998: 170). 
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John XXIII died in June 1963, but his overtures to communism were 
continued by his successor Paul VI, who pursued a vigorous Ostpolitik 
that emphasised a step-by-step approach and moderation at the level 
of public rhetoric. 470 Paul VI was prepared to mute overt criticisms of 
the human rights' performances of East European regimes for the sake 
of maintaining dialogue. 471 
Paul VI's strategy was to obtain sufficient breathing space for the 
Churches in communist Europe, 'to save what can be saved' (salvare 
il salvabile), to achieve a modus non moriendi that might, over time, 
evolve into a genuine modus vivendi. 472 Although the papal Ostpolitik 
was primarily addressed to the communist leaders, any outcomes were 
470 By the end of his Pontificate, Paul VI had received in private audience the 
following East European Communist Party leaders: Yugoslav Josip Tito, 
Romanian Nicolae Ceauýescu, Bulgarian Todor Zhivkov, Hungarian Janos Kadar 
and Polish Edward Gierek. Paul VI also saw a number of Warsaw Pact Prime 
Ministers and Foreign Ministers, including the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko. 
471 On occasion Paul VI clashed with the more traditional and militant anti- 
communist East European Church leaders such as Primate Wyszyfiski and 
Hungarian Primate JOzef Mindszenty. At times, for example, the Pope by-passed 
Wyszyfiski in dealing directly with the Polish communist regime. Kwitny (1998: 
2 11 & 249). When the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was crushed by Soviet troops, 
Mindszenty was granted asylum in the United States Legation building in 
Budapest where he remained until 1971, rejecting Vatican requests to leave 
Hungary. Then, bowing to entreaties from President Richard Nixon, Mindszenty 
moved to Rome., where he continued to criticise Vatican policy towards Hungary. 
Finally, in 1974, Paul VI forced Mindszenty to resign the Hungarian primacy. 
Kwitny (1998: 24 1). 
472 Weigel (1992: 76). 
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bound to affect all Poles, not least the dissident intelligentsia. 
According to Bromke, the Polish liberal-leaning Catholic intelligentsia 
especially welcomed Paul VI's 1967 Populorum progressio. 4 73 In the 
spirit of Mounier, Populorum progressio recognised the Catholics' 
moral commitment to socio-economic progress and presented the 
necessary conditions for growth in the solidarity of peoples. Paul VI 
argued that only with an accompanying reflection on liberation from 
injustice and genuine human values can there be true development 
towards a more human condition. 
The idea of a Christian-Marxist dialogue based on some shared values 
was not new to the 1960s. In 1947, the French Jesuit priest and 
philosopher and theologian, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, writing about 
the Christian and the Marxist, had rhetorically asked: 
473 The influence of (Paul VI 1967) was long lasting. John Paul 11's encyclical 
Sollicitudo rei socialis (On the Social Concerns of the Church) (John Paul 11 
1987) was written to celebrate the 20th anniversary of its publication. In (John 
Paul 11 1987), the Pope criticises economic and political ideologies of both the 
West and East and expands upon Populorum progressio's concepts of 
development. In a letter that John Paul 11 received from Gorbachev in the last 
week of August 1989, the Soviet Communist Party's General Secretary praised 
the Pope's writings and stressed that he had been particularly impressed with 
Sollicitudo rei socialis. 
241 
"is it not incontestable ... that each of these, to the extent that 
he 
believes (and sees the other believe) in the future of the world, 
feels a basic human sympathy for the other ... arising out of the 
obscure prediction that both are going the same way, and that 
despite all ideological differences they will eventually ... come 
together on the same SUMMit?, ý 474 
However the intense post-WWII Cold War climate of the times 
contributed to preventing Teilhard de Chardin's prediction of a 
Christian-Marxist dialogue from being pursued until the 1960s. Then 
during the 1960s, with its new political climate partly reflected and 
engendered by the changes in Vatican- inspired political Catholicism, 
the Christian-Marxist dialogue commenced. By the mid-1960s, as a 
result of this dialogue, prominent members of the secular left were 
changing their attitudes to Christianity. In 1965, for example, the 
prominent French Marxist Roger Garaudy 475 responded 'in a fraternal 
manner' to John XXIII's Pacem in Terris arguments that were 
addressed not just to Catholics but 'to all men of good will' by writing 
From Anathema to Dialogue. 476 In it, Garaudy wrote of "the absolute 
necessity for dialogue and co-operation between Christians and 
Communists. " 477 Furthermore, during the 1970s, the idea of a 
Compromesso, Storico (Historic Compromise) which envisaged 
474 Teilhard de Chardin's address to the World Congress of Faiths (French 
section), 8 March, 1947. Teilhard (1964: 191-192). 
475 Garaudy had been a member of the Central Committee of the French 
Communist Party (PCF). In 1970, he was expelled from the PCF for criticising 
developments in the Soviet Union. 
476 From Anathema to Dialogue, Garaudy (1967). was an English translation of 
the original French edition De IAnatheme au Dialogue, first published in Paris in 
1965 by Librairie Plon. 
477 Garaudy (1967: 25). 
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collaboration between the Italian Communists and the Catholic 
Church was initiated by Enrico Berlinguer (1922-1984), General 
Secretary (1972-1984) of the Italian Communist Party (pCp . 
478 
Meanwhile in mid-1960s' Poland, Kolakowski, a militant atheist and 
Marxist in his youth, was also adopting a more open approach to 
Christianity and recognising its umbilical ties with Polish culture. A 
young Kolakowski had written in pre- 1960s' times that the function of 
religion was "'to promise the exploited the rights which are to be 
given in the other world, while asking them to renounce their worldly 
rights. ,, 
479 In 1965, Kolakowski now asserted: 
444any attempt to 'invalidate Jesus', to eliminate him from our 
culture on the basis that we don't believe in the God in which he 
believed, is ridiculous and Eruitless. Such an attempt is the deed 
only of unenlightened people who imagine that a crudely 
formulated atheism can suffice as the view of the world and can 
also justify someone's curtailing the cultural tradition according 
to his own doctrinaire plan and by that taking away fTom it the 
most vital saps. ýiq 480 
4.4.4 The Impact of a New Evolutionism 
As mentioned earlier, for many left-leaning intellectuals critical of the 
Polish regime - particularly, but not exclusively, those of the secular 
478 In 1986, the Polish regime took up the Historic Compromise motif in 
discussions with the Polish Church hierarchy. In a meeting in May 1986, General 
Kiszczak the Interior Minister, asserted that an Historic Compromise based on 
the Italian model, must take place in Poland, although perhaps not immediately. 
Raina (I 995b: 123). 
479 As cited by Labedz (1988: 15 1). 
480 Argumenty, December 1965, which appeared in English translation in Tri- 
Quarterly, No. 1, Spring 1967. As cited by Labedz (1988: 152). 
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left - the 1968 anti-Semitic and anti - intelligentsia attacks upon critics 
of the Polish regime and the crushing of Czechoslovakia's attempts at 
4socialism with a human face'. forced such Polish intellectuals to the 
reluctant conclusion that East European communisms, including 
Polish communism, were not reformable. A fundamentally different 
approach to that of reforming communism, as they gradually began to 
believe, was required: an approach that focused upon civil society 
rather than upon the regime's authoritarian state. Michnik's 1976 
essay, New Evolutionism 481 was to be an important influence upon 
opposition thinking and action in the remaining years of Polish 
communism. New Evolutionism advocated an opposition strategy of 
by-passing the state and rebuilding an autonomous civil society 
outside of Party-state control. Michnik, along with others, proposed a 
gradualist approach to loosening the communist totalitarian 
hegemony: a revolution by osmosis, whereby social self-defence 
groupings would defend their basic interests and gradually reclaim 
various spheres of civil life appropriated by the communist state. New 
Evolutionism evoked the organic work myth in looking for 
"progressive and partial changes rather than for the violent overthrow 
of the existing system. " 482 The liberal-leaning democratic opposition 
approach proclaimed the as if principle: try to live as if you lived in a 
free country, and emphasised 'change from below'. Michnik evoked 
the symbolism of Brzozowski in stressing the important role of the 
481 Michnik (1976). 
482 
Michnik (1976: 273). 
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Church (see later) and of the workers who were "the sine qua non of 
the evolution of national life towards democratization. " 483 
4.4.5 A Process Based upon Attitudinal Shifts 
The consequences of the theoretical case for dialogue and for greater 
solidarity resulted in a willingness to co-operate and a mutual 
recognition by both dissident Catholics and secular left intelligentsia 
that the perceptions, often stereotypical, that each hitherto had held 
about the other, had either been inappropriate or were now outdated. 
Authentic and enduring attitudinal shifts were occurring on both sides 
that went beyond mere expediency of fighting a common enemy. In 
(Cywin'ski 1972), Cywin'ski, concerned to draw lessons for the present 
from the heritage of the past, recognised the common modem liberal 
values held by both dissident/unconquered Catholics and the secular 
left. His conclusions, given their identification of common modem 
liberal values and the subsequent political repercussions of this 
identification, warrant quoting at length: 
"'The up-to-date element in this heritage is the ideals with which 
the radical unconquered identified themselves, which, with an 
intuition of ethics, had linked the question of real social progress 
with a set of values, such as the necessity of social commitment, 
the respect of human beings and their opinions, a democracy 
which is never static but is a process of struggle between 
ideological inertia and social conscience; the ability to analyse 
onels own opinions in a creative manner and honestly to correct 
them; and finally, a proud non-conformism, an indispensable 
precondition for developing a sense of moral responsibility for 
society's future. The most eager hope of any Catholic thinking 
483 Michnik (1976: 274). 
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on these problems would be that in the propagation and defence 
of these values, all their followers could find in the Polish 
Church an ally and a source of Christian inspiration. ( ... 
) As we 
consider our contemporary Christian attitudes regarding our 
mission, and as we think about our ethic of social action, we 
must find space for an understanding for this ideological and 
moral tradition, the recognition of these real ethical values, and a 
respect for the memory of those who have paid witness to it. This 
will enable us to take a fundamental step in the honest dialogue 
between believers and non-believers in Poland. This step will 
enable us to bridge the divide, which we have inherited from the 
last century, and which is so outdated and mistaken today -a 
divide which has separated from the Church an important and 
precious section of the unconquered Polish intelligentsia. ýiq 484 
The secular left dissidents also recognised the liberalisation process 
within political Catholicism. In his childhood, Michnik had hated 
Catholic religious education, but by the 1970s he saw the Church in a 
different light, given that it too was fighting for human rights and 
against totalitarianism. Michnik's New Evolutionism stressed the 
important role of the Roman Catholic Church. The Church was "an 
essential element in the situation, " 485 with the hierarchy, Michnik 
recognised, moving from a condemnatory attitude to all post-1945 
change to an increasingly anti -totalitarian, pro human rights stance. 
"The jeremiads against the impieties have disappeared, giving way to 
affirmations of human rights. " 486 In The Church - The Left - Dialogue 
Michnik argued that if there was any chance of institutional support, it 
was the Church that was to be relied on. Like Cywin'ski, Michnik 
advocated greater solidarity between liberal Catholics and the secular 
484 As cited by Potel (1982: 120). 
485 
Michnik (1976: '22 74). 
486 Michnik (1976: 275). 
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leftl based, Michnik argued, on the realisation that freedom for the 
Church was the ultimate measure of freedom in society. Michnik 
asserted: 
"'we have the political responsibility of defending the freedoms 
of the Church and the human rights of Christians. ... Human 
rights are for everyone. "' 
487 
In tracing his intellectual journey from close association with 
Marxism to Christian sympathies, Michnik now accepted that what he 
took as secular ideas of human dignity, personal freedom, and respect 
for individuals, had their roots in Christianity. 488 
"'The children of the Church, who had grown up and departed 
from her, in the hour of danger returned to their mother. And 
although in the course of their long alienation they have changed 
a great deal, though they look different and speak a different 
language, at the decisive moment mother and children 
recognized each other. Reason, law, civilisation, humanism - 
whatever they are called - have sought and found at their source a 
new meaning and new strength. This source is Jesus Christ. 999 489 
In an 1977 interview with Kisielewski, Michnik claimed that the 
ultimate aim of his work The Church -The Left - Dialogue was to 
create a bridge between two major democratic forces in Poland: the 
Catholic Church and the secular opposition. Such an aim, Michnik 
asserted, was not "merely an attempt to use the Church for political 
ends. " His publication, argues Michnik, was intended to demonstrate 
487 
Michnik (1977: 83) as cited by Connor (1982: 403-404). 
488 Szajkowski (1983: 46). 
489 
Michnik (1977) as cited by Szajkowski (1983: 47). 
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to critical members of the secular opposition that the Church is not an 
obscurantist institution, and to demonstrate to Catholics that non- 
believers played a positive role in the defence of freedom and national 
culture throughout Polish history. In another interview, in 1987, 
Michnik was to say of the Catholic Church: 
"It is the guardian of Polish national identity. During the most 
difficult years of totalitarian oppression, it defended human 
dignity and cultural identity, including freedom of worship. In 
the Stalin era, the Church was the only institution from which 
people did not hear lies. This is one reason why Poles remain 
faithful to it. Another reason is that the present totalitarian 
system insists that every person is state property. The Church's 
contrary view is that the human being is a child of God, to whom 
God has granted natural liberty. This God-given dignity is so 
great that the individual can admire only God, and not the state. 
It follows from this that in Poland and other communist countries 
religion is the natural antidote to the totalitarian claims of the 
state, especially given that the Church relies not upon power, but 
upon dialogue. " 490 
Another key member of the secular left, Kuron', 49 ' believed that the 
C athol ic- secular left dialogue helped not only the left to look again at 
the problems of the Church and its beliefs, but also the Church to 
understand its relationship with the emerging liberal democratic left 
opposition. 492 Garton Ash claims that initially for Kuron", the desire 
for greater solidarity between Catholics and the secular left was more 
490 Michnik (1988: 28). The interview was conducted with Erica Blair in 
Gdafisk, October 1987. 
491 Kuron' was expelled from the Party in 1953, although rejoined for a brief spell 
subsequently. Kurofi was dismissed from his post at Warsaw University in March 
1968. He was imprisoned several times for his opposition to the regime. 
492 
Kurofi (1996: 164). 
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a calculation of political tactics. 493 Whether Garton Ash's claim is 
valid or not, by 1978, in Ideological Principles, Kuron' wrote: 
"'I place among the supreme values the common good, the 
sanctity of the individual and human creativity. During the past 
decade, I and many of my friends ... discovered for ourselves the Gospel as a code of ethics of universal significance. -)55 
494 
4.5 Conclusions: Dialogue And Its Practical Outcomes Prepared 
The Ground For The Opposition 
This chapter has indirectly argued that the 1970-1976 dialogue 
between dissident Catholic and secular left intelligentsia and their 
subsequent 1976-1979 practical co-operation contributed to the 
fostering of a liberal political culture of 1980-1989 opposition. Other 
chapters argue that pre-1945 myths also contributed to the latter 
process. The two positions are not, however, contradictory. The role 
of myths has barely figured in this chapter, which has focused upon 
the role of the intelligentsia within the Polish opposition. The 
significance of this chapter to the overall concerns of the thesis is that 
it has shed light on the 'how and why' of not just the fostering but 
also the emergence of a liberal political culture of opposition. Chapter 
6 that will show how and why pre-1945 myths acted as a vehicle for 
493 Garton Ash (1991 a: 23). 
494 Kurofi, J. Mysli o programie dzialania, zasady ideowe, uwagi o strukturze 
ruchu demokratycznego. Warsaw: NOWA, 1978 as cited by Ciolkosz (1979: 62). 
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this liberal political culture by showing that these myths were to 
influence the non-intelligentsia component of the Polish opposition, 
that is to say, upon the ordinary workers that joined Solidarity and 
constituted the backbone of not only the opposition but also of 
Catholicism. These workers were to find organised voice in the 
Solidarity movement of the 1980s. This movement was to be given 
much direction and advice by a united dissident Catholic and secular 
left intelligentsia that participated in the process of dialogue explored 
in this chapter. 
This present chapter argues that the dissident Catholic - secular left 
intelligentsia pre-1989 solidarity was based on attitudinal shifts 
resulting from a process of dialogue. The process of 1970-1976 
dialogue and the ensuing 1976-1979 practical solidarity between the 
two intelligentsia groupings was not merely based on the expediency 
of defeating a common enemy. Rather, the success of the dialogue and 
of the ensuing solidarity was in large part a result of learning lessons 
from the past, as well as a result of the impact of personal Thomism, 
of changes in Vatican thinking, and of new evolutionism. These 
factors all helped in the identification of common liberal values, and 
these values, together with the trust and friendships that gradually 
evolved during the 1970s, meant that the emergence of dissident 
Catholic-secular left solidarity was based upon authentic and enduring 
attitudinal shifts that occurred on both sides. During the process of 
dialogue the dissident secular left moved beyond dogmatic anti- 
clerical and class politics. The dissident Catholic intelligentsia, in 
embracing personal Thomism and the new Vatican 11 thinking, was 
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also able to discard dogmatic doctrinal baggage. In consequence, a 
liberal political culture was emerging. 
Chapter 5 now explores how John Paul 11 was to build upon the 
liberalisation and solidarity-formation processes initiated by the 
dissident Catholic and secular left intelligentsia. Chapter 5 also 
examines how the new Polish Pope was to extend these two processes 
to influence significant numbers of urban and rural workers that 
constituted the backbone of Polish Catholicism. As Chapter 5 will 
show, John Paul 11 in large measure achieved his goal of fostering a 
liberal political culture of opposition by his deployment of the myths 
and accompanying symbols and rituals of pre-1945 Polish nationalism 
and political Catholicism. 
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CHAPTER 5: JOHN PAUL II'S DEPLOYMENT OF PRIE-1945 
NATIONAL AND CATHOLIC MYTHS TO FOSTER A 
LIBERAL POLITICAL CULTURE OF OPPOSITION 
5.1 Introduction: John Paul 11, Culture And The Nation 
Appointed a Cardinal in 1967, Wojtyla/ John Paul 11 was a pivotal 
495 
player within the opposition, a judgement that others also hold . In a 
poll published in April 2000,496 Poles were asked which figures had 
the greatest influence upon Poland's fate during the 20th century. They 
could nominate three people. The highest ranking was John Paul 11 
(g 1%). 497 As the only Cardinal apart from Wyszyn'ski, Wojtyla was 
already a political force in the 1960s before becoming Pope in 1978, 
when his authority both formally and in practice, became 
significantly greater than that of another key political player Primate 
Wyszyn'ski. 498 Critically Wojtyla/John Paul 11 also had key ties with 
495 Sobocin'ski (1996). 
496 Wprost. 16 April, 2000, p. 27. 
497 Tying for joint-second rank were Pilsudski and Walqsa (58%). Dmowski only 
received 2% of the votes. 
498 Primate Glemp succeeded Wyszyn'ski in 1981. Although Glemp met often and 
sometimes secretly with Jaruzelski (Sobocin'ski 1996), the Primate was not 
considered a key player in tenns of political influence and had less authority than 
his predecessor. (Wal 1998). Plazek described Glemp as a key player who did not 
play well. (Plazek 1998). Hours before the declaration of Martial Law, on the 12 
December 1981, Glemp established the Primate's Social Council, comprising 28 
lay Catholics, which was to serve as the Primate's 'think tank'. Although several 
of the Council's members were to play a key part in the search for compromise 
between the Party and the opposition in the second half of the 1980s, according to 
Jonathan Luxmoore and J6zefa Hennelowa, the Primate's Social Council as such 
did not really play an important political role. (Luxmoore 1996) and (Hennelowa 
1998). 
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the Znak intellectuals, who in turn, as Chapter 4 showed, increasingly 
co-operated with the dissident secular left. Plazek (1998), who had 
met Wojtyla many times, said that during the 1980s, when senior 
church figures differed with Glemp's political strategy towards the 
regime, they went straight to the Vatican and that John Paul 11 exerted 
'direct rule' with regard to Polish political Catholic policy. 499 
However John Paul 11 was not only a pivotal player in terms of being 
able to deploy the combined institutional forces of the centre and the 
periphery. The Pope was also a key player in terms of his ideological 
influence, for John Paul 11 was also the main propagator of pre-1945 
myths that fostered a liberal political culture of opposition. 
The key aim of the chapter is to demonstrate how and why John Paul 
11 deployed myths of pre-1945 Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism in order to foster a liberal political culture of opposition 
within Poland. During the 1990s, a number of biographies on John 
Paul 11 appeared, for example (Szulc 1995), (Bernstein 1996) and 
499 Although the Pope's meetings with the Polish bishops were nearly always 
private ones and his meetings would relate to other matters than opposition to 
communism many of the biographies of John Paul 11, for example (Szulc 1995: 
385), support Plazek's appraisal of John Paul 11 taking a 'direct rule' approach. 
Throughout the 1978-1989 period, as the semi-official Vatican weekly 
L'Osservatore Romano records, John Paul 11 would receive in audience key 
members of the Polish Episcopate leadership, at a slightly less than once a month 
rate. In addition, he would see other Polish bishops at a similar rate. At times, for 
example when visiting Poland in the June of 1979,1983 and 1987, or when the 
Polish bishops made their ad limina trips to Rome, as they did in the winter of 
1982 and 1987, the Pope would receive them even more frequently. During the 
visits, the Pope tried to see the visiting prelates at the beginning and end of their 
time in Rome, individually or in larger groups. During the Polish ad limina trips 
of 1978-1989, the Pope met the majority of the Polish Episcopate on their two 
trips, in a total of at least 16 separate audiences. Ad limina or 'on the threshold' 
visits ýM a tequirement laid down by the Roman Catholic's Church Code of 
253 
(Kwitny 1998). Their timing can be largely explained by the fall of 
East European communism and John Paul 11's perceived contribution 
to the fall. Most of these biographies devote several chapters to the 
pre-1978 influences that shaped the Pope, and subsequent chapters of 
these biographies portray the Pope as a key political player not only in 
Poland but throughout the Catholic world. (Bernstein 1996) for 
example portrays the Pope as a key Cold War warrior in both Central 
East Europe and Latin America by highlighting the ties between John 
Paul 11' Vatican and President Ronald Reagan's intelligence 
community. The concerns of this thesis and chapter are not directly 
related to John Paul 11 as a world statesman nor to his contribution to 
the demise of communism, but, clearly, in arguing that John Paul 11 
was an important influence upon the Polish opposition, the thesis 
suggests the possibility of a direct relation between the Pope's role 
and the demise of Polish communism. However, Chapter 7 will argue 
that more research is needed to establish any causal relationship 
between John Paul 11's role and the downfall of Polish communism, 
let alone other East European communisms. Many of the works on 
John Paul 11 explore the political significance of the Pope's 1979 
pilgrimage to Poland - for example (Szulc 1995: 303-3 10) and Kubik 
(1994: Chapter 7). The present chapter claims to systematically 
analyse John Paul 11's deployment of national and Catholic myths, 
symbols and rituals during the 1978-1989 period in order to foster a 
liberal political culture of opposition within Poland. 
Canon Law and were quinquennial trips by Church figures (usually. but not 
exclusively bishops) from throughout the Catholic world. to the Vatican. 
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For John Paul 11, the pre- 1945 myths 500 not only served to adapt 
political culture, but were an important component of Polish culture 
without which Poland's survival was threatened. In his 1987 
pilgrimage, the Pope addressed representatives of the Polish world of 
culture assembled at the Warsaw Church of the Holy Cross. The very 
setting, as with many of the Pope's settings for public addresses, was 
full of symbolism. The Holy Cross is the Catholic symbol of 
martyrdom and salvation. Buried at the Church is the heart of Polish 
patriotic composer Frederic Chopin, whose music, banned by the 
Nazis during their WWII Polish occupation, was played 
conspiratorially underground . 
50 1 Here, in October 1979, KOR and 
ROP00 members had staged a protest fast in solidarity with 
persecuted Czechoslovakian Charter 77 members. From here in 
September 1980, the first Holy Mass was broadcast by radio to the 
Polish nation as a direct result of the Gdansk Agreement between 
Solidarity and the regime. In his 1987 address, the Pope made clear 
the connection between culture and the nation, and, as he so often did, 
used the symbolism of previous foreign domination to allude to 
current domination. 
"'The nation in fact persists in its spiritual identity through its 
culture. ... '(The) nation exists 
'through' culture and for'culture 
... I am the son of a nation ... condemned to 
death more than once. 
Yet she has survived and has remained herself She has kept her 
identity and, not withstanding the divisions and foreign 
occupations, she has kept her national sovereignty, not relying on 
the sources of physical might, but relying only on her culture. ... 
i0o The phrase 'pre- 1945 myths' will be used as shorthand for 'the myths of pre- 
1945 Polish nationalism and political Catholicism. ' 
501 Suchodolski (1986: 216). 
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There is a fundamental sovereignty of society which shows faith 
in the culture of the nation. ' 9ýý 
502 
Before embarking upon a more detailed analysis of the pre- 1945 
myths and how the Pope deployed them to liberalise the political 
culture of opposition in his 1978-1989 war of political legitimacy with 
the Polish regime, the chapter makes some general observations of the 
political implications of his use of the ritual of pilgrimage and of his 
political deployment of venerated sacred figures. 
5.2 Tools For The Task: Myths, Symbols And Rituals 
John Paul 11's main task in his war of political legitimacy was to 
sustain the opposition by giving them hope, removing their fear, and 
fostering their nascent liberal political culture so that it could 
successfully challenge the regime's political culture. To a large extent, 
John Paul 11 undertook this task by deploying the tools of myths, 
symbols and rituals of pre-1945 Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism. Within this deployment, the Pope's use of the ritual of 
pilgrimage and of venerated sacred 'saints' played particularly 
significant interrelated and reinforcing roles. 
John Paul 11 was to exploit the political potency of pre- 1945 myths by 
altering the meanings of illiberal myths and changing and extending 
the liberal meanings associated with other myths. He exploited the 
political potential of these myths above all during his June 1979,1983 
and 1987 pilgrimages to Poland, when he delivered homilies within 
502 As cited by OR, 3 August, 1987, p. 9. Most of this passage comprises the Pope 
citing from a speech he made to UNESCO in Paris in June 1980. 
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Holy Masses to the millions of Poles that gathered at Jasna Gora and 
at numerous other locations throughout the country. There were three 
other key, although less significant, opportunities for such 
exploitation. 
His first such other opportunity was his October 1978 papal 
inauguration, 503 which was watched in Rome by some 200,000 
faithful, including some four thousand Polish pilgrims. 
504 In Poland, 
almost the entire nation watched it, 
505 
the first Holy Mass ever on 
Polish television, 
506 
as streets stood deserted and public activities 
ceased . 
50' Another opportunity was afforded by his regular weekly 
Prayers to Our Lady of Jasna Gora, which the Pope initiated 
following the December 1981 introduction of Martial Law. These 
Prayers were published and broadcast by organs of the extensive 
Vatican media, 
508 
which were often used to spread his liberal 
503 Described by Bernstein as "a solemn ritual by which the Roman Church raises 
a man to its post of supreme dignity, transforming him into a splendid monarch 
like the emperors of Byzantium. " Bernstein (1996: 180). 
504 Bemstein (1996: 180). 
505 Szulc (1995: 288). Countless millions in the rest of the world also watched his 
inauguration via satellite television. 
506 The Polish authorities had at first said that insufficient funds prevented the 
showing of the inauguration on television, but their pretext collapsed when the 
Italian state television network offered to provide free transmission to Poland. 
Kwitny (1998: 16-17). 
507 Kwitny (1998: 19). 
508 The Vatican media included Vatican Radio, the Vatican Television Centre, the 
Vatican Polyglot Press, the Press Office, and the weekly newspaper, 
L'Osservatore Romano. Papal ceremonies were filmed and broadcast world-wide 
Nia satellite link-ups. In times of crisis under communism, Poles avidly listened to 
Vatican Radio. Despite the best attempts of the Polish authorities at jamming. 
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preachings to his fellow Poles. Finally, a key opportunity was afforded 
when the many thousands of Poles were reluctantly allowed by the 
Polish regime to make pilgrimages to Rome and hear his Vatican 
homilies preached weekly at his General Audience and Angelus 
509 Prayers. 
5.2.1 The Political Implications of the Ritual of Pilgrimage 
The very day that the Pope's election was announced in October 1978, 
the Party leadership showed its concern about the political potential of 
pilgrimages for the opposition during a hastily convened Politburo 
meeting to discuss the political implications for the regime of John 
Paul 11's election. One minister worriedly asked "'What if the new 
Pope decides to come to Poland? "', and the Interior Minister asserted 
that that the govermnent had to focus immediately on the risk of a 
wave of Polish pilgrimages to Rome. "'Those trips alone might pose a 
danger to the stability of Poland, "' he warned .5 
'0 The Party leadership 
had good cause for concern. With the onset of the John Paul 11 papacy, 
the nature of papal pilgrimages was dramatically changed insofar as 
Vatican Radio together with Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, BBC World 
Service, and Solidarity's own underground radio, all broadcast in Polish during 
the 1982-1988 period. There was a Polish edition of L'Osservatore Romano from 
April 1980, with an initial run of 50,000 mailed regularly to Poland. 
509 The Polish custom of making pilgrimages is quite strong. A significant 
proportion of the Polish nation takes part in pilgrimages. At the end of the second 
millennium, it has been estimated that a fifth of all European pilgrims are Poles, 
with about 15% of the total population, some 6-7 million Poles, taking part in a 
pilgrimage either in Poland or abroad, (usually Rome), each year. There are some 
500 places of pilgrimage within Poland, most dating from the I 9th century, of 
which about 85% are associated with the cult of Mary. Luczak (2000: 26). 
SIO 
As cited by Bemstein (1996: 174). 
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pilgrims now not only came to Rome, but the Pope also came to the 
faithful. The pilgrim pope, as he often called himself, understood that 
modem technology made it possible for him to reach in person huge 
numbers during his own pilgrimages outside of Rome, and John Paul 
11 was to be an unsurpassed master of the political exploitation of the 
pilgrimage ritual, not least within his homeland. Within Poland, John 
Paul 11 utilised the ritual of pilgrimage for political purposes in the 
manner that had been well established by the Polish Catholic Church 
in the 19th century and recently rejuvenated by Primate Wyszyn'ski's 
Novena, that is to say, with the main focus of pilgrimage being Jasna 
Gora, Czqstochowa, and with the Madonna icon constituting the key 
symbol of an independent Poland. Importantly, John Paul 11 utilised 
the ritual of pilgrimage not only to preach a liberal nationalism but 
also, influenced by a more liberal papal political Catholicism, to 
preach other values associated with liberal democracy. His most 
powerful means of spreading his liberal message was via the use of 
pre-1945 myths and the direct communication with millions of fellow 
Poles afforded by his three pilgrimages to communist Poland. About a 
third of the nation came out to see and hear him on each of the three 
pilgrimages. Others watched on television . 
51 ' These three Polish 
ý11 Poland's total population c. 1979-1987 was about 35-38 million. (GUS 1994: 
44). The total numbers who came out to see and hear him, for the 1979 
pilgrimage have been variously estimated as 'over 10 million', (Szulc 1995: 303) 
to 13 million (Szajkowski 1983: 67) and (Weigel 1992: 133) to as many as 20 
million, (Daily, Mail, 11 June, 1979, p. 1). Although the 1983 crowd estimates 
were lower, they were still impressive. Counting only those that attended the 
major events, usually Holy Mass, and those who lined the Pope's routes (that is 
to say excluding the myriad of smaller events). even the Party's Central 
Committee gave an overall figure of 7.55 million (Aneks 1993: 293). whilst the 
International Herald Tribune gave a total of 10 million. (International Herald 
Tribune, 24 June, 1983, P. 2). The 1987 pilgrimage also confirmed John Paul 11's 
phenomenal drawing power amongst his fellow Poles. 
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pilgrimages and particularly the first, were to have a profound effect 
on the spiritual, psychological and political scene. 
During his 1979 pilgrimage, the Pope empowered the Polish nation, 
by giving them a strong sense of national solidarity. Afterwards, Poles 
tended to see themselves not as a communist nation, but just as a 
nation in a communist state. Poles increasingly realised that their 
national identity could be defined in terms that excluded the 
communist state. The Polish Church, for example, organised an army 
of lay Catholics to marshal the public gatherings; literally, and in 
people's minds, the regime's police had been replaced. The dissident 
leftist Polish novelist Andrzej Szczypiorski contemporarily observed: 
"it suddenly became obvious that 'the emperor had no clothes. ' ... 
During ... the Pope's visit all 
functions of the state were subordinate 
to the desires of society. This is a precedent which may be decisive for 
the nation. " 512 
Other sections of the opposition, including KOR, publicly identified 
with the liberal values fostered by the Pope during his 1979 
pilgrimage. After the pilgrimage KOR proclaimed unequivocal praise 
for the Pope: 
"'The millions of Poles, whatever their religious views, listened 
to his words with understanding, enthusiasm and emotion. The 
unending applause has shown how much his words were heeded, 
how exactly his message about the supreme importance of the 
individual fitted the deep spiritual need of the people who reject 
the denial of human and national rights. The Pope's message 
512 Szczypiorski (1979: 29 & 32). 
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created for many of us ... an obligation to undertake or else to intensify the campaign in defence of freedom. 991 
513 
"'Very seldom can one man speak in the name of the whole 
nation, expressing the thoughts and desires of all. ... Each of us 
was given a chance. And it depends on us whether we can create 
a community of conscious people, honourable and brave, 
believers and non-believers, people living in truth. "' 514 
John Paul 11's 1979 pilgrimage, in empowering civil society at the 
expense of the state and in stressing the need to live an ethical life 
with meaning and in truth, gave Poles not only a sufficient sense of 
national solidarity but also sufficient fearless hope that a year later 
Solidarity was to live in truth and undertake the seemingly hopeless 
task of challenging the all-powerful communist state. 
John Paul 11's focus upon hope, ethics, the individual, and the nation 
as opposed to the state, had been echoed by other East European 
dissidents. The Polish dissident secular leftist Kolakowski (1971) had 
concluded that it was impossible to change the state, all one could do 
is change oneself, and that the basis of hope in a hopeless situation 
was living an ethical life. The Czech dissident Vaclav Havel (1989) 
believed that hope was not procrastination about the future, but the 
conviction that something had meaning which permitted the 
undertaking of the difficult enterprise of living in truth. 
The effect upon the dissident secular left of John Paul 11's three 
pilgrimages, particularly of the first, supports Kertzer's contention that 
513 As cited by Ciolkosz (1979: 62). 
514 
Robotnik, 20 June, 1979 as cited by Kubik (1994: 274 & 276). 
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"the power of the ritual transcends its ideological context. " 515 One 
Pole, writing shortly after the Pope's 1979 pilgrimage, commented: 
"a believer will observe certain customs because for him they 
have a religious and national significance, whereas for a non- 
believer these same customs have only a national significance. 
But it is impossible to claim that the commitment to the nation of 
one or the other is 'better' or 'stronger'. " 516 
Szczypiorski believed that the majority of those demonstrating their 
support for John Paul 11 in 1979 were concerned with civic rather than 
religious matters. Although it is true that non-Catholics, including 
secular left dissidents, and indifferent Catholics were also part of the 
enthusiastic 1979 crowds, Szczypiorski overstates his case and creates 
a false dichotomy. The majority were concerned with civic and 
religious matters. This reservation notwithstanding, Szczypiorski 
writing shortly after the Pope's 1979 pilgrimage, identifies some of 
the key aspects that help explain John Paul 11's psychological impact 
upon the Polish nation, and as such warrants citing at length: 
"They were showing their attachment to the Polish tradition, to 
Polish history, to the western world, to Latin civilisation, to their 
thousand-year-old ties with western culture and to democratic 
principles. For centuries this Latin world shaped the Polish 
mentality, and the Pope is a symbol. ... For the Poles, cut off from their own Western roots for decades, (John Paul 11's 
election) ... came as a great moral and psychological 
compensation. The Poles have felt many times that they were 
abandoned and betrayed by the West, with which they have had 
515 Kertzer (1988: 45). 
516 
Anon. (1980: 198). 
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many bitter experiences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
... Is 
it surprising that (John Paul 11's election) ... was one of the 
most significant events in their history? And that it produced a 
moral and psychological breakthrough for all society. ... Poland is a different country. - .. the recreation of authentic social ties 
among the people - suddenly became a possibility ... This 
is 
irreversible. " 517 518 
Several other Polish commentators, also analysing 
contemporaneously, appreciated the enormity of the political 
significance of John Paul 11's 1979 pilgrimage. For example. ) 
Kolakowski wrote: 
"there is nothing in the history of empires to prove that their 
disintegration process cannot be given impulses from peripheries 
- and this is what is happening right now. " 
519 
The psychological impact of the 1983 and 1987 pilgrimages may 
have been less than that of 1979, but they were still highly politically 
significant for both opposition and regime alike. One month after his 
1983 pilgrimage, Martial Law was lifted. The timing of the Pope's 
second pilgrimage had been made conditional upon the political 
517 Three examples of the abandomnent/betrayal felt by many Poles are: 
i) The lack of Western support for the Poles in their 1830-1831 and 1863-1864 
National Uprisings. 
ii) The lack of Western support at the beginning of WWII when Poland was 
invaded by Nazi and Soviet forces. 
iii) The agreement reached at Yalta in 1945. when the US and UK effectively 
acquiesced to Soviet coercive hegemony of Poland. 
5 18 Szczypiorski (1979: 30-32). 
ý 19 , Introduction'. Leszek Kolakowski. Survey. Vol. XXIV, Autumn 1979. p. 6. 
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situation in Poland. 520 Some years later, in 1998, Jaruzelski conceded: 
"The Pope's visit and his message were a valuable incentive for the 
closing of that stage. " 521 Furthermore, within months of John Paul 
11's mobilisation call to Baltic shipyard workers (see later) during his 
1987 pilgrimage, these workers were flexing their muscles again in 
spring and summer 1988 strikes that were to lead to the resurrection of 
Solidarity and shortly thereafter to the fall of Polish communism. 
5.2.2 The Political Deployment of 'Saints' 
The traditional Catholic veneration of esteemed figures, particularly 
those associated with cults, beatifications and canonisations, lent itself 
especially well not only to the creation but also to the maintenance of 
myths. John Paul 11 proved particularly adept at politically exploiting 
the mythology surrounding some of the most esteemed of these 
figures for his Polish liberalisation project. 
John Paul 11 significantly altered the saint creation process, which 
aided him in this exploitation. 522 For example, he has beatified and 
520 
Szajkowski (1983: 184). 
521 BBC (I 998b: Jaruzelski). 
522 Not all those beatified become saints, but saints will be used loosely in this 
chapter to refer to both beatified and canonised figures, and also to the highly 
venerated Virgin Mary, considered a 'patron saint' of Poland. A patron saint 
within the Catholic Church is a saint venerated as a special protector or 
intercessor. Saints usually become patrons of countries through popular devotion 
rather than by official designation, although recent popes have also named patron 
saints. 
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canonised in record speed and numbers. 523 However it is in his 
influencing of the selection of potentially politically symbolic 
candidates and their subsequent exploitation, together with his 
changing of the Rome location of ceremonies to include ones that lay 
on the routes of his numerous foreign visits, that he has demonstrated 
the brilliance of his art of using the mythology and symbolism of 
saints for political purposes. He has demonstrated this art particularly 
in his war of political legitimacy with the Polish communist regime. In 
almost eight 20th century decades of Italian popes, only two Polish 
saints were created. 524 In barely a decade, that is to say, the 1978- 
1989 period, as pope, John Paul 11 canonised two and beatified eight 
'Poles'. 525 His choice of candidates who nearly all suffered acts of 
repression, usually administered by Russians, and the ways in which 
the Pope deployed their biographies during beatification and/or 
canonisation ceremonies, clearly demonstrates John Paul 11's political 
523 Until John Paul 11 became Pope, the process of beatification and canonisation 
were normally hugely extensive processes, sometimes lasting hundreds of years. 
They culminated in ceremonies in Rome, and, except in the case of martyrs, 
involved certifying that two miracles, worked by God through a candidate's 
intercession, had been performed. In 1983 John Paul 11 speeded up the saint 
creation process by easing the criteria required for candidacy and by doubling the 
number of 'judges' that examined nominees. Paul VI named a mere 84 saints 
during his 1963-1978 tenure. In just over two decades, John Paul 11 named 283, 
more than all his predecessors in the 20th century put together. He also beatified 
some 919, of which the clear majority, some 700, were martyrs. (Time, 14 June, 
1999, pp. 30-3 1). 
524 Andrze Bobola(1591-1657) and Klemens Hofbauer(1751-1820). i 
S25 John Paul 11 canonised Rajmund Kolbe (1982*); beatified and canonised 
Adam Chmielowski (1983 and 1989*); and beatified Rafal Kalinowski (1983), 
Urszula Led6chowska (1983). Karolina K6zka (1987), Jerzy Matulewicz (1987*). 
Michal Kozal (1987), Queen Jadwiga (1987) and Waclaw Ko: ýmiftski (1988*). All 
the ceremonies, apart from those asterisked, took place in Poland during his 1983 
and 1987 pilgrimages. Jadwiga and Matulewicz were 'assimilated' or 'adopted' 
Poles. 
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deployment of these sacred Polish figures in his war of political 
legitimacy. Seven of the ten beatifications and canonisations were 
carried out before millions of Poles during his 1983 and 1987 
pilgrimages, when the Pope did not fail to draw contemporary 
political lessons from the lives of those figures. 526 
The Polish Church hierarchy also showed an awareness of the political 
potency of the mythology and symbolism of saints. For example, 
Cardinal Macharski in his first letter to the Pope - his predecessor as 
Archbishop of Krakow - after Martial Law was declared in December 
1981 . made two requests. One was to canonise Kolbe 
527 
and the other 
528 
was to beatify Chmielowski. 
526 Kalinowski and Chmielowski were both freedom fighters in the National 
Uprising of 1863-1864 and victims of the ensuing Russian repression: 
Chmielowski was wounded and both were deported to Siberia. The sixteen year 
old, Kozka was a rape victim and martyr to a Russian soldier in 1914. 
Ledochowska had been forced by the Russians in 1914 to leave her missionary 
work in Saint Petersburg. Her uncle was the Polish national hero Primate 
Ledochowski, who had been imprisoned by the Prussians during the Kulairkampf. 
Koz'min'ski (1829-1916), a Franciscan friar, had been active in the Russian 
Partition of Poland, at a time when the Russians were openly liquidating the 
Roman Catholic monasteries. Matulewicz (Bishop of Wilno, 1918-1925) had 
acted as a mediator in the national dispute between the Poles and Soviets over 
parts of Lithuania which Pilsudski had regained in 1919. Kozal and Kolbe, were 
both martyrs to Nazism, killed in Auschwitz and Dachau concentration camps in 
1941 and 1943 respectively. 
527 Kolbe, a Catholic priest, died in 1941 in an Auschwitz death cell from a lethal 
injection after offering himself in place of a fellow prisoner condemned to 
execution by the Nazis. Auschwitz is the Gen-nan name for the town and 
concentration camp at 09wiqcim in south east Poland not far from Krak6w. 
i. )8 
.- Macharski (1998). 
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Unsurprisingly, the political symbolism of John Paul 11's 
beatifications and canonisations did not go unnoticed by the Polish 
Party leadership. In November 1986, for example, Kazimierz 
Barcikowski 529 expressed his concern 
530 
that the proposed 
beatification of Karolina Kozka during the Pope's 1987 pilgrimage 
6might have a subtext. ' Previously there had been regime concerns 
about the beatification of Kalinowski. During the actual 1987 
pilgrimage, as a result of concerns about the political messages of the 
Pope's addresses, in particular his exploitation of Kozal and Kozka, 
the Party hastily dispatched Barcikowski, Stanislaw Ciosek 53 1 and 
Jerzy Kuberski 532 to speak to Cardinal Agostino Casaroli . 
533 A few 
days after their dispatch, a secret analysis of the Pope's 1987 
pilgrimage, presented to the Politburo, commented, respectively, on 
the Pope's beatification of Kozal and Kozka thus: 
529 Barcikowski was a Secretariat Member from 1970 - 1974 and 1980 -1985, and 
a Politburo Member from 1980-1989. He was also a Member of the Joint 
Government-Episcopate Commission from 1980-1989. 
530 At the 36 th Session of the Joint Government-Episcopate Commission. Aneks 
(1993: 486). 
531 Ciosek was a member of the Secretariat from 1986-1989 and a member of the 
Politburo from 1988-1989. He was also a member of the Joint Government- 
Episcopate Commission from November 1986. 
532 Kuberski was a member of the Central Committee from 1975-1981, and from 
1980 to 1982., Head of the Office for Religious Affairs, and a member of the Joint 
Government-Episcopate Commission. In 1982 he became Head of the Polish 
Government's Delegation in Rome. 
533 Aneks (1993: 506). Casaroli, as Secretary of State. was the Vatican's next 
highest ranking official after the Pope, and was considered by many to be John 
Paul 11's right-hand man. At the suggestion of the Vatican side. the Party envoys 
met John Paul 11 as well. 
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"the choice of persons to be beatified was not by chance. On the 
one hand the beatification of a person who was killed by the hand 
of German fascism (Germany), whilst the second person, who 
perished at the hands of a Russian soldier (Russia) - which had a 
clear political subtext. " 534 
The Party's reaction to symbolism that, at first sight, might appear an 
unlikely political threat, the symbolism of fascism and 'czarism', may 
well be explained by their appreciation of how John Paul 11 deployed 
the German and Russian/Soviet enemy myths. He did so, not by an 
illiberal engendering of hatred, but rather by invariably linking 
Prussian absolutism and German fascism with Russian absolutism and 
Soviet communism via the concept of totalitarianism. 535 Thereby he 
made these two enemy myths serve the liberal purpose of criticising 
the contemporary Soviet political system with its illiberal 
expansionist imperialism that was preventing Poland achieving full 
national self-determination and popular democratic sovereignty. 
Wojtyla particularly venerated the Virgin Mary/Madonna and three 
notable Polish figures who shared his own close associations with 
Krakow: Szczepanowski, a distant predecessor of his as Bishop of 
Krakow; 536 Jadwiga, Queen of Poland (1384-1386); and the friar 
534 Politburo meeting of 19 June 1987. Aneks (1993: 506). 
535 Interestingly the Pope, like many Polish dissidents - see, for example, Michnik 
(1988: 26-28) - did not make the distinction between authoritarianism and 
totalitarianism with regard to 1945-1989 Poland as made by many Western 
observers, for example, Linz (1996: 255). Accordingly, the chapter uses the 
totalitarianism label to reflect this Polish perspective even although the author 
recognises that 1945-1989 Poland, particularly if the 1948-1956 Stalinist era is 
excluded, was significantly different from the excesses of Germany under Hitler 
or the Soviet Union under Stalin. 
536 Shortly after becoming Pope, John Paul 11 completed a poem entitled 
Stanislaw, as a tribute to his martyred predecessor. 
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Brother Albert/Chmielowski. As Pope, John Paul 11 deployed the 
mythology associated with all four figures in his war of political 
legitimacy, but in particular he deployed the mythology related to 
Stanislaw and the 'honorary saint', the Madonna. Both Stanislaw and 
the Virgin Mary were regarded as patron saints of Poland and both 
had accumulated a considerable mythological legacy over many 
centuries. Their patron status and legacy greatly facilitated the Pope's 
linkage of their myths with messages of political Catholicism and of 
Polish nationalism. 
John Paul 11 was determined to fix the foci of attention for his first and 
second pilgrimages to Poland around these two figures, and the Polish 
regime did all it could to prevent him. 
The Polish Church had adopted 8 May 1079 as the date of 
Stanislaw's murder. 
537 Just one week into his papacy, in October 
1978, the Pope said in a message to Poles, that he wished to make a 
pilgrimage to his homeland in May 1979, to commemorate the 900th 
anniversary of the death of Saint Stanislaw. First Secretary Gierek told 
Wyszyn'ski at a January 1979 meeting that, while accepting that the 
Pope's pilgrimage to Poland could take place, a May visit would give 
the pilgrimage a political character and he was concerned with 
opposition from Party hard liners. 538 In February 1979, Politburo 
Member Kania told Bishop DELbrowski, the Secretary of the Polish 
537 Other accounts, for example Basista (1999: 40) & Gach (1997: 66), give II 
April 1079. However, historical accuracy was not the key point. What was more 
important for political Catholicism was to have a date that could be deployed to 
exploit the powerful religious/political possibilities of annual commemoration. 
S38 Raina (I 995a: 329). 
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Episcopate, that the authorities were not prepared to accept the May 
date. 539 In March 1979, the Party's instructions for teachers, 
published in the underground KOR publication, Biuletyn Informcyjny, 
stated that the Pope: 
"'is dangerous, because he will make Saint Stanislaw the patron 
of the opposition to the authorities and a defender of human 
rights. Luckily we managed to manoeuvre him out of the date of 
May 8. !, 5i, 540 
On the 8 May 1979 anniversary date, a defiant John Paul 11 delivered 
from outside Poland a pastoral letter in which he wrote: 
"'In this year in which the Church in Poland celebrates the nine- 
hundredth anniversary of the martyrdom and death of Saint 
Stanislaw, Krakow's bishop, the bishop of Rome, Saint Peter's 
successor cannot be absent. Too significant is this Jubilee, too 
much related to the history of the Church and the Polish Nation, 
which for more than one thousand years of its history united with 
this church in a particularly deep way. 191 541 
In the above two sentences, the Pope linked the emotive symbolism 
of martyrdom and death with Stanislaw. He linked Stanislaw with 
himself as Bishops of Krakow. He linked Saint Peter with himself as 
539 Nor, for that matter, added Kania, perhaps ironically, the 15 August 1979 - the 
5 9th anniversary of the Battle of Warsaw - or the 17 September 1979 - the 40th 
anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland. Raina (I 995a: 349). 
540 Biuletyn h? formacyjny, 30 April, 1979 as cited by Kubik (1994: 135). 
541 
As cited by Kubik (1994: 136). 
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Popes and Bishops of Rome. 542 He linked the Polish Church with the 
nation. Lastly, he linked a millennium of Polish history with the 
Polish Church. 
In the event, the pilgrimage took place in June 1979. As far as the 
Church was concerned, although a month later than desired, the 
pilgrimage was still officially in the name of the 900th anniversary 
commemoration of Stanislaw's martyrdom. John Paul 11 still had the 
last word, for the myth of Stanislaw's martyrdom, as noted by Jan 
Kubik, constituted the keystone of the papal discourse during the 
1979 pilgrimage. It assured a flawless transition from the 
transcendental order to pragmatic-political issues. Saint Stanislaw was 
confirmed as a symbol of opposition to secular power and as a patron 
of all defenders of human and civil rights. 543 
The political symbolism of Mary and of annual commemorations were 
to be a factor in the choice of dates for the Pope"s second Polish 
pilgrimage. The date when the image of the Madonna was said to 
have first appeared at Jasna Gora, is taken to be 26 August 1382. The 
Pope had wanted to make his second pilgrimage in August 1982 to 
commemorate the 600'h anniversary of the appearance. A nervous 
communist regime prevented this. 544 The Pope, however, was again 
542 The pope is also head of the Italian Church and Bishop of Rome. Saint Peter is 
regarded by the Catholic Church as the first of an unbroken succession of popes 
and as the founder of the Church in Rome. 
543 See Kubik (1994: 149-150). 
544 On II June 1982, the Polish Politburo held an unexpected meeting and two 
days later the official Polish Press Agency (PAP) accused the Polish Episcopate of 
making 'unilateral decisions' not yet cleared by the Vatican and the Polish 
government. The PAP statement asserted: 
" 71 
not deterred. Although prevented from being in Poland for August 
1982, he was still able to exploit the symbolism of Mary and the 
power of the ritual of annual commemoration from Italy. In addition, 
the enormity of the power of centenary commemoration and the value 
given to the symbolism of the Madonna made it possible for him to 
plausibly and effectively commemorate the 600th anniversary during 
his June 1983 pilgrimage to Poland. 
5.3. John Paul 11's Deployment Of Pre-1945 Myths To Foster 
The Cause Of Liberty, Equality And Fraternity 
John Paul 11 frequently deployed the emotive pre- 1945 mythology and 
symbolism of military valour, extreme suffering and sacrifice, and the 
ultimate sacrifice - martyrdom/death. In his deployment of military 
valour and death, the Pope gave meaning to Anderson's words: 
"the nation's biography snatches ... exemplary suicides, poignant 
martyrdoms, assassinations, executions, wars and holocausts. 
But, to serve the narrative purpose, these violent deaths must be 
remembered/forgotten as 'our own. -)99 545 
To demonstrate John Paul 11's deployment of the pre- 1945 myths 
within his liberalisation project, an analysis was undertaken of their 
'"The visit should be preceded by thorough organizational arrangements for 
which adequate socio-political conditions are indispensable. These 
conditions depend on the progress of normalization in Poland. "' As cited by 
Szajkowski (1983: 184). 
Eventually the pilgrimage went ahead in June 1983. just one month before Martial 
Law was lifted. 
54S 
Anderson (1991: 206). 
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deployment by the Pope in the 1978-1989 period, in terms of the 
liberal values identified within the definitions of liberal nationalism 
and liberal political Catholicism that are associated with Liberty, 
Equality and Fraternity. The key liberal values identified with liberty 
were national self-deten-nination and popular sovereignty; with 
equality, they were social justice and tolerance; and with fraternity,, 
they were solidarity with other nations and with fellow nationals. 
John Paul 11 was particularly adept in extending meanings by linking 
one concept with another, a skill that was frequently employed in his 
linking one myth/symbol with another. Often, as the following two 
examples illustrate, he was able, in the space of a few sentences, to 
touch upon a broad range of issues that spanned more than a single 
liberty, equality or fraternity category. 
546 
The first example pertains to his Victory Square Mass in Warsaw in 
June 1979 attended by some quarter of a million Poles. 547 Here John 
Paul 11 made references to the 'Tomb of the Unknown Soldier' that 
stood close by: 
546 Hence, given the multivocality and changing meanings associated with myths 
and symbols, precise categorisation. according to specific liberal values is difficult. 
547 Before World War ll,. the Square had been called Saski Square. named after the 
Polish King August III Saski (1733-1766). After WWII allied victory, it had been 
renamed Victory Square by Communist rulers confident of success in shaping a 
new Communist Poland. With the fall of communism. it was to be renamed yet 
again: this time Pilsudski Square. Far greater numbers were to attend other 
Masses he held in Poland in less restricted spaces. The Masses were all-ticket 
affairs, with Poles sometimes queuing for days to obtain them. 
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"In the history of Poland - past and contemporary - this grave is 
reflected and justified in a particular way. How many are the 
places on this native soil where this soldier fell! How many are 
the places in Europe and the world where his death said that there 
can not be a just Europe without an independent Poland on its 
map? How many are the battle-fields where, dying 'for our 
freedom and yours', he testified to the rights of man, embedded 
deeply in the inalienable rights of the nation? " 548 549 
In the above example, John Paul 11 manages in a few brief sentences 
to link the past Polish experiences with present ones, to evoke the 
emotional symbolism of death via tombs and soldiers sacrificing their 
lives for their country, and to raise the liberal concepts of national 
self-determination as a universal right, of solidarity with other nations, 
and the rights of man. 
The second example relates to Sunday 28 August 1988, when the 
Pope addressed Polish pilgrims visiting Rome to commemorate the 26 
550 August anniversary appearance of Our Lady of Jasna Gora. It was 
551 
at a time of great tension in Poland . 
"Today we go to Czqstochowa ... Important events such as the defence of Jasna Gora, Poland, and freedom of conscience in the 
mid-sixteenth century, during the Swedish invasion ... are 
548 As mentioned in Chapter 3, although the exact identity of the soldier buried in 
the tomb was unknown,, it was known that he was a soldier of Pilsudski's Polish 
Army, who had died in defence of Lwow during the 1919-1920 Polish-Soviet 
War. 
549 
Pax (1989: 38). 
550 Her first appearance at Jasna Gora, it will be recalled, was taken by the Church 
to be 26 August 1382. 
551 On the 24 August 1988, for example, riot police fighting Polish striking 
workers had sealed off the port of Gdansk, forcibly taken a Szczecin bus depot, 
and stormed three Silesian mines. 
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associated with Jasna Gora and the image of the Mother of God. 
The sanctuary has also played a role in the defence of the faith 
and culture, and the conservation of the national identity, 
particularly during the long period of the partition of Poland. 
During the Second World War Pope Pius XII said: 'Poland has 
not perished and will not perish because Poland believes, and 
prays; Poland has Jasna Gora'. In the difficult years after the war, 
during the years of the organised and systematic spread of 
atheism, Jasna Gora, under the guidance of the Cardinal Primate 
Stefan Wyszyn'ski, became a meeting place for the creation of 
effective programmes and pastoral initiatives. It also became a 
reference point for social regeneration, such as Solidarity or other 
groups and movements of social renewal. From this comes the 
terse and appropriate definitions, such as 'Here beats the 
immortal heart of Poland'. The image has often been called 'the 
icon of liberty' and the 'sign of the unity of Christian east and 
west' ... Mary, Queen of Poland, I am with you; I remember; I keep vigil. "' 552 
In a few short passages, the Pope in classic style combined the 
political mythology of the Madonna with the power of the ritual of 
annual commemoration, and linked the periods of partitioning and re- 
partitioning with Poland's contemporary fate. At the same time, John 
Paul 11 signalled his disapproval of the regime, as well as his support 
for freedom of conscience, for national self-determination, for the 
social role of the Polish Church under Wyszyn'ski, for Solidarity, and 
for the unification of East and West Europe. The Pope also alluded, in 
his reference to WWII, that he was not a pacifist and that in extreme 
times Poles should be prepared to die for the liberty of their country. 
iil 1. - As cited by OR, 5 September. 1988, P. 20. 
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5.3.1 The Deployment of Myths Fostering Liberty via National 
Self-determination and Popular Sovereignty 
For John Paul 11, the issues of national self-determination and of 
popular sovereignty were intrinsically linked. The lack of the former 
prevented the latter. In fostering sentiments of national self- 
determination and, particularly during the December 1981 to July 
1983 period of Martial Law, of popular sovereignty, John Paul 11 
above all deployed the Madonna myth. In doing so, he followed the 
example of Wyszyn'ski in linking this myth with the 3 May myth. He 
also exploited the symbolism of 'holy geography. ' 553 The Pope's use 
of the Madonna myth was usually explicit, but sometimes contextually 
implicit, in the sense that his political message was delivered at a 
related location, usually Jasna Gora, or during a day or prayers 
devoted to Mary, but without the myth being directly evoked. 
When addressing more than 1.5 million at a Holy Mass during his 
1983 pilgrimage to a Poland still under Martial Law, John Paul 11 
indicated his preference for a peaceful road to Polish independence. 
As he invariably did, he would mention the past as his way of talking 
about the present. In doing so, he would use key phrases that were 
highly relevant to the contemporary situation. He asserted: 
"'Just as the individual feels the need to achieve a moral victory 
if his life is to have sense and meaning, so also does a nation, 
which is a community made up of individuals. So throughout the 
553 O'Brian described Herder as 'the high priest of cultural nationalism' and as 
strong in holy geography' whose 'landscape is invested with a specifically 
national aura'. O'Brian (1988: 5 1). 
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nineteenth century untiring attempts were made to achieve moral 
reconstruction and to regain political independence. ... We all 
understand that it is not a question of military victory, as it was 
three hundred years ago, but rather a moral victory. 5,554 555 
Here, the key phrases were 'moral victory' and 'regain political 
independence'. 
The Deployment of the Madonna Myth 
The above example, while advocating peaceful means, also indicates 
that John Paul 11 was not a pacifist. Often, when advocating peaceful 
means, he would remind his audience that in certain extreme 
situations, such as under partitioning or repartitioning, Poles had been 
prepared to deploy the physical force tradition to achieve national self- 
determination. Another such example, this time also indirectly 
evoking the Madonna myth, was on the 4 August 1982 with Poland 
under Martial Law, when as part of his weekly Prayer to Our Lady of 
Jasna Gora, the Pope commemorated the 38 th anniversary of the 
August 1944 Warsaw Uprising. He said: 
"'Today 
... 
I recall the Warsaw insurrection... I implore: save my 
country from a similar destruction! ... 
help us preserve the same 
love of fatherland, the same readiness to serve the cause of its 
independence and of peace, as was manifested in that 
generation. 191 556 
554 A reference to Jan III Sobieski's 1683 victory in Vienna over the Turks. 
As cited by OR. 27 June, 1983, p. 8. 
556 As cited by OR, 9 August, 1982, p8. 
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John Paul 11 on several occasions indicated the dangers of an illiberal 
expansionist nationalism. One such occasion was in late 1981, with 
the possibility of Soviet intervention imminent. On the Catholic Holy 
Day of Mary's Immaculate Conception, 8 December, just five days 
before Martial Law 557 was declared in Poland, John Paul 11 wrote: 
"'An excessive desire for expansion impels some nations to build 
their prosperity with a disregard for - indeed at the expense of - 
other's happiness. Unbridled nationalism thus fosters plans for 
domination. "' 558 
As the following two examples show, John Paul 11 often evoked the 
Madonna myth in its 19th century form of Mary the defender of the 
nation. During a Jasna Gora Holy Mass in June 1979, when some two 
million had lined his route or gathered on the hill of Jasna Gora, 559 the 
Pope tried to instil hope into the nationalist cause when he invoked 
the Madonna myth, via Pan Tadeusz: 
"'how Brightly you defend Czqstochowa, ' wrote Mickiewicz, 
speaking the language of faith, and at the same time the language 560 
of the national tradition. ' ... 
"'Hearing the beating heart of the nation in the heart of the 
Mother. How many times has it vibrated with the laments of the 
557 Martial Law lasted from 13 December 1981 to 22 July 1983. It will be recalled 
that 22 July was the Polish communist regime's public holiday of 
liberation/independence. 
558 As cited by OR, 4 January. 1982. p. 5. 
S ýk) 
- Daily Telegraph, 5 June, 1979, p. 1. 
560 As cited in Pax (1989: 64). 
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historical sufferings of Poland, but also with the shouts of joy 
and victory! ... 
Every threat ... against the 
family and the nation has its source in 
our weakness ... Before Our Lady of Jasna Gora ... this 
is what I 
am entrusting to you. Do not succumb to weakness! iqý 561 
In June 1983 in Jasna Gora, at the 194th Plenary Conference of the 
Polish Episcopate, John Paul 11 evoked the symbolism of the Madonna 
as a defender of Poland's national self-determination who protected 
Poland from external threats. 
"'From the time in which Jasna Gora resisted the pressure of the 
Swedes, from when subsequently the entire homeland was freed 
from the invaders, (there has been) a particular bond between the 
sanctuary of Jasna Gora and the increasingly difficult history of 
the nation ... During my previous pilgrimage 
in 1979,1 said at 
Jasna Gora that here we have always been free. It is difficult to 
express in a different way what the Image of the Queen of Poland 
became for all the Poles during the time when their homeland 
was wiped off the map of Europe as an independent State ... And it is here too that we have learned the fundamental truth about the 
freedom of the nation: the nation perishes if it deforms its spirit - 
the nation grows when its spirit is ever more purified, and no 
external power is able to destroy it! "' 562 
The key phrases in the above example were 'independent State', 
'freedom of the nation', and 'no external power is able to destroy ifl% 
while the subtext read that, just as Mary had protected Poland from 
the Swedes, so she would protect Poland from the Soviets. 
561 
As cited by Kwitny (1998: 326-327). 
562 
As cited by OR, 4 July. 1983, p. 5. 
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In the Holy Mass during his 1983 pilgrimage at Jasna Gora to 
commemorate the 600th anniversary, John Paul 11 also deployed the 
mythology of God's intervention to restore national self- 
determination. The Pope said: 
"The hope of the nation also relied on ... the persistent striving for obtaining independence, expressed with these words: 
'Before Thy altars, we bring our entreaty: 
Restore, 0 Lord, our free country. qqý 
563 
Here, there were two key phrases ostensibly linked to the past but for 
contemporary application. The first phrase was 'persistent striving for 
obtaining independence', the other 'Restore, 0 Lord, our free 
country. ' The latter was the last line from the 1816 patriotic hyrnn 
God Who Protects Poland. After 1945, the regime attempted to have 
the line replaced with "Bless, 0 Lord, our free country. " Such a 
change had been made during the 1918-1939 period of Polish 
independence. Nevertheless, post-1945 many in communist-ruled 
Poland defiantly sang the original line. Now the Pope, too, was openly 
defying the authorities in the cause of national self-determination. 
Garton Ash describes how the state television cameras 'were directed 
elsewhere' and not to the scene that followed on hearing the defiant 
version. The meadow in front of the Jasna Gora monastery 'turned 
into a forest of hands raised in the V-for-victory sign' and half a 
million voices cried, as they cried at the end of other masses, the 
unofficial 'Restore, 0 Lord, our fTee country'. 
564 
563 Pax (1989: 366-367). 
564 Garton Ash (1991 b: 49). 
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The Deployment of the 3 May Myth 
As used by John Paul 11, the 3 May Constitution was a symbol of 
popular sovereignty and of national self-determination, lending some 
support to Kertzer"s view that the political legitimacy gained from the 
continuity of ritual and the symbolic value of a Constitution as a 
unifying force can be more meaningful than its actual content. 565 The 
1791 Constitution was a symbol of popular sovereignty insofar as the 
then government sought the respect of all the nation, and insofar as the 
Constitution put in place safeguards against abuses of state power. 
John Paul 11 also deployed the myth in the cause of national self- 
determination. In this he was helped by the 19th century romantic 
nationalist 'political spin' which stressed that, shortly after the 
Constitution's adoption, it was annulled due to Poland's loss of 
national self-determination as a result of the 1793 partitioning by the 
absolutist powers. The Pope also used the circumstance of a common 
date to link the Madonna myth with 3 May myth. 566 Again, his 
political messages contained key phrases ostensibly linked to the past 
but with a contemporary resonance. During a Mass for the Solemnity 
of Mary in May 1982, a few months after the Declaration of Martial 
Law, John Paul 11 said that the 1791 Constitution had: 
"'shaped the life of the nation even under foreign domination and 
in the other system. The Constitution became the soul of public 
565 Kertzer (1988: 44 & 63). The myth conveniently forgets that the Constitution 
was in force only between 1791-1793 and heralded a return to hereditary 
monarchical rule. 
566 The 3d of May was also, it will be recalled, the anniversary date when Polish 
Catholics commemorate the Solemnity of Mary, Queen of Poland, defender of the 
nation. 
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life, of national life, and through the decades, through the 
generations, it prepared our ancestors for the rebuilding of 
independence. Now, it is our historical destiny: that which in 
itself is already a programme for life must at times be put into 
practise in life at the cost of dying. And that is precisely how it 
was with the Constitution of 3 May. ... (Referring to 'the events 
of the 1980s linked to the word 'Solidamos'c', " the Pope, 
continued) 'We have not lost the conviction that these contents 
and also these events - as once the Constitution of 3 May - wi II 
shape the life of the nation. Since they come from her soul, and 
the nation - if it must live - must live with its own SOUI. iii 567 
The Pope in the above passage had not only combined the Madonna 
myth and 3 May myth, but also linked the latter with the now illegal 
Solidarity. He also indicated that, at certain times, resisting meant 
preparing to sacrifice one's life. 
A year later, in May 1983, in his Prayers to Our Lady of Jasna Gora 
the Pope said: 
"'The Constitution proclaimed on this day in the year 1791 was 
to restore the Republic at that moment when it was threatened by 
mortal danger. Even though the danger proved to be stronger, 
nevertheless the Constitution has survived as a proof of the 
Nation's will for life and self-determination. "' 568 
In the above two quotations while evoking the 3 May myth, John Paul 
11 had planted many key phrases for contemporary application: 
phrases that explicitly related to pre-1945 times but that implicitly 
carried political messages relating to Poland under communism. These 
included: 'foreign domination', 'rebuilding of independence, ` 'at the 
567 
As cited by OR, 24 May, 1982. p. 9. 
568 OR, 16 May, 1983. p-2. 
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cost of dying', 
deten-nination. " 
'threatened by mortal danger', 
The Deployment of the Symbolism of Holy Geography 
and 'self- 
John Paul 11, in the romantic tradition of Herder, exploited the 
political potential of the symbolism of holy geography. He did this, 
particularly during his 1987 pilgrimage, 
landscape features with political messages 
nationalism of opposition. 
by associating Polish 
supporting a liberal 
During his 1987 pilgrimage, for example, speaking in the adjoining 
Baltic seaports of Gdynia and Gdansk, the birthplace of Solidarity, the 
Pope developed the solidarity symbolism with the aid of some 'holy 
geography'. In Gdynia, near where the River Vistula flows into the 
Baltic Sea, the Pope celebrated the Liturgy of the Word in KoS'ciuszko 
Square, named after the leader of the 1794 National Uprising. The 
Pope managed to link the river, the sea and the city to Poland's 
struggle for national independence. Also, in his reference to priests, he 
evoked the organic work myth. 
"'This river is a silent eyewitness of life in Poland through many 
generations... It is a witness to their struggles, sometimes for life 
and sometimes for death, in order to maintain and assure all that 
it is Proper and native to us, all that which fon-ns our common 
heritage and inheritance... 
The sea 
Speaks to people in a special language. Above all it speaks to 
them in a language that transcends all limitations. .-- 
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Here in this territory of the Kaszubs, during the Reformation and 
the Partitioning of Poland, the defence of Catholicism was 
indissolubly joined to the defence of our Polish identity. During 
the years preceding the First World War, the priests began an 
animated work of sel f- instruction and the co-operative work of 
Kaszub fishermen and farmers. Their purpose was to prevent 
Germanization. ... 
I salute Gdynia ... 
because in a certain sense it has becomefor us 
the symbol of our second independence ... Gdynia therefore has become an expression of a new willpower to live as a nation. 999569 
The following day, the Pope celebrated Mass for an estimated one 
million Gdansk workers, many of them from the shipyards. He 
invoked a thousand years of Christianity in Poland; offered vistas of 
freedom and liberation; alluded to Solidarity, and, most dramatically, 
in a highly politically charged way, implied the need for a new 
mobilisation of the workers. 
"'I greet Gdansk ... where in ... 977 ... . ... the multitudes of the 
people received baptism! ' Gdansk, which through the 
vicissitudes of history has always given an example of strength... 
Here, on the Baltic coast, she has opened up to us the prospects 
that the sea offers to men of 'terrafirma , -prospects offreedom! Man in the vastness of the sea, feels free, liberated from 
conditioning factors created by life on dry land, but at the same 
time subject to the demands of a new element. He feels 
mobilizedfor a new responsibility ... 
I 
salute Gdansk. In her I salute all that she has been for us in the 
various chapters of the past, and what she has become in recent 
years. 9-)1 
570 
569 As cited by OR, 27 July, 1987, pp. 7-8. Gdynia was built in the 1920s to give 
the newly re-independent Poland a sea-port. 
570 
As cited by OR, 3 August, 1987, pp. 2-3. 
284 
The two examples above illustrate John Paul 11's belief that by 
defending Polish Catholicism one is defending national identity. 
Again, one sees the allusion to Sovietisation via the device of evoking 
the German enemy myth in referring to 'Germanization. ' Once more, 
there is the scattering of key phrases for contemporary reflection. 
Amongst the latter were: 'sometimes for death', 'transcends all 
limitations'. 'our second independence', 'vistas of freedom and 
liberation'. 'liberated from conditioning factors', and 'mobilized for a 
new responsibility'. 
5.3.2 The Deployment of Myths Fostering Equality via Social 
Justice, Tolerance and Respect for the Individual 
John Paul 11 and Personal Thomism 
John Paul 11's political Catholicism, in adopting an ethical personal 
Thomism influenced by such thinkers as Mounier, Maritain and 
Gilson, saw man not only as being concerned with the Hereafter, but 
also as being politically concerned with the Herenow. His modem 
Thomism combined faith with rationalism. His personalism - by 
perceiving man as both a spiritual person and an individual, combined 
communitarianism with individualism. Communitarianism and 
individualism were not seen as being in contradiction, but as being 
complementary. His commitment to communitarian values 
engendered a belief in greater political activity to help community 
members develop their communal, and thereby personal, lives. His 
commitment to individualism helped shape his attitudes towards 
285 
liberalism and away from communism. It led him, for example, to 
defend the individual from the excesses of the communist state and to 
attack Marxist determinism. During his 1987 pilgrimage, for example, 
John Paul 11 particularly stressed the importance of the subjectivity of 
man, implying that Polish communism's pervasive totalitarian state 
impeded that subjectivity. On his first day in Poland, he told 
Jaruzelski: 
"In the name of proper dignity each and every one strives to be 
not only an object of the activity of the authorities, the institution 
of state life - but to be a subject. " 571 
Later during the 1987 pilgrimage he was to say: 
"Above all man is a person, is the subject of his deeds. The 
subject of morality. The subject of history. Not only 'the 
reflection of the prevailing socio-economic conditions. ' Not only 
the epiphenomenon of materialism, of the economy. -)ý 
572 
The pope's ethical personal Thomism also helped shape his belief in 
the dignity of man and thereby in equality as expressed in the related 
liberal values of social justice for all, tolerance and respect for the 
individual. 
571 Pax(1989: 526). 
572 Pax (1989: 729). Interestingly, Jaruzelski in his 1987 farewell speech to the 
Pope appropriated both the subjectiviýy and solidarity leitmotivs of the Pope. Pax 
(1989: 734) and Michel (1995: 183-4). 
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5.3.2.1 The deployment of myths fostering social jqsWe 
Influenced by this ethical personal Thomism and by his pre-papal 
experiences in Rome while still Archbishop of Krakow ,3 as well as 
by a Poland deprived in practice of many basic human rights, John 
Paul 11 believes strongly in human rights, that is to say, that people are 
entitled to rights by virtue of being human. In 1980, he wrote: 
"'It is on this conception of the dignity 
various categories of human rights are 
political' rights as well as 'economic, 
rights. "' 574 
A few years later, he was to assert: 
of the person that the 
founded: 'civil and 
sociall and cultural' 
"'The foundation and goal of the social order is the human 
person, as a subject of inalienable rights which are not conferred 
from outside but which arise from the person's very nature. 
Nothing and nobody can destroy them, and no external constraint 
can annihilate them, for they are rooted in what is most 
profoundly human. iýi 575 
573 As Archbishop Wojtyla he was directly involved with 'the human rights 
revolution' of Vatican 11. He submitted a memorandum to the Council, urging that 
the Church should become a bulwark of human rights not just for its own 
adherents, but for all. (Kwitny 1998: 195). Appointed a Cardinal in 1967, Wojtyla 
was to be a frequent visitor to Rome and was greatly influenced by the liberal 
Cardinal Frantz K6nig of Vienna. See Szulc (1995: 223). 
574 As cited by OR, 28 January, 1980, p. 8. The quotation is part of a message 
given by John Paul 11 to the Presidents of European Court for Human Rights and 
of the European Commission for Human Rights on occasion of their respective 
20th and 25th anniversaries. 
575 As cited by OR, 21 December. 1987, p. 1. From his 1988 annual World Day of 
Peace Message. 
287 
John Paul 11 was frequently to endorse publicly the UN's 1948 
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights that comprised not only civil, 
but also political and socio-economic rights. The Pope's belief in the 
full gamut of rights - be they so-called 'negative' civil rights that are 
exercised within civil society and serve to limit or check state power, 
or the positive political and socio-economic rights that provide 
individuals with the opportunity to participate in political life and 
guarantee them minimal socio-economic status - was a clear 
indication of his belief in a 20th century liberal sense of equality as 
defined by modem liberalism. 
In the context of communist Poland, his advocacy of human rights 
was of immense political importance. It questioned the entire 
communist system and promoted the sovereignty of the individual and 
of the nation. 
His defence of negative rights which entail the liberal value of limited 
government and that state 'interference' should be minimal, was 
implicitly and sometimes explicitly an attack on the role of the 
communist state. In his address to Jaruzelski and other Polish regime 
leaders during his 1987 pilgrimage, John Paul 11 urged the communist 
leadership to remember man's "'right to religious freedom, his right to 
576 
ree association and to the expression of his own opinions. "' 
Furthermore in Lublin during the 1987 pilgrimage the Pope talked 
about the necessity to reflect on 'the very presuppositions of the 
576 
As cited by OR. 6 July, 1987. p. 10. 
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present organisation of the State' and of the 'need for academic 
freedom'. 577 
The Deployment of the German Enemy Myth 
In fostering social justice for all, John Paul 11 was to enlist the 
mythology surrounding his three favourite sacred Polish historical 
figures, namely Saint Stanislaw, Queen Jadwiga and Brother Albert, 
and used the German enemy myth to evoke human rights and criticise 
totalitarianism rather than engender an illiberal hatred of others. In his 
fostering of social justice, he defended Solidarity when its members 
were deprived of civil and political rights in December 198 1. 
The Nazi concentration camps, where millions, including some three 
million Polish Jews and substantial numbers of Polish Catholics, were 
massacred in WWII, were an immensely powerful symbol of the 
absolute disregard of human rights. Speaking at a Mass in the grounds 
of the most notorious of the camps, Auschwitz, during the 1979 
pilgrimage, he linked the symbolism of the camp to himself, to Saint 
Peter, to the universal concepts of human dignity, human and national 
rights, and of anti -total itariani sm, by asking rhetorically: 
6( (Can anyone ... be surprised that a pope who was 
born. and 
raised here on this land, a pope who came to Peter's See from 
Krakow - the archdiocese in the territory of which the OS'wiqcim 
camp is located ... that 
he devoted (Redemptor Hominis his first) 
encyclical ... to the 
dignity of man, the threats facing man, and ... 
human rights, the inalienable rights of man, which can be so 
577 OR. 13 July, 1987. pp. 4-5. 
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trampled on so easily and annihilated by ... man? To 
do so it is 
enough to dress him in another uniform, to equip the apparatus of 
violence with the means of destruction; it is enough to foist on 
him an ideology in which human rights are subordinated to the 
requirements of the system, subordinated in an arbitrary fashion, 
so that, in fact, they do not exist. ... One nation can never 
develop 
at the expense of another, at the expense of its subordination, 
conquest, oppression, at the expense of exploiting it, at the 
expense of its death. "' 578 579 
Again during his 1983 pilgrimage, in a Mass to commemorate Kolbe's 
martyrdom to Nazism, John Paul 11 extracted universal messages from 
the particular. For the Pope, Kolbe's death confirmed 'the human 
drama of the 20th century' 580 and good as the means to conquer evil. 
For his audience of several million, the subtext of the symbolism of 
the effects of an evil Nazism, had much resonance, living, as they felt, 
under the oppression of another evil totalitarian system. 
With the Declaration of Martial Law on 13 December 198 1. Solidarity 
leaders were arrested or driven underground. The following day, the 
Pope, in Rome, thanked the thousands who had come to pray for the 
Polish people. "'This solidarity with the Polish people serves also to 
confirm some values and some inalienable principles such as the 
rights of man. "' 581 Some two weeks later, after his ritual weekly 
578 Auschwitz is near both to where the Pope was born and grew up in Wadowice, 
and to Krakow, where he moved to on completing his secondary schooling just 
before the onset of WWII. 
579 J. Weydenthal and K. Zamorski (eds. ) Pope In Poland. Munich, Radio Free 
Europe Research, 1979, p. 66 & p. 69 as cited by Kubik (1994: 143 -144). 
580 Pax (1989: 332). 
581 As cited by OR, 21 December, 1981 ý p. 
20. 
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Angelus Prayer on I January 1982, the Catholic Holy Day of Mary, 
Mother of God, John Paul 11 said: 
"'I thank you warmly, for these expressions of solidarity with 
'Solidamos"c"'. This word is the expression of a great effort which 
the workers in my country have made to ensure the real dignity 
of the working man. The workers ... have the right to set-up 
autonomous trade unions to protect ... their ... rights. "' 
582 
In his Angelus address on the 31 January 1982, effortlessly inter- 
linking the symbolism of solidaritylSolidarity with the nation, with 
morality, with the physical force tradition of WWII, and with current 
injustices, the Pope said: 
"'Solidarity with the Polish nation assures a still greater ethical 
eloquence if one considers that this nation in large measure (one 
could say, disproportionate) has borne on its shoulders the 
burden of the last war, and has faced terrible sacrifices for the 
cause of justice. 9ý9 583 
He then went on to support the Polish bishops in their call for the 
abolition of Martial Law and of all forms of limitation and violation of 
civil rights. 
A significant proportion of the post-WWII Polish population still lived 
off the land, 584 and many were still peasants, in the sense that they 
eked an existence from their small landholdings. Most of these 
582 As cited by OR, II January, 1982, p. 14. 
583 As cited by OR, 8 February, 1982, p. 2. 
584 In 1985, this proportion was nearly 30% of the working population. GUS 
(1994: 227). 
291 
peasants were devout Catholics, and John Paul 11 was to make clear 
that they, too, were included in his concept of sovereignty and social 
justice. During his 1987 pilgrimage, for example, at a Mass for the 
beatification of the peasant girl Ko"zka in TarnOw attended by many 
rural workers, John Paul 11 quoted from the pre-WWII peasant leader 
Wincenty Witos (1874-1945), 'a great leader of the Polish people': 
"Insofar as the sensible, independent, content Polish peasants are 
prepared to sacrifice their health for every piece of their native 
land, just imagine them in defence of their entire Homeland. 51 585 
Immediately following his reference to Witos, John Paul 11 went on to 
say that the agreements reached in nearby RzeszOw 586 between Rural 
Solidarity and the regime in early 198 1: 
"'should find their full realization. ... Many 
deformations of 
country life find their source in the second-class status of the 
farmer, as worker and as citizen. "' 587 
The Deployment of the Saint Stanislaw Myth 
Szczepanowski, the Bishop of Krakow murdered by, or on the orders, 
of the Polish King, Boleslaw 11, symbolised to different political 
groupings several different things, which epitomised three powerful 
properties that make symbols, with their condensation of meaning, 
585 W. Witos, Moje wspomnienia. Vol. 1, Paris 1964, p. 35 as cited by Pax (1989: 
574). 
586 About forty miles from Tarnow in south east Poland. 
587 As cited by OR, 20 July, 1987, p. 4. 
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multivocality and ambiguity, as Kertzer points out, such powerful 
political devices. 
588 
Many Polish Catholics regarded Saint Stanislaw as a symbol of 
justified resistance against the excesses of (royal or other) state 
power. 
189To 
others, Stanislaw was a symbol that proved that physical 
force used by the regime was not an argument. '90 In stark contrast to 
many within civil society for whom Saint Stanislaw was a heroic 
martyr who gave his life for justice, the communist regime regarded 
Stanislaw as a rebel against legitimate authority of the state and rarely 
mentioned him in the official media. When the Stanislaw-Boleslaw 
conflict was mentioned by the regime, the King was presented as a 
symbol of secularisation, being portrayed as one who: 
444persistently pursued independence from ecclesiastical 
authority, ... and treated 
(Stanislaw) as an intruder, when (the 
bishop) interfered with political affairs. "' 591 
In 1966, during the state celebrations of the Millennium of the Polish 
State, slogans declaring Boleslaw the Bold - hero and patriot were 
displayed in several Polish towns. 
592 
588 Kertzer (1988: 11). 
589 Kubik (1994: 13 0). 
590 This 'right not might' interpretation was held by Hennelowa who described 
Stanislaw as a 'political saint', and the commemorative celebrations for Stanisla\, \- 
under communism as being of immense political significance. Hennelowa 
(1998). 
591 Edward Ciupak, Kull religijny ijego podloýfe spoleczne (The religlous cult and 
its social background), LSW: Warsaw, 1965, p. 59 as cited by Kubik (1994: 132). 
592 Kubik (1994: 132). 
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Polish political Catholicism led by Wyszyn'ski also regarded the saint 
as a symbol of justice and of the unity of the nation, as the Primate 
indicated in his address at the 1978 commemoration to Stanislaw's 
martyrdom: 
"'The conflict between Boleslaw and Stanislaw revolved around 
the issues of justice and human rights. It proves that already nine 
hundred years ago the Church struggled for human rights. The 
cult of Saint Stanislaw is the symbol of unity of our nation; this 
is not only a religious, but also a national symbol. 911 593 
In April 1979, the KOR underground monthly Robotnik wrote that the 
authorities were afraid of the pilgrimage taking place in May 1979 
"'because the cult of Saint Stanislaw ... is identified with a dangerous 
world, opposition. "' 
594 
For John Paul 11, Stanislaw was a symbol of morality fighting an 
immoral communist regime. In a Holy Mass for Stanislaw in Krakow 
during the 1979 pilgrimage, attended by a crowd of several million, 595 
probably the largest assembly in Polish history, John Paul 11 said: 
"' All of life assumes the aspect of ... a 
large number of tests of 
faith and character. ... Saint 
Stanislaw has become in the spiritual 
history of the Polish people the patron of these tests ... From 
every victorious test the moral order is built up. From every 
failed test moral disorder grows. We know very well from our 
593 Tygodnik Powszechny, 21 May, 1978 as cited by Kubik (1994: 133). 
594 Robolnik, I April, 1979 as cited by Kubik (1994: 134). 
S95 
t)v 
,, servalore Romano estimated 3 million. 
OR, 16 July. 1979. p. F, 
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entire history that we must not permit, absolutely and at whatever 
cost, this disorder. "' 
596 
He then went on to instil fortitude in his audience and asked them not 
to forget their Christian heritage: 
"'Never lose your trust, do not be defeated, do not be 
discouraged, - do not on your own cut yourself off from the roots 
from which we had our origin.... I say these words on the 900th 
anniversary of the martyrdom of Saint Stanislaw. "' '9' 
When interviewed, the present Archbishop of Krakow and successor 
to Stanislaw and Wojtyla, Cardinal Franciszek Macharski, in stressing 
the symbolism of Stanislaw, emphasised that he had died by the 
sword, and implied a criticism of the Polish communist state's use of 
violence to maintain power. 598 
With the introduction of Martial Law came, according to Halina 
Filipowicz, an 'unprecedented pogrom' of Polish culture. 599 When 
Polish theatres were allowed to re-open, some staged plays that the 
state censors would find hard to ban but that still carried political 
messages of opposition. Such was the 1982 production of T. S. Eliot's 
596 As cited by Kwitny (1998: 329). 
597 As cited by OR, 16 May, 1983, p. 2. In May 1983. the 904 th anniversary of 
Saint Stanislaw's murder in 1079, in a Prayer to Our Lady qf Jasna G6ra, the 
Pope repeated some of these 1979 words on Stanislaw. 
598 
Macharski (1998). 
599 See Filipowicz (1982). 
". 2.9 5 
Murder in the Cathedral . 
600 Based on the murder of Archbishop 
Thomas Becket by King Henry 11's soldiers in 1170, it was performed 
at two major national shrines: Saint John's Cathedral in Warsaw and 
the Wawel Cathedral in Krakow. 60 1 The Polish audiences were well 
aware of the historical parallels between Becket's martyrdom and that 
of Stanislaw's, described by the historian Norman Davies as 'the 
Polish Becket'. 
The Deployment of the Jadwiga Myth 
John Paul 11's use of the Jadwiga myth in furthering the liberal 
concept of peaceful international justice was somewhat tenuous. 
Jadwiga was an 'adopted Pole, ' who died aged just 25. She was raised 
in Budapest, before - still not in her teens - she became Queen of 
Poland and reigned for barely fifteen months. However, her 
significance for John Paul 11 was that she symbolised the extension of 
Catholicism to Lithuania and the genesis of the Jagiellonian/ 
Commonwealth myth. Before becoming pope, Wojtyla demonstrated 
his veneration of Jadwiga in hundreds of sermons and homilies over 
600 The director, Zbylut Jarocki, received one of underground Solidarity's 1981- 
1982 cultural prizes for the production. Biernacki (2000: 89). 
601 Saint John's Cathedral was where, for example, Wyszyn'ski in December 1976 
had criticised the police for their brutality against the workers arrested for their 
June 1976 protests over price rises. It was also where John Paul 11 was to deliver 
one of his Masses during his 1983 pilgrimage. Wawel Cathedral was where 
several of Poland's pre- 1945 national heroes were buried. Wawel Cathedral is 
also closely associated with Wojtyla. During WWII, Wojtyla took part in Holy 
Mass services within Wawel Cathedral. On 2 November 1946, as a newly 
ordained priest, he celebrated his first Mass in the cathedral. In July 1967, he had 
his Cardinal's Installation Ceremony in Wawel and in 1969. he ordered the 
Cathedral's restoration. 
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decades, when he often linked her with Saint Stanislaw as a great 
figure in the history of Poland and of the Church. During his second 
(1983) Polish pilgrimage, John Paul 11 gave a Mass dedicated to the 
'Blessed Jadwiga' and told his one million audience that she was a 
'brave woman' "who applied herself to the demands of the laws of the 
,, 602 nation, international justice and peace. In his 1987 pilgrimage, 
John Paul 11 officially beatified Jadwiga in the Wawel Cathedral. He 
saw Jadwiga, like the Virgin Mary, as a Queen of Poland protecting 
the Polish nation. "God put you in the midst of the people, of the 
nation. He called upon you, to encompass with your heart their fate, 
their aspirations, their struggles. He called upon you to divine God's 
wishes in relation to Poland, to Lithuania, to the Ruthenian lands. 99 603 
The Deployment of the Brother Albert Myth 
It will be recalled that Chmielowski, also known as Brother Albert, 
had taken part in the 1863-1864 National Uprising. Shortly after 
WWII, Cardinal Adam Sapieha, Archbishop of Krakow, bestowed 
604 
upon him the title 'servant of God' . At about the same period, 
WqJty1a, a protege of Sapieha's, wrote a play with Chmielowski as 
the protagonist. Entitled, Brother of Our God, the play has as one of 
its key themes 'splendid human anger'. Another key theme 
emphasises social justice, including human rights that create human 
dignity. A character known as 'the Speaker' tells the homeless: 
602 Pax (1989: 426). 
603 Pax (1989: 593). 
604 Gach (1997: 23 1). 
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"'You have the right to have human rights'. (The Speaker 
continues): I came here to awaken what sleeps inside you ... Why do you ... 
hold back your justified revolt? Why is your anger 
silent? 555 605 
The Speaker then goes on to exclaim: "'DON'T BE AFRAID! ... Just 
provide the anger, and forces will emerge that will know how to shape 
it, use it and lead it! ý55 
606 At the end of the play, Brother Albert says: 
"'You know that anger must explode ... And it will last because it is 
just! 115 607 
In January 1977, Paul V1, who also took Wojtyla under his wing, 
published a decree on the heroism of Chmielowski's virtue, thereby 
opening the beatification process . 
608 During his inaugural sen-non as 
Pope in October 1978, John Paul 11 was to stress one of his Brother 
Albert play's key phrases and themes: 
"' Do not be afraid! Open wide the 
saving power open the boundaries 
political systems, the vast fields of 
development. Do not be afraid! ý-). ) 
609 
605 As cited by Szulc (1995: 68). 
606 As cited by Szulc (1995: 168). 
607 As cited by Szulc (1995: 169). 
608 Gach (1997: 23 1). 
doors for 
of state s 
culture, 
- Christ. To his 
economic and 
civilization and 
609 
As cited by Kwitny (1998: 19). 
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Like Havel, John Paul 11 believed that if East European civil societies 
were offered hope and human dignity and lost their fear, they would 
cease to acquiesce to communism. The Pope considered this 
acquiescence to be a major factor in the ability of the communists to 
retain power in East Europe. 610 John Paul 11 beatified Chmielowski in 
Krakow during his second Polish pilgrimage in 1983 in the presence 
of some two million faithful . 
61 1 The Pope reminded his vast audience 
that, as a 17 year-old student, Chmielowski had been wounded in the 
1863-1864 Uprising and then exiled to Siberia. He referred to him as 
one of the 'children of the Nation' whose faith, hope and love would 
bring a victory of 'truth, freedom and justice'. 612 
5.3.2.2 The deployment of myths fostering tolerance and respect 
for the individual 
For John Paul 11 to appeal to the liberal-leaning Polish dissident 
intelligentsia, he had to show that he subscribed to the more open 
papal political Catholicism associated with Vatican 11. This he was 
able to do by disowning the illiberal Jewish and communist enemy 
mythology and thereby exhibiting his tolerance with regard to 
610 Weigel (1992: 89). 
611 In November 1989, as East European communism was collapsing, the Pope 
canonised Chmielowski with the words: 
"'He is witness to, and participant in, the Pole's historic battle to gain 
independence 
... 
He went to the insurrection, from which he returned 
maimed ... Brother 
Albert, ... an apostle of 
his times. And of ours as well? "' 
As cited by OR, 4 December, 1989, p. 10. 
612 Pax (1989: 462 & 465). 
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Judaism, atheism 
613 
and communism. His views on Judaism showed 
he clearly belonged to a liberal nationalist position that was ethically 
sustainable, and did not define his Polish nationalism in Pole = 
Catholic terms. His views on atheism and communism, because they 
did not engender hatred, meant that he could engage in a dialogue 
with those of the secular left, including some of those associated with 
KOR and with the estimated million communist party members who 
had joined Solidarity and who in doing so had demonstrated their 
serious misgivings about the practice of Polish communism. 
The Deployment of the Organic Work Myth 
Another influence on John Paul 11's liberal thinking was Norwid and 
in particular this poet's interpretation of tolerance, respect for the 
individual, and the organic work myth. It would be incautious to claim 
that there was a direct causal relation, but what one can claim is that 
613 Wojtyla was one of the drafters of Vatican 11's 1965 In Our Time declaration 
on relations with non-Christian religions which affirmed that not all Jews could be 
blamed for Christ's death. During the Final Session of Vatican 11, in September 
1965, Wojtyla spoke on atheism. He was careful to distinguish between an 
atheism imposed from above and an atheism which was a personal conviction. He 
believed that atheism diminished the fullness of a person's humanity, but he was 
able to empathise with the problems that unbelievers might have in dialogue with 
believers in God, as much as believers in dialogue with atheists. Walsh (1994: 
30). 
As Pope, John Paul 11 retained his more tolerant approach to atheism and sought a 
dialogue based upon common humanism. In his January 1983 World Day of 
Peace Message, he said: 
- every person, whether a believer or not ... can and must preserve enough 
confidence in man, in his capacity of being reasonable, in his sense of what 
is good, of justice, of fairness, in his possibility of brotherly love and hope, 
xN-hich are never totally averted. in order to aim at recourse to dialogue. 1") As 
cited by OR, 24 November. 1986, p. 2 1. 
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John Paul 11 was very greatly influenced by Norwid and in 
philosophical sentiment, held several similar views. Norwid, asserts 
Szulc, may have exercised the greatest single artistic, intellectual, and 
religious influence on the young Wojtyla. 614 Later, as Pope, John Paul 
11 declared that Norwid "was very, very important to me, and I still 
read him. " 615 Amongst the more significant of the commonly held 
views are the following. One should be wary of the bold claims about 
the possibility of immediate independence from heaven-on-earth 
millennialists. National self-determination would come via 
evolutionary non-violent organic work means. Work should also be 
valued for itself, should not be alienating, and could lead to personal 
and national liberation/salvation. For the organism that is the nation to 
function effectively one should value the attributes of all components 
of the organism, not, for example, just the intellectual or industrial 
worker, but the peasant too; not just the Catholic, but the Jew also. 
The Non-Deployment of the Jewish Enemy Myth 
John Paul 11 is not anti-Semitic, although like many Catholic Poles he 
may well perceive of 'Jewish Poles' as Polish citizens of Jewish 
rather than Polish nationality. 616 His lack of anti-Semitism was 
614 Szulc (1995: 40). 
61S Szulc (1995: 32). 
616 In Poland in June 1987, John Paul 11 addressed representatives of the small 
Polish Jewish community and said, in a revealing comment on his concept of 
6nation': 
-Be sure, dear brothers. that the Poles, this Polish Church, is in a spirit of 
profound solidarity with you when she looks closely at the terrible reality of 
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perhaps shaped by his experiences in his youth and during World War 
119 617 and reinforced by the 'spirit of dialogue' associated with papal 
Catholicism from the 1960s. Wojtyla's refusal to succumb to 
prevailing populist anti-Semitic pro-Dmowski illiberal non-ns during 
the pre-1945 period showed his strength of character. Later in his role 
as Archbishop/Cardinal and in his criticism of the regime's evoking 
of the Jewish enemy myth in 1968, he demonstrated to the Polish 
secular left opposition that in him, they had a man of integrity and 
liberal principle. 618 
5.3.3 The Deployment of Myths Fostering Fraternity with Other 
Nations and with Fellow Nationals 
In the context of his war of political legitimacy with the Polish 
communist regime, John Paul 11 used the symbolism of Christian 
solidarity in two key ways. One way was by invoking the concept of 
the extermination - the unconditional extermination - of your nation. ' " As 
cited by OR, 3 August, 1987, p. 10. 
617 Wojtyla's youth coincided with the height of illiberalism in pre-WWII Poland; 
but he had Jewish friends and neighbours. He remembers his parish priest 
preaching that 'anti-Semitism is anti-Christian' and his secondary school Polish 
literature teacher quoting from Mickiewicz's 1848 Manifesto for a Future Slav 
State Constitution that 'all citizens are equal - Israelites, too. ' During World War 
11, Wojtyla helped Jews seek refuge, thereby risking his life. (Szulc 1995: 68-70). 
Time, 3 April, 2000, p. 58 reports Wcjty1a's saving of a 14-year old Jewish girl - 
just released from a Nazi work camp - from death by exhaustion. 
618 Wojtyla showed his opposition to the anti-Semitism of factions within the 
Gomulka-led regime by encouraging his students to care for neglected and 
abandoned Jewish cemeteries. (Nowak 1982: 11). In February 1969, Wojtyla 
visited the two Jewish synagogues, in the Kazimierz district of Krak6w (named 
after Kazimierz the Great), which the Nazis had turned into a sixteen-square mile 
walled ghetto during the war. Hitherto, nobody in Poland had heard of a cardinal 
visiting a synagogue. 
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Christian solidarity/fraternity with other European nations. The other 
way was by invoking Christian solidarity with and amongst urban and 
rural workers and by associating Christian solidarity with the ideals of 
the Solidarity and Rural Solidarity movement. 
5.3.3.1 Fostering fraternity with other nations 
John Paul 11's fraternity with other nations was expressed in his belief 
in the rights of all nations to enjoy self-determination, and was 
probably shaped by his awareness of the dangers of illiberal 
imperialistic nationalisms (for example, those that had resulted in 
Poland's partitioning and re-partitioning) and by his sense of a 
common Christian European culture that he equated with a respect for 
the liberal values of human dignity and human rights. This sense of a 
Christian European culture helps explain the Pope's allusion to 
election and antemurale christiantis myths and his deployment of the 
mythology surrounding two patron saints of Europe. 
His awareness of the dangers of illiberal imperial nationalisms helps 
explain his perception of post-WWII Soviet imperialism, particularly 
in its denial of Poland's right to national self-determination and its 
attempts to 'colonise' Poland's economy, politics, and culture. Thus, 
when speaking to the Polish communist leadership during his 1979 
pilgrimage he said that: 
"'All forms of political, economic or cultural colonialism remain 
in contradiction to the exigencies of the international order, it is 
necessary to esteem all the alliances and pacts which are based 
on reciprocal respect and on the recognition of the good of every 
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nation and of every 
relations. 95ý619 
State in the system of reciprocal 
The above citation is significant in that it demonstrates the John Paul 
11 recognised the universal right of all nations, not just Christian ones, 
to self-determination. 
A key component in John Paul 11's belief in the solidarity of European 
nations is his perception of the role of Christianity on the continent. 
He believes that Europe, both East and West, shares a common spirit, 
shaped by a common Christian history and a culture that respects 
human dignity and human rights. Within the context of a post-Yalta, 
divided Europe and Soviet coercive hegemony, advocating pan- 
European unity was politically dangerous in Eastern Europe. Within 
the official discourse of communist-ruled Poland, the issue of the 
unity of Europe was taboo. The task of the official media and 'court' 
intellectuals, asserts Kubik: 
46was to discount the specificity of Eastern European culture and 
construct a picture of Poland fraternally related to the Soviet 
Union. The idea that European unity should be founded on the 
common Christian background must have sounded even more 
sacrilegious to the official ear. " 620 
John Paul 11 was prepared to break that taboo. Addressing Polish 
bishops at Jasna Gora in June 1979, John Paul 11 said that: 
619 As cited by OR, II June. 1979, p. 3- 
620 Kubik (1994: 143). 
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"'Europe, which despite ongoing divisions of regimes, 
ideologies, and economic-political systems, cannot cease to seek 
its fundamental unity, and must address itself to Christianity. ýiiQl 
In 1980, speaking in France and echoing De Gaulle's pan-European 
vision, the Pope said: 
"' in a multitude of instances, Europe as a whole, from the 
Atlantic to the Urals, in the history of the individual nations as 
well as in the community as a whole, bears witness to the link 
between culture and Christianity. -)ý-) 
622 
Again in 1988, the Pope spoke of Europe's 'common identity' and of 
Europe rediscovering in its roots a 'common spirit. ' 623 He expressed 
the wish that "'Europe ... might one day extend to the dimensions it 
has been given by geography and still more by history. iv) 
624 
Alluding to the Myths of Election and of Anternurale Christiantis 
As a young man in Krakow during WWII, Wojtyla was clearly 
influenced by the 19th Polish romantic political messianism that 
believed Poles were a 'chosen nation' with a special mission of 
disinterested sacrifice to achieve independence for Poland and for 
621 J. Weydenthal and K. Zamorski (eds. ) Pope In Poland. Munich, Radio Free 
Europe Research, 1979, p. 70 as cited by Kubik (1994: 143). 
622 As cited by Walsh (1994: 82). In 1959, de Gaulle. in a speech to the people of 
Strasbourg, had said: "Yes, it is Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, it is 
Europe, it is the whole of Europe, that will decide the fate of the world. " (Le 
Monde, 24 November, 1959, p. 4). 
623 As cited by OR, 14 November, 1988, pp. 7-9. 
624 Speaking in Strasbourg, October 1988. before the Council of Europe and the 
European Court. As cited by Walsh (1994: 20 1). 
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other Christian nations. In November 1939, barely four weeks after 
the Nazis had occupied Krakow, Wojtyla wrote "'Poland has been the 
greatest martyr, she whom He had raised as Christ's bulwark for so 
many centuries. 95ý 
625 Wojtyla confessed bitterly that until then he had 
not seen Poland 'in her real truth'. having been unable to detect: 
"'the atmosphere of ideas that should have surrounded in dignity 
the nation of Mickiewicz, Slowacki, Norwid and Wyspian'ski ... Today ... I understand ... that the idea of Poland lived in us, as a 
romantic generation, but in truth it did not exist because the 
peasant was killed and imprisoned for demanding his just rights 
from the government ... Our liberation must be the gateway of Christ ... (This) nation collapsed, like Israel, because it did not 
encounter the messianic ideal, its own ideal ... that was not fulfilled. 99. ) 626 
Although Wojtyla's above WWII writings indicate a belief in 
messianism and the myth of election, with Poland as a chosen nation, 
as Pope, John Paul 11 did not explicitly preach such beliefs. He did, 
however, allude to the antemurale myth as exemplified earlier in his 
references to King Sobieski's 1683 victory over the Turks. He also 
preached a 'solidarity of Christian nations', that hinted at special 
contributions and disinterested sacrifice by Poland. 
625 As cited by Walsh (1994: 9) in a letter to Mieczyslaw Kotlarczyk, a language 
and drama scholar, who opened the world of 19th Polish Literature and was a key 
formative mentor to the young Wojtyla. (Szulc 1995: 78). 
626 As cited by Szulc (1995: 108) quoting from the same letter to Kotlarczyk. 
Woityla's comparing of Poland with Israel indicates the influence of the Old 
Testament myth of election upon him. 
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The Deployment of The Symbolism of Saints Cyril and Methodius 
Another way in which John Paul 11 emphasised the common 
Christianity of East and West Europe and solidarity with other 
European nations was through the symbolism provided by Saints Cyril 
and Methodius, whom he declared 'the Apostles of the Slavs' and 'co- 
patrons of Europe' 627 at the end of 1980. For John Paul 11, Saints 
Cyril and Methodius not only signified the concept of a Europe which 
embraced both halves of Yalta's divisions, but also emphasised the 
messianic role of pan-Slavism in deepening, evangelising and 
defending a Christian Europe. The work of these two 'co-patrons of 
Europe', John Paul 11 believed: 
"is an outstanding contribution to the formation of the common 
Christian roots of Europe ... which no serious attempt to 
reconstruct in a new and relevant way the unity of the Continent 
can ignore. " 628 
In 1985, in an encyclical that commemorated Saint Methodius's 
evangelising work and his death eleven centuries before, the Pope, 
referring to his 1980 decision to designate the saints as co-patrons, 
stated that it "was dictated by the firm hope of a gradual overcoming 
627 In an Apostolic Letter Of Outstanding Virtue. The brothers, Cyril (827-869) 
and Methodius (c. 826-884/5) were Slav evangelists, canonised by Leo XIII in 
1881, and have Feast Days dedicated to them in both the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Orthodox Church. Thus they also serve for John Paul 11 as symbols of 
reunification of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, a mission close to John Paul 
11's heart. 
628 John Paul 11 (1985: para. 25). 
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in Europe and the world of everything that divides the Churches, 
nations and peoples. " 
629 John Paul 11 argued: 
"Cyril and Methodius are ... the ... spiritual bridge between the Eastern and Western traditions ... (they) made a decisive 
contribution to the building of Europe not only in Christian 
religious communion but also to its civil and cultural union ... (the only way of) overcoming tensions and repairing the 
divisions and antagonisms (in Europe). 5ý 630 
5.3.3.2 Fostering fraternity with fellow nationals 
Two important ways in which the Pope demonstrated his fraternity 
with his fellow nationals, thereby fostering national solidarity, was by 
showing his respect for workers and by associating the Madonna myth 
with the cause of the political movement Solidarity. 
Wojtyla was attracted to Norwid's idea that work was intimately 
bound up with the meaning and dignity of human experience and man 
could redeem himself through his work. This respect for work and 
workers, was an important factor in establishing his temporal as well 
as spiritual credentials with Solidarity and Rural Solidarity members 
629 John Paul 11 (1985: para. 2). He also, in the Encyclical Slavorum Apostoli, 
drew a connection between Christian Poland and the two saints: "The beginnings 
of Christianity in Poland are in a way linked with the work of the Brothers. " (John 
Paul 11 1985: para. 24). In 1985, Slovakia - where the majority are Catholics and 
where Methodius was believed to be buried - witnessed an expression of religious 
feeling of unexpected strength. The Czechoslovakian communist regime refused 
to allow John Paul 11 to attend the eleventh centenary commemorations there. 
(Crampton 1997: 384 & 414). 
630 John Paul 11 (1985: para. 27). 
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and those on the left who believed the working class was the vehicle 
for liberal change. 
Wojtyla's respect for workers was strengthened by his own formative 
experiences, experiences which help explain why he believes not only 
in the intrinsic value of work, but also in solidarity with workers, and 
in social justice, including workers' rights. During 1940-1942 in Nazi- 
occupied Krakow, he worked as a manual worker in a quarry and in a 
factory, and lobbied management for better working conditions. In the 
summer of 1947, Wojtyla had first-hand experience of the worker- 
priest movement in Western Europe and between July 1948 and 
August 1949 he was an Assistant Pastor in a poor rural parish near 
Krakow. 631 
Throughout the 1980s, John Paul 11 strongly supported Solidarity in a 
multitude of direct and indirect behind-the- scene ways. This support 
did a great deal to continue the sense of national solidarity engendered 
631 According to Szulc: 
"Wojtyla's encounter with the worker-priest movement was another major 
turning point in his life. His attitude toward not only the relations between 
the Church and Catholic workers, but, just as importantly, toward the social 
welfare of workers was vastly influenced by his experiences in France and 
Belgium - on top of his own Krakow worker years. They would define 
much of his social justice philosophy. " (Szulc 1995: 148-149). 
In 1956, he wrote a poem, The Quarry, where he expresses the beauty of work, 
and shows his solidarity with workers by paying tribute to a dead 'companion of 
labour'), and praises his fellow workers. Recalling what he gained from his 
wartime experience of work, John Paul 11 said in March 1982: 
-I brought with me the irreplaceable experience of the world and the 
profound dignity of human friendship and vibrant solidarity with my fellow 
workmen. "' As cited by OR, 5 April, 1982, p. 10. 
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by the Pope's 1979 pilgrimage and by the trade union during 1980- 
198 1. It also greatly helped keep Solidarity's liberal flame alive 
during its 1982-1988 underground years. 
In a February 1982 Prayers To Our Lady, John Paul 11 pleaded that 
Mary protect the recently banned Solidarity: 
"'Lady of Jasna Gora! Take under your matemal protection this 
name 'SolidamoS'C' and this profoundly difficult task which it 
implies for the Poles of the eighties. ýiq 
632 
In so pleading, John Paul 11 not only demonstrated his solidarity with 
the workers, but linked the potency of the Madonna myth to help 
create a new Solidarity myth. 
In 1983, addressing Polish bishops at Jasna Gora during his 
pilgrimage, the Pope said: 
"'The Christian doctrine of work postulates both the solidarity of 
workers among themselves and the need for honest solidarity 
with workers. I spoke of this theme in ... June 1982 ... .... Within 
the same community of work, solidarity sets out to discover the 
unity inherent in the nature of the work rather than the forces 
making for division and opposition. It refuses to conceive of 
society in terms of a struggle 'against' and of social relationships 
in terms of uncompromising opposition between classes. 
Solidarity 
... will create the machinery of 
dialogue and co- 
operation that is needed to resolve opposition without seeking to 
destroy the opponent. "" 633 
632 As cited by OR, I March, 1982, p. 11. 
633 As cited by OR. 4 July, 1983, p. 8. 
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The above quotation, in rejecting the use of class struggle and in 
focusing upon 'the unity inherent in the nature of work', echoes the 
thinking of Norwid and Brzozowski and helps explain the liberal 
democratic perspective - as opposed to the Marxist perspective of the 
role of labour - adopted by Solidarity. 
5.4 Conclusions: Fostering A Liberal Political Culture Of 
Opposition 
In his use of history, in his use of a protest repertoire that highlighted 
the Madonna myth, and in his use of pastoral mobilisation during his 
pilgrimages to communist-ruled Poland, John Paul 11 kept alive, and 
extended key features of the Novena as used by Wyszyn'ski. 
Moreover, John Paul 11 developed the repertoire of pre-1945 myths 
and their associated meanings to continue the liberalisation. process 
started by Wyszyn'ski. 
Political Catholicism has, as shown in Chapter 2, traditionally treated 
liberalism with much suspicion. This suspicion remained during the 
20th century. John Paul 11 himself, in 1979, said that the world faced a 
choice between three movements that were 'in acute conflict. ' One 
was Marxism, another "'rationalism, Enlightenment and scientism 
the so-called ... 'liberalism' of Western nations, which 
brought with it 
the radical negation of Christianity"' 634 The third option, he asserted, 
was Christianity. Much of this chapter implicitly takes issue with the 
Pope's stark options and has shown that, in practice, within the Polish 
034 As cited by Kwitny (1998: 349). 
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political context, he combined Christianity with many of the key 
values of liberalism and in doing so helped create a liberal Political 
culture of opposition. An analogy may be the Church's belief that it 
could offer a third way between capitalism and communism. In 
practice, as exemplified by Christian Democracy, it supported a 
Christian-influenced liberal democracy. For example, the chapter has 
shown that although the starting point of much of the Pope's political 
thinking was from a particular Catholic/Christian/Polish perspective, 
John Paul 11 developed his thinking to propagate universal liberal 
ideals. Thus, although his motivation with regards to freedom of 
conscience may have been determined by his desire for freedom of 
Catholic worship in communist Poland, he extended this to propagate 
a belief in freedom of conscience for all and a belief in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 635 To take another example, although 
his concern for the rights of nations may have been focused upon 
Poland and other Christian European nations, he recognised that all 
nations had the right to self-determination and respect. In (John Paul 
1991: Para. 45), the Pope clearly expresses his belief in the 
modernliberal democratic welfare state. 636 Others have also 
questioned the extent to which the Catholic Church was truly liberal 
635 The dissident Catholic intellectual Hennelowa told this author of her realisation 
that legal rights meant rights for all, even if that meant freedom for non-believers 
to choose different values. (Hennelowa 1998). 
636 
"The State must contribute to the achievement of these goals both directly 
and indirectly. Indirectly and according to the principle of subsidiarity, by 
creating favorable conditions for the free exercise of economic activity, 
which will lead to abundant opportunities for employment and sources of 
wealth. Directly and according to the principle of solidarity, by defending 
the weakest, by placing certain limits on the autonomy of the parties who 
determine working conditions, and by ensuring in every case the necessary 
minimum support for the unemployed worker. " (John Paul 11 1991: para. 1). 
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or merely expedient. 637 Also as other chapters argue that the 
liberalisation of the opposition was not merely transient and not 
merely a question of expediency, this debate will be revisited in the 
concluding chapter. 
The present chapter demonstrated how John Paul 11 was able to 
exploit the attributes of pre-1945 myths, symbols and rituals to foster 
a potent liberal political culture of opposition that constituted a serious 
challenge to the regime's political culture. The Pope exploited the 
transmitting ability of myths and symbols that allowed him to link the 
legitimacy of past struggles to contemporary ones and thereby 
facilitate the process of 'adapted continuity'. He demonstrated the 
ability of rituals to create solidarity in the absence of complete 
political consensus and the ability of myths and symbols, given their 
inherent attributes of condensation of meaning, multivocality and 
ambiguity, to give different messages to different people. The ritual of 
annual commemoration, of Holy Mass, and of pilgrimages, afforded 
John Paul 11 the opportunity of combining numerous cognitive 
messages with high emotion. For, as Kertzer recognised, rituals do 
not simply excite, they also instruct with the potency of that 
instruction depending heavily on the power of ritual to place the 
individual in a receptive frame of mind. 
The chapter has also shown how John Paul 11 was able, aided by his 
deployment of pre- 1945 myths, to credibly and effectively synthesise 
strands of pre-1945 idealistic and realistic proto-liberal nationalism 
637 See, for example Szacki (1995: 73). 
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and strands of Polish and papal liberal political Catholicism. The 
chapter has shown that the pre-1945 myths allowed him to continue 
the process of synthesis between nationalism and political 
Catholicism; a synthesis that contributed to the formation and 
fostering of a liberal political culture of opposition. The chapter has 
shown how, in his rejection of the meanings attached to the enemy 
myths associated with the illiberal Dmowski-influenced political 
culture of pre-WWII Poland, the Pope was able to use these myths to 
criticise illiberal systems and regimes rather than engender hatred. 
Kubik (1994: 152) describes the religious ceremonies of the Pope's 
1979 pilgrimage in ten-ns of 'transformative ceremonies' that 
"do not serve to settle social conflicts but to articulate and 
amplify them; they are staged by the oppressed in situations in 
which other forms of rebellion do not seem viable. " 
Kubik's point is highly significant in helping to explain the crucial 
role of political Catholicism and its pre-1945 myths, symbols and 
rituals. During the Stalinist era, the regime had tried to take on the 
Church frontally and had failed, as was symbolically expressed by 
Wyszyn"ski's release from detention in 1956. Given this failure, the 
regime was very reluctant to take on the Church directly again. At the 
same time, the regime was prepared to attack the Church if it was 
explicitly political, and to ban other components of the opposition, 
particularly when they raised transparently contemporary political 
issues. The pre-1945 myths were the Church's way of manifesting an 
alternative political culture of opposition where other avenues were 
denied. Despite the regime seeing through this smokescreen, it was 
much harder for it to prevent the use of such ethereal, multivocal and 
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ambiguous mythology, particularly with the eyes of the world upon 
its chief propagator, the Pope. 
638 
John Paul 11's political exploitation of mythology, symbolism and 
ritual was so effective during his 1979 pilgrimage, and the resulting 
sense of national solidarity so strong, that it was this pilgrimage that 
proved to be the point of no return for Poland rather than the advent of 
the political movement Solidarity. As a result of his 1979 pilgrimage, 
John Paul 11 broke the hegemony of communist discourse that had 
hitherto prevailed. 639 What is more, during this pilgrimage John Paul 
11 imbued millions of Poles with a sense of national solidarity. John 
Paul 11 developed this sense of national solidarity not only through his 
unifying presence, but also through his use of the symbolism of 
Christian solidarity and of ritual, which possesses the power, as 
640 Kertzer recognised , to produce 
bonds of solidarity without 
requiring uniformity of belief. The chapter has shown how, as part of 
this 1979 national solidarity formation process, the Polish Pope helped 
to continue the process of uniting dissident liberal-leaning Catholic 
and secular left intelligentsia through his deployment of myths, 
symbols and rituals. The national solidarity engendered by the Pope 
helps explain the birth barely a year later of Solidarity and the liberal 
road that it was to take. John Paul 11's post-1981 deployment of pre- 
1945 myths, symbols and rituals helps explain how Solidarity's 
638 Nearly a thousand foreign correspondents covered the Pope's 1979 pilgrimage, 
(Guardian, 7 June, 1979, p. 6) and there were even more for the second in 1983. 
One estimate for 1983. perhaps including Polish journalists too. said 'nearly 
1.500' (The Universe, 24 June, 1983, p. 14). 
639 As Kubik (1994: 150) notes. 
640 Kertzer (1988: 99 & 67). 
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liberal flame was kept alive during the years of the union's 
banishment. The following chapter explores the influence of pre- 1945 
myths of nationalism and political Catholicism, that John Paul 11 so 
successfully deployed, on Solidarity. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYTHS, SYMBOLS 
AND RITUALS OF PRE-1945 POLISH NATIONALISM AND 
POLITICAL CATHOLICISM UPON SOLIDARITY 
6.1 Introduction: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Solidarity 
And Polish Nationalism And Political Catholicism 
The main aim of this chapter is to show the influence of myths, 
symbols and rituals of pre-1945 nationalism and political Catholicism 
on Solidarity and, in particular, to show how these myths, symbols 
and rituals acted as vehicles for the union's liberal political culture. 
Much of the empirical evidence within this chapter is related to 
outward manifestations of nationalism and political Catholicism that 
appeared during the formative period of the 14-31 August 1980 strike 
at the Gdansk Lenin Shipyard. This strike culminated in the historic 
Gdansk Agreement and the emergence of the fledgling independent 
workers' movement, Solidarity. The Solidarity movement actually 
comprised two trade union/political wings: Solidarity and Rural 
Solidarity. During their first legal phases that ended with Martial Law 
in December 1981, the vast majority of Polish workers chose to be 
members of these unions, despite the continued presence of regime- 
sanctioned unions. There were some 10 million urban, mainly 
industrial, workers within Solidarity and some 3.5 million agricultural 
workers within Rural Solidarity. 
One of the two key Western academic debates 641 of the 1990s 
concerning Solidarity in its first legal 1980-1981 phase, was 
641 The other key debate concerned the role of the Soviets in the introduction of 
Martial Law to outlaw Solidarity. Garton Ash (1999: 364). 
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concemed with the extent to which Solidarity owed its genesis to the 
workers themselves 642 or to the opposition intellectuals, especially 
those within KOR, who might have played a more, or equally, 
significant role. See, for example, Kubik (1994: 230-238) and Osa 
(1997: 339-343), or Garton Ash (1999: 364-365) who is a proponent 
of this latter 'equally significant' position. 643 Although the main 
purpose of this chapter is not to focus on the genesis of Solidarity, 
nevertheless this and other Part 2 chapters have a bearing on the 
'workers and/or intellectuals' debate. Kubik (1994: 238) concludes 
that it was neither the workers nor the intellectuals that were 
responsible for Solidarity, but rather 'a new cultural-political class'. 
The judgement reached by this author is that both workers and 
intellectuals were 'necessary but not sufficient in themselves' to create 
and sustain the liberal-leaning Solidarity political movement of the 
1980s, and that liberal nationalism and liberal political Catholicism 
played a greater role in shaping Solidarity's outlook than class 
politics. A more pertinent issue, given the concerns of this thesis, is 
the role of pre- 1945 myths of nationalism and political Catholicism in 
the genesis and sustenance of Solidarity. Osa (1997: 339-340) asserts 
"the most dismissed and controversial bystander in the debate over 
Solidarity's origins is the Catholic church. " Osa (1997: 364) 
concludes that "the Church was crucial in the emergence and 
642 See Roman Laba's Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's 
Working-Class Democratization, Princeton University Press: Princeton: 1991 and 
Lawrence Goodwyn's Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1991. Laba and Goodwyn both argue that the 
workers were the prime force responsible for the genesis of Solidarity. 
643 Garton Ash (1999: 365) concedes however that KOR secular left members 
Kuroh and Michnik thought that free trade unions were impossible in 1980, given 
the implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine. 
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activation of the movement across social boundaries. " This author 
concurs with Osa's conclusion and in this chapter, systematically 
explores the Church's influence, via Catholic myths, symbols and 
rituals, upon Solidarity. The chapter also systematically examines the 
influence of national myths on the genesis and sustenance of 
Solidarity. Only a few works have explored the influence of 
mythology/symbolism on Solidarity. Laun in her article (Laun 2000) 
does so indirectly, but her main focus is on the impact of idealism and 
realism within Solidarity during the 1980-1993 period. Kubik (1994 
Chapter 7) devotes a chapter to the 'Symbols and ceremonies of 
Solidarity', but does so without an easily discernible theme. 
The chapter will argue that Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism, in providing their repertoires of pre- 1945 myths, symbols 
and rituals, contributed a great deal to Solidarity. 644 These myths, 
symbols and rituals, it will be argued, helped create a sense of 
solidarity, enhance morale and legitimise the union's struggle for its 
very existence, for its survival, and for its tasks of bettering the 
conditions of workers and of striving for popular sovereignty and 
national self-determination. 
As previous chapters have already shown, such is the closeness of the 
relationship between nationalism and political Catholicism that it is 
644 This chapter focuses on the politically more significant urban Solidarity. but it 
should not be forgotten that the influence of nationalism and political Catholicism 
on Rural Solidarity was probably even greater. ISee, for example, Garton Ash 
1991 and The Times, 22 January, 1981 as cited by Szajkowski (1983: 148-149). 
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inherently difficult to portray their contributions separately. The 
empirical evidence provided within this chapter supports this 
contention of closeness and inextricable connections. 
Notwithstanding, insofar as it is possible, the chapter will reveal 
Polish nationalism's contribution to Solidarity by exploring the role of 
myths and symbols of pre-1945 idealistic nationalism and by 
examining Solidarity's deployment of the symbolism of the national 
flag, anthem and emblem and its deployment of the ritual of protest 
singing. Similarly, the chapter will reveal political Catholicism's 
contribution to Solidarity by exploring the role of the ritual of Holy 
Mass, the role of the myths of sacred omnipotent saviours, and by 
examining the role of political Catholicism in influencing Solidarity's 
leader, Lech Walqsa. 
Although it is not the immediate concern of this thesis, it should not 
be forgotten that political Catholicism also gave much more tangible 
aid to Solidarity during 1980-1989. Examples of this contribution 
include political Catholicism's support for the workers' civil rights, 
political Catholicism's negotiations with the regime on Solidarity's 
behalf when the union was outlawed during the 1982-1988 period, and 
the practical support, including physical resources, afforded by the 
Church to Solidarity during the critical 1989 election campaign. It 
should also be noted that the relationship between Solidarity on the 
one hand, and Polish nationalism and political Catholicism on the 
other was a symbiotic one, with both sides contributing and gaining. 
Thus in 1989, Polish nationalism, in large part thanks to Solidarity, 
realised its twin key aims of popular sovereignty and national self- 
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determination. Political Catholicism also received a great deal from 
Solidarity, not least the right of access to the mass media, one of the 
original sixteen demands of the August 1980 Gdansk strikers. These 
original demands were made on the 18 August. On 20 August 1980, 
the Inter-Factory Strike Committee had extended the original 16 
demands to 21 and now, in an example of the nascent union's liberal 
nature, were asking for mass media access as a constitutional right, 
and not only for the Catholic Church, but "for representatives of all 
Faiths. " 
645 The strikers' demands were conceded. The 31 August 
1980 Gdansk Agreement included the following point: 
"'The access to the mass media by religious organizations ... will be worked out through an agreement between the state 
institutions and the religious associations. 999 646 
6.2 The Role Of Myths And Symbols Of Pre-1945 Idealistic 
Nationalism 
Many of the myths and symbols deployed by Solidarity were linked 
with the traditions of idealistic nationalism of pre-1945 Poland, such 
as the myths of military valour associated with the physical force 
tradition of the period of Partitions (1772-1918) and of WWII (1939- 
1945). Thus during the 1980s, Solidarity members and supporters 
commemorated the anniversaries of the 1830-1831 and 1863-1864 
Uprisings, and the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. 647 Like the Pope, 
645 Part of their 3rd demand. As cited by Biernacki (2000: 18). 
646 As cited by Stokes (1991 a: 207). 
647 Wenzel (1998: 142). 
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Solidarity deployed the myths of military valour not to signal its 
desire to use physical force, but to remind those in power that there 
were extreme circumstances, such as a Soviet invasion, where the use 
of force by the opposition was justified. 
Solidarity's idealistic nationalism was sometimes expressed via the 
myths and symbols of romanticism and of neo-romanticism as 
epitomised by the works of the Romantic Bards, Mickiewicz and 
Slowacki, and by the mythology/symbolism surrounding Pilsudski and 
the Home Army (AK). On 28 August 1980, actors of the Theatre of 
the Coast performed to the striking Gdansk shipyard workers. They 
recited from Poland's great romantic poets, greatly appreciated by the 
strikers. 648 In Tomes of the Polish Nation and the Polish Pilgrimage 
(1832), written just after the 1830-1931 National Uprising, initially 
against the Russians, Mickiewicz, the most influential of the Bards, 
deploys the Christ of Nations' myth of election in his political 
messianism. He presents Poland as a nation that has been martyred to 
restore Christ to Europe, and the partitions as a divine crucifixion. 649 
The actors read for the Gdan" sk shipyard workers from the 18 32 work, 
including the line where Poland speaks and evokes the liberal values 
of liberty and equality: "'Whoever comes to me will be free and equal, 
because I am FREEDOM. 959 650 In response to the strikers' repeated 
requests, The Confederate Song from Slowacki 's Father Mark (1843) 
was mass-duplicated. The Confederacy referred to in the song was the 
648 Kubik (1994: 19 1). 
649 Laun (2000). 
650 
As cited by Bqdkowski (1982: 13 7). 
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Bar Confederacy, which, it will be recalled, was an anti-royalist group 
of Polish nobles that waged a war of national self-determination from 
1768-1772 against the ever increasing Russian domination. The song 
evokes myths of omnipotent saviours in the cause of national self- 
determination and begins with the defiant words: 
"'Never shall we make alliance with kings, 
Never shall we bow our necks to might; 
It is from Christ we take our orders, 
Each of us Mary's knight! "' 
The poem ends with the declaration: 
"'Hunger nor misfortune shall not break us, 
Nor the world's flattery shall lead us astray: 
For we are all the recruits of Christ, 
Each of us in His pay! "' 
651 
Pilsudski was known for his lack of anti-Semitism. 652 In embracing 
the symbolism of Pilsudski, who was seen not as a dictator nor a 
denier of popular sovereignty, but as a symbol of Poland's restoration 
of national self-determination against Russian/Soviet coercive 
hegemony, Solidarity disavowed the symbolism of Dmowski and his 
illiberalism. The Solidarity press in 1981, for example, began to write 
about Polish national minorities, including the Jews, in a positive 
651 As cited by B4dkowski (1982: 13 1). 
652 For example, in 1926 Pilsudski granted some 600,000 Jews who had fled into 
Poland from the East due to fear of persecution full citizenship rights, saying that 
Poland could not afford to have second-class citizens. (www. geocities. com 
/Capitol HiI I/Parl iament/6 764/1917-193 8. html). 
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light . 
653 Several of Solidarity's advisers - for example Bronislaw 
Geremek, Kuron' and Michnik - were of Jewish origin. A hand-written 
inscription placed on the wooden cross that in August 1980 marked 
the memorial spot for the 1970 shipyard martyrs (see later) was a line 
associated with the Pilsudski's Legionnaires' 1917 song March of the 
First Brigade: "'To want to is to be able to. JOzef Pilsudski. 91,654 
During the 1980s, Solidarity members and supporters commemorated 
the II November Independence Day anniversaries. In doing so, they 
evoked a foundation myth closely associated with Pilsudski and the 
restoration of national self-determination. 
Amongst the nationalist slogans daubed in the Lenin Shipyard in 
August 1980 was the Home Army's motto: God, Honour, 
Fatherland. 655 Two sources that may have stirred the Home Army 
myths of military valour in the cause of national self-deten-nination 
were memoirs by Jan Nowak-Jezioran'ski (1913-) and by Stefan 
Korbon'ski (1901-1989) of their WWII underground resistance 
experience. Despite the regime's attempts to erase the exploits of the 
Home Army from Polish history, the two memoirs were disseminated 
in the underground press in the late 1970s and, according to Anna 
Cienciala, helped fuel the national revival embodied in the Solidarity 
movement . 
656 During the war, Nowak- Jezioran'ski had been a courier 
653 Wr6bel (1997: 566). 
654 Kubik (1994: 187). 
6" Bqdkowski (1982: 132). 
65 6 Cienciala (1983: 78). 
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between the Home Army and the Polish Government in exile in 
London. From 1952-1976, Nowak- Jeziorafiski was Director of the 
Polish Section of the CIA-funded Radio Free Europe. During WWII, 
Korbon'ski had been a member of the Political Consultative 
Committee of Sikorski's London-based Polish Government. In 1945, 
Korbonski became the Government in Exile's Acting Delegate to 
Poland. In 1947 he was briefly an MP for the Polish Peasants' Party 
(PSL), but in November 1947 Korbonski emigrated to the US. 657 
6.3 Solidarity's Deployment Of The Symbolism Of The National 
Flag, Anthem And Emblem 
When Solidarity deployed the national flag, anthem and emblem, it 
did so in a manner that made it clear that its deployment differed from 
that of the Party-state's deployment. The Party-state's deployment of 
these symbols of the nation attempted to convey that the Party-State 
best represented the nation. In contrast, Solidarity's deployment 
signalled that the trade union better represented the nation than the 
Party-state. It signalled this difference by altering the political 
meanings associated with these symbols of the nation and by 
challenging the Party-state's attempts to monopolise their use. In 
1982. ) Maria Janion, a Professor of Polish 
Literature, poetically wrote 
about the August 1980 Gdansk strikers' response to the state's 
'institutional isation' of the National Anthem, of the national colours, 
and of the national emblem - symbols which the regime allowed to be 
657 Coutouvidis (1986: 30,187,188 & 224). 
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used in strictly defined circumstances, treating all other uses as a 
crime. Janion argued that the shipyard workers: 
"hung out ... the national flags 'without an order', and gave the 
powers that be to understand that they would use the National 
Anthem and the national emblem and the national colours when 
it was absolutely necessary for them - to live. "" 
658 
The National Flag was prominently displayed within the Lenin 
Shipyard during the August 1980 strike. Several writers have 
commented upon the role of the national flag in defining national 
identity, and of its political potency. Kertzer, for example, argues that: 
64a flag is not simply a decorated cloth, but the embodiment of a 
nation; indeed, the nation is defined as much by the flag as the 
flag is defined by the nation. " 659 
What is more, the founder of modem political Zionism and the 
designer of the Israeli state flag, Theodore Herzl, went even further: 
"'with a flag one can do anything, even lead a people into the 
promised land. 911 660 
The National Anthem. ) as sung 
by the 1980 strikers, was a song of 
protest, for it exPressed their sense of continuing to fight for national 
self-determination. The strikers, not least Walqsa, frequently sang the 
Anthem. In his memoirs, Walqsa wrote, 
658 Janion (1982: 136). 
659 Kertzer (1988: 7). 
660 
As cited by Kertzer (1988: 174). 
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"I sometimes feel as if I belong to a past age, the age which is 
evoked in our national anthem. ... The conditions in which this 
anthem saw the light of day are much the same as those we live 
under today, and the same can be said of the hopes and values it 
expresses: courage, defiance, pride. 99 661 
It will be recalled that the National Anthem was composed in 1797, 
shortly after the third partitioning of Poland, for General D4browski 
who was organising Polish Legions to be incorporated into 
Napoleon's army. Poles hoped that Napoleon, in his opposition to the 
three partitioning powers of Poland, would deliver to them national 
self-determination. Walqsa in his above-mentioned comments was 
clearly stating the view held by most Solidarity members and 
supporters. This was that the post-1945 position in Poland was, as a 
result of foreign coercive hegemony, similar to that of the period of 
partitions, namely that Poland had been yet again deprived of her right 
to national self-determination. 
In the afternoon of 24 August 1980, the final fragments of the address 
of First Secretary Gierek to the Party's Central Committee were 
relayed to the Lenin Shipyard strikers. When Gierek started to intone 
the Internationale, all the strikers started to sing the National Anthem 
very loudly. 662 The incident graphically illustrated the strikers use of 
the National Anthem as a protest song and showed how songs could 
serve as symbols of the confrontation between international class 
politics and nationalism; a confrontation that was an important aspect 
661 Walqsa (1988: 310-311). 
662 
Bqdkowski (1982: 77). 
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of the war of political legitimacy between the regime and the 
opposition. 
In August 1980, the national emblem, a white eagle on a red 
background, was to be seen displayed around the Lenin Shipyard. 
Usually, the displayed eagles were crowned, in defiance of the 
communist regime that had removed the crown from the emblem 
shortly after coming to power. In an incident that illustrated both the 
political idealism and realism of the Solidarity strikers, the strikers' 
leadership ordered the crowns adorning the two eagles displayed on 
the shipyard fence to be removed, so as to avoid unnecessary 
confrontation with the authorities. 663 664 
The political potency of the Solidarity emblem, created during the 
August 1980 strikes, can be better understood, if it is seen in terms of 
combining the symbolism of the national colours, the symbolism of 
the national flag and the symbolism of solidarity amongst fellow 
nationals. The colours used for the emblem are the national colours of 
white and red. Atop the letter N of the union's name SOLIDARNOSC 
there is a small Polish flag. The letters leaning one upon another 
rr 
within the word SOLIDARNOSC signified the union's belief in 
solidarity with fellow citizens. The letters cannot stand by themselves: 
each needs the support of its neighbours. 665 Evidence of the political 
potency of the Solidarity emblem is provided by the fact that soon 
663 In one case at least, the strikers had literally sawn the crown off. Bqdkowski 
(1982: 183). 
664 Kubik (1994: 195). 
66S 
Kubik (1994: 7& 195). 
328 
after the banning of the union in December 198 1, the regime decreed 
666 
the use of the Solidarity emblem as illegal. With the banning of the 
emblem, many Poles wore, in lieu of Solidarity badges, badges with 
the Black Madonna icon. This use of the icon was also a telling 
indication of the political potency of the Madonna myth, and of the 
myth's ability to adapt to new political circumstances and serve as a 
vehicle for political messages when other alternatives were prohibited. 
6.4 Solidarity's Deployment Of The Ritual Of Protest Singing 
Chapter I noted the role of the ritual of annual commemoration in 
constantly reviving the collective ideals of the community. As 
exemplified in this chapter and also Chapter 3, Solidarity also 
deployed anniversaries, and in so doing, not only revived ideals but 
legitimised its own struggle by association with past struggles. 
Chapter I also explored the theoretical role of rituals in morale 
enhancing, in legitimising and in solidarity creating, without requiring 
uniformity of belief. The practical roles of rituals of the singing of 
hymns/protest songs and rituals of Holy Masses supporting Solidarity 
were to validate this theory. The political significance of these rituals 
was felt particularly during times of crisis, such as the strikes of 1980 
and 1988, during the autumn of 1981, and following the murder of 
Father Jerzy Popiefuszko (1947-1984). 
During the 1980s, there were many times when Solidarity members 
and supporters must have despaired of victory over the regime. 
666 Mach (1985: 34). 
329 
Kertzer notes that the singing of protest songs helps maintain the 
morale of protesters in the face of defeat by legitimating their own 
cause and by implication, de-legitimating that of their adversaries. He 
adds: 
"Such rites are also important in attaching participants to a longer 
tradition of protest, lending the legitimacy obtained by the earlier 
protest movement to the newer movement. " 667 
During the August 1980 Lenin ShiPyard Strike many pre- 1945 
patriotic protest songs were sung. Many of them evoked the 
symbolism associated with the struggle for national self- 
determination. Apart from the use of the National Anthem composed 
in 1797, the strikers sung the 1816 God Who Protects Poland hymn; 
the 1908 Rota song; and the 1917 March of the First Brigade 668 song 
of the Pilsudski's legionnaires who fought against Czarist Russian 
troops in the fight for national self-determination. 
Virtually every evening during the Lenin Shipyard Strike of August 
1980, the strikers, led by Walqsa, sang the National Anthem and God 
Who Protects Poland . 
669Thus, on the evening before the signing of 
the Gdansk Agreement, Walqsa ended his address to some two to 
three thousand strikers with the words: 
"'tomorrow ... our Poland will 
have more citizens. And now, 
therefore, let us sing the National Anthem for this country of 
667 Kertzer (1988: 122). 
668 Laun (2000). 
669 
Walqsa (1988: 162). 
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ours. .... Oh, and one more thing: Let us sing a religious song to God because now we can't go any further without God. ,, 
670 
His juxtapositioning of sentences in the above address skilfully linked 
the vision of popular sovereignty with a nationalism legitimised by the 
National Anthem and with an evocation of the omnipotent saviour 
myth of God. The strikers, by defiantly singing 'Restore, 0 Lord, our 
free country' instead of the regime-preferred 'Bless, 0 Lord, our free 
country', were calling for national self-determination with the help of 
the God myth. It will be recalled that the striker's version was the 
original last line from the 1816 patriotic hymn as sung during the 
Partitions. 
The Rota song, it will also be recalled, was a song protesting the 
process of Germanisation within the German partition. By altering the 
lyrics of the Rota appropriately, for example the lines "We won't be 
spat on by the Teutons, Nor let our children become German, " the 
strikers sometimes switched the focus away from hatred of the 
German enemy - one of the Party-state's key illiberal enemy myths - 
to a criticism of the Soviet regime. 
Even when the strikers sang more recent protest songs, such songs 
could deploy the myths and symbols associated with the struggles of 
the past to fight current battles. The prime example of such a song was 
the popular song with lyrics by Jan Pietrzak That Poland may be 
Poland. The song acquired the political legitimacy associated with the 
protest song-singing ritual. It did so by linking Poland's current 
670 Bqdkowski (1982: 66). 
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struggle for national self-determination with pre- 1945 traditions of 
protest against lack of national self-determination due to foreign 
domination. 671 Written in 1976, and influenced by the Radom and 
Ursus workers' protests 672 against regime- introduced price rises, That 
Poland may be Poland became the unofficial hymn of Solidarity 
during the 1980 August strikes. The song included references to 
patriotic insurrectionary, with descriptions of Poland's historic 
struggle against both Russian and German partitioning. It also had 
references to the poetry of Norwid and to the priest Piotr Sciegienny 
(1801-1890). In 1842, Father Sciegienny had written, under the guise 
of a Gregory XVI papal encyclical, a political tract that defended a 
Christian vision of socialism. Father Sciegienny organised a 
revolutionary conspiracy among peasants against Czarist rule and, on 
capture, Sciegienny was sentenced to a Siberian labour camp. As with 
most National Anthems, including the Polish, Pietrzak's song evoked 
sentimental imagery, in this case, of mothers and wives sewing the 
'Honour and Fatherland' motto into flags. 673 The motto God, Honour, 
Fatherland had a long heritage associated with the Uprisings during 
the Partitions, with the Second Republic and with the Home Army 
who appropriated the motto as their own. The references to Norwid 
and the use of the 'Honour and Fatherland' motto without the 
evocation of God may be indicative of Pietrzak's desire to evoke a 
liberal, inclusive nationalism that did not exclude non-Catholics. His 
reference to Father Sciegienny, and thereby to a Christian vision of 
671 Laun (2000). 
672 There were smaller protests elsewhere in Poland too. 
673 Source for the lyrics: http: //www-personal. engin. umich. edu/-zbigniewiHymny 
/HPie. html. 
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socialism, may be indicative of Pietrzak's wish to 
liberal/progressive political Catholicism. 
6.5 The Role Of The Ritual Of Holy Mass 
portray a 
In December 1970, Baltic-coast workers protested a regime-forced 
increase in prices. On 16 December 1970, with the police and army 
surrounding the Baltic shipyards, Gdansk workers were shot dead by 
regime forces in front of the gates of the Gdansk Lenin Shipyard. 674 
For one shipyard worker in particular, a member of the 1970 strike 
committee, the duty to honour the martyrs' memory became a driving 
force, almost an obsession. His name was Lech Walqsa. 675 The day 
after the shooting, on Thursday 17 December 1970, workers on their 
way to work at the Gdynia shipyards were also shot dead on the orders 
of the authorities. 676 Subsequently, the local parish priest to the 
677 Gdynia Paris Commune Shipyard, Father Hilary Jastak , celebrated, 
674 Nonnally when reference was made by writers on Solidarity to the Gdansk 
Shipyard during the 1980 and 1988 strikes, it meant the Lenin Shipyard. 
However, there were another two, less well-known shipyards in Gdafisk; the 
Repair Shipyard and the Northern Shipyard. 
675 Garton Ash (1991 a: 14). 
676 On the same day, 17 December 1970. striking shipyard workers in Szczecin 
demonstrating outside the local Party headquarters were fired at and tanks were 
deployed. Kuroh (1996: 3 05). 
677 Father Jastak was a priest to the Church of the Sacred Heart. the local church to 
the Gdynia Paris Commune Shipyard. In the late 1970s, Free Trade Union (WZZ) 
activists used his Presbytery and flat as 'safe houses". WZZ was to be the 
precursor of Solidarity, with many of the WZZ activists involved in the fon-nation 
and leadership of Solidarity. 
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first daily, later annually, 678 a Holy Mass for 'the killed, the wounded 
and the imprisoned' following the 'Black Thursday' attacks. 
679 
In retrospect, Walqsa and Father Jastak's responses to the 1970 
killings can be seen as having significant political repercussions. 
Walqsa's 1970 response helps explain his involvement in the 1980 
formation of Solidarity. Similarly Jastak's 1970s' deployment of 
Holy Mass to show solidarity with the dissident workers helps 
explain the critical 1980s' role of Holy Mass in supporting Solidarity 
and the moral and political legitimacy enjoyed by political 
Catholicism in its support of dissident workers and subsequently of 
Solidarity. 
Shortly after the 14 August 1980 commencement of the Lenin 
Shipyard strike, a ROPOO activist suggested that the local priest to 
the Lenin Shipyard, Father Henryk Jankowski 9 
680 dedicate a wooden 
678 Walqsa (1988: 72). 
679 On 27 January 1971, Jastak wrote to Wyszyn'ski with a detailed account of the 
true events of 'Black Thursday'. It was, he said, necessary to multiply the official 
figure of 21 deaths, 'several times'. "In one hospital alone 15 people died. " 
WOjcicki (1999: 171). 
680 Father Jankowski, (1937-), is rector of Saint Brigid's, the local church to the 
Gdahsk Lenin Shipyard. From August 1980, he was also Chaplain to Solidarity. 
Jankowski is a friend of Walqsa. After Martial Law, Jankowski organised aid for 
repressed Solidarity members and their families. Atypically for priests that 
supported Solidarity during the 1980s, Jankowski is known for his illiberal 
nationalism, including anti-Semitism. His views are reminiscent of the inter-war 
integral nationalism of followers of Dmowski and of certain Church figures and 
also of certain 1945-1989 'national non-communists'. In 1995, for example. 
Jankowski likened the Star of David to the hammer-and-sickle and swastika, and 
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cross to the memory of the December 1970 martyrs. On 16 August 
1980, a delegation of striking workers in the Gdynia Paris Commune 
Shipyard requested that Holy Mass be celebrated in their shipyard 
also. Hence the following day, Sunday 17 August 1980, the same day 
as Father Jankowski was celebrating Mass in the Gdansk Lenin 
Shipyard, Father Jastak celebrated Holy Mass in the neighbouring 
Gdynia Paris Commune Shipyard. 681 
Garton Ash wrote an eyewitness account of the first Holy Mass at the 
Lenin Shipyard: 
"So at nine o'clock on the morning of Sunday 17 August, Father 
Jankowski celebrated Mass at a makeshift altar on a platform 
inside Gate No. 2 (the Main Gate of the Lenin Shipyard). The 
blue-grey gates were adorned with flowers and a large, framed 
colour photograph of the Pope. ... 
After Mass, Jankowski blessed 
the crude wooden cross ... 
Later a sheet of paper, decorated with 
a ribbon in the national colours and a small image of the 
Madonna, was pinned to the cross. It bore some lines from 
Byron's Giaour: 682 
For Freedom's battle once begun 
Bequeath'd by bleeding sire to son, 
Though baffled oft is ever won. 9,683 
said the Poles should not allow those who owed 'secret allegiance' to Israel or 
Russia to remain in the government. (http: Hwww. axt. org uk/antisem/ archive/ 
archive2/poland/poland. htm#Religious and http: //www. warsawvoice. pl/v407/ 
NewsO I. html). 
681 WOjcicki (1999: 18 1). 
682 Byron's Giaour was fairly well known in Poland thanks to a translation by 
Mickiewicz. 
683 Garton Ash (1991 a: 48-49). 
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However, as noted by Garton Ash, and an indication of the worker's 
disavowal of the physical force tradition, the dedication omitted the 
word 'bleeding'. Some 4,000 strikers took part in the Mass; an 
additional 2,000 were outside the gates. 684 From 18 August 1980, 
three priests could be seen inside the Lenin Shipyard saying Mass. 685 
The Holy Mass now became a daily part of the strikers' life. 
On Sunday 24 August 1980 several thousand took part in a morning 
Holy Mass celebrated by Father Jankowski on both sides of the Main 
Lenin Shipyard Gate. Confession and communion followed the 
686 Mass. 
A young priest, Father Malkowski, wrote an account of his visit on 27 
and 28 August 1980, first to the Gdansk Lenin and then the Gdynia 
Paris Commune Shipyards. It seemed that the proletarian symbolism 
of Lenin and of the Paris Commune had been replaced by the 
symbolism of a more liberal political Catholicism. 
"'My cassock enabled me to gain entry to the Shipyard. The 
enemy was nowhere to be seen; the police kept their distance and 
behaved fairly discreetly. It was the first time for several decades 
that power had been in the hands of the people, and these people 
turned out to be God's people - not a mob thirsting for anarchy or 
684 Szajkowski (1983: 91). 
68i From Keston File PO/11/1(1980) 'Church Involvement in Workers' Unrest: 
The Episcopate, the Pope', quoting Catholic Herald, 22 August, 1980, - 'Polish 
strikers rally to Church. " 
686 Biemacki (2000: 22) and Bqdkowski (1982: 77). 
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revenge, but people capable of self-government, aware that 
public order is founded on moral law, the law of the heart. The 
cross in the main conference hall symbolized the real presence of 
Christ in the hearts of the strikers, those celebrating the festival 
of truth and justice. Lenin looked towards the window as if 
wanting to escape. ... The presence of the 
Church among the 
workers was even more evident at Gdynia than at Gdansk. In the 
Gdynia Shipyard the priests were celebrating a solemn Mass 
twice a day. ýqq 687 
The Gdansk Agreement between the workers and the regime was 
signed on Sunday 31 August 1980, the last day of the strike, when 
Father Jankowski again celebrated Holy Mass inside the Lenin 
Shipyard. The Agreement stipulated that "the government will ensure 
the transmission by radio of the Sunday Mass through a specific 
agreement with the church hierarchy. "' 688As a result, on Sunday 21 
September 1980, the first regular Holy Mass service since September 
1949 was broadcast on Poland's national radio. During the Mass, 
Bishop Jerzy Modzelewski called on his congregation to pray for 
church access to all mass media, not only radio. 689 
In the months that followed the Gdansk Agreement, the regime 
created obstacles to recognising the union's right to legally exist. Lay 
Catholic advisers and the Church fully supported Solidarity's effort to 
achieve legal status as a trade union independent of the Party-State. 
On Sunday 19 October 1980, Holy Mass services were held in support 
687 The Festival of Freedom on the Baltic Coast. 23 September 1980. From 
Keston File PO/ 12/11.1 PR 'Church and Solidarity' citing Keston News Service, 
No. 118,26 February, 198 1; Document B. 
688 As cited by Stokes (199 1 a: 207). 
689 International Herald Tribune, 22 September. 1980, p-2- 
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of Solidarity at Opolski Cathedral, PrzemyS'l Cathedral and Krakow's 
Wawel Cathedral and also in churches in the towns of Rzeszow, 
Jaroslaw and Przeworsk. The Holy Mass given at Opolski Cathedral 
by Bishop Adamiuk was attended by Solidarity trade unionists from 
about 500 workplaces in the region. 690 Bishop Tokarczuk celebrated 
the Mass at PrzemyS'l and RzeszOw with a reported 10,000 and 20,000 
respectively, attending. 69 1 The Mass at Wawel Cathedral was 
particularly symbolic as the Wawel evoked so many myths and 
symbols of national self-determination. 692 Some 5,000 attended, in 
what was reported as 'a bizarre cross between a Church service and a 
political rally', with Lech Walqsa, his supporters and Solidarity 
banners all featuring prominently. 
In November 1980, Solidarity was finally recognised by the regime as 
a legal trade union. It was, with its sister trade union Rural Solidarity 
which gained its legal status in May 198 1, the first and only such trade 
union that functioned, albeit briefly, legally and independently of a 
ruling communist Party. The subsequent months were ones of constant 
crisis and confrontation between Solidarity and the regime. The 
permanent atmosphere of crisis was considerably heightened by the 
Soviet Communist Party's clear disapproval of the emergence in 
Solidarity as a political force that, in its liberal demands, seriously 
690 From Keston File PO/11/1(1980) 'Church Involvement in Workers' Unrest: 
The Episcopate, the Pope, quoting Gog Niedzielny, 16 November, 1980. Se 
691 From Keston File PO/I 1/1 (1980) 'Church Involvement in Workers' Unrest: 
The Episcopate, the Pope', quoting Vatican in Polish; 22 December, 1980,1515 
GMT. 
692 From Keston File PO/ I I/ I (1980) * Church Involvement in Workers' Unrest: 
The Episcopate, the Pope' quoting Le Monde, 21 October, 1980. p. 3. 
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challenged the communist system and its monoply of power. As the 
Solidarity delegates began to arrive on 5 September 1981 for their first 
national congress, the Soviet Union began a nine-day massive naval 
and military exercise in the Baltic. The exercise was part of the 
incessant pressure that the CPSU was exerting on the Polish regime to 
crush Solidarity. The Solidarity congress proceedings were 
inaugurated by a Holy Mass concelebrated by the new Primate 
Glemp, 693 and two Gdansk bishops. Garton Ash described the scene 
that was resplendent with religious and national symbols: 
"Predictably, the symbolic politics ... were superb. From the 
moment when the electronic scoreboard lit up with the sign of the 
cross and the words Tolonia semperfidelis', while Walqsa rose 
to intone yet again 'Poland is not yet lost' and 'God who 
protects Poland the usually soulless Olivia sports hall was 
filled with the spirits of national martyrs. No chance was lost to 
demonstrate that here were the true heirs of the great tradition of 
Polish ideals. " 694 695 
Within weeks of the start of the congress, General Jaruzelski replaced 
Kania as the First Secretary of the Polish Party. Jaruzelski, the Soviets 
hoped, might succeed in the task at which Kania had failed, namely 
the removing of Solidarity ftom the political scene. 
It should be remembered that not all members and supporters of 
Solidarity were Catholics, and the political beliefs of these members 
and supporters ranged across a broad spectrum of liberal-leaning 
693 Wyszyfiski had died in May 198 1. 
694 Some English translations give 'Poland has not perished yet" rather than 
'Poland is not yet lost' for the first line of the National Anthem. 
695 Garton Ash (1999: 217). 
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perspectives of democracy. Yet, despite this, and despite Solidarity's 
strong identification with political Catholicism, Solidarity's members 
and supporters broadly stayed united during the 1980s. Just as the 
Holy Mass services of John Paul 11's pilgrimages had contributed to 
uniting differing strands of belief, so too did the Holy Masses 
supporting Solidarity. 
From the very first days of Martial Law in December 198 1, 
Popieluszko's Holy Masses for the Homeland attracted thousands 
from all over Poland, including non-believers. Milosz, commenting in 
1982 about the participation of non-believers in religious ceremonies, 
observed: 
"It would be a mistake to attribute this to political motives alone. 
'Religion' ... 
fulfils the function of being the only infallible 
referential system in a situation where mistrust is absolute and 
without exception. " 696 
Some half million Poles, believers and non-believers and practically 
all the leaders of the Polish opposition, attended Popieluszko's funeral 
and commemorative Mass. Primate Glemp and Walqsa addressed the 
crowds. 
Popieluszko had been a chaplain to the Saint Stanislaw Kostka 
Church, the local church to the major Warsaw Steelworks. An 
extremely popular priest, Popieluszko was well known for his support 
of Solidarity and for his deeply moving humanitarian homilies during 
his Masses for the Homeland. Popieluszko, and other pro-Solidarity 
696 Milosz (1982: 196). 
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priests, often with congregations from nearby large state enterprises 
known for their militancy and support for Solidarity, paid a high price 
for their support of Solidarity during its 1982-1988 period of illegality 
and for their patriotic Masses for the Homeland. In September 1984, 
Father Stanislaw Orzechowski who had also been celebrating Masses 
for the Homeland and devoting Holy Masses to political prisoners in 
Wroclaw, was interrogated and threatened. 697 A month later, in 
October 1984, Popieluszko was murdered by secret police. In the mid- 
1980s, another priest, Father Tadeusz Zalewski, the local priest to the 
Nowa Huta Steelworks, was interrogated by the police on numerous 
occasions and assaulted several times by 'unknown perpetrators', 
691 almost certainly the secret police. 
Just as they had during the strikes of 1980, Holy Mass services also 
played a key morale-enhancing and legitimising role in the spring and 
late-summer of 1988, when two waves of nation-wide strikes again 
erupted in Poland. Despite the strikes being nation-wide, again the 
greatest focus of media attention in 1988 was the Gdansk Lenin 
Shipyard. The first spring 1988 strike was towards the end of April 
1988, with the Lenin Shipyard striking from 2 to 10 May 1988. 
Alongside the usual regime-sponsored May Day celebrations, on I 
May 1988 there were unofficial May Day counter-celebrations under 
the slogan of solidarity with the strikers of the Nowa Huta Lenin 
697 1 lelsinki Watch (I 986b: 57). 
698 
Helsinki Watch (I 986b: 59). 
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Steelworks. 699 While Walqsa spoke after the I May Holy Mass at 
Saint Brigid's Church, the local church to the Lenin Shipyard, IW 
renowned for its support of Solidarity and popularly referred to as the 
'Solidarity church' , attacking ZOMO troops 
700 charged the church. 701 
On 4 May 1988, Father Tadeusz Zalewski held a Holy Mass at the 
striking Nowa Huta Steelworks. The following day, on 5 May 1988, 
ZOMO troops brutally crushed the Nowa Huta strike and also 
demolished Father Zalewski's altar. 702 When Father Zalewski 
informed foreign press correspondents of the pacification of the strike, 
the official Polish regime-controlled press responded with a 
slanderous campaign against the priest who, not for the first time, had 
experienced the unwelcome attention of the authorities. On 10 May 
1988, without a written agreement being reached, the Gdansk Lenin 
Shipyard strike ended. About one thousand strikers, with Walqsa to 
the fore, silently left the shipyard and headed for Saint Brigid's 
Church, where they took part in a service. 703 The spring 1988 strikes 
resulted in defeat for the workers, their mainly economic demands not 
granted. This first wave of strikes was led in the main by a new 
699 The Nowa Huta steelworkers were amongst the first to strike that spring and 
had been striking since 26 April 1988. The May Day counter-celebrations were 
held within eleven cities, with an estimated total of some 30,000 participating. 
(John Reed The May Day Demonstrations. Radio Free EuropeIRL Vol. 13, No. 
18,6 May, 1988, pp 17-19) as cited by Laun (2000). 
700 ZOMO troops were paramilitary riot troops, reserved for the most repressive 
actions. ZOMO is the Polish abbreviation for 'Motorised Detachments of the 
Citizens' Militia. ' 
701 Biemacki (2000: 157). 
702 Radio Free Europe Press Review15,4 July, 1988, p. 19 citing Wola, No. 
9(246)ý 9 May, 1988. 
703 Biemacki (2000: 160) and Janko)Nj4j 1996: 134). 
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generation of dissidents, many too young to have been involved in the 
Solidarity movement of 1980_1981.704 
The first of the late summer second wave of 1988 strikes was on the 
15 August, the Lenin Shipyard striking from 22 to 31 August 1988. 
This second wave of strikes was more influenced by Solidarity 
members active from 1980. The strikes were more politically 
motivated than the first wave and, included in the strikers' demands, 
was a call for the re-legalisation of Solidarity. On Sunday 28 August 
1988, hundreds of riot police stood by without intervening as several 
thousand Solidarity supporters rallied outside the Saint Brigid's 
Church. 705 On I September 1988, the Gdansk Shipyard strikes ended 
with the workers from the Northern Shipyard joining their Lenin 
Shipyard work-mates and together they headed for Saint Brigid's 
Church. 706 This second wave of strikes was more successful than the 
first and eventually led to the spring 1989 round table talks originally 
scheduled for October 1988. 
6.6 The Role Of Myths Of Sacred Omnipotent Saviours 
As previous chapters have shown, myths portraying God, Christ and 
the Black Madonna as sacred omnipotent saviours of Poland figured 
704 According to Solidarity activist Boguslaw Gol4b who helped organise the May 
1988 Gdansk Northern Shipyard strike about 90% of the strikers were youngsters 
who had had no direct experience of the 1980-1981 Solidarity-led strikes.. Gol4b 
(1996). 
705 The Times, 29 August, 1988, p. 6. 
706 
Biemacki (2000: 162). 
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significantly in Poland's pre-1918 and post-1939 struggle for national 
self-determination. These myths and associated symbols were to be 
deployed again by Solidarity in its struggle for popular sovereignty 
and national self-determination. The myth of God was mainly evoked 
via the singing of the God Who Protects Poland hymn. How the 
myths and symbols of Christ and the Black Madonna were evoked is 
now explored. 
Amongst the religious slogans daubed in the Lenin Shipyard in 
August 1980 were 'Jesus I trust you', and 'Suffering Queen of 
Poland, , 707 a reference to the Black Madonna. 708 A large painting of 
Jesus Christ and of the Black Madonna was displayed on one of the 
roofs of a Lenin Shipyard building during the August 1980 strike. 
Poems composed in the Lenin Shipyard during the August 1980 strike 
were memorised and recited or sung together with the poems of the 
nation's greatest poets. Thirty-eight of the strike poems were 
subsequently published. Six of these poems sought the ultimate 
justification for their struggle in religion and prayed for divine 
protection. Two of them praised the Black Madonna, 'the mother of 
the wretched. ' '09 
707 
Kubik (1994: 279-280). 
708 
The slogan 'God with us' was also to be seen. 
709 Kubik (1994: 190). 
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6.6.1 The Role of the Myth of Christ and of the Symbolism of His 
Cross 
The cross of Jesus, according to Kubik, was one of the most 
conspicuous symbols of the 1980 strike. 710 Within Christianity, the 
cross stands for Christ's sacrifice and symbolises the faith. In Poland, 
it acquired additional significance. From the early 1 9th century, the 
cross was a metaphor of national martyrdom and a symbol of Poland 
as a messiah of nations. Post-1945, the cross became a sign of 
defiance towards the communist regime and, to the 1980 striking 
shipyard workers, something even more meaningful. 711 One striking 
worker explained the significance of the symbolism of the cross thus: 
"'For the onlookers the cross was merely a relic two thousand 
years old and nothing more. For us, strikers, it was something 
much more because of our (unconscious) identification with 
Christ. We were ready to take the cross upon our own shoulders, 
the cross in the form of the caterpillar tracks of tanks, if it came 
to an assault on US. -)-)1 
712 
After the Sunday 17 August 1980 Holy Mass in the Lenin Shipyard, 
Walqsa carried a wooden cross out of the Main Gate to the spot where 
a monument to the workers that had died in 1970 was later to be 
erected. 713 In December 1980, there were commemorative 
ceremonies in Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin for the workers attacked 
710 Kubik (1994: 189). 
711 Kubik (1994: 189). 
712 
As cited by Kubik (1994: 189). 
713 Walqsa (1988: 58). 
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and killed ten years before to the day, in 1970. At the 16 December 
1980 Gdansk memorial several hundred thousand, including State, 
Party and Church dignitaries, assembled for a Holy Mass, at which a 
telegram from the Pope was read, and at which Walqsa, now 
Solidarity's official leader, spoke. Outside the Lenin Shipyard main 
gates, where the December 1980 Mass was held, now stood a new 
permanent memorial to the fallen workers at the spot where the 
wooden cross had been temporarily erected by Walqsa and the August 
1980 strikers. The new memorial comprised three very tall crosses, 
each bearing an anchor, a religious symbol of hope that originates 
from the time of the Partitions. Inscribed on the new memorial are 
words from Milosz: "You who harmed a simple man ... Do not 
feel 
secure, for a poet remembers. " There are also lines from Psalm 29 
from the Old Testament bible: "The Lord will give strength unto His 
people/The Lord will bless His people with peace. " These lines evoke 
the Old Testament myth of election which Milosz, through his 
translation from the Hebrew into Polish of the Old Testament Book of 
Job and the Book ofPsalms, had done much to keep alive. 714 
6.6.2 The Role of the Black Madonna Myth 
On the 20 August 1980, John Paul 11 sent an open letter to Wyszyn'ski. 
In it, he evoked the Black Madonna myth and linked this myth with 
the cause of the strikers and with liberal aspirations for social justice 
and human rights. 
714 It will be recalled that Milosz was the revered anti-communist 6migr6 Polish 
writer and poet, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in October 1980. 
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"'I pray with my heart that the Polish Episcopate led by its 
Primate (and supported by the trust in Her who is the defender of 
our country) may now again be able to help this people in its 
difficult task it is fulfilling for its daily bread, for social justice, 
and for the protection of the inviolable rights to its own life and 
development. ý9-)715 
On 24 August 1980, the Solidarity Strike News Sheet prominently 
displayed John Paul 11's 20 August 1980 open letter to Wyszyn'ski on 
716 its front page . 
6.6.3 Towards the Creation of New Myths of Sacred Omnipotent 
Saviours 
The August 1980 strikes, and the events leading to and following 
them, contributed in the following decades to a process of creating 
new myths. For example, the Lenin Shipyard strike of August 1980 
and the opposition roles of John Paul 11 and Walqsa now constitute 
part of post-1989 Polish political mythology. The new myth-making 
process illustrates the process of simplification and of convenient 
forgetting, so typical of all myth-making. 
During 1980-198 1, there were already many manifestations of John 
Paul 11 and Walqsa becoming cult figures. The Lenin Shipyard strike 
was of great political significance, but the August 1980 strikes were 
715 As cited by OR, I September, 1980, p-2. The part of the quote placed in 
brackets is from another source. viz. Keston File PO/12/11. IPR 'Church and 
Solidarity' quoting Solidarity Strike News Sheet, 24 August, 1980, p. 1. 
716 
Keston File PO/I 2/11.1 PR 'Church and Solidarity' quoting Solidarity Strike 
News Sheet, 24 August, 1980, p. 1. 
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not confined to one shipyard and were but a continuation of the 
numerous strikes that had erupted in July 1980 all over Poland 
following regime price increases introduced on the I July. The focus 
of world media attention and of the subsequent myth-making, 
however, was the strike in the Gdansk Lenin Shipyard, headed by 
Lech Walqsa, that lasted from 14 to 31 August 1980. The world- 
famous Gdansk Agreement of 31 August 1980 had, in fact, been 
preceded by a similar Szczecin Agreement of 30 August. 
Many Poles saw the opposition roles of John Paul 11 and Walqsa in 
terms of hero-saviour mythology. In the Lenin Shipyard during the 
August 1980 strike, for example, pictures of John Paul 11, surrounded 
by garlands, hung on the wire fencing of the Main gate next to the 
Polish flag. Adjacent to his image was a picture of the Black 
Madonna. During the August 1980 strikes, Father Jastak was 
inundated by thousands of People day and night around his 
Presbytery. The crowds were asking him for religious pictures, and for 
crosses and medals with the picture of the Black Madonna and/or of 
the Pope. 717 The Pope's face was to adom Solidarity badges. 718 
Alongside the traditional omnipotent saviours, God, Christ and the 
Virgin Mary, depicted in the 'strike poems' written in the Lenin 
Shipyard during the August 1980 strike, was a new saviour: John Paul 
11. On 31 August 1980, Walqsa used an outsized pen adorned with a 
portrait of the Pope to sign the historic Gdansk Agreement. 
717 WOjcicki (1999: 178). 
718 From Keston File PO/I 1/1 (1980) 'Church Involvement in Workers' Unrest: 
The Episcopate, the Pope' quoting Catholic Herald, 22 August, 1980; 'Polish 
strikers rally to Church. ' 
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Walýsa's leadership and Catholic faith inspired others to hero-worship 
him, as exemplified in a verse of an anonymous 1980 strike poet 
referring to the 1970 Gdan" sk strikers murdered by the regime: 
"'But their blood was not shed in vain 
Although we had to wait ten years 
Now we are led to the struggle 
We are led by Lech Walqsa"' 
719 
Amongst the letters sent during the 1980-1981 period to a Gdansk 
newspaper to praise Walqsa, one could read of the Solidarity leader: 
"'I am quite sure that the man who fights under the banner of the 
Cross and who approaches the Lord's Table often, that the man 
who carries the picture of Our Lady of Czqstochowa on his 
breast will triumph. He will triumph because history has been 
teaching us for twenty centuries that those who fought against the 
laws of God were vanquished. )-)-) 720 
During the 1980-1981 period, many likened Walqsa to Pan 
72 1 Wolodyjowski 
9 also known as the Little Knight. The Little Knight, 
which became Walqsa's nick-name, was the fictitious protagonist in 
Sienkiewicz's novel Pan Wolodyjowski (1888) in which, in portraying 
his protagonist's heroism and sufferings, Sienkiewicz implies a strong 
sense of Christian mission. 
719 As cited by Laun (2000). 
720 
As cited by Bqdkowski (1982: 156). 
721 For example, the Polish film director, Andrzej WaJdq. See Bqdkowski (1982: 
132 & 18 1). Both Pan Wolodyjowski and Walqsa sported moustaches and were 
considered impetuous, courageous and melancholy. but with a sense of humour. 
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6.7 The Role Of Political Catholicism In Influencing Solidarity's 
Leader 
During the 1980s, Walqsa dominated the Solidarity movement. 
Consequently, his own beliefs had a great impact on Solidarity 
members and supporters. The charismatic leader of the Solidarity 
movement clearly believed in the Church as a prime defender of the 
nation. Of the 1980 struggle to establish Solidarity, Walqsa said: 
"'Many people understood then that what the Church has been saying 
for two thousand years is the same thing as we are fighting for. "' 722 In 
the Autumn 1981, a time of grave national crisis, Walqsa, when 
addressing about 12,000 striking textile workers on the day before a 
one-hour nation-wide warning strike called by Solidarity, said: 
"'The Church should not get totally involved in our affairs, 
because if we lose, and we could, we must leave something 
behind ... The Church must always be with our nation. "' 
723 
Of the 1984 murder of Popieluszko, Walqsa said: 
"This tragedy has already borne fruit, for there were many ... 
who finally understood that Christian morality and Polish 
traditions were so deeply imbedded in our national identity that it 
was impossible to imagine a future without them. " 724 
722 
As cited by 134dkowski (1982: 103). 
723 From Keston File PO/11/1(1980) (sic) 'Church Involvement in Workers' 
Unrest: The Episcopate, the Pope' quoting The Tablet, 7 November. 198 1. 
724 
Walqsa (1988: 305-306). 
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As a result of the failure of the 1830-1831 National Uprising, many 
Poles were exiled in the West. In Tomes of the Polish Nation and the 
Polish Pilgrimage (1832), Mickiewicz told his fellow emigres to 
regard themselves as "'apostles among the idolaters', pilgrims of 
freedom, precursors of a new era of Christian politics in Europe. " 725 
Walqsa was to write of his 1980-1981 trips to the West in a way that 
harked back to the Bard's 1832 message: 
"There are some roads that Poles have used for centuries, on 
journeys or pilgrimages. I followed these same roads but not as a 
pauper seeking prosperity. ... I was coming to bear witness to our 
movement before the whole world. 11 726 
Walqsa was often to publicly acknowledge the critical role that his 
Catholic faith and values played in his political life, for example, in 
sustaining him at difficult times, in giving him hope and in adopting a 
non-violent approach to political change. Shortly after the August 
1980 strikes he said: 
"'I derive strength from faith, it's the motor of my life. 
During the strike, many people ... reminded themselves of the basic moral and ethical values with which they had been brought 
up. And that morality is sustained by the Church, which also 
spreads the truth. We lacked that truth at the time. Thus we 
sought it in God's word as proclaimed by the Church. igg 727 
725 Gomulka (1990: 46). 
726 Walqsa (1988: 164). 
727 WTK, 5 October, 1980 as cited by Bqdkowski (1982: 103). WTK was a 
Catholic weekly, published by Pax from 1953-198 1. 
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In mid-November 1980, Walqsa told a journalist: "'If I did not believe 
in God I would not be where I am today. iýi 
728 Speaking from the 
pulpit of Saint Brigid's Church a few days after Popiefuszko's murder 
in 1984, Walqsa said: 
"We've chosen non-violence. ... We 
disarm them by showing our 
strength in our places of work, and to show that we are strong 
when we are on our knees at prayer. ... We must find a Christian 
solution that avoids violence. " 729 
th Compared with other 20 century Polish primates, Wyszyn'ski was 
held in particularly high esteem. The Primate had gained significant 
moral and political legitimacy for refusing to accede to the demands 
of the Polish regime and swear a loyalty oath of allegiance to the 
communist state, for which act of defiance he was interned from 1953- 
1956. Wyszyn'ski was referred to popularly as 'the Primate of one 
thousand years'. From Walqsa's memoirs, it is clear that Walqsa also 
held Wyszyn"ski in high esteem and was influenced by his teachings. 
On Sunday, 7 September 1980, the newly constituted Solidarity 
Founding Committee leadership, some sixteen members led by 
Walqsa travelled to Warsaw for a private but well publicised meeting 
with Primate Wyszyn'ski. Walqsa wrote of the meeting: 
"'At last I was to meet, face-to-face, the man who personified the 
Polish church and who, as a prisoner of conscience for three 
years, had represented the principal link with the best of our 
living national traditions. ,, 730 
728 Keston File PO/11/1(1980) 'Church involvement in Workers' Unrest: The 
Episcopate, the Pope' quoting The Universe, 28 November, 1980. 
729 
Walqsa (1988: 303). 
730 
Walqsa (1988: 143). 
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In private conversation during their 7 September 1980 meeting, the 
Primate spoke to Walqsa about the Party leadership: 
"'It's not a question of wanting to change the leaders, it's they 
who must change. We must make sure ... that one gang of 
robbers doesn't steal the keys of the state treasury from another 
similar gang. What is at stake is the rebirth of man himself. )-)-) 
731 
With this conversation in mind, Walqsa recalled in 1988 that during 
the August 1980 strikes 
"we were showing such optimism, such faith in man by our 
openness and by the fact that everyone was being urged to 
'change themselves' - rather than 'be changed' by our actions. I 
felt close to the Primate on all these concerns. ýi 732 
As regards his 1980-1981 journeys to the West, Walqsa wrote: 
"throughout I kept in mind the view shared by Cardinal Wyszyn'ski 
that the key to these Polish problems lay in our own hands. " 
733 
As with many other Solidarity members and supporters, Walqsa often 
evoked the omnipotent saviour myths, not least the Black Madonna 
myth, in connection with Solidarity's struggle. During the August 
1980 strike, Walqsa was to be seen scattering little coloured cards of 
731 
As cited by Walqsa (1988: 143-144). 
732 Walqsa (1988: 144). 
733 
Walqsa (1988: 172). 
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the Black Madonna around the shipyard. 734 At moments of stress 
during the strike, Walqsa would momentarily escape from the 
pressures: "'I commended myself to the Virgin Mary. I commended to 
Her our destinies. This gave me courage and strength. 9ýý 735 On 31 
August 1980, Walqsa was wearing a Black Madonna badge 736 when 
signing the historic Gdansk Agreement. The badge was later to be 
replaced by a cotton patch stitched to the left lapel of his jacket that 
bore the face of the Black Madonna. After the August 1980 strike, 
Walqsa was to make a pilgrimage to the Black Madonna shrine at 
Jasna Gora, where he slept in the monastery. 737 There, at the 
monastery, he writes: I made my profession of faith to the Holy 
Mother. " 738 Explaining why the pilgrimage to Jasna Gora was 'so 
important'. Walqsa wrote: 
"The Primate himself has said: 'The heart of Poland beats there. ' 
So. if that was the heart of Poland, I had to go to it, to become 
one with that heart; I wanted the whole country to beat in time to 
its heartbeat. " 739 
After the August 1980 strikes, Walqsa put up a crucifix in his new 
Solidarity office. In his 1988 memoirs, his juxtaposition of sentences 
links a belief in God with the fight for popular sovereignty and 
734 Bqdkowski (1982: 7-8). 
735 As cited by Bqdkowski (1982: 66). 
736 Szajkowski (143: 98). 
737 Walqsa (1988: 5). 
738 Walqsa (1988: 173). 
739 
Walqsa (1988: 173). 
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national self-determination by approvingly quoting the words of 
Popieluszko: "'I see before me all of Poland. The true Poland that 
believes in God. A Poland that aspires to freedom and 
sovereignty. 
151740 
6.8 Conclusion: Solidarity's Deployment Of A Liberal Political 
Culture 
The chapter has shown how the myths, symbols and rituals of Pre- 
1945 nationalism and political Catholicism played a key role in 
creating a sense of solidarity, in enhancing the morale of Solidarity 
members and supporters, and in legitimising Solidarity's cause. The 
chapter has also indicated how these myths, symbols and rituals acted 
as vehicles of certain liberal values and in doing so helped foster the 
union's liberal outlook. Additional confirmation of this liberal outlook 
can be found in Solidarity's policies and actions during the 1980s. 741 
The chapter has also shown how the process of synthesis of 
nationalism and political Catholicism, initiated in the I gth century and 
considerably furthered post- 1945 by the preachings of Wyszyn" ski and 
John Paul 11, found practical expression within Solidarity. 
In evoking the myths and symbols associated with pre- 1945 
nationalism and political Catholicism, Solidarity often took its lead 
740 
Walqsa (1988: 305). 
741 For example, in Solidarity's Programme produced in October 198 1. the trade 
union called for fundamental reforms leading to a -permanent introduction of the 
principles of self-government, democracy, and pluralism. - As cited by Stokes 
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from the liberal-leaning preachings of Wyszyn'ski and of John Paul 11. 
Thus the Madonna myth was evoked in the cause of popular 
sovereignty and national-self determination. Thus, for example, the 
German and Russian/Soviet enemy myths were, on the whole, not 
used illiberally to engender hatred, but to signify that Poles once again 
wanted their national self-determination, freed of Russian/Soviet 
coercive hegemony. Thus, in the manner of John Paul 11, the meanings 
associated with the Gen-nan enemy myth were adapted to convey 
criticism of current Soviet domination of Poland. Moreover, the myths 
of military valour were used to remind the regime that, although 
Solidarity sought a peaceful path to popular sovereignty and national 
self-deten-nination, there were extreme situations when the physical 
force tradition was justified. 
Demonstrating the influence of political Catholicism upon the 
thinking, emotions and motivation of the workers who were to 
constitute the Solidarity movement is an inherently difficult task. 
Inevitably, one relies on outward manifestations such as actions taken, 
words spoken, symbols and rituals deployed, rather than inner 
manifestations of any such influence. From such outer manifestations 
it seems clear, however, that the political culture of members of 
Solidarity, not least its leader Walqsa., was greatly influenced by the 
pre-1945 myths, symbols and rituals of political Catholicism. These 
myths, symbols and rituals gave the workers a moral legitimacy. They 
also gave Solidarity members hope when situations seemed hopeless, 
and lent sufficient courage and sustenance to Solidarity members that 
(1991 a: 212). The issue of liberalism within the democratic opposition is returned 
to in Chapter 7. 
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they could stand up to, and oppose, the communist regime, a 
seemingly far more powerful adversary that could, in its monopoly of 
physical violence, call upon a vast array of repressive forces. Political 
Catholicism's teachings also helped shape the non-violent strategy 
that Solidarity adopted in its struggle with the regime. 
The liberal nationalism and liberal political Catholicism that Solidarity 
displayed during the 1980s were important constituents of its liberal 
political culture. The very name of the trade union was a declaration 
of Solidarity's liberal values, for the word Solidarity evokes the liberal 
ideal of solidarity/fraternity amongst fellow nationals. This ideal has 
also been identified by others as necessary for the building a true 
nation. For Renan (1996: 58), the nation is "the expression of a great 
solidarity, " while for Anderson (1991: 7), "the nation is conceived as 
a deep, horizontal comradeship. " 
Several observers of Solidarity's nationalism and political Catholicism 
alluded to their liberal nature. Thus, for example, Wenzel wrote of 
Solidarity's patriotism: 
"On the whole, this was 'positive, rather than 'negative' 
patriotism. It was a revival of traditions and symbols pushed 
aside earlier, and not a rebirth of aggressive nationalism. " 742 
The Polish critic and essayist Jelen'ski (1922-1987) declared of 
Solidarity: 
"There is nothing more Polish nor more Catholic than 
Solidarity's revolt: but it seems to me to be purified of the 
742 
Wenzel (1998: 142). 
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detestable elements present in the 'Pole equals catholic' 
syndrome. " 
743 
This current chapter marks the end of Parts I and 2 of the thesis. Parts 
I and 2 have, as heralded in Chapter 1, sought to achieve a better 
understanding of the role of the myths, symbols and rituals of pre- 
1945 Polish nationalism and political Catholicism in synthesising 
these belief systems and in transforming an illiberal political culture 
into a liberal political culture of opposition. It now remains in the 
following and final chapter to draw together the conclusions of the 
preceding chapters and to explore issues not raised or fully developed 
before. 
74; 
"- Jeleftski (1982: 183). 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this final chapter is to draw together the conclusions 
of the preceding chapters and make other conclusions of a broader 
nature. Two secondary aims are, briefly to explore the post- 
communist period in Poland in the light of two key related concerns of 
the thesis - namely the political role of myths and the liberalisation 
process - and to discuss the implications of this current research in 
terms of its achievements and limitations that would call for possible 
new research. 
7.2 The Role Of Pre-1945 Myths, Symbols And Rituals 
In essence, the thesis has argued that Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism, despite their illiberal pasts, were synthesised into a post- 
1945 liberal political culture of opposition supportive of 
democratisation, in large part thanks to the role of their pre-1945 
myths and their accompanying symbols and rituals. 
Chapter 2 argued that the pre-1945 genesis of the process of synthesis 
of Polish nationalism and Polish political Catholicism was aided by 
the sharing of common myths. These common myths, and in particular 
the Madonna myth, served both the aims of nationalism and of 
Catholicism and, in so doing, brought the two belief systems closer 
together. Chapter 2 also contended that the prevailing political culture 
of the Polish Second Republic was increasingly illiberal and that this 
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culture was significantly influenced by an illiberal Polish nationalism 
and an illiberal political Catholicism. Chapter 2 argued that the 
illiberal nationalism expressed itself partly in terms of a conspiratorial 
enemy mythology, deployed mainly against Jews and communists. 
The chapter also argued that the Polish Church hierarchy adopted the 
same mythology during the 1918-1939 period. Finally, Chapter 2 
identified certain pre-1945 myths associated with the proto-liberal 
strands within Polish nationalism and political Catholicism, and 
suggested that these might be the seeds of a post-1945 liberal political 
culture of opposition. 
Chapter I identified some of the key, often shared, characteristics and 
functions of myths, symbols and rituals and made the theoretical case 
that these characteristics and functions enabled myths, symbols and 
rituals to serve as vehicles for nationalist and political religious 
beliefs, values, and emotions, and thereby for political culture and for 
the political actions it induced. 
Chapters 3,5 and 6 presented empirical Polish evidence to make the 
practical case. In particular, these three chapters showed how the 
characteristics and functions had been politically exploited to serve as 
vehicles for a liberal political culture of opposition. The 
transcendental characteristic of myths, particularly Catholic ones, 
answered the moral, spiritual, psychological, and emotional needs of 
millions of Poles and gave Poles a sense of destiny by giving meaning 
to the past, present and future. The multivocal characteristic of myths 
and symbols enabled Poles to understand them in different ways, thus 
allowing Poles with differing approaches to liberal democracy to be 
united. The capability of the meanings attached to myths and symbols 
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to be altered enabled more modem liberal values to be attached to pre- 
1945 myths and symbols. More than that, it facilitated the changing of 
illiberal values to liberal ones and allowed a communist regime to 
foster non-communist values. The adaptive abilities related to the 
transmitting function of myths and symbols and enabled pre-1945 
myths and symbols to re-emerge post-1945 and carry new modem 
liberal interpretations of contemporary events. Their function of 
condensing meaning made it possible for pre-1945 myths and symbols 
to bring together diverse aspects of liberal democracy and embody 
them in a simplified form. The morale-enhancing function of myths, 
symbols and rituals gave confidence to the opposition under 
communism, helped them through periods of adversity and gave them 
hope in seemingly hopeless situations. The ability of myths, symbols, 
and particularly rituals to create a sense of solidarity within the 
opposition was a vital ingredient in the formation and sustenance of 
Solidarity. Moreover, because ritual is about common participation 
and emotional argument, rituals deployed by the opposition served to 
produce bonds of solidarity amongst Poles with differing approaches 
to liberal democracy, by transcending their ideological contexts. The 
effects of the motivating and mobilising functions of myths helped 
explain the scale and fortitude of the Polish opposition. The 
legitimising and explaining functions of myths and symbols served to 
strengthen the opposition's liberal democratic beliefs, and gave them a 
sense that right was on their side. The legitimising function of ritual 
and its ability to create solidarity encouraged the opposition to foster 
such rituals as pilgrimages, Holy Mass, annual commemorations, and 
protest- and hymn-singing, and thereby to utilise the legitimacy 
attached to such traditional forms and redirect this legitimacy to the 
struggle for modem liberal democracy. 
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Chapters 3,5 and 6 showed how - thanks to the characteristics and 
functions of myths and symbols - the associated pre-1945 political 
values were reinforced, extended and/or significantly changed. These 
chapters showed, for example, how the opposition transformed the 
communist and Soviet enemy myths into myths indicating an 
opposition to a political system rather than a hatred of others. 
Chapter 3, in showing how pre-1945 myths were deployed in 1945- 
1989 Poland, illustrated the relationship of myths with the dynamics 
of political culture and democratisation. Chapter 3 showed how myths 
were able to further the synthesis of nationalism and religion. It 
further showed how political culture could be transmitted over time 
and how political culture could be adapted to take on different values 
and yet retain the legitimacy of past tradition. Chapter 3 argued that 
the changing political culture of the opposition and the regime during 
the post-1945 period was reflected in their different uses of pre-1945 
myths. Both the opposition and the regime exploited the attributes of 
myths that engender political legitimacy and political potency and 
allow myths to extend and/or change their meanings. However, the 
opposition increasingly deployed the pre-1945 myths as vehicles of 
liberalism, while the regime, in its national non-communism, used 
them as vehicles of illiberalism. It was argued that changing attitudes 
to the Soviets, Germans and the Jews - as reflected by the ways in 
which the three associated enemy myths were adapted - shaped much 
of the development of 1945-1989 Polish nationalism and significantly 
impacted upon the course and outcome of the war of political 
legitimacy between the regime and the opposition. As the opposition 
discarded in part, or significantly changed, the meaning of these 
myths, so the regime maintained the illiberal values associated with 
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them. The result, Chapter 3 contended, was that the political culture of 
opposition became more liberal, while that of the regime, in fostering 
hatred of others, became more illiberal. 
Although the role of myths was not directly explored within Chapter 
4, the significance of the chapter to the overall concerns of the thesis 
is that it shed light on the 'how and why' of the emergence of a liberal 
political culture of opposition. It was left to the other Part 2 chapters 
to show how certain of the pre-1945 myths identified in Chapter 2 
fostered this liberal culture. Chapter 5 demonstrated how John Paul 11 
in large measure achieved his goal of fostering a liberal political 
culture of opposition by his deployment of the myths and 
accompanying symbols and rituals of Pre-1945 Polish nationalism and 
political Catholicism. Chapter 5 also showed how the process of 
synthesising Polish nationalism and political Catholicism reached a 
high point with the Pope's political preaching. It was argued that this 
synthesis was in large part due to his deployment of myths that served 
both the aims of liberal nationalism and liberal political Catholicism, 
and that this synthesis thereby contributed to the formation and 
fostering of a liberal political culture of opposition. Chapter 5 argued 
that, in his use of the past, in his use of a protest repertoire that 
highlighted the Madonna myth, and in his use of pastoral mobilisation, 
John Paul 11 kept alive key features of the Novena as used by Primate 
Wyszyn'ski. Furthermore, Chapter 5 contended that John Paul 11 
developed the repertoire of pre-1945 myths and their associated 
meanings to continue the liberalisation process started by Wyszyn'ski. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated how John Paul 11 was able to exploit the 
attributes of pre-1945 myths, symbols and rituals to foster a potent 
liberal political culture of opposition that constituted a serious 
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challenge to the regime's political culture. Chapter 5 contended that 
John Paul 11's political exploitation of mythology, symbolism and 
ritual was so effective during his 1979 pilgrimage, and the resulting 
sense of national solidarity so strong, that it was this pilgrimage rather 
than the advent of the political movement Solidarity, that proved to be 
the point of no return for Poland. Chapter 5 showed how the Polish 
Pope, through his 1979 deployment of myths, symbols and rituals, 
aided the continuing process of uniting dissident liberal-leaning 
Catholic and secular left intelligentsia. The national solidarity and 
liberal values engendered by the Pope, it was claimed, helped 
understand the emergence of Solidarity and the liberal road that it was 
to take. Finally, Chapter 5 argued that John Paul 11's post-1981 
deployment of pre-1945 myths, symbols and rituals helped explain 
how Solidarity's liberal flame was kept alive during the 1982-1988 
years of illegality. Chapter 6 showed how these myths and their 
associated symbols and rituals were to influence the non-intelligentsia 
component of the Polish opposition, that is to say, the workers of 
Solidarity, the main pillar of not only the opposition but also of 
Catholicism. Chapter 6 argued that the myths, symbols and rituals of 
pre-1945 nationalism and political Catholicism played a key role in 
creating a sense of solidarity and in enhancing the morale of Solidarity 
members and supporters, and in legitimising Solidarity's cause. The 
chapter also indicated how these myths, symbols and rituals acted as 
vehicles of Solidarity's liberalism and in so doing helped foster the 
union's liberal outlook. Furthermore, Chapter 6 showed how the 
process of synthesis of nationalism and political Catholicism found 
practical expression within Solidarity. Finally Chapter 6 contended 
that, in interpreting the myths and symbols associated with pre-1945 
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nationalism and political Catholicism, Solidarity often took its lead 
from the liberal-leaning preachings of Wyszyn'ski and of John Paul 11. 
The thesis has focused on the role of pre-1945 national and Catholic 
myths primarily because such myths help explain the emergence of a 
liberal political culture of opposition from illiberal starting points. The 
thesis has shown how these myths, given their characteristics and 
functions, proved a potent political force for the opposition in its 
struggle to achieve liberal democracy. Part of the political struggle 
within 1945-1989 Poland was a struggle over the competing 
communist and liberal democratic symbolic paradigms. The 
opposition's deployment of pre-1945 myths contributed to breaking 
the communist hegemony, to winning the war of political legitimacy 
and, in helping to change the prevailing political culture, to inducing 
millions of Poles to engage in political actions of opposition 
supportive of liberal democracy. 
7.3 Revisiting Some Of The Broader Issues 
Some of the broader issues initially raised in Chapter I can now be re- 
addressed in the light of the research undertaken. 
As one of the main contentions of the thesis is that pre- 1945 myths 
acted as a vehicle for a liberal political culture within the post- 1945 
democratic opposition, the issue of whether this opposition was indeed 
liberal is an important one. The thesis argues that sufficient evidence 
of its liberal political culture - including evidence relating to a belief 
in social justice, national solidarity, liberty, toleration, pluralistic 
democracy and respect for the individual - has been furnished. In so 
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arguing, the thesis disagrees with the contentions of Szacki and Ost as 
presented in Chapter I as to the extent of the limitations of liberalism 
within the pre-1989 opposition under communism. Specifically, this 
thesis disagrees with the implications of mere expediency contained in 
their contentions. Szacki and Ost's observations underestimate the 
influence of John XXIII, Vatican 11, Paul VI and John Paul 11 upon 
the Roman and Polish Catholic Church in their transformation of 
traditional socio-political teachings of Catholicism. Szacki and Ost 
also underestimate the influence of the Znak intelligentsia upon the 
Polish Church and its adherents. 744 Znak's propagation of the 
transformed papal Catholicism reflected many, but not all of the 
values of modem liberal democracy. 745 Chapter 4 argued that 
authentic and enduring attitudinal shifts occurred on both sides of the 
dialogue between dissident Catholic and secular left intelligentsia, and 
that the shifts went beyond mere expediency of fighting a common 
enemy. The dissident Polish Catholic and secular left intelligentsia 
who were engaged in the 1970s' dialogue honoured the liberal 
principles they espoused, as their subsequent post-communism actions 
have indicated. 746 
744 This influence was exerted, for example, through the Znak MPs and the actions 
of individual Znak members, via the Catholic Clubs of Intelligentsia and the Znak 
publishing media, and via Wojtyla who had close ties with the Krakow-based 
Znak intellectuals and who, as Pope, maintained these ties. 
745 Szacki and Ost's underestimation may be in part due to the ambiguous signals 
emanating from post-Vatican 11 Catholicism which became more liberal in the 
socio-political domain but retained many of its illiberal stances in the socio- 
religious field. This later illiberalism, is reflected, for example, in the intolerance 
still shown over gender and sexual politics. 
746 Although the opposition alliance between the workers and the intelligentsia 
collapsed post-1989, the collapse reflected a dispute essentially about 
personalities (Burdelski 1996); symbolised by the 1990 presidential conflict 
between the Catholic worker Walqsa and the Catholic intellectual Mazowiecki, 
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The opposition, as manifested in the early and late 1980s by the 
Solidarity-led movement, clearly comprised a wide coalition of 
political views. Socialist, nationalist and political Catholic views were 
constituent parts. Nevertheless, pro-trade union, nationalist and 
political Catholic collectivist views can also be consistent with liberal 
values, and socialist views that went beyond modern social democracy 
were in a minority. 147 There can be little doubt, however, that the 
predominant tendency within the Solidarity-led movement was a 
liberal democratic one. As Garton Ash rightly asserts (1999: 239) 
"Solidarity looked to existing liberal democracies and to Poland's 
own liberal and democratic traditions, rather than to any socialist 
utopia, for the blueprint of their own new political system. " 
What is more, even Szacki concurs with Ken Jowitt's view that 
"'Solidarity' is the most powerful and consequential liberal 
democratic revolution since the French Revolution. i, ý 
748 
rather than about class or ideology. The collapse did not detract from the change 
of heart and mind on the part of both dissident liberal Catholic and secular left 
intelligentsia. The bonds formed between people such as Kuron', Michnik, 
Kisielewski Jozefa Hennelowa and Mazowiecki, endured after 1989. Although 
devoid of a unifying common enemy, many liberal secular left and liberal 
Catholic intelligentsia are still to be found politically united within the Freedom 
Union (Uffý Party. All the aforementioned, bar Kisielewski, who died in 1991, 
had been UW MPs prior to the 2001 parliamentary elections. 
747 Solidarity's famous June 1989 electoral High Noon poster - see Biernacki 
(2000: 178) - depicting a US sheriff sporting a Solidarity badge and striding in 
front of the Solidarity emblem is hardly the symbolism of socialism. 
748 Ken Jowitt. The Leninist Extinction in The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline 
Qfthe Lýft: The Revolutions of 1989. Daniel Chirot (ed. ) Seattle University of 
Washington Press, 199 1, p. 77 as cited by Szacki (1995: 117). 
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The research has shown that neither Polish nationalism nor papal or 
Polish political Catholicism are inherently illiberal and that their 
associated myths may serve both the causes of liberalism and 
illiberalism. The research has highlighted, via an exploration of myths, 
symbols and rituals the role of nationalism and of 'political religion' 
and their relationship to the transformation of political culture. An 
underestimation by some observers identified in the review of 
literature in Chapter I of the part played by myths, symbols and rituals 
may well account for the underestimation of the roles of nationalism, 
of religion and of long-term factors within the democratisation 
process. The durability and political potency of the national and 
Catholic myths - attributes highlighted in the thesis - contributes to the 
relevance of long-term factors within the democratisation process. 
The research has shown how certain of these myths emerged in 
Poland during the period of state-building, how they were adapted to 
the cause of nation-building and of national-self determination during 
the period of partitions and then how they served the opposition and 
the cause of liberal democratisation under communism. The Madonna 
myth, for example, underwent such a transformation, as is highlighted 
later in this chapter. 
7.4 Post-1989: A Return To History? 
Political developments in post-communist Poland support two 
contentions of the thesis, namely that there was a successful 
liberalisation of the political culture of opposition, and that pre-1945 
myths and symbols serve as vehicles for both liberal and illiberal 
political cultures and hence, that long term 'myth factors' play a key 
part in contemporary politics. 
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Many different and sometimes conflicting forces have influenced 
Poland's post-1989 political culture. One is the Western liberal 
democratic influence, particularly as currently brought into focus in 
the form of coming to terms with the acquis communitaire 749 
necessary for Poland's European Union (EU) membership. Another is 
the influence of the condition of post-communism in the sense of a 
distinct society or mentality shaped by 1945-1989 communist 
legacies, 750 and there are also the rebirthlreturn to history influences 
of pre-1945 proto-liberal and illiberal legacies. 751 
In July 1989, diplomatic relations between Poland and the Vatican 
which were cut off in 1945, were restored. The same month also 
witnessed the inaugural sitting of the re-established upper house of 
parliament, the Senate, which had been abolished by the communists 
shortly after they came to power. Other symbolic signs of Poland's 
return to its pre-1945 history were quick to emerge after the collapse 
of Polish communism in 1989. In December 1989 the name of the 
Polish state was changed from the Polish Peoples' Republic to the 
Republic of Poland, a symbolic disassociation with proletarian 
dictatorship. In February 1990, the then state emblem, an uncrowned 
eagle, regained its crown. A month later, in April 1990, the date 
commemorating the liberal constitution of 1791 . the 3 
rd May, was 
declared a national holiday, in place of the 22 
nd jUly, which 
749 Acquis communitaire is the body of EU rules and regulations that aspiring EU 
members need to meet in order to accede to the Union. 
750 See Sch6pflin (1994 Chapter 10). 
751 
See Glenny (1993) and Michnik (1999). 
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commemorated the 1944 Manifesto of the communist-controlled 
Polish Committee for National Independence. The Senate, the 
Republic of Poland, the crowned eagle, and the 3 rd May national 
holiday, had all been well known and recognisable features of inter- 
war independent Poland. 
In the ensuing post-communist period, these restored symbolic signs 
were to have both liberal and illiberal values attached to them. On the 
whole, return to history tendencies have signified a respect for liberal 
values and the free market, rather than support for the prevailing 
illiberalism of the inter-war years. It is also contended that, despite 
difficulties, post-1999 Poland is essentially succeeding in the liberal 
democracy consolidation process. In this it has been helped by good 
economic growth in the 1990s, 752 membership of NATO, and a 
favourable response to its desire to join the EU. However, that is not 
to say that there have not been and there do not remain considerable 
consolidating problems. Recently, for example, there have been signs 
of a renaissance of an illiberal political culture. This illiberal political 
culture is significantly shaped by illiberal nationalism and illiberal 
political Catholicism. Although it is still only a marginal force, it is a 
growing one, and its fortunes seem related to the recent weakening of 
the Polish economy. It is associated mainly with two right-wing socio- 
political groupings, the Self-Defence of the Polish Republic 
(Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families (LPR), and with 
LPR's newspaper Nasz Dziennik and the influential Radio Maryja 
753 that actively supports the LPR . In a recent opinion poll of the 
752 
The Observer, 31 October, 1999. 
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strength of the parties, 
754 Samoobrona commanded 10% and LPR 
some 8% of the votes. 
755 These two groupings and the media that 
support them have evoked the pre-1945 myths mainly associated with 
the illiberalism of Dmowski. Chief amongst the enemy myths that 
have been evoked are the ones already encountered in this thesis: 
namely the German, 
756 
communist and Jewish enemy myths, as well 
as another conspiratorial enemy myth of the 1930s - the (Free) Mason 
enemy myth -a myth that was also sustained by numerous papal 
condemnations over the centuries. 
757 758 Furthermore, leading LPR 
753 Unsurprisingly, Samoobrona, LPR and Nasz Dziennik all incorporate national 
symbolism is the form of the Polish flag within their emblems. The LPR also 
deploys a second emblem namely the Polish emblem of the crowned eagle with 
the national colours in the background. The Electoral Action Solidarity (A WS) 
success in the 1997 parliamentary elections is partly attributed to the backing of 
Radio Maryja that has an estimated 4 million listeners. (Economist 2001a: 53). 
Radio Maryja resurrected the communist enemy myth which it directed at the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) during the 1997 and 2001 parliamentary and 
2000 presidential election campaigns. Befitting this illiberal deployment of the 
Madonna myth, Radio Maryja uses the 'Black' Madonna icon in its emblem with 
the Madonna's face now white. 
754 The opinion poll was published in March 2002. See Mazur (2002: 30). 
755 In contrast the two political groupings that may be seen as representing the 
interests of the Solidarity workers, AWS and the Catholic and secular left 
intelligentsia, UW, received, respectively, a mere 3% and 2% of the votes. 
756 See for example Hooper (2001: 1.13). 
757 Examples are the Pontifical Constitutions of Clement 11, In Eminenti (1738) 
and of Benedict XIV, Providas (175 1); the Encyclicals of Pius VII, Ecclesiam a 
desu-Cristo (1821), Leo XII's Quo Graviora (1825), Pius VIII's Traditi, and Leo 
X111's Humanum Genus (1884). In the 20th century Pius X, Benedict XV, Pius XI. 
and Pius XII have all specifically condemned Freemasonry. John Paul 11's 1983 
Code of Canon Law in revising the 1917 Code does not explicitly refer to 
Freemasonry, although the 1983 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
insisted that the Church was still opposed to Freemasonry. 
758 See for example the web pages of the journal Opoki w Kraju (Bedrocks in the 
Country) (http: //www. ciemnogrod. net/owk/) edited by Maciej Giertych, the leader 
of the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodoive) which is a component part of the 
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MP Macierewicz evokes the communist enemy myth by portraying 
the EU as a communist plot in which "the way to Moscow is through 
Brussels. , 759The individual targets for attack when the enemy myths 
are evoked post-1989 are often the same or similar people as those 
targeted pre-1989 by national non-communism, that is to say, the 
Catholic and secular left advisers to Solidarity, particularly those that 
belonged to KOR. 
7.5 Concluding Remarks: Implications Of The Research 
In this final section, the perceived strengths of the research are 
explored and the limitations of the research that call for further 
research are also discussed. 
7.5.1 What the Research Achieved 
At the outset of this research, the thesis stated its goal of seeking a 
better understanding of how and why Polish nationalism and political 
Catholicism, despite their illiberal pasts, were synthesised into a post- 
1945 political culture of opposition which was supportive of 
democratisation. It is contended that the thesis has achieved this goal. 
LPR. The Mason enemy myth in post- 1989 Poland is often linked to attacks upon 
the EU, capitalism and international finance. Just as other enemy myths have been 
merged together to give hybrid dual-enemy myths (for example the Jew- 
communist myth), post-1989 the Mason myth has been merged to give the Jew- 
Mason myth. See for example the Polish Dqfence League's web pages at 
http: //www. maloca. com/pdl. htm. 
759 Economist ( 2002b: 55). It should be noted that this is the same Macierewicz 
that co-founded KOR. 
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None of the four works discussed in Chapter 1 760 that explored the 
role of myths and/or symbols within Polish 1945-1989 politics 
approached the historic scope and depth of empirical evidence used in 
this thesis. More importantly, none of these works, looked at the role 
of pre-1945 myths as part of a dynamic process of the liberalisation 
of political culture. 
Thus, to take but one of the many myths analysed, the current research 
in exploring the political deployment of the Madonna myth, argued, in 
Chapter 2. that that during the 15 th_ I 8th century, the myth was evoked 
to portray the Black Madonna as Defender of the State and thereby 
developed political Catholicism's close ties with the state. Chapter 2 
went on to argue that increasingly during the I 9th century the myth 
was deployed not only as a symbolism of state, but as a Defender of 
the Nation against the partitioning powers, thus beginning to develop 
political Catholicism's close ties with Polish nationalism and the 
struggle for national self-determination. In Chapter 3, one saw during 
the post-1956 period, particularly during the Battle of the Second 
Millennium, how the Polish Church sought, via the deployment of the 
Madonna mythology, to strengthen political Catholicism's ties with 
nationalism and to highlight political Catholicism's role in saving and 
protecting the nation from the onslaughts of communism. Chapter 5 
demonstrated how John Paul 11 deployed the Madonna myth as a key 
symbol of an independent Poland, thereby highlighting the role of 
political Catholicism as a defender of Poland's national self- 
determination against Soviet coercive hegemony. It was also shown 
that John Paul 11, in following the example of Wyszyn'ski, was able 
760 Mach (1985), Plewa (1992), Kubik (1994) and Davies (200 1 b). 
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to successfully link the Madonna myth with the 3 May myth, thus 
emphasising political Catholicism's role in supporting the causes of 
popular sovereignty and of liberal reform. Chapter 6 presented 
arguments as to the political potency of the Madonna myth, and of the 
myth's ability to adapt to new political circumstances such as Martial 
Law, and serve as a vehicle for political messages when other 
alternatives were prohibited. The chapter explored how, for example, 
the Madonna myth was associated with the cause of the democratic 
opposition and used to attack the communist regime, how the myth 
was linked with the cause of Solidarity, with the concept of liberty and 
with a vision of a non-divided Europe. It was further contended that 
the myth gave hope and sustenance to many Solidarity members and 
supporters,, not least Solidarity's leader, Walqsa. Finally, Chapter 6 
showed how the Madonna myth was evoked by Solidarity in the 
liberal cause of popular sovereignty and national-self determination. 
The thesis also made a number of other claims which, it is suggested, 
have been justified. Chapter 3, identified a distinct non-communist 
strand of nationalism deployed systematically by the regime. This 
identification necessitates a reinterpretation of Polish regime 
nationalism as depicted solely by national communism. Chapter 4 
claimed to be a systematic examination of the 1970-1976 process of 
dialogue, and an exploration as to why the predominant pre-Solidarity 
opposition was a liberal-leaning one in Poland, rather than a more 
conservative national Catholic or populist one as in some other East 
European countries. Chapter 5 claimed to provide a systematic 
analysis of John Paul 11's deployment of pre-1945 national and 
Catholic myths, symbols and rituals during the 1978-1989 period in 
order to create and foster a liberal political culture of opposition 
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within Poland. Finally Chapter 6 claimed to explore systematically the 
Church's liberal influence upon Solidarity and the role of (liberal) 
nationalism upon the genesis and sustenance of Solidarity. 
7.5.2 Possible Areas of Further Research 
Although this research may have its achievements, like all research, it 
also has its limitations that call for possible new areas of research. 
The research made an assumption that a change in the Polish 
opposition political culture led to a change in political actions. This 
assumption and other Polish case issues relating to the current 
research, some mentioned below,, could be the focus of useful future 
research. 
Chapter I made a special-case argument for Poland and yet, at the 
same time, suggested that the role that universal myths played within 
the Polish democratisation process may have a bearing upon other 
CEE countries. Further comparative research may shed light onto this 
and onto the apparent contradiction that, if Poland was a special case 
why did democratisation occur at more or less the same time 
throughout Central and East Europe? 
If a key contention of this thesis - namely that nationalism and 
political Catholicism played an important role, in part thanks to pre- 
1945 myths, in the liberalisation of Polish opposition - is accepted, 
other related areas of new research suggest themselves. One such area 
relates to the issue as to why, in post-communist Poland. Christian 
Democracy is not a major political force and why the SLD, now the 
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home of choice of former communists, appears to have so successfully 
embraced a liberal political culture, albeit in a modem social 
democratic form. 
Other possible research areas relate to the pre-1989 period. Chapter I 
argued the case for a mono-country rather than comparative approach. 
it is recognised, however, that there are disadvantages of such an 
approach. Chapter I also argued that the thesis may contribute 
important insights into how the nationalisms and religions of other 
Central East European countries, despite also having illiberal pasts, 
were synthesised into post-1945 liberal political cultures of opposition 
supportive of democratisation. Using insights gained from this 
research into the role of national and Catholic myths within the 
democratisation process, it might well be useful to compare the Polish 
case with that of Hungary and Slovakia where political Catholicism is 
also relevant. In turn, the lessons learnt from the three Catholic 
countries could be compared with those of the Eastern part of 
Germany, where political Protestantism may well have been a factor 
in the pre- 1989 democratisation process. Chapter 3's identification of 
national non-communism suggests research into the nationalisms of 
other communist regimes to establish if the usual national 
communism designation is sufficient. Chapter 5 acknowledged that 
more research was needed to establish any causal relationship between 
John Paul 11's papal political Catholicism and the downfall of Polish 
and other East European communisms. 761 From a broader perspective, 
that acknowledgement indicates that future research into the 
relationship between Polish nationalism and political Catholicism and 
'61 Lecomte (1997), written in 199 1, represents an initial start within this area. 
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the demise of Polish communism would also be useful. Another 
related area of possible research would be the relationship between the 
collapse of Polish communism and of other East European 
communisms. Other related and even broader areas of possible 
research would be the relationship of other East European 
nationalisms and the role of their religions to the downfall of their 
communisms. Finally, one more area of possible research concerns the 
complex issue of whether the failure to predict the fall of CEE 
communism may partly be attributable to paradigms, influenced by 
Cold War perspectives, that over-estimated realpolitik forces and the 
international hegemony of two superpowers and underestimated 
seemingly non-realpolitik forces such as national and religious myths, 
symbols and rituals. 
As Davies (2001: 67) observed, "all myths serve a purpose. " As the 
purposes change, the myths are usually modified or sometimes new 
myths are created. Davies ponders whether in post-communist Poland 
the traditional myths can be revived or modified to match the new 
political circumstances. For example, Davies wonders if the 
antemurale myth might rise again as a result of Poland becoming a 
frontier zone of NATO or as a result of Russia renewing its ambitions 
to dominate Central Europe. He believes that the Catholic = True Pole 
myth and the Piast myth have little point in a mono-ethnic country 
whose frontiers are no longer under threat. However, as was shown in 
Part 2 chapters that covered 1945-1989 Poland, and as is being 
observed in post-communist Poland in the 21" century, mono- 
ethnicity did and does not prevent the deployment of the Catholic = 
True Pole myth or other related myths such as the Jewish enemy 
myth. An important aspect of myths is that people want to believe in 
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them, irrespective of whether they are rational or based on validated 
truths. One is forced to agree with Cassirer (1979: 246) when he 
argues that myth is a necessary factor, a fundamental element in the 
development of human culture, and that "man is not exclusively a 
rational animal. ... Myth is part and parcel of human nature" and that 
"in the critical moments of man's political and social life myth regains 
its old strength. " 
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